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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the position of women at work and in trade 
unions. The study focusses on a large electrical engineering company 
employing mainly women workers and examines how they fared in relation to 
the union at workplace and branch level.
Developing an understanding of the problems the women workers faced through 
detailed study of the employer's production strategies, it becomes clear 
that these issues do not appear in the collective bargaining framework. 
Despite the women's numerical superiority, the grievance procedure at higher 
levels was dominated by the male workers' problems and formal agreements 
consistently reflected their interests over and above those of the women. 
Most of the key positions in the local organisation were held by men and 
male workers were over-represented in the shop steward system.
Arguments are advanced to explain this which go beyond the usual explanations 
of women's distinctive (and historically sustained) patterns of union 
representation and involvement. Reconsidering the industrial relations 
orthodoxy, it is proposed that inequalities in bargaining strength and 
resources of men and women workers may be reinforced by the process and 
distributive effects of collective bargaining.
This is shown through detailed empirical study of members' problems and 
responses and shop stewards' grievance handling on the shopfloor. Disputes 
involving men and women workers are examined and the way negotiations 
were developed and concluded on issues such as pay, discipline, and movement 
of labour are analysed.
The conclusion is reached that collective bargaining has implications which 
are significant not only for the position of women workers in the 
workplace and union, but the shape and responsiveness of the institution's 
representational and bargaining structures as a whole
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Introduction
This study is concerned with exploring the problem of women's 
low levels of participation and involvement in trade unions.
In the 1970s this long-standing question had apparently out-lived 
its twin - their low levels of membership and difficulty of recruitment. 
Indeed, the dramatic growth of female unionisation - in some sectors 
especially - now highlighted a persistent and seemingly anachronistic 
pattern of women's under-representation at every level of union's 
organisational structure.
During the 1980s, in the face of a falling membership in general, 
the problems of recruitment are, again, being reposed for trade unions. 
But perhaps in respect of women, this can no longer be seen simply as a 
prior question to that of their "involvement". While the issue of 
women's participation was raised in the first instance, as a result of 
an obvious failure in terms of union policy to address their needs and 
interests, many unions discovered that to attempt to do so was the 
secret of recuitment and growth. (e.g. in banking, see Heritage (1983)). 
But the big question still remains for working women: with what effect? 
Table (i) Unions with largest increases in women's membership
1968
OOOs
1980
OOOs
Increase
OOOs
Per cent 
Increase
NUPE
NALGO
TGWU
USDAW
GMWU
COHSE
ASTMS
136.0
132.1 
194.7 
155.6 
199.9
38.9
461.2
355.8
342.8
290.3 
328.2 
164.5
85.9
165.0
160.0 
85. 1 
64.0
325.2
223.7 
148.1
134.7
128.3 
125.6
76.5
67.6
60.0
46.4
31.4
239 
169 
76 
86 
64 
3 73 
813 
69 
60 
119 
96
9.4
AUEW (Eng) 97.4
100.0
38.7
32.6
CPSA
APEX
BIFU
Source: TUC Statistics
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Table (ii) Women in the unions
Figures in brackets show how many women there would be if they were 
represented according to their share of the membership.
Executive Full-time TUC
Union Total
OOOs
F
OOOs
%F Members 
Total F
Officials Delegates 
Total F Total F
APEX (Professional Executive 
Clerical, Computer)
150 77 51 15 1 (8) 55 2(28) 15 4(8)
ASTMS (Technical,Managerial) 472 82 17 24 2(4) 63 6 (1 1 ) 30 3(5)
BIFU(Banking, Insurance 
Finance)
132 64 49 27 3(0 41 6 (20) 20 3(10)
GMWU(General & Municipal) 9 56 327 34 33 0 (1 1 ) 243 13(83) 73 3 (25)
NALGO(Local Govt Officers) 705 356 50 70 14(35) 165 11(83) 72 15(36)
NUPE (Public Employees 700 470 67 26 8(17) 150 7(101) 32 1 0 (22)
NUT (Teachers) 258 170 66 44 4(29) H O 17(73) 36 7(24)
NUTGW (Tailor & Garment) 117 108 92 15 5(14) 47 9(43) 17 7 (16)
TGWU (Transport & General) 2070 330 16 39 0 (6) 600 9 (96) 85 6(14)
USDAW (Shop, Distributive 
Allied
46 2 281 63 16 3(10) 162 13(102) 38 8(24)
TOTALS 6022 2265 38 309 40(147) 1636 90(640) 418 66(174)
All figures are approximate and the most recent that were available in 
November 1980.
Source: Coote and Kellner (1980)
Over three-quarters of women working full-time in manual jobs are 
still being paid less than the two-thirds of average-male-manual-earnings 
figure taken to define low pay. In 1982 just two equal pay cases heard 
by tribunals were successful (only 39 applications had been made). Women's 
pay relative to men's ceased to improve two years after the implementation 
of the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts in 1975 and has since fa . en 
back to nearly the same level it was then,despite our legendarily 'strong* 
trade union movement. The position in the UK is almost the worst in 
Europe; of all EEC countries only Eire and Luxembourg show a greater 
inequality between men and women's earnings.
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On questions of women's pay at least, trade unions have consistently
stated a preference for collective bargaining over legal enactment:
"We have always taken the view that the ut.». means 
to achieve equal pay is through collective bargaining 
and that the law shall only be used as a last resort 
when all else has failed."
GMWU (1977) quoted in Beale (1982) p.69
But collective bargaining appears to have failed as well.
To the growing body of women members active in their unions, it 
seemed they had had a lot more impact on their organisation's policies 
than these were having on their position in employment (Coote and Campbell 
(1982) and EOC (1983) pp.22-35). Even on such a 'commonplace' issue as 
maternity rights, for instance, fewer than half of the workplaces in a 
survey conducted via trade unions in 1983 reported having a negotiated 
agreement. (LRD (1983))
The problems of policy implementation have kept the question of women's 
under-representation in, and men's domination of, trade unions' decision­
making structures firmly on the agenda. And the emergent 'gap' between 
union policies and bargaining practices has begun to pose this even more 
sharply. Equal Pay was contradicted by negotiated improvements in 
differentials and the 'bread-winners' wage; job security, by agreements 
that part-timers (frequently in the same union) should 'go first'jand 
equal opportunities - by numerous union-backed work rules. (Campbell & 
Charlton (1978) and Ellis (1981) p.41). Policies to help workers with 
family responsibilities have given way in the face of men bargaining as, 
and for, breadwinners rather than fathers; and commitment to women's 
equality in general is denied by pin-ups in trade union offices and
journals.
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These contradictions have lent force to the view that there should be 
more women office-holders in trade unions to ensure that womens' voices 
are heard and their interests represented. Indeed positive action 
measure to increase women's involvement generally have gathered momentum 
in the movement as a whole. Arguments for these have been informed by 
the women members' experiences and their insistence on union platforms 
that the problems be addressed. They have also been backed up by 
investigations to identify the Vnain barriers to participation' such as 
that carried out by Jane Stageman (and a number of individual unions 
themselves e.g. NALGO).
While the picture of the obstacles which emerges from these studies 
is complex, most heavily stressed are the problems arising from women's 
domestic role and socialisation (lack of confidence etc); in the light of 
which,institutional features (such as inconveniently arranged meetings, 
hierarchy, jargon, rules and procedures) and male dominance are seen as 
particularly problematic.
The significance of women's domestic role in shaping their trade 
union involvement can scarcely be denied. It is reflected statistically 
in surveys which show for example that in 1980 one man in two, aged 25-34 
had a full-time job and belonged to a union - compared with one woman in 
20 in the same age range (Coote s. Kellner (1980) p.30). And it is expressed 
in demands for child-care facilities at union meetings and conferences, and 
for 'our brothers' to take their proper share of responsibility in the home.
The extent to which institutional features shape women's involvement 
in trade unions - independently, even,of these domestic commitments - 
is a question only more recently recognised. "For most women", Be*
Campbell comments "trade unions meet at the wrong time in the wrong place 
about the wrong things"i which-she might well have added - they deal with 
in "the wrong way". That the process of making trade union organisations 
more accessible and accountable to women involves changing not only 
'what', 'where*, 'when' and 'why', but also, crucially, 'how' things 
are done, clearly has implications which extend beyond this section 
of the membership alone. In the course of realising that it is not 
just a question of 'slotting women into the machinery' but of trans­
forming it, women trade unionists have been drawing on ideas and experience 
of democratic organisation and participative practice developed in the 
women's liberation movement. (See Stageman (1980), Beale (1982), Rowbotham 
(1979) .)
From this source too is derived a greater awareness of the degree
to which male domination of union structures shapes women's participation
within these. In contrast to other questions, the implications of men's
sexism are only just beginning to be addressed - and gingerly so:
"Some of the issues (...) have been discussed for some 
time - the problems of domestic commitments and meeting 
times, for example. But the points about male attitudes 
and women feeling intimidated have generally been swept 
under the carpet. Are they too dangerous? Will men 
be upset? They are real barriers to equality and need 
to be brought out into the open. It is important to 
listen to what women have to say about their own 
experiences.
Beale (1982) p.23.
Women in trade unions have begun to look more carefully at the old 
'explanation': - "women lack confidence". They have begun to ask - 
if/when men predominate, how does this affect women's (or anyone's) 
ability to participate? Is it just a matter of 'confidence'? Or 
are there particular obstacles facing women when they attempt to put 
their points across? Writers such as Dale Spender have opened up
fruitful avenues of discussion about men and women's different styles of 
communication which trade unionists of both sexes who are concerned 
with increasing participation and democracy in their organisations are 
finding useful; and the topic is, increasingly, incorporated into union 
education courses. (See Spender (1980) and Rowbotham (1979)).
We can see, therefore, that a number of problem areas are beginning
to be opened up around the question of women's continuing low levels of
participation and involvement in trade unions, partly because of the
consequences which we have identified. There are, all too often,
contradictions between union policies and bargaining practices in relation
to women, and there is a general and continuing low priority accorded
to their particular needs and interests. Despite their overwhelming 
in some unions,
numerical dominance/ women hold few decision-making positions in the 
organisational structure and this is seen as both cause and consequence 
of trade unions' lack of effectiveness in bargaining on behalf of their 
female membership.
However, the question of women's under-representation has mostly 
been addressed at levels of the organisation above the workplace. And, 
even here, changes in the machinery - such as reserved seats or special 
committees - have often been focussed on the upper echelons of the 
structure (where those involved have, of course, often been faced with 
considerable problems of isolation). The need to underpin these positions 
right down to the local level has been recognised as necessary for this 
representation to be both responsive and accountable and ther?lore effective. 
Thus, it is the problem of women's involvement at branch and workplace 
level which is ultimately the most crucial. And, in order to explain 
how the patterns of representation and involvement are generated in the 
first place and therefore threaten to persist, it is the level at which 
analysis has to begin.
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To the extent that many activists (men or women) in local trade 
union branches are ,or have been,shopstewards or representatives at their 
place of work - this is where the pattern of involvement and representation 
in the organisational structure is first formed. But what shapes it?
The question is made much more complex at workplace level because of 
the need to take account of the labour process. And, since we are 
also particularly interested in examining gender relationships, we need 
to see how these are constructed at this level as well - and, more 
importantly, with what effect.
The significance of job structure for trade union involvement is 
generally recognised, but little explored. As Valerie Ellis points 
out:
"Low participation in trade unions is not a phenomenon 
restricted to .women (...) Some groups of workers have 
a higher degree of participation and influence within 
unions than others. For example, from all the 
evidence available it would appear that skilled 
workers tend to be better organised, more involved, 
and more influential within unions than the less 
skilled."
Ellis (1981) p.19.
But we need to ask why? How? And, again - with what effect?
She concludes that:
"Insofar as women tend to be concentrated in the 
less skilled jobs that, rather than gender, 
may be at least part of the explanation of their 
lower degree of participation."
ibid p.19
But surely we need to ask why workers in less skilled jobs have 
less involvement and influence and why it is that women fill these 
positions? Without doing so, the above is no explanation at all - 
simply a description: and the argument is tautological. It is clear to
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us that, since gender divisions are as crucial in terms of job seg­
regation as they are for trade union participation/representation, 
it is essential to consider how they are all linked.
As Veronica Beechey has noted:
"Occupational segregation is a very important 
structural characteristic of women's work in 
contemporary Britain (...) and a major reason 
why the Equal Pay Act has proved virtually 
useless in rectifying inequalities between men 
and women. It seems likely too that occup­
ational segregation has had a major impact on 
women's relationship to trade unions, but very 
little work has been done on this to date."
Beechey (1983) p.40
This relationship is, moreover, a highly complex one, since it is
apparent that job structures are not only determining - in terms of
uneven patterns of union involvement and influence - but also, to a
degree, determined by these as well.
"Insofar as workers are acting defensively against 
the threat of substitution and competition, their 
most effective tactic is to differentiate themselves 
from potential competitors. Such protection through 
differentiation may be provided by various systems, 
from union organised apprenticeship schemes to 
promotion lines based on strict seniority provisions."
Rubery (1978) p.260.
Thus:
"Worker organisation has been shown to have played 
an important part in developing and shaping 
structured labour markets, but its own develop­
ment has been determined, in its turn, by changes 
in the employment structure."
ibid p.268
THE STUDY
This study is a detailed investigation of union organisation and 
collective bargaining in a large company (BSR) where the majority of the 
workers were women. All of the employees were in a trade union (the
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GMWU) and they were organised within a single branch. This is an 
examination and an attempted explanation of the patterns of repres­
entation and participation which had evolved after seven years of union­
isation. The analysis is concerned with the processes involved in 
shaping the men and women members' quite distinctive patterns of part­
icipation. And it is interesting to note in relation to this how^at 
this level of analysis,the significance of the three 'key areas' identified 
as crucial above: women's domestic responsibilities, institutional 
features and men's sexism, shift in terms of the extent to which they 
are primarily or immediately determining. For example, women's domestic 
commitments can certainly inhibit them from attending meetings out of 
working hours or conferences etc., away from home, and this may be 
directly important for the extent of their office-holding at higher 
levels of the organisation. But at workplace level the impact of 
these commitments is to some degree "controlled for" - home respon­
sibilities or not - the women are, at least, at work. But again it
is assumed that women do not take on the position of shopsteward (or 
act as 'unofficial' spokeswomen or 'stand-up' to management) primarily 
or solely "because of their domestic commitments." We would argue that 
the extent to which this may be the most direct or immediate reason needs 
to be examined. To say this is not at all to deny the significance of 
women's domestic role: "I already do two jobs - I'm a worker and a mother. 
Now you are saying I should do three jobs and be a shopsteward as well."(l) 
But we would suggest that there is a danger of "women's domestic commit­
ments" being made to bear so much direct or primary explanatory weight 
that the significance of the other "factors" affecting women's parti­
cipation are falsely minimised. Certainly, at the workplace, we found
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the significance of domestic commitments much more indirect - under­
pinning or structuring the women's position, in the light of which 
(perhaps) other 'factors’ - linked but not necessarily either wholly or 
directly reducible to this - were more immediate and primary. An 
example here is the role of the employer. In our analysis the employer's 
bargaining activity was fundamental in shaping the (men and) women 
workers' union involvement, and directly so. In most accounts of 
union structure however,employers tend to remain almost totally invisible(as in 
Lewenhak (1977) ) or have only a shadowy and 'indirect' presence (apart 
from when they are directly engaged in a dispute over union recognition).
The study began at a time when women in some unions were beginning 
to make their voices heard and to gain recognition for their demands 
within their own organisations. (In 1975 the TUC had adopted a version 
of the Wbrking women's Charter as a 'code' of bargaining aims for the 
movement). In common with many researchers, I suspect, my original 
aims were altered when my fieldwork - which took place over two years 
(1977-8) - began, and the reasons are relevant.
AIMS
The starting point of my research is that women are not usefully 
considered separately as a 'special category' of employee. They are 
workers who sell their labour power and enter relations of employment 
and the labour process under significantly different conditions to men.
What aro the implications of this?
In combining waged and domestic work in the way that they do, married 
women especially, bring into employment needs and demands shaped to an 
important degree by pressures outside the workplace. Increasingly, union 
policies might acknowledge this, but with what effect?
I hypothesised that the failure of trade unions to take up women's 
interests - distinctive because of the way they combine home-related and 
job-related aspects - was rooted in a disjuncture between these and the 
institutionalised patterns of collective bargaining already shaped by 
male workers along 'economistic lines' through their historical dominance 
of the organisational structures.
I¿therefore,considered that, in practice the most distinctive 
aspects of women's needs and demands would only be accommodated within 
the collective bargaining process and machinery with difficulty. Some 
of these issues would be more easily 'processed' and acted on than others. 
Perhaps those more specifically job-related would be taken up. But I 
was interested to discover what happened (and had been happening) to 
those 'other' needs and demands, constantly arising outside the workplace, 
but 'willy-nilly' brought into it because women workers - unlike men - 
do not have wives. I imagined that some process might take place 
whereby, in the normal course of job-related bargaining and grievance 
handling, some of these 'women's issues' would be progressed, but perhaps 
in a slightly 'translated* form (to make them 'fit' more appropriately).
For example, the demand for child-care facilities might be translated 
into agreements about 'time-off* or flexible hours) or demands for any 
of these - into more pay. Some issues, of course, might not be taken 
up at all, or simply fail.
I wanted to observe how this process might work, i.e. how 'women's 
demands' fared in the established bargaining channels - to what degree 
they succeeded, were distorted or failed. This would obviously have 
implications for both the ability and willingness of women workers to 
participate in trade unions. The nature and extent of their involve­
ment is clearly going to be connected to the degree to which they can 
progress those demands - which specifically arise from their position as 
wage labourers and domestic workers - via this Institution for advancing 
their interests.
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In a sense, this was, indeed, the process X observed and have 
analysed. But, needless to say, things were not quite as I had imagined. 
No "special" or progressive demands recognisably advancing the women 
workers' position by shaping employment to their needs were on the 
bargaining agenda - or even within a mile of it. More significantly, 
as far as the women (the overwhelming majority of workers in the company) 
were concerned, none of the 'usual' or 'expected' issues appeared to be 
on the agenda either.
The question I was studying was,therefore,shifted back a stage.
Naturally, in order to make 'advances' a sufficiently strong bargaining
position has first to be established through adequate defence. But
these workers seemed to have great difficulty in securing the most 
job
minimal level of/security, despite being employed in a highly profitable 
firm and being fully unionised. Why were they so weak? For sure, 
compared to the majority of trade unionists chronicalled and analysed 
in the field of Industrial Relations (but not, I suspect, compared to 
the majority of trade unionists) these members appeared peculiarly 
ineffective.
There are very few studies of women in the workplace. And in the 
few that exist there is little analysis of their position in relation to 
trade union organisation. But the picture, vivid in descriptive 
accounts such as that by Cavendish (1982), seems to confirm that
women workers feel themselves to be ineffective and in a number of respects 
appear to be rendered so. Pollert (1981) tried to explain the weakness, 
in trade union terms, of the women workers she studied - who she described
as being:
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"Stuck in a rut of fear - fear of lack of 
backing from the union, fear of lack of support 
from each other. The shopfloor was fragmented 
by mistrust and individualism...."
Pollert (1981) p.181
But apart from a short discussion of the pattern of representation ( the 
women's shopstewards were men who worked elsewhere; and the male workers 
were better represented proportionally ■ a "vicious circle of poor 
organisation, vulnerability and fear" is, again, better described than 
explained. The women "lacked the necessary level of co-operation and 
organisation." This study aims to ascertain both the level that is 
"necessary" and the reasons why it might not be attained.
THESIS STRUCTURE
A short resume' of the argument,content and findings is provided 
in the introduction to each Chapter and is not, therefore, reproduced 
here. Thereafter, the thesis is divided into three parts.
In the first, some theoretical and analytical issues are set out 
in the light of shortcomings identified in established approaches to 
the questions of women's low levels of unionisation, representation, 
organisation and bargaining in industrial relations literature.
In Part Two, the position of the women in the production process 
at BSR is examined in order to identify problems arising both within 
the workplace and outside it; and to see how these were linked.
A major tendency, as Sally Alexander has noted, of Investigations
into women's position is that they never probe beneath the surface
phenomena of inequality:
"Discimination and inequality are dealt with as 
they operate in the market place, but the world 
of social production is never investigated as a 
source of divisions and inequalities among the 
working class. Thus, technical innovation is
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mentioned as providing 'opportunities' for female 
employment; mechanization is held responsible for 
the 'feminization' of many jobs; women's 'dual 
role' is invoked as an explanation for the low- 
paid, part-time character of married women's work.
But the methods of work and payment, the division 
of labour and hierarchy of jobs - in other words, 
the relations of production and the labour process 
itself - are never carefully examined."
Herzog (1980) p.13 My emphasis.
We demonstrate how the relations of production and the labour 
process structure bargaining interests, relationships and opportunities. 
Some of these chapters are divided into two parts: the first outlining 
management's position and strategies: the second, examining these from 
the point of view of the women workers.
The relations of production and the labour process are themselves 
structured by the sexual division of labour. We look at the sexual 
differentiation of interests, problems and demands arising as a result 
of this. We compare the bargaining position - in terms of the strength, 
resources and opportunities available - of the men and the women workers, 
and most importantly, the nature of the relationship between them.
In Part Three we go on to examine the women workers' position in 
relation to the trade union on the shopfloor and at branch level. With 
unionisation,representational and bargaining structures were established - 
backed up by institutional strength and resources. However,we find that 
all these features are problematic from the women's point of view in 
terms of the problems established in Part Two -for reasons which do 
not stem either wholly or necessarily directly from characteristics of 
the workers involved or their sex per se. Rather,they appear to derive 
from the position of this group in terms of the relations of production 
and the labour process, inequalities in bargaining relationships, the 
nature of the institution and the representation/bargaining process itself.
The thesis is a sustained argument therefore¿against explanations
of women's position in trade unions (or anywhere else) which isolate the
subject and treat it as a separate and unitary category. We need to
have a view of the major sets of interests and relationships structuring
capital and labour, see that the working class is gendered, ask questions
about the implications of this for society's institutions, and analyse
the processes - in terms of both outcome and consequence - through which
changes are, or can,be made. Taking the point made by Sally Alexander
about the equality legislation:
"However desirable in themselves, the recommended 
reforms (where they have been introduced) leave 
untouched the place of women in social production."
Herzog (1980) p.15
We have examined the position of women in social production in order 
to ascertain the limits and possibilities of change through the established 
institutions of trade union organisation and collective bargaining.
Methods and problems of Research
Most of the material used in this thesis was gathered in two phases
over a period of two years 1977-8 in the manner set out below. I too,
found myself unable - as Helen Roberts had warned - to completely follow
the advice of Evans Pritchard to:
"behave like a gentleman, keep off the women, 
take quinine daily and play it by ear."
Roberts (1981) p.l.
NON-PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
For a period of six months between January and June 1977 I was 
permitted to spend between two and four days a week at the office of the 
*69 branch of the GMWU with the full-time branch administrative officer 
(hereafter referred to as the branch secretary). I was allowed to 
accompany her on regular visits to the BSR factories where she met with 
convenors, shopstewards and management in the course of her duties. I 
was also fortunate to be allowed to observe on numerous occasions,
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negotiations involving top management and the union's full-time regional 
organiser. I attended a branch meeting and a number of shopsteward meetings 
at factory and 'joint' factory level. I took copious notes and was 
allowed to copy some of the documents I was shown. This fieldwork 
came to an end when the annual wage claim was being negotiated and the 
company gave way to pressure from the membership to 'break' the social 
contract. This was a tricky period for the union officials as well 
because the union was committed to uphold the labour government's 
incomes policy.
INTERVIEWS
Research was resumed in October 1978. This time, based at one 
of the four factories (Stourbridge), I was given the use of a small 
room and allowed to interview the shopstewards, using a tape-recorder, 
during works time.
I had, initially prepared my questions and began to "try them out" 
during the summer at one of the other factories in the group. But 
there had been considerable changes in the domestic organisation there 
during the year's upheavals and the shopstewards, who were still finding 
their feet, decided they did not want to continue with the interview 
programme. There were no similar problems (so far as I was aware) at 
Stourbridge and the interviewing continued for several days each week 
over a three month period - ending in December 1978.
I was given a list of the shopstewards' names and prepared a pre­
interview questionnaire (see Appendix6)which asked for 'basic information', 
dates etc. This was distributed and collected by the convenor. It 
was useful from my point of view because it saved time in recording 
basic details and gave me a preview of the person I was to meet. It 
seemed to be useful for the shopstewards as well because they had more 
time to remember details and dates - for example, of their previous job
histories.
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Of the 19 female shopstewards listed, 16 were available and prepared 
to be interviewed, as were 6 of the 7 males (2). The procedure was 
for me to inform the personnel officer who I wanted to see and she 
would enquire whether or not they could be released from the shopflcor.
The shopsteward was then informed and made their way to the little "office". 
Occasionally, they were re-called and some interviews were taped over 
a period of several days. Some of the interviews lasted - in broken 
periods - over 4 hours. Most were around three hours long.
Although I followed the schedule as a guide it was not adhered 
to strictly. Nor did I adopt the position of 'simple questionner1, 
being prepared to enter discussions, answer questions and give opinions 
either when required or when clearly appropriate. (see Oakley (1981))
None of those interviewed objected to the tape-recorder (I always 
offered to take notes instead). But I found it rather off-putting 
myself and constructed a "tea-cosy" for the machine, so that it could 
be more easily ignored.
My questions covered three main areas, employment (from school 
onwards), union and home-life, but mostly concentrated on their own 
and their members' experience of the factory and the union. This was 
my main access to the position of the 'ordinary' members, since I did 
not live in the area and the workers were not available for interview 
in works time. (For the shopstewards, permission for time off had been 
given under "union-duties".)
One of the problems with chis research is ,therefore,that information 
about the members' problems is mainly derived through the shopstewards.
In one respect, at least, this may be less serious than it at first 
appears» because there had also been a considerable change-round at the
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factory in the previous year, when the long-standing convenor had resigned 
and many new shopstewards elected. Seven of the sixteen women inter­
viewed had been representatives for under twelve months and only one 
for more than five years. Of the men, four had been stewards for under 
two years and two for over five years. While the perspective of 
many of those interviewed might be expected (and did appear) to be 
'less institutional' as a result» it is also true that all of the shop- 
stewards had had at least two years length of service with the company, 
since this was a requirement for being nominated as a shopsteward in 
the first instance. They were therefore;a part of the 'stable core' 
of employees which will have coloured their perceptions. (Twelve of 
the women and four of the men had been with the company between six 
and nine years.)
Transcription of the tapes took many months (a real problem with 
this method). X reproduced them verbatim and in long-hand. I made 
detailed indexes of both the transcripts and my field-notes under a 
variety of "subject headings". A process which was a useful start to 
analysis. Whenever I have used quotes subsequently I have attached an 
index reference which allows these to be located on tape and in trans­
cripts or field-notes. This has saved so much time and trouble that 
I have retained the referencing in the thesis. It is meaningless for 
the reader and apologies are offered for the inconvenience,but any kind 
of check or follow-up would be almost impossible without such a system.
I have used a larqe numbe’ of quotations. They are utilised as 
a necessary part of the text in four main respects: first to convey 
information» secondly to illustrate - oc more strongly - demonstrate 
points» thirdly to support or confirm arguments (often at the same time, 
conveying complexity)» and finally, to initiate suggestions and open up 
lines of analysis for the reader - in much the same way as they have done
for me.
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In transcribing, I at first reproduced exactly what was on the 
tape. In using the guotes I realised this was unnecessary - some are 
reproduced in the text in this way (with dropped 'h's etc.). I would 
have preferred the time to write them out properly. Finally, to 
preserve confidentiality in respect of those whose unstinting generosity 
made this research possible - nearly all of the names have been changed.
- X X -
INTRODUCTION
Footnotes
(1) June (APEX) quoted in Beale (1982).
(2) I also tape-recorded a detailed discussion with the factory's 
production manager.

CHAPTER 1: WOMEN IN TRADE UNIONS AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DISCIPLINE
This study looks at the organisation of women in the union at 
workplace level and their involvement in collective bargaining.
There is not an abundance of literature on this subject, and rather 
than discuss the few studies which are available here, the aim, in 
this chapter, is to place this paucity of information and analysis 
within the broader context of industrial relations as an academic 
discipline in this country. It is, therefore, a "lack of 
literature" review, and an attempted explanation.
As it happens, the literature in the mainstream of industrial 
relations is not entirely silent on the issue of women in trade 
unions. Indeed it may be more accurate to say that their absence 
is less a consequence of being unconsciously over-looked, rather 
than a result of being (consciously) viewed in a particular kind 
of way. Not just in general, but, more importantly, in relation 
to whatever subject matter has been of major concern to industrial 
relations practitioners at different times in the post-war period.
The work of three such authors is, therefore, examined here. Their 
work has been, and remains, central in the field of industrial 
relations; the main interest of each reflects what has at some point 
grown to be the focus of strong,general political concern over the 
last thirty years.
George Bain is noted for his work on the question of trade
white-collar
union growth, the development of/unionisation and changing patterns 
of membership. Hugh Clegg, responsible for the Report of the 
Donovan Commission in 1968, has been a central figure in discussions 
about workplace organisation and the development of collective 
bargaining. John Hughes took an early interest in the question of
2trade union government and structure.
None of these authors has made the position of women in trade 
unions a particular focus of concern. Those who have done so 
may be viewed as exceptional; which may be all the more reason why 
work on the mainstream should be examined for whatever views/ 
explanations of the position of women which are offered. Moreover, 
all three of the authors chosen, recognise , in some degree, the 
problematic we are concerned to explore.
First , there is the slow and uneven development historically 
of proportions of women unionised. That is, their peculiar 
membership patterns which differ from those of men. Secondly, there 
is the persistent problem of women's slower and again, uneven, 
patterns of participation and representation within trade union 
structures.
The analysis offered by the authors whose work we are examining, 
both reflects and establishes the dominant (although by no means 
static) approach to, conception of, and explanation for these problems 
in the field of industrial relations. Before identifying the main 
elements of these, it may, to begin with, be worth noting two 
general features of the kind of approach, conception and explanation 
which can be found throughout the literature.
First, the approaches which are adopted. These tend to fall 
into two main groups: women are a problem when they do not join 
trade unions; and women are a problem when they do join trade unions. 
Unpromising as this might seem, interest in the literature examined 
here is justified because of the underlying recognition that women 
do have some kind of distinctive relationship to trade unions and the 
authors thereupon attempt to offer some kind of explanation for this.
A second general feature of the literature characterises the kind 
of explanations which are provided. Authors usually want to 
emphasize either woman-related features or job-related features 
or union-related features, and fashions in this have tended to change.
Women's low level of unionisation
American industrial relations practitioners who adopted a systems 
approach, began building models in earnest in the 1950's, in order 
to isolate the main factors which might appear to have a determining 
effect on whether trade unions "grew" or not. The context of this 
work was that the proportion of the unionised workforce in America 
was low and falling. This appeared to be related to massive changes 
in the structure of the economy, leading to changes in the occupational 
structure and in the composition of the labour force.
Women make a regular appearance in this literature and the issue
is nearly always presented in the same kind of way. This is a
typical example from Shister (1953):
"The sex of the relevant work group will 
influence their propensity both to organise 
and to stay organised. While the proportion 
of females 'permanently* in the labour market 
has been increasing, many women, if not most - 
look upon work experience as a temporary interlude 
between school and marriage or school and the 
rearing of a family. The problems they confront 
in the labour market, even though they may be 
serious, are viewed as temporary and transient 
matters. This entails indifference towards 
unionism. The large proportion of women in 
retailing for example, has certainly been one 
of the obstacles to any large-scale unionisation 
of this industry". p.421 (My emphasis).
The explanation given here, apart from its totally unsubstantiated 
generalisations and assumptions, is given in terms of women's attitudes
4and many other writers have contended that women are neither 
career-oriented nor hold strong attachment to the labour force 
and are therefore, highly resistant to union organising efforts.
But by the 1960's dependence upon this kind of explanation had 
become less fashionable and we begin to hear much more along the 
lines of Bernstein (1954) who explained the low unionisation of 
women in terms of "the jobs held by women in sales, service and 
office occupations, rather than their sex". This inclination to 
stress structural features of employment rather than attitudinal 
(normative) aspects of the workers has been the one adopted by 
George Bain who extended the American interest in union growth 
to Britain.
We can divide the body of Bain's early work in terms of two 
themesi White collar unionism and overall aspects of trade union 
development such as aggregate size, industrial coverage and 
membership density - particularly in relation to changing employment 
trends. The earlier worry in the context of the Donovan Commission - 
which assumed a close relationship between the trade unions on the 
one hand and the effectiveness of the Government and the country's 
economic performance on the other - was that the power and influence 
of the trade union movement may be in decline. Largely due to the 
shifting employment structure and changing composition of the labour 
force - away from strongly unionised and towards weakly unionised 
areas - the unions, it was feared, might become "the representatives 
of a declining industrial minority". McCarthy (1962). However, 
after 1968 there was a general resurgence and attention was switched 
to examining the "causes" and identifying the determinants of union 
growth, largely by establishing statistical correlations.
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5Two questions addressed in Bain's work are of interest to us 
here. First, is a high proportion of women in the workforce 
associated with a low level of unionisation? And secondly, what 
are the political implications of the growth of white collar 
unionism?
In respect of the first question, two papers may be mentioned: 
First, Bain and Price (1976) (which updates an earlier article 
Bain and Price (1972)), and second, Bain and Elsheikh (1979).
The first merely "charts" changes in female share of employment 
and increasing union membership and density with tables - but there 
is no discussion of the findings at all. In the second paper we 
have a regression analysis (but still no discussion) to test the 
proposition that the higher the proportion of women (especially 
married) in an industry, the lower the level of unionisation is 
likely to be (i.e.Shister's proposition, see above).
The results are equivocal, but do seem to suggest that there
definitely is some kind of effect due to sex. For in a discussion
about "age effect" and "sex effect", the authors state:
"Although females per se tend to have a 
negative effect on unionisation, age per se 
tends to have a positive impact, and ... 
the age effect may have cancelled out the sex 
effect". Bain & Elsheikh (1979).
and, further on:
"The negative impact of women upon the inter­
industry pattern of unionisation is less strong 
now than it was twenty years ago". Ibid .
So, presumably, it was there once and still exists. Once again a 
"depressing” effect on unionisation associated with women has been 
found. How is it to be explained?
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6It is in the work on white collar unionism, Bain (1970), that
we find the most discussion of women and unionisation in the section
headed SEX in Chapter IV. Sex is considered as a factor which
could help to explain the "pattern of white collar unionism".
The issue is important for analysts concerned to draw out the
political implications of shifts in the composition of the organised
sectors of the labour movement, thus interest had already been shown
in the question (problem) of women. Blackburn (1967) had suggested
that characteristics of female employment, for example, the
discontinuity and supplementary nature of their earnings, reduced
women's "commitment" to work, thereby increasing their indifference
to trade unionism. Lockwood (1958) on the other hand, disagreed
with the conclusion that it was the sex ratio which caused differences
in degree of unionisation:
"Clearly, the factor of sex is of relatively 
small importance among the conditions affecting 
unionisation. In other words, the differences 
between different types of clerical employment 
are much more significant than differences in 
their sex composition", p.153 .
Bain joins in the debate, but sits on the fence in relation to 
these conclusions.
"Lockwood's findings are sufficient to indicate 
the inadequacy of generalisations about women 
having a dampening effect on the level of 
unionisation, but they are not sufficient to 
discount his argument completely". Bain(1970) 
p.40 (my emphasis). '
Because, says Bain, "It is common knowledge that the density of 
unionisation is much less among women than among men ... There 
is a correlation between low union density and a high proportion 
of women among white collar workers in manufacturing industries'*
(ibid, p.41). How does he explain this? Providing evidence
that Lockwood was short of, Bain accounts for differences in
the degree of unionisation associated with sex in terms of the
different patterns of male and female employment across industries
and firms. Smaller firms and industries with low employment
concentrations are associated with lower unionisation and proportional
more women just happen to be employed in these areas. He concludes:
"Density of unionisation and proportion of women 
have no significant connection with each other 
except through their separate relationships 
to a third variable, the degree of employment 
concentration". Ibid p.43 .
The problem with this analysis is that while Bain's results
tend to show there is an independent "sex effect", his conclusions
say there is not. (i.e. that it has nothing to do with the fact
that they are women, it is to do with where they are employed).
Bain is able to come to a comfortable conclusion which manages to
fall in line with both the TUC ^  and modern thinking on women:
"Female employees appear to have no inherent 
characteristics which make them more difficult 
to unionise than men, or, at least, if they 
have, unions have been able to overcome them".
Ibid p.43 .
Overall, we find the weight of Bain's explanation of the pattern 
of female membership of trade unions, specifically the density 
or degree of unionisation, is couched in terms of certain job or 
employment characteristics which can be associated with "propensity 
to unionise", rather than characteristics inherently associated with 
thp job-holders themselves. One could argue that this 
"explanation" raises many more questions than it answers.
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Fbr example: what are the relationships between the 
different features selected? Why are women in these sort of jobs?
Why are these jobs badly organised? And, ultimately, there does 
seem to be a "sex effect" which shows up in these correlations, 
whether one likes it or not. But the way the analysis is presented,
these results are passed over, and we are left to conclude that 
there are really no distinctive aspects which relate specifically 
to women which remain and therefore need to be examined. This 
is of crucial importance from our point of view, but it is also 
significant in terms of Bain's own problematic which is concerned 
with the political implications of the changing composition of 
organised labour. There is a suggestion that sex-differences 
have no "real effect" at all. So the question of whether or not 
the increasing female membership and density, noted in Bain & Price 
(1976), could have any implications for the trade union movement, 
is never raised.
Finally, if we are directed to examine employment or job-related 
features alone, those who are looking at the position of women 
are left with a problem, because of course, by now the women have 
totally disappeared. They're still not in the unions, and now they're 
not in the analysis either. But if the women appear merely to 
disappear from the analysis of George Bain,they hardly seem to appear 
at all in the work of Hugh Clegg.
Women's low level of organisation and bargaining
The work of Hugh Clegg is of particular interest in relation 
to the approach to women in trade unions because his standard textbook 
has been recently revised and there are notable differences between
the last two editions. The analysis provided in Clegg (1972),
"The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain" is thus 
compared with that which is found in Clegg (1980), "The 
Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain".
A further reason for examining this author's works is his 
particular interest in the workplace and the initial stages of 
union organisation. Both books are structured in terms of an 
implicit model of trade unionism, whereby the work group is 
constituted as both the basic unit and the initial stage of a 
process which culminates in the formation and membership of a 
trade union at a later (and more mature?) stage. According to the 
model, collective activity of an informal and spontaneous kind 
(such as that investigated in the Hawthorne studies), first takes 
place in this work group context. This gives way to"planned 
collective activity" (Clegg (1972) p.27), and from here, the 
development/joining of the institution proper. This would appear 
to be a useful starting point for examining sex-differences in 
unionisation. Since the 1972 edition presents more information 
about this, than that of 1980, our discussion draws on the 
"unrevised" analysis first.
It is apparent that for Clegg, sex differences are significant
from the earliest stage. Following the conclusions of the Hawthorne
studies (rather uncritically), women are seen as not susceptible
to informal collective activity. Following on from this,for
this author, therefore, women comprise a category which is "not
predisposed to planned collective activity". (Ibid p.27).
"In most factories of any size it seems 
that one or more groups have a reputation for 
sustained activity in the industrial relations
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field, while others are considered 
quiescent. Generally it seems that work 
group activity is much lower among women 
and white collar employees than among male 
manual workers". Ibid p.26 .
To substantiate this, Clegg cites Lupton (1963). But it
should be noted that Lupton himself was careful not to draw such
general conclusions from it:
"It would be necessary, in each case, to 
examine the structure and traditions of the 
industry in which they are working".
Lupton (1963) p.92 . (2)
Clegg also outlines a notion of strike proneness to substantiate 
his thesis:
"If the number of unofficial strikes were 
taken as an index of work group action 
(on the assumption that official strikes are 
evidence of formal trade union activity), then 
women and white collar employees strike much 
less frequently than male manual workers".
Clegg (1972) p.26.
Of this, we might note: that the "index" may not be the best nor 
the only one to use; the "assumption" is certainly dubious; and 
the subsequent generalisation, even if it follows, is not backed 
by evidence or references. ^
To explain his proposition, Clegg mostly depends on Sayles (1963)
quoting from this paragraph in Sayles' book:
"....  low prestige jobs are likely to contain
larger than proportionate shares of young 
newcomers, low seniority employees, persons 
marking time until seniority brings them 
promotion, unambitious individuals, and workers 
who intend to remain only until they can find 
better jobs. Employees of these types do not 
exert vigorous pressure for the improvement of 
their working conditions", p.55 .
Again, it should be noted, Clegg does not use the final sentence
found in this quotation, he substitutes his own conclusions, thus:
"Such groups are not predisposed to planned 
collective activity". He goes on, "Because 
women are concentrated in lower grades, tend 
to be less career-minded than men, and have 
a considerably higher rate of turnover than men, 
work groups of women are more likely than
groups of men to come into this category", p.27. (My emphasis)
While it is clearly tenable to locate the position of women in 
terms of the environmental features identified by Sayles as 
significant, we are again forced to note that Sayles was (also) 
reluctant to assert these general conclusions about the differences
between male and female work groups - that Clegg was now using him
>1 " to prove:
"Nevertheless, those female groups that we expected, 
on the basis of other criteria, to produce 
high activity, often fulfilled the prediction". 
Sayles (1963) p.68 .
Apart from the passage on women quoted from Clegg (1972) 
above, which contains elements of both attitudinal and structural 
environmental factors (but with no indication of how these might be 
related), there are only a few brief snippets we can glean from 
Clegg which might "explain" such a notable difference between women 
and men in trade unions. He mentions, for example, apprenticeship 
which affects few women, but which "offers especially favourable 
conditions for indoctrination in group values". (Ibid p.30).
Also:
"the presence of trade unions" which "promote 
collective action, so trade union membership 
may both indicate belief in solidarity and help 
to strengthen it". Ibid p.29 .
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Noting that almost twice as many men are in trade unions than 
women, he concludes, irresistibly, that "these figures help to 
explain the relatively low level of group activity among white 
collar employees and women". (Ibid p.29). This, in the absence 
of any other discussion, has every appearance of being circular.
In terms of the basic model, therefore, the position of 
women is identified as distinctive, although the distinctions are 
designated negative and (therefore?) neither explained nor explored. 
Clegg's work on the development of collective bargaining is 
however,further elaborated in terms of two major themes, namely 
the formal and informal system. What is the position of women in 
regard to these?
The development of the informal system is seen as central to 
the growth of domestic plant bargaining, of such importance in the 
1960's - 1970's. Two areas were early identified as crucial to 
such developments, namely problems of overtime and payment by results 
systems. Unfortunately women workers are not considered significant 
in either respects
"Overtime is a male habit"(ibid p.183) and 
since women"work less overtime, then they are 
less likely to exercise work group control over 
the amount and distribution of overtime earnings".
Ibid p. 27 .
Can we assume they would if they did? And,quoting the conclusions 
of the NBPI Report No. 65, "PBR systems"(May 1968) , Clegg declares
that there is:
"a marked difference between men and women in 
the readiness to haggle over job values, on which 
women appear to have accepted the results of work 
measurement as 'correct' and tend not to bargain 
over times and prices". Ibid pp.266-7 . (4)
13
This is despite studies which show the contrary Lupton (1963), 
Cunnison, (1966), Brown (1973).
The consequence of all this is that in the Donovan Report 
which was centrally concerned with the informal system, the only 
specific reference to women is not in the context of trade unions 
at all, but appears in Chapter VI "The Efficient use of Manpower" 
(sic) Donovan (1968)a .
What can be learned from Clegg's study of the formal system? 
The lower, slower, and "weaker" unionisation of women is simply 
noted as a fact:
"Women are not so well organised as men.
About half of male employees in Britain are 
in unions, but rather less than one female 
employee in four. This helps to explain 
the poor performance of distribution, catering 
and domestic service, all of which are 
predominantly women's industries".
Clegg (1972) p.61 .
And as for their participation in trade union government, he notes
in his study Trade Union Officers:
"The proportion of women in each group 
(of officials )is, of course, far below the 
share of women in total trade union membership".
Clegg (1961) p.33 . (My emphasis).
No other comment is appended to this, until finally some lOO pages 
later, we find:
"Women are notoriously less trade union 
minded than men". Ibid p.130 .
Clearly, we have a series of problems here which stand in little
danger of receiving an explanation. Overall, in Clegg's work
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women are given very little attention at all. Where women
are mentioned, however, we are given to understand that it is their 
work group behaviour which has first to be explained in order for 
us to comprehend their lack of progress in trade unionism.
Perhaps it is worth mentioning here that the lack of analysis in 
this work does not appear to invalidate the importance of utilising 
a non-institutional focus - since it could be argued that if Clegg 
had not started from this point himself (that is the work group, 
rather than the union), he would never have "seen" women at all.
The "explanations" Clegg does provide (up to 1980) to explain the 
position of women utilises a mixture of both characteristics 
inherent to women as a sex (for example, less career minded, trade 
union minded, etc.); and characteristics of their employment situation 
(for example, size of work group). But there is no indication of 
whether, or how, these aspects might be related.
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Clegg's work 
discussed above, is the view he gives us of the power of stereotypes. 
On at least two occasions stereotypical assertions were being re­
constructed, ironically enough, on the basis of works which did, 
in fact, show a few signs of trying to escape from their own 
stereotypical foundations.
However, in the revised version, Clegg (1980), these discussions 
have been removed altogether. The edition has been brought up to 
date, in order to take account of the vast changes which have 
taken place over the past ten years - this indeed is reflected 
in the book's new title. We might note that during this period 
women have been central to some of the most important changes.
They are the subject of trade union growth - the influx of female
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membership changing the balance of relations between unions 
as well as within them, and they are also the subject of much 
employment legislation burgeoning at this time.
It is curious, therefore, to find that despite this and 
the increasing amount of literature available on women workers, 
there are even fewer references to women in this book than in the 
previous edition. Whereas twenty one items were indexed in 1972, 
in 1980 there are only nine, and three of these refer to new 
legislation.
There appear to be two reasons for the change: a deliberate 
decision to remove explicit assertions about women from the text, 
and the use of new sources which fail to problématisé the position 
of women. Examples of this last reason include the extensive 
use of studies by Batstone (1977) and Brown (1973) and Brown (1978), 
(while Lupton has been dropped entirely). Both of the former 
are primarily concerned with male workers and the authors ignore 
the possible implications of gender difference in their work. Thus on 
the subject of workplace organisation and quoting from a study 
based on questionnaires to shop stewards (which failed to ask the 
sex of the respondents), we find the comfortable assertion from 
Clegg that:
"One finding of Brown and his colleagues which 
compounds much that has been said about women 
in trade unions is that, although their survey 
discovered a lower level of shop steward 
organisation and activity where the labour force 
included women as well as men, the relationship 
is slight. Some predominantly female workforces ... 
had steward organisations quite as sophisticated 
as the average predominantly male ones with 
comparably sized workforces". Clegg (1980) p.49.
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And where, in the previous edition, points about women were made 
explicitly now we may well find precisely the same sources 
referred to and even quoted, but they are cited in a rather 
different way and all explicit reference to sex differences have 
been removed from the discussion. (See, for example, the use of 
Saylesf bargaining typologies, ibid p.55).
In some respects this refusal to problematise gender 
difference is quite surprising given the interest of industrial 
relations practitioners in analysing the political implications of 
the changing composition of the labour force and the increasing 
impact of this on the labour movement. Over the last twenty 
years there has been a shifting balance in relations between the 
different unions - with white collar and public sector unions 
gaining increasing prominence in the TUC. There have also been 
significant changes in the balance/proportions of different 
membership groups, male/female, white collar and manual within 
individual unions. It was women workers who constituted the major 
source of this union change and growth, and it was not long before 
the focus of the problem had started to shift - from their low levels 
of unionisation to their low levels of participation and representation 
within the organisational structures. The underlying assumptions 
of John Hughes, for example, analysing trade union structure and 
government in 1968 were, certainly, that sex differences had 
significance. And it is interesting to see why the low representation 
of women in trade unions had begun to attract attention at this 
time and what kinds of explanation were offered for it.
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Women's low level of participation and representation
If there was any possibility that the changing composition
of trade union membership might have implications for unions'
"political behaviour", it is easy to see why this was of interest
to those industrial relations practitioners who recognised the
significance of developing links between the trade unions and the
Government. Once trade union leaders became party to making
Government economic policies work, the internal affairs of the
unions - such matters as representation, participation, integration
and control over the membership - (in other words the subject of
trade union democracy) was clearly on the agenda. John Hughes
puts the matter clearly:
"The main reasons for stressing the importance 
of membership participation might be listed 
as follows: unions have continually to commit 
themselves to policy initiatives”. Hughes 
(1968) p.5.
(Hughes, as will subsequently become clear, is not referring here
to the policy initiatives of the membership, and by "unions"
he is only referring to the leadership.)
'• ... not only industrially but also in social and 
political affairs. Much of the time these will 
be contested from one direction or another; 
the union may find itself going against the stream.
The influence and pressure that the union can 
bring to bear is very directly related to its 
REPRESENTATIVE character, to the extent to which its 
actions and demands are known to represent the 
felt interest and active concern of its members.
It carries less conviction in its representative 
role if its initiatives are merely passively 
acquiesced in by its members or are not even 
communicated to or understood by many of them.
For trade union action to be effective, there has 
to be an active process of IDENTIFICATION by the 
members concerned with the means and ends proposed ... 
Effective action by a trade union necessarily 
requires also a measure of discipline. But if 
conformity is required, and minorities coerced, the 
democratic basis of union decisions has to be 
clearly in evidence for union action to retain
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any moral force. A continuing process of 
membership participation can help minimise 
the number of occasions on which members feel 
the action prescribed by the union as an 
external imposition upon them". Ibid p.5
(emphasis in original in upper case. Otherwise my emphasis)
Apart from this need for the close incorporation of 
labour in interests which have sources other than themselves 
via the medium of their own organisations, we are given two more 
reasons why membership participation in trade unions is important, 
and the influx of women therefore, a problem.
We are told there is a need for increased lay participation 
"in order to free full-time officers from routine administration". 
This is specified as the recruitment, retention and servicing of 
members (i) To do what is unspecified,but presumably this is 
to allow them more time to sit on the Government's growing number 
of industrial and consultative bodies.
Finally, we are warned that a low degree of membership
participation may give disproportionate importance in union
government to organised minority groups - meaning the
( 6 )Communist Party. The overall conclusion is that the influx
of women into membership could have quite serious political 
implications, because of their large numbers in some unions, and 
their low level of participation and representation in the 
organisational structures. Because of this, Hughes devotes a 
special section in his research paper to discuss the problem.
Three groups of membership who play a limited role in union 
government are singled out for special attention, namely: 
ancillary workers (with second-class membership), young workers 
and women workers. (Women, in fact, apart from being significantly
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represented in all three of these "problem categories", are also 
largely implicated in most of the other features identified as 
inhibiting membership involvement, for example labour force scatter 
and turnover; although these connections are not examined).
It is in his discussion of the shortage of women as officials,
on executive committees and in delegations that explanations about
their low levels of representation are advanced; and it is
interesting to examine them. Hughes reproduces the explanation
provided by the TUC Women's Advisory Committee in 1966:
"There is a growing ... realisation that for most 
women the working day does not finish when they
leave their employer's premises....
(realisation for whom?). Trade union work is 
satisfying but it consumes time and it is ... 
partly because of their domestic responsibilities 
that so few women act in a representative capacity 
for their unions in the wider movement although, 
without doubt, there is still a lingering prejudice 
in some areas against permitting women to discuss 
anything other than their own problems... "
Ibid pp. 29-30 .
His only comment on this is - "it would be true to say that we lack
any adequate studies of these pressures, and of the ways in which
they operate". (Ibid p.30). But Hughes does go on to criticise
some aspects of the way women are treated in trade unions.
This is not, however, in terms of what the unions are doing
(or not doing) for their women members. Indeed:
"In terms of the development of policy, and 
of wage bargaining in particular, it cannot 
be said of the trade unions in recent years 
that they have been neglectful of the interests 
of their women members". Ibid p.30 .
His criticisms are levelled at the lack of uniformity, there being
no "consistent or generally accepted approach by British trade
unions towards the rights and participation of women members".
(Ibid p.31). The main source of problems is identified as
disorder in”the system". He points to the multiplicity of different
\arrangements to be found, a confusion of women's sections, 
special committees, or 'woman officials' and so on. Perhaps 
more cogently he points also to the existence of discriminatory 
rules in the constitutions of various unions (e.g. the AEU), 
which ensured for women an inferior status and fewer rights.
And finally he notes the existence of "backward attitudes" ai'onr trade 
unionists, expressing criticism of those opponents of special 
representation for women, whose objections were not based on a 
fear of tokenism, but were instead, grounded in a wish to disregard
( Q )
issues important to women. While admitting that there are
valid arguments in respect of the dangers of tokenism, Hughes 
argues:
"Against this has to be set the inadequate 
focus of attention on problems and policy 
objectives of importance to women that there 
may be in the absence of specific arrangements 
for representation of women and review of their 
needs and interests". Ibid p.32 .
In his opinion special representation was beneficial to women:
"It is ... apparent that there has been a very 
marked improvement in the quality of the 
contributions made by women delegates at the 
TUC's advisory conference, as compared with 
that in its early days; the very existence of 
the conference may have played a part in that 
result". Ibid p.32 .
It is apparent that both of these arguments sit rather 
oddly in the context of the early statement that trade unions can 
no longer be said to neglect the interests of their female 
membership. Nor is there any suggestion that women's low 
levels of involvement might at all be connected to "the 
inadequate focus of attention on problems and policy objectives 
of importance to women", or the "lingering prejudice (still
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found) in some areas". Moreover, his view that the main impact
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of special representation lies in the changes wrought in women 
themselves, rather than in anything or anyone else, still derives 
from the view that it is in the women that the fundamental 
problems lie.
Leaving these points aside, together with his top-down conception 
of trade union democracy and the bizarre suggestion that women 
members might be unwittingly responsible for communist domination
(simply because they are so unwitting....  ?), this short section
on the representation/participation of women in John Hughes' 
research paper represents a more substantial view of the position 
of women than hitherto seen. One reason for this is, that during
the course of the discussion the focus of the problem shifts
(9)away from women as object to subject. Once this occurs
the institution itself is problematised and new areas of 
investigation are opened up. The effect of this becomes clear 
when elements of the explanation for women's low levels of 
participation which are offered here are compared with those 
given by the writers above. They differ markedly because the 
trade unions are seen as problematic; and for the first time, 
therefore, we are presented with "trade union related factors".
It is suggested for example, that there are problems for women 
associated with: the way organisational arrangements fit in 
with family responsibilities; the way trade union organisation is 
related to labour market structure, and the way male domination 
is reflected in discriminatory rules and sexist practices.
We have examined the work of three authors whose output has 
been influential in each of the key areas of industrial relations:
trade union growth, the development of collective bargaining and
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organisational structure and government. We have been 
concerned to explore what kinds of information and explanation 
is provided about the position of women, since each of these 
authors has drawn attention to their distinctive and historically 
sustained patterns of unionisation, participation and representation.
In the course of this investigation, we have identified a 
number of problems which, it could be argued, are common to much 
of the literature on this particular subject, that is produced 
in the industrial relations field. Thus we have found a 
recurring displacement of analysis by stereotype; a 
displacement of investigation by assertion; a displacement of 
explanation by description; plus an absolute shortage of information. 
To the extent that these kind of problems arise in the industrial 
relations field in general, that is, regardless of the subject 
area, their sources may well be found to lie in, for example, 
the kind of methodologies commonly used (such as correlation/ 
regression analyses); or distortions in the style of conception 
(such as that produced by reification); or an institutional
approach (which can lead, among other things, to a failure to 
problematise the organisation). Undoubtedly, these aspects 
have a bearing on some of the problems we have identified with 
regard to the treatment of women.
It may, however, also be the case that the subject area of 
women, is also peculiarly affected by another source of 
distortion. This source of distortion has been identified in 
other academic fields such as sociology,a discipline which Ann 
Oakley has described as sexist.
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"Sociology is sexist because it is male 
oriented. By male oriented I mean that 
it exhibits a focus on, or a direction 
towards,the interests and activities of 
men in a gender differentiated society.
The social situations of men and women 
today are structurally and ideologically 
discrepant, and the dominant value system 
of modern industrialised societies assigns 
greater importance and prestige to 'masculine 
than to feminine' roles". . Oakley 
(1974), p.2.
What are the implications of this? One consequence of the 
sexism Ann Oakley identifies is that women as a social group 
are rendered:
"invisible or inadequately represented: 
they take the insubstantial form of ghosts, 
shadows or stereotyped characters". Ibid p.l
Beyond this there are crucial implications for the discipline
itself which is structured fundamentally by this ideology:
"The concealment of women runs right through 
sociology. It extends from the classification 
of subject-areas and the definition of concepts 
through the topics and methods of empirical 
research, to the construction of models and 
theory generally". Ibid p.3 .
It is reasonable to assume that the industrial relations 
discipline is structured in a similar way, although the full 
consequences of this have yet to be examined. Richard Brown 
has looked at the way women as employees are treated in 
industrial research:
"In the majority of cases where they have not
been ignored altogether, women employees have
been regarded by industrial sociologists in
one of two ways: on the one hand as indistinguisable
from men in any respect relevant to their
attitudes and actions at works and on the
other as giving rise to special problems, for
the employer and/or the families or communities
from which they come". Brown (1976) p.21
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Brown identified two particular consequences arising from
this ideological distortion in the discipline which appeared
important. First, he found little in the existing body of
knowledge which contributed to his own field of study which is
concerned with the effects of sexual divisions on worker's social
consciousness and their orientations to work. Thus he concludes
that the whole discipline has been impoverished as a result of
this existing sexist bias. Secondly, he notes a general
political consequence: which is that the especially exploitative
nature of the relationship between employers and women workers
tends to remain invisible and all the more easily ignored.
These points can be certainly illustrated with an example from the
work of Robert Blauner (1964), who, in "Alienation and Freedom",
analysed job conditions in four factory technologies:
"He dismisses the women who make up almost half 
the workers in the textile industry he studied 
as 'a major safety valve against the consequences 
of alienating work conditions'. The high 
concentration of women in jobs which are, in 
Blauner's words, 'the least skilled, the most 
repetitive, and the least free' makes it possible 
for men to have jobs with the opposite attributes.
'Women in the industry are not dissatisfied with 
such work* asserts Blauner, without giving his 
evidence for this statement: 'work does not have 
the central importance and meaning in their lives 
that it does for men, since their most important 
roles are those of wives and mothers'".
Oakley (1974) p.20 .
A further point can be made about the overall impact 
of this kind of approach, which may be highly significant for 
explaining the problem of "absence". Namely, that it has the 
effect of "actively" closing down whole areas of potential 
investigation and research. In other words, we would maintain, 
that women's absence from the literature is not simply a
"reflection", but has, in important respects, been constructed.
It is a consequence of the type of approach, analysis and 
explanation which has been offered when the subject has not 
been ignored or overlooked.
Conclusions
One aim of this Chapter, as stated in the beginning, was to 
place the paucity of information and analysis available in the 
area covered by this particular study in the broader context 
of industrial relations as an academic discipline. We have 
done this by examining how the position of women in trade unions 
is handled in some of the literature.
We have noted first, the overall lack of attention this 
subject receives, which is by no means confined to the authors 
reviewed. What is the reason for this? Is their lower profile 
in the literature simply a reflection on the lesser role women 
play in those organisations which are studied? Then why is this not 
given a higher profile as a problem? And what about those areas 
where they do not "play a lesser role?". However, a closer view 
of the matter reveals there are more serious difficulties here than 
simply an absence in the literature, because the literature is not 
entirely silent on the issue of women. We have also found it 
necessary to examine the nature of the contributions which have been 
made on the subject. And it is being argued here that this has 
a more significant impact than mere "absence" suggests.
First we have seen that women are given problem status; 
viewed as a deviant case from the male norm or deficient in 
masculine characteristics; treated as a special homogeneous sub­
group and categorised in terms of (so-called) inherent sex
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characteristics. As a consequence, women are rendered invisible 
(rather than overlooked); empirical and historical information 
on the position of women is sparse and theoretical knowledge as 
a whole is inadequate and distorted.
Secondly, we have seen that there is an overall lack of attention 
paid to gender. There is a common assumption informing industrial 
relations research that gender differences or distinctive attributes 
have no significance in or for analysis and this is matched by 
the common use of perspectives and methodologies which exclude 
attention to gender. Again we would argue that this is not just 
a matter of the question being "overlooked". For where gender 
difference cannot, perhaps, be ignored, its social or political 
significance is likely to be demolished by a resort to biological 
reductionism and other forms of stereotyping, (such as in the 
example from Blauner above) .
Finally, in the works which we examined, and in the 
literature generally, we commonly find, wherever women were the 
subject of discussion: the displacement of information, 
investigation, analysis and explanation,by assertion,description 
and stereotype.
In conclusion, it is maintained here that this displacement, 
the "invisibility" of women and the lack of attention to gender, 
can all be seen to lead directly to the problem we first started 
with, which was - a lack of information and analysis in the area 
in which this study is undertaken. This is because the overall 
impact of each aspect identified above is to close down whole areas 
of investigation, which is a more important reason for "absence" 
than simple neglect. The impact of sexist ideology in the field
of industrial relations, therefore, needs to be examined, 
just as it does in every other branch of the social sciences.
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CHAPTER 1 WOMEN IN TRADE UNIONS AND THE INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS DISCIPLINE
FOOTNOTES:
(1) As the TUC stated:
"The fact that the proportion of women in employment who 
belong to trade unions is only about half that of men is mainly 
to be accounted for by differences in their industrial and 
occupational distribution". Donovan (1968)b p. 185 (my emphasis).
(2) See also Lupton's comments, ibid pp. 90-93, 190-191
(3) Kate Purcell questions the "passive woman worker thesis" in 
her article Militancy and Acquiescence Amongst Women Workers.
Her own studies suggested that men and women "join and express 
support; for unions .and engage in widespread - action according 
to the traditions of their industry rather than according to 
their sex." Purcell (1979) p.123. And she notes how mis­
leading it is to use strikes as an index of militancy.
(4) This NBPI report also substantiates the notion that women are
less interested in pay questions generally. Explanatory 
offerings include: (for an instance where they appeared less
prepared to take on the rate-fixer) "The predominantly female 
labour force seemed less-aware of pay questions". And (for an 
instance when earning were reduced without apparent protest) the 
women are deemed to be suffering from "a form of economic fatalism 
(which) prevented them from complaining". NBPI Report No. 65 p.19
(5) There are very few references to women in general in Hugh Clegg's
work. A total of thirty seven appear in Clegg (1964)"A History 
of British Trade Unions since 1889” Vol 1. 500 pages long.
(6) Domination by full-time officials is also mentioned but the possibility 
yives less cause for concern (ibid p.7). In the research paper
the Communist Party has a special section, as do women. The 
one on the Communist Party is bigger. (ibid pp. 69-74).
(7) Those rules were made illegal by the Sex Discrimination Act.
(8) "It is not clear whether the objection to 'special representation' is a 
protest against provision that might make an inferior status more 
acceptable, or is to be applied also to special representation 
existing together with full membership rights for women. ...
one might envisage a development of women's committees and 
conferences which indicate recognition of special needs rather than 
being a badge of inferior status. It is clear, however, that a number 
of unions resist such developments, even in situations where 
sections of their women's membership would welcome them".
Ibid p. 31 (my emphasis).
(9) It is interesting to note that when this occurs there is
also an inversion in the workers' perspective on trade union 
democracy from top-down to bottom-up (see the quotation above 
which refers to the representation of women's interests).
(10) One consequence of this is to effect a switch between the (live) 
subject and (inanimate) object. For example:
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(10) con'td. "Nupe's style of active recruitment effort - including
a marked ability to build effective unionism out of 
part-time women workers - has clearly distanced its main 
trade union competitors". Hughes (1973), p.54
(11) This kind of explanation for the absence of literature,
interest or research on the position of women is of a rather different 
kind to that generally offered by those working in the area.
For example, Valerie Ellis in her study The Role of T rade Unions 
in the Promotion of Equal Opportunities notes: "the paucity 
of research and historical evidence on women and trade union 
activity ... is itself a reflection of the fact that women have 
been "hidden from history", that their economic role has with 
few exceptions been that of a "reserve labour force" to be called 
upon when needed and despatched to domesticity thereafter."
Ellis (1981) p.l. (my emphasis).
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CHAPTER 2 SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANALYSING THE POSITION 
OF WOMEN IN THE TRADE UNION FROM WORKPLACE LEVEL.
In this thesis we examine how the women workers in one company 
(BSR) fared in relation to the collective bargaining structures established 
as a result of unionisation. The recognition agreement signed by 
representatives of the firm and the GMWU contained both procedural and 
substantive terms; both of which patterned BSR's workplace organisation.
On the face of it there was little in the procedural arrangements to 
suggest that the men would be favoured since, if anything, workplace 
organisation was bound to reflect the women's numerical dominance.
Yet a closer look reveals significant inequalities within these repre­
sentational and bargaining structures. Most of the key positions in 
the local organisation were held by men and male workers were over­
represented in the domestic system; the grievance procedure at higher 
levels was dominated by their problems and formal agreements consistently 
reflected their interests over and above the women's. How is this 
pattern to be explained?
The usual explanations of women's 'lesser bargaining strength' at 
the workplace are confined to exploring problematic aspects of the 
subjects themselves (e.g. their "docility" and family commitments).
Similar arguments, in fact, as are advanced to explain why women are 
not members of, or more active in, trade union organisations in the 
first place. But will this do? Can we unquestioningly assume that 
the non-appearance of their problems in the grievance procedure and 
the down-grading of their interests in agreements, is entirely explained 
by women's ’apathy"in the workplace and children in the home? How much
does their lesser bargaining strength within the workplace, for example,
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OF WOMEN IN THE TRADE UNION FROM WORKPLACE LEVEL.
In this thesis we examine how the women workers in one company 
(BSR) fared in relation to the collective bargaining structures established 
as a result of unionisation. The recognition agreement signed by 
representatives of the firm and the GMWU contained both procedural and 
substantive terms; both of which patterned BSR's workplace organisation.
On the face of it there was little in the procedural arrangements to 
suggest that the men would be favoured since, if anything, workplace 
organisation was bound to reflect the women's numerical dominance.
Yet a closer look reveals significant inequalities within these repre­
sentational and bargaining structures. Most of the key positions in 
the local organisation were held by men and male workers were over­
represented in the domestic system; the grievance procedure at higher 
levels was dominated by their problems and formal agreements consistently 
reflected their interests over and above the women's. How is this 
pattern to be explained?
The usual explanations of women's 'lesser bargaining strength' at 
the workplace are confined to exploring problematic aspects of the 
subjects themselves (e.g. their "docility" and family commitments).
Similar arguments, in fact, as are advanced to explain why women are 
not members of, or more active in, trade union organisations in the 
first place. But will this do? Can we unquestioningly assume that 
the non-appearance of their problems in the grievance procedure and 
the down-grading of their interests in agreements, is entirely explained 
by women's ’apathy"in the workplace and children in the home? How much 
does their lesser bargaining strength within the workplace, for example,
hinge on the fact that they cannot attend meetings outside it? And, 
if women are consistently under-represented on the job because they 
have fewer shopstewards, need we really look no further than their own 
lack of confidence, to explain this? We hope to show that when the 
position of men and women workers in relation to their union organisation 
on the shopfloor is examined more closely, such arguments in terms 
of the latter's attitudes and family commitments, are being made to 
bear far too great an explanatory weight. However relevant they are, 
the immediate significant of these factors must vary with the problem 
and the level of analysis, and their significance has to be assessed. 
First, for both men and women, rather than as at present, ignored in 
relation to the former and assumed for the latter. And secondly, 
in relation to other aspects of the employment/bargaining relationship 
which may be in an immediate respect, operative to greater effect 
and which are at present being missed from the reckoning altogether.
We begin by trying to identify what kinds of approach, theoretical 
perspectives and concepts can most usefully be employed to examine the 
impact of the sexual division of labour on trade union organisation 
and collective bargaining which begins at the level of the workplace. 
GENERAL APPROACH
We have already argued against a view of women as a separate and 
'deviant' category of employee, preferring an approach which sees them 
like men, selling their labour power on the market and remaining party 
to its utilisation within the capitalist labour process. Thus the 
workforce is seen as gendered with a major line of differentiation 
lying in the way family/household relationships ~ impinging on both men 
and women workers - do so to radically different effect. One conse­
quence of the sexual division of labour both inside and outside the 
workplace may be found therefore, in a distinctive structuring of
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interests between men and women in employment. We are concerned
with examining how these are mediated by trade union organisation.
A second feature of our overall approach is that we have found 
it necessary to reformulate the traditional Industrial Relations problematic 
and pose (the working class in general and) women workers in particular, 
as being the subject rather than object of inquiry. Thus our question 
becomes: why and how are trade unions a problem for women?
This perspective has already proved useful to those who, in examining 
women's low level of participation in trade unions, have wanted to 
escape from the fruitless circularity of explanations (and recommendations) 
posed solely in terms of the women themselves.
Writers such as Anna Coote (1980), Bea Campbell (1982) and Ann 
Phillips (1983) addressing trade unions as problematic have begun to 
examine the failure of these organisations in representing women's 
interests, particularly those aspects arising as a result of their 
family responsibilities differing from those of men. The utility of 
this approach can be seen in the wide field of enquiry it opens up 
(which need not be confined to the question of women or sex-based 
differentiation in the working class). There is the immediate question, 
for instance, as to what these interests are, and thus the need to 
enquire into what problems women workers ( in this case) have. What 
is the particular nature of their employment experience and or the 
issues they raise? At present we have little literature or research 
on this subject to help us and the heavy emphasis on domestic circum­
stances differentiating women's position to employment has largely 
hidden those distinctive aspects which also arise within it. These do 
not simply derive from the women's 'dual role' (the employment relation­
ship is fundamentally shaped by the forces of capital accumulation and
competition) and we need to consider the relevant links. The industrial
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and occupational structure is sexually segregated to a very high degree 
and we would argue that women workers are employed in the most highly 
exploitative spheres. We need a view also, therefore, of how this 
structures their needs and demands as waged workers, and in what 
respects trade union organisation and collective bargaining might be 
problematic.
Far from spiralling into circularity therefore, our approach raises 
further questions about trade union structure and how bargaining policies 
are formed. For, if women's interests are not represented, whose and 
what interests are? While such an enquiry can be carried out at any 
level, this study concentrates on the workplace because here men and 
women workers can be seen in direct relationship with each other at 
the initial stage of collective organisation.
The questions suggested by this general approach and also raised 
by our research findings are centrally concerned with the impact of 
the sexual division of labour on trade union organisation and bargaining 
power. And in order to examine this, we need first to clarify a few 
terms which are essential for the analysis. These concern the aspects 
which together form the core of the concept 'trade unionism'» and in the 
course of defining them it should also be possible to present the main 
pillars of our argument. Thus it is considered necessary to specify: 
first the social relationships encompassed by trade union organisation 
institutionally at workplace level and above; secondly, the nature of 
job control as a non-institutional source of bargaining power; and 
thirdly the nature of the institution's primary practice - collective 
bargaining.
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Social relations of trade unionism
Since we are centrally concerned with exploring the implications 
of the sexual division of labour for trade union organisation and practice, 
a key question for analysis is the impact of gender differentiation in 
and on institutional relationships. This requires us to specify more 
closely what the main dimensions of these relationships are.
THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF TRADE UNION ORGANISATION
We begin by identifying the main sets of social relationships 
which together shape trade union organisation and practice as a whole.
We see three as being primary. But we might note that there is a 
common tendency to single out and consider in isolation only one 
of these. This is found again, for example, in the Industrial 
Relations literature which defines trade unionism almost exclusively 
in terms of the regulation of relations between workers and their 
employers■
However, it is also relevant to consider how relations between 
employers are mediated by trade union organisation and practice. To 
the extent, for example, that this leads to an equalisation of employment 
conditions (or, perhaps, the opposite) between competing units of 
capital, there is some regulation of their relationship? of the kind 
indeed, employers have often consciously sought through trade union 
organisation for themselves.(1)
The third social dimension of trade unionism is particularly 
crucial from ou1- point of view, and this concerns the regulation of 
relationships between workers. This is a key aspect of trade union 
organisation and practice which has again been largely ignored in the 
academic field of Industrial Relations (tending itself to match the 
historical progress of its subject area into higher realms of insti­
tutionalisation) .
It is interesting to note that the Webbs paid far more attention 
to the impact of trade union organisation on relations between workers 
than their successors have done. (Fox (1975)) Today, however, in 
the light of recent work by feminists, it is apparent that the study 
of women in the workplace and in trade unions, once again serves to 
reinstate forcefully a focus on relationships between workers. And 
it is not difficult to see why.
Under capitalism the nature of the relationship between workers in 
general, first in the labour market and then in employment, is funda­
mentally competitive. But of all identifiable divisions and groups 
within the working class,competitive relations between men and women 
have a particular (and peculiar) prominence. So do the historically 
developed modes of regulation, since these have been, so frequently, 
institutionalised in formal trade union practices of sex-based differ­
entiation and exclusion (Cockburn (1983)). It is telling to note, for 
instance, that a history of women workers in trade unions (such as that 
produced by Sheila Lewenhak (1977)) may be almost entirely constituted 
by an account of their relationships with male workers; with correspond­
ingly diminished attention to, for example, the impact of employers on 
patterns of unionisation.
However, we would argue that neither this nor the Industrial 
Relations problematic described above is adequate to the task of analysing 
trade union organisation and practice. Rather, it is necessary to assess 
the inter-relationship of all three dimensions of this social formation 
giving proper attribution to the changing weight and significance of each.
Since we are here mainly concerned to examine the implications 
of the sexual division of labour for trade union organisation and 
collective bargaining, and the context is a single firm, the most crucial
processes from our point of view involve the regulation of relations between 
workers and employers on the one hand and regulation of relations between 
workers on the other: and the links between them (2).
A further aspect of this study is that we are concentrating on 
trade union organisation at the workplace. Thus, it also becomes 
necessary to specify more closely the main dimensions of social relation­
ships at this level: in short, to define the concept of "workplace 
organisation".
THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF WORKPLACE ORGANISATION
It is considered here that workers are organised or "collectivised" 
along two major dimensions and these need to be differentiated. In 
the initial instance, workers are brought together under the sway of 
individual units of capital, and within these (re)distributed in each 
labour process into smaller collectivities or work groups. In the 
second instance the same workers may be distributed through the mediation 
of trade union organisation into bargaining units. These two forms of 
collective are, by no means, necessarily synonomous. On the one hand, 
bargaining units pattern (and are patterned by) an institutional system 
of representation which remains the product of negotiation. It is 
thus subject to different organising principles and pressures to those 
which shape the labour process, although the representational system 
is bound to be structured by this to some extent. We would therefore 
maintain that, exploring both the parameters of and the links between 
each of these two dimensions, is crucial to any discussion of workplace
organisation.
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But, more often than not, in the Industrial Relations literature 
this analysis is entirely missing and both aspects are collapsed into 
the one generic term. Thus the "workplace organisation" referred to 
is, in fact, that of the shopstewards; i.e. the institutional form, 
but how this system of representation relates to the pattern of 
organisation of the labour process is not revealed (e.g. Batstone (1977)). 
Without this information, we would argue that it is almost impossible 
to make sense of either the patterns of representation or office-holding 
that are evolved and how they may change, or the content of collective 
bargaining in terms of the issues taken up and the priority they are 
accorded in the domestic organisation. (Thus in Batstone explanations 
are entirely at a 'normative' level i.e. in terms of attitudes and 
character of the shopstewards - and the theory provided is a mystical 
typology which begs for some kind of material anchorage.)
What are the links between the sexually differentiated occupational 
structure on the one hand and sex-related differences in union organi­
sation and bargaining power on the other? The analysis required to 
address this central question is extremely complex. But we would 
argue from the outset that it is impossible unless both dimensions of 
workplace organisation - the institutional system of representation on 
the one hand and the utilisation/distribution of workers in the labour 
process on the other - are properly differentiated and the relationship 
between them problematised.
This is a tricky business. Because now we have not only to assess 
how the two sections of the workforce (male and female) are organised in 
terms of these two dimensions: that is, to see how men and women are 
distributed in the labour process and also how they are grouped in union 
constituencies. We have also to enquire how the men and women relate
to each other (within and between each sex-group) in terms of both of
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these structures; and also how the structures themselves are related.
What impact does the differential power of workgroups have on the 
institutional structures of the union? If we are discussing the 
implications of occupational segregation then this is a relevant 
question.
It brings us to consider the two major axes of our thesis - collective 
bargaining and job control - and how they are related. We examine them 
separately to begin with.
Job control
If we are proposing that sex-related differences in the institution 
(patterns of organisation, representation and bargaining power) are 
related to the sexually differentiated employment relationship, part­
icularly as it is manifested in the sex-segregated occupational structure, 
then analysis requires that we examine this latter side more closely.
Thus, the second term of our argument requires that we specify the 
nature of job control as a non-institutional source of bargaining power 
and consider the implications of this for the institutional structures.
The aims of job control in general have to be viewed in relation 
to the nature of the contract between wage labourers and their employers. 
This may specify the price or amount of compensation for labour and also 
the terms (for example, the structure and length of the working day) , 
although it does not secure either these or the continuity of employment 
and, therefore, income. Moreover, there is no limit specified as to 
the amount of labour fie employer can exact - he Is "free" to use the 
commodity he purchases as his own. Hence it is the regulation of work 
effort which remains at the centre of workers' job control, and this 
extends to cover the maintenance/improvement of employment terms and 
conditions, together with the establishment of longer term security and 
continuity of income for the individual worker. (3)
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Where workers' job controls or 'regulatory practices' are sufficiently 
strong they manifestly constitute a powerful bargaining resource. They 
are clearly the basis of 'unitary regulation* of employment relations 
(security terms and conditions) and even underpin 'collective bargaining' 
(or joint regulation which as the Webbs observed also "prevails in a 
more or less elaborate form...long before a trade union comes into 
existence." (Webb (1901) p.220)
Since we are concerned to explain the bases of the differential 
bargaining strength of men and women workers and to examine what further 
implications this might have in the workplace and in the trade union, 
it is clear that we need to analyse the elements of job control.
THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF JOB CONTROL
We are proposing that there are two essential dimensions to job 
control - technical and social - which spring from the two sets of 
relations engaging the worker in the labour process - their relation­
ship to the job or task and the relationship to other workers. Job 
control necessarily requires their regulation of both of these sets of 
relationships.
But, studies of workers' control in the labour process have a tendency 
to focus on the individual labourer engaged in exerting control over the 
performance of the task - that is regulating their relationship to their 
work alone. (see many of the contributions in Zimbalist(1979)) This 
neglects the system of co-operation in the labour process which will 
require the workci also to exert control over relationships with other 
workers in order to control his/her own task performance. On the other 
hand studies such as Hawthorne have emphasised the social controls 
entailed in job regulation but they have retained an individualistic
(and male) orientation.
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We would argue that no longer a 'petty commodity producer', the
individual labourer's job controls must be viewed in the context of
the collective worker characteristic of the socialised,capitalist labour
process. The individual worker's job controls therefore have
necessarily, a collective basis and orientation. The process of
worker
protecting/advancing those of one/is dependent upon them also being 
engaged in the 'protection/advanceraent' of the collectivity or social 
organisation in which each individual's controls are embedded. The 
maintenance/development of job controls entails therefore the regulation 
of individual workers' relationships to the job and to each other and 
also the protection of the group as a whole (the strength of the whole 
being greater than the sum of the parts).
One problem with the literature is that the study of job control 
practices has usually been carried out in relation to craftsmen where the 
concept becomes conflated with notions of "craft" and "skill" which tend 
to emphasise its technical aspects as well as confine its applicability 
to a tiny minority of (male) workers. We would argue that it is more 
useful to view the construction of a "skill" and craft strategies (such 
as those aimed at controlling labour supply) as variations on a more 
general control theme.
It is certainly necessary to disengage the concept of job control 
from the notion of "skill”. First because this blocks any perspective 
on the job controls of so-called 'un' or 'semi-' skilled workers. And 
secondly because it suggests an unwarranted conflation of de-skilling 
and work degradation (associated with, for example, mechanisation or 
new technology) with an overall loss of control (Rubery 1973 256-261). 
And, most importantly from our point of view, the emphasis on technique 
which a concentration on "skill" endows, does seriously detract from 
the social bases or dimensions of work regulation.
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But a re-reading of some of the studies of craft-workers reveals 
just how much of their activities centred around socialisation, the 
development of social cohesion and group "solidarisation". Moreoever, 
the struggle against innovation, viewed from a social rather than a 
technical perspective, reveals a significant concern on the part of 
craft-workers with the structural aspects of their relationships with 
each other. The craftsmen's stand against changes in technology or 
payment systems (the engineers objections to piecework, for example) 
seem to us to be as much concerned with their inherent potential for 
altering the way that the workers related to each other - as much as to 
the employer, or to other technical/material features, suggesting 
possible loss of control. Because it is in these social changes also - 
in the way workers relate to each other within the labour process - that 
the potential gain or loss of control lies. Once a degree of control 
has been established on the basis of one pattern of relating, it may 
be some time before it can be re-established on a new social basis.
And some systems of social organisation, production or payment would 
seem to facilitate this more than others.
Thus it is interesting to note Cynthia Cockburn's discussion of the 
introduction of new technology into newspaper printing, which has 
totally transformed the labour process. Many features suggest the job 
has been de-skilled and the work de-graded although an overall loss of 
control over the labour process could not be assumed to result. On 
Fleet Street the Chapels decided to go for "inti ndtea working" as averse 
to the old system whereby workers specialised in one aspect of the type- 
setting/composing process only. Where the latter tended to generate 
hierarchy and division in the work group, in the new system all would 
rotate jobs (deployment being controlled by the team). It was reckoned
that unity in the Chapel would be enhanced by this and the equalisation
of performance and earnings: "There'll be no more prima donnas now"
(Cockburn (1983) p.llO). The suggestion was, therefore, the loss of 
areas of strong individual control, as well as that lost generally as 
a result of the demolition of old skills, could be recouped by the 
increased collective solidarity of the group as a whole within the new 
labour process.
If the workers themselves acknowledge the basis of job control in 
their mode of relating, it seems necessary for analysts to do so as well.
It is clear for example, that many of the craftsmen's work rules investigated 
by Montgomery (1979) are aimed at regulating the relationships between 
the workers as much as with the employer. We would argue that neither 
such practices, nor this particular aspect of them, should be seen as 
being confined to this small group of employees.
DIFFERENTIAL JOB CONTROL
If all workers regulate their relationships both to their jobs and 
with each other on an individual and a collective basis we may surmise 
that the forms of this regulation will be embodied in a variety of 
practices - albeit with differing degrees of explicitness and "formality" - 
and also, with differing degrees of effect. To the extent that we would 
see job controls as not only a 'consequence' of bargaining strength in 
the labour process but also in terms of other (institutional) relationships 
a source of it* we need to consider differences in the scope and extent 
of these resources available to different groups in the workforce.
While the regulation of work effort can be seen as a requirement 
common to all wage workers, the nature, extent or the scope of the controls 
which any group can institute will vary over time and according to a 
number of factors. Of these, the most important may well lie beyond 
the power of workers alone to influence (for example, the degree of
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competition in the product or labour market). Others may be subject to 
their influence, but to a degree which is hard to determine, often 
becoming apparent over the longer rather than shorter period (for 
example, the system of production, use of technology and social organ­
isation shaping the labour process). Finally, there are, of course, 
those aspects which fall within the sphere of immediate influence in 
the workplace and these comprise what is broadly referred to as the 
"frontier of control" (Goodrich (1975)).
While the speed, degree and the direction that this "frontier" 
can be shifted by workers or employers continuously varies according to 
environmental factors as well as their own ability and willingness to 
move it, its overall position "on the map" is the outcome of much longer- 
term trends. Thus at any point in time, groups of workers in different 
sectors of the economy will find themselves engaged in common, in a 
struggle over the regulation of work effort; but the content, mode and 
practices of this activity may appear to be quite different. One 
reason for this being that they are operating from widely divergent 
"base-lines" .
The industrial and occupational structure is patterned by clear-cut 
divisions along sex-lines. What are the implications of this for men and 
women workers' job controls and bargaining resources? Since women 
workers are not generally viewed as engaging in work regulation, the 
literature is not very helpful. And where comparisons are made - as 
in Edwards and Scullion 119'2) thi starting point is clearly the sex of the 
subjects - which means that sex difference can hardly be explained 
except in terms of itself. Moreover, this approach renders an evaluation 
of men and women's job controls as "strong/weak", "oppositional/non- 
oppositional" - assessed in terms of a comparison of their "achievements"
across different industrial sectors largely meaningless.
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Nevertheless, we are interested in exploring the implications of 
the differential bargaining power and resources of men and women workers.
To do this, we need first to examine the sources of job controls in the 
labour process and the different kinds of problems involved in sustaining 
these experienced by differently placed groups of workers.
We need, secondly, to look at the uneven pattern of job controls 
within the (sexually structured) labour force and to ask what impact 
inequality in work groups' non-institutionally derived bargaining power 
and resources might have on institutional structures and relationships.
Since the latter are so strongly shaped by the practice of collective 
bargaining, it is to an examination of this that we now turn, before 
setting out our hypothesis as a whole.
Collective bargaining
The final term of our argument therefore, requires us to specify 
the parameters and nature of collective bargaining which is the primary 
practice of trade unionism. It thus shapes institutional relationships 
to a very high degree, and we need to consider, of course, how gender and 
the sexual division of labour are relevant in terms of this. We begin 
with a discussion of our general approach and go on to examine some key 
aspects of collective bargaining which are crucial to our analysis.
Again, departing from the mainstream approach in Industrial Relations, 
we would argue that collective bargaining is essentially problematic - 
for the working class as a whole and for women in particular. To the 
extent that it perpetuates conceptions integral to capitalism, such as 
the particular form of relationship between wage labour and domestic 
work (and the sexual division of labour structuring these spheres) or 
the irremediable character of wage labour itself, it underpins the 
characteristically economistic nature of labour politics and the inequalities
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which pattern sex relations within the class (Barrett and Mackintosh (1982)) 
And it is its centrality in trade union practice which makes these 
organisations the bearers of particular forms of interest definition and 
articulation which, we would argue, render them especially problematic 
for women.
Here we will look specifically at the scope, form and content of 
collective bargaining, and examine the nature of the process. From 
these more general discussions we can draw the main points of the hypo­
thesis we are using to explore the position of women workers in the union. 
THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The institutional perspective on trade union organisation which 
concentrates narrowly on the collective regulation of relations between 
employers and workers reflects and also defines "trade unionism" almost 
totally in terms of activity which takes place at this level. (So 
much so,that Flanders (1970) preferred to narrow the concept of collective 
to joint-regulation (p.222.))
However, Richard Herding (1972) has shown how the social dimensions 
of collective bargaining have (also) been too narrowly defined in 
industrial relations literature, with its focus on management/union 
negotiations. Both taking this locus as the starting point and con­
sidering it in isolation, serves to conceal, because it passes over, 
prior collective bargaining processes which have already taken place within 
either side. It is the outcome of these which subsequently pattern 
negotiations between each side's representatives when they finally meet 
"across the bargaining table" (in such terms as, for example, the issues 
raised, the direction of, and scope for compromise and the possible use
of sanctions).
Moreover, the collective bargaining process does not finish with 
the formulation of an agreement. Whatever the degree of formality or 
explicitness characterising this, the impact of any compromise remains 
to be negotiated. (There is a "vital distinction", the Webbs noted, 
"between the making of a new bargain and the interpreting of the terms 
of an existing one." (Webb (1901) p.182.) In other words, collective 
bargaining continues over the distribution of its effects, but, again, 
more attention is paid in the literature to (the impact of) this process 
at the level of management and the workforce (Terry (1977)) than to 
the internal bargaining which takes place on either side.
If the process of collective bargaining - in its 'true sense' - 
both precedes and proceeds beyond the point of contact between negotiators 
on the workers' and management's sides, and the social dimensions like­
wise extend beyond this, then we need a view of how all of these bargaining 
relationships both 'internal' and 'external', are structured in order to 
assess the outcome of collective bargaining in relation to any one part­
icular group. Indeed, we would argue that it is impossible to assess 
the impact of the sexual division of labour and gender differentiation 
on collective bargaining unless the perspective on its scope is broadened 
to include the process of negotiation which takes place within the ranks 
of labour especially.
THE CONTENT AND FORM OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
When we look at the content of collective bargaining both between 
and within organisations, we can see that it has both procedural and 
substantive aspects. Offe (1980) has argued that this is necessarily
the case because the institutionalised forms of interest definition and 
articulation are particularly problematic for the workers' side. And 
the problems here are inextricably linked not only to the heterogeneity 
but also to the nature of the issues involved. Thus he sees collective
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bargaining as resting on an institutionalised system of representation 
which is more suited for registering preferences than constructing the 
demands in the first place (p.95). Caught between "the two logics of 
collective action", the process of interest representation is also one 
of interest re-definition and, therefore, as a conseguence, one of dis­
tortion (p.79).
The problematic relationship between the form or process of interest 
representation and the nature of the issues or bargaining content, is 
also relevant to that other (and more commonly identified) aspect of 
interest distortion in bargaining on the workers' side. That whereby 
the impact of procedural and representational forms of collective action 
on the one hand and employers' power to assert managerial prerogatives 
on the other, structure a 'preference' for bargaining over compensatory 
rather than control issues (Herding (1972), Goodrich (1975)).
Thus, we can see that the distribution of power between bargaining 
parties, as well as the forms of interest definition and articulation 
are crucial determinants of collective bargaining and its outcome.
And so it is clear that we need to examine the nature of the issues 
arising for women as a result of the sexual division of labour and their 
position in employment and to assess what impact the above structural 
determinants might have in relation to them.
In fact, we already have a suggestion in Offe that it is precisely 
those aspects of women's interests which render these distinctive which 
are most likely to be subject to the processes of distortion ant. re­
definition which he describes. Because he identifies, at the outset, 
that it is the "width of the spectrum" of wage workers' needs - (necessarily) 
extending beyond their position 'simply' as bearers of labour power -
which tends to render these "problematic" (p.75). But Offe does not
consider that the working class is gendered nor that differentiated
interests within the class may (also) be systematically subject to 
differing degrees of distortion and re-definition. This is because 
his focus is on the inequality of power between capital and labour; 
and, while he insists on the heterogeneous nature of the latter, the 
impact of power inequalities structuring the internal processes of 
negotiation which he does also describe - are not considered. Although 
we would, of course, argue that they are also crucial.
THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The final and key point to be made here refers to the nature of 
collective bargaining itself. We would argue that it is essentially 
a distributive process involving the exchange of costs as well as benefits 
for the workers. What is the nature of the costs involved?
The pluralist assumption is that under 'normal conditions', through 
the system of joint negotiation, both sides gain. Leaving aside for 
the moment the pre-supposition of parity in power or 'joint interest', 
this conception must also 'unconsciously' assume growth. For during 
periods of capital's retrenchment, joint negotiations will reflect 
pressure on workers to 'share' the costs - perhaps financially in terms 
of a wage cut or by increased effort through speed-up and work intensi­
fication with no guarantee of picking up an equivalent share from 
any future surplus. The problem is that even when there is a surplus 
to be shared, the quid pro quo's integral to any negotiated settlement - 
being a bargain and having two sides - tend to be ignored in industrial 
relations research. Perhaps this is because the institutional perspective 
lends emphasis to the procedural rather than the substantive aspects of
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the process. There is, in any case, a reluctance to admit that if 
"both sides gain" costs must be involved for the workers.
An exception to this can be seen in the studies of productivity 
bargaining (for example, the Fawley Agreements Flanders (1964) and McKersie 
and Hunter (1973)). These are distinctive in the recognition accorded 
both to the substantive issues and also to the fact that the bargain has 
two sides - one of which is constituted by the employers' demands. It
is interesting to note that, while McKersie and Hunter feel able to refer 
in their text to the 'costs and benefits' these two sides constitute 
from the workers' point of view, they are rather more coy in their titling - 
these become "achievement" and "reward" elements respectively (1) (Back 
to "both sides gain".)
We would not hold that 'productivity bargaining' is a significantly 
different form of collective bargaining apart from the explicitness of 
the employers' demands. And since, as has been noted elsewhere, 
collective bargaining was not foisted on management by trade unions 
(Clegg (1964) and Bain (1983) pp.152) but has historically been utilised 
by employers as an essential means of gaining control over the labour 
force and the labour processj It is this aspect, control, that can be 
taken as generally characteristic of the nature of employers' demands.
What then is the nature of the 'exchange'?
Andre Gorz in the 1960s, attempted to assess the implications and 
construction of wage (compensation) rather than work (control and job 
content) issues as constituting the central vehicle of workers' demands, 
and subject of trade union negotiation. This was in the period that 
so-called 'productivity bargaining' developed as an explicit practice.
And a longer term assessment of those gains (monetary) which were immediately
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apparent to labour might already be confirming the more problematic aspects 
of collective bargaining suggested by Gorz and others - wherein workers 
have been and are, consistently encouraged to accept financial compen­
sation in return for changes in working conditions and practices which 
reduce their job control and ultimately their bargaining strength (see for 
example the impact of 'productivity' agreements at Chemco:Nichols and 
Armstrong (1976) and Nichols and Beynon (1977); and at Churchman's:
Pollert (1981)).
According to Pollert, for example, the women at Churchman’s 
altogether "lacked the necessary level of co-operation and organisation" 
to engender effective resistance (p.183). Yet the tobacco workers 
"retained memories of lost control" (p.175). This had existed before 
the joint agreement for a proficiency pay scheme which had been accompanied 
by drastic reorganisation of the labour process - resulting in considerable 
fragmentation, divison and separation of interests among workers (p.181).
It is therefore, quite clear that the links between the institutional 
and non-institutional regulation of the employment relationship at workplace 
level are problematic; and we need to explore further the parameters of this. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND JOB CONTROL
It has been recognised that the collective basis of job control or
work regulation is, and has been historically, independent of trade
union organisation. In his classical study in 1930 of output restriction
among (so-called) unorganised workers, Mathewson had observed:
"The same practical necessity is impressed upon 
all wage-earners, and the common mind resulting 
from the similar circumstances in which they find 
themselves, develops an instinctive co-operation and 
collective action for restriction where trade unions 
are not present to organise it."
(Mathewson (1969) p.165)
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Against Mathewson we would argue that the basis of co-operation and 
collective action lie less in the instincts than in the organisation of 
the labour process. Clearly therefore, in order to examine the relation­
ship between the two forms of collective regulation, it is necessary to 
differentiate between the institutional resources available to workers 
as a result of unionisation - a broad based collectivity and the system 
of representation and negotiating structures, and those patterns of 
organisation and bargaining resources derived from the labour process - 
a narrowly based collectivity and the systems of co-operation and job 
control. How are the two related? And what impact does institutional 
regulation have on the maintenance/development of non-institutional 
regulation?
To the extent that trade union organisation provided an institutional 
forum for the formal elaboration of (previously established) work rules, 
institutional and non-institutional regulation were seen as synonymous. 
Indeed, as Leiserson commented, prior to Mathewson's study in the 
United States:
"Unionism, it was assumed, made possible the 
collective action necessary to bring about any 
important restrictions."
(Leiserson in Mathewson (1969) p.161)
This view has now been called into question. Richard Price (1980), 
examining the process whereby the power of trade unions in the building 
trade increased in the nineteenth century along with the development of 
collective bargaining, noted that this was accompanied by a decline in 
unilateral regulation on the part of both management and men. He 
concludes however that the 'gains' accruing to labour from 'consensus', and 
the increased authority/status of the Movement's institutions, as well as
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the benefits workers won by formal bargaining, cannot be assumed as 
unproblematic. It is necessary to evaluate "what is bought and what 
is sold" (p.190). And in his assessment the employers "bought" the 
workers' bargaining power. As the formalised system of joint regulation 
with its procedural and substantive collective bargaining and conciliation 
arrangements was developed; and as the unions achieved viability and sources 
of support that were external to a membership, which they had increasingly 
to be able to control, the workers' independent bargaining strength and 
resources based on the controls exercised by work groups over the job 
were reduced, and their decision-making powers were both diminished and 
constrained by procedures. As a result, the membership lost bargaining 
strength vis a vis management at the workplace. They also lost power 
in relation to their own organisations. Price shows how, increasingly, 
they were unable to counteract the disciplinary control exerted by the 
unified and powerful employer/union authority structure.
This view of the strength of the institution being not only 'not 
synonymous' with but 'in opposition' to the power of workers/members has 
been posed - for the present day - quite starkly by Herding (1972) 
who examines the proposition that a rise in union power in the plant 
is associated with a decline in power and control exercised by workers 
on the shopfloor. His is a detailed study of shopfloor problems and 
issues and union bargaining practices and agreements covering a number 
of major American plants in the late 1960s. He is able to illustrate, 
with a number of concrete examples, the decline in effectivity of work 
rules and increased power of management on the shopfloor being accompanied 
by the growth in scope and elaboration of formal bargaining structures 
and agreements. This consequence he associates with the 'passive/responding'
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character of bargaining and representational structures patterned on 
the (Anglo-American) collective bargaining model, which he contrasts 
with the more 'active/initiating' character of institutions based on 
the (German) 'co-determination' type.
How is this relationship between collective bargaining and job 
control to be explained? These writers are not simply describing the 
supercession of autonomous or unilateral regulation by joint regulation 
but - at least on the workers' side - its demolition. The reasons (and 
the processes) are clearly complex. They include aspects we have 
mentioned, such as the 'mis-fit' or inappropriateness of representational 
structures and procedures for job control issues. And also, importantly, 
the form of bargaining by which employers secure agreement to changes in 
working practices where they cannot impose them. They also include 
the institution's interest in preserving the bargaining relationship by 
imposing discipline on the membership in order to secure adherence to 
agreements (and employers'control demands)» as well as to secure the 
strength of the * common-rule1 against sectional interests which might 
otherwise undermine the strength of the wider collectivity.
The process discussed by the above authors is one whereby workers 
who have established job controls, lose them - as both a direct consequence 
of employers' actions (mediated or not through the union), and as an 
indirect consequence of institutional forms of collective action being 
imposed. But what happens after that? And what are the implications 
cf collective bargaining for workers who did not have such 'explicitly 
recognisable' job controls in the first place? What we really need to 
have some view of is the impact of collective bargaining on workers' 
capacity to develop and sustain job controls rather than simply the impact 
on the controls themselves.
i
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This is where we would argue it is important to examine the impact 
of the employers' actions/demands on workers' relationships with each 
other - because it is the social basis of the controls which is crucial. 
Where this is preserved, controls may be quickly developed over new 
production processes and machinery etc., despite the fact that these 
have demolished old skills and expertise. (See Hinton (1973) for example 
who discusses the success of skilled engineering workers in "following 
the machine"? and Cockburn (1983) regarding the compositors' retention 
of control over new printing technology.) But, we would maintain, 
where the social basis of job control is disrupted, the effects are more 
long-term. And for some workers, managements' actions never allow this 
to become properly consolidated. (Although this is not without contra­
dictory consequences for production and the employer - as we show in 
this study.)
Insofar therefore as we would view collective bargaining as con­
stituting a process whereby employers' demands are 'distributed down- 
wards' to be borne by the workforce, and that these demands usually 
comprise 'control' questions concerned with increasing productivity, 
changing working processes/practices and/or the social organisation of 
production we would see these as bearing important implications for 
workers' capacity to develop and sustain job controls i.e. for their 
non-institutional bargaining resources.
However, we also need to consider the relationship the other way 
round. What is the impact of differential job control ori institutional 
relationships and structures? Sections and groups within the labour 
force derive differential power from non-institutional sources - for 
example, the labour market, the mode of organisation of the labour process 
and certain more (or less) key positions within it. It seems obvious to
say that the more powerful groups, in terms of the labour process, will 
dominate the institutional structures and the trade union organisation 
itself. But we would argue it is important to ask - with what effect, 
in particular, for other groups?
This is where we would maintain that it is important to examine 
those bargaining processes internal to the workers' side which are both 
prior to and consequent upon the meeting between representatives of the 
union and the employer. And, insofar as we would view collective 
bargaining as distributing costs and benefits, we would see these as 
being distributed unequally. Those groups in a stronger bargaining 
position being better able to reap a greater share of the reward and 
to avoid the greatest impact of the 'costs' involved.
The hypothesis
We have been examining the main conceptual terms of an analysis 
adequate to explain the position of women in the union through an 
examination of the relationship between the sexually differentiated 
relations of employment on the one hand and those sex-related differences 
clearly patterning institutional structures on the other.
We have proposed that in order to do this it is necessary to 
consider the relationship between institutional and non-institutional 
sources and forms of regulation in the employment relationship. It 
is therefore necessary, first to understand the essentially distributive 
nature of the dominant institutional form of collective bargaining 
itself. Secondly, to evaluate the content of joint-bargaining (for 
example, by examining the substantive terms of agreements) giving proper 
weight to what is conceded in relation to what is gained by either side; 
to see how this may be structured by the predominant forms of interest 
representation and articulation, and also to assess the implications of
the 'exchange' for the subsequent bargaining position of the parties 
concerned. Finally, it is necessary to consider how the structuring of 
bargaining relationships patterns the outcome: that is, how the dis­
tribution of power between the bargaining parties shapes the dis­
tribution of costs and benefits, and with what effect.
Here we have been particularly concerned to establish that our view 
of bargaining relationships must comprehend not only that between 
workers and employers but, crucially, between workers themselves. And 
it is an assumption fundamental to our argument that both of these 
relationships are characterised by systematic inequalities of power.
As a consequence of this we would assume that in the first place 
labour can be made to bear more of the 'costs of capital' (than vice 
versa) through a system of joint regulation: to the extent that these 
are the more easily passed on as a result of gross inequalities of power 
between capital and labour which are institutionalised in the bargaining 
process. (And it has to be borne in mind that employers only have to 
negotiate the imposition of these costs "at the margin" because they already 
retain their unilateral 'managerial prerogatives'). We do not preclude 
there being particular historical conjunctures when the 'terms of trade' 
may be pushed slightly the other way. From our point of view though, 
this may be less significant than the fact that any bargain entails the 
exchange of costs as well as benefits. And it is with the nature and 
distribution of these, particularly on labour’s side, that this study 
is chiefly concerned. Thus, it should not necessarily be supposed that 
those benefits accruing to labour will be distributed equally within 
labour's ranks. Nor, indeed, that any costs, however grudgingly or 
willingly acquiesced, will be equally borne. For certain sections may be 
better placed than others to avoid their impact, and to gain at, what
may turn out to be, another group's expense.
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All these strands of our argument can now be drawn together and 
our hypothesis simply stated. As a consequence of sexual inequalities 
structuring class relationships the distribution of costs and benefits 
(effected by means of collective bargaining) within the ranks of labour 
will be systematically unequal. Male workers will reap a greater share 
of the reward. As a consequence of the competitive struggle over its 
distribution internally, the strongest groups will come to dominate the 
union's organisational structure. On the other hand, women workers are 
likely to bear more of the costs imposed by capital and mediated by 
collective bargaining - to the extent that these can be effectively 
passed on to them by both the employers and male workers who are in a 
stronger bargaining position. Given the nature of these costs, as a 
consequence of this distribution pattern, the women workers' bargaining 
resources will be reduced and their bargaining strength in relation to 
the employer, the trade union as an institution and other (male) workers, 
will be further diminished.
The dominance of strong groups of male workers in the institutional 
structures will result in some proportion of their gains being redistributed 
internally, and 'passed on' as costs to the women workers - whose capacity 
to reverse the direction of distribution via institutional means is 
correspondingly further undermin d.
The relative lack of representation of women workers in the organ­
isation in proportion to male workers and in proportion to their own 
numbers» and also their relative lack of bargaining strength, have thus 
to some degree to be seen as an outcome. They are a consequence of the 
institutionalisation of both the distribution of costs and benefits between 
workers and employers and their unequal distribution within the ranks of
labour, by collective bargaining processes
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Moreover, it should be clear that such an outcome as we have hypo­
thesised need not be seen as being confined to women (although the power 
relationship between men and women is a highly particular one). Our 
proposition that the actions of stronger groups can serve to weaken further 
the position of the less strong, when both 'compete' in an arena which 
'assumes' their equality - has a general relevance.
Apart from the direct implications for groups of workers, we also 
need to consider the impact of those processes and relationships discussed 
on the organisation and the institutional structures. And this con­
stitutes the second strand of our hypothesis. We would propose that 
the distribution of costs as well as benefits between workers and employers 
on the one hand, and on unequal distribution of these within labour's 
ranks on the other, will render the institutional structures of bargaining 
and representation increasingly unresponsive to the membership as a 
whole and to certain sectors of it in particular.
In the first place, there is the institutional need to sustain the 
bargaining relationship, which exerts the requirement that agreements are 
'kept' and 'costs' (arising from the employer) are borne on the members' 
side. But this relationship is inherently instable because the employers' 
demands are also the source of the members' problems, needs and demands - 
which are processed through the same representational structures. Thus 
considerable control may have to be exerted through the members' own 
organisations over themselves, to sustain stability in the bargaining 
relationship at an institutional level.
In the second place, unequal distribution on the members' side also 
renders internal relationships unstable. Stronger groups strive to 
secure domination of the organisational structures in order to secure
their gains, and weaker groups seek to effect a change in the pattern 
of distribution in their favour. Again the need for stability engenders 
a requirement for increasingly strong institutional controls over the 
membership as a whole.
The overall consequence of both of these we would surmise,is a con­
tinuous process of "undemocracy" and increasing bureaucratic control. 
Although this has also to be seen in relation to an equally persistent 
process of démocratisation as groups in the membership - such as the 
women members today - attempt to increase the responsiveness of their 
organisations to their needs.
This view of institutional 'responsiveness' (and the processes which 
determine it) is important if we are attempting to explain the strength 
and effectiveness of - in this case - women workers in relation to trade 
unions or their employers. Because this can only be properly assessed 
if we have some view of the bargaining strength and resources required. 
And, if, as may be the case given the predominant pattern of distribution 
proposed, the representational and bargaining structures are rendered 
particularly unresponsive from such as the women's point of view, these
processes clearly must constitute a significant part of our analysis.
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Footnotes
(1) See Joseph White (1978).
(2) It could be argued that a further set of relationships - that 
between the 'rank and file' and the 'bureaucracy ' - should be 
listed here because it is so crucial to shaping trade union org­
anisation and practice. But despite their significance we have 
not designated these as 'primary* in the same sense because they are 
constituted by the institution in the first instance.
These relationships are important in this thesis however, as we are 
concerned with examining (the processes of) trade union democracy - 
and in explaining patterns of power and control within the organ­
isation. Our approach is informed by Herding's critique of 
writers whose perspective is limited by the framework of organisation 
theory. This seeks to explain organisational behaviour in terms 
of internal structures and fails - in relation to trade unions - 
because it can neither accommodate these organisations' bases in 
relations of conflict or their essentially mediating role. Herding 
(1972) pp.65-70. We would therefore argue that the internal 
structure of power within trade unions can only be explained by 
analysis combining inter and intra-organisational relationships.
"The actual government of a trade union really 
depends on the relationships between three groups: 
its full-time officials, that proportion of its 
lay members which takes an active part in the 
union's management and the usually more passive 
majority of the rank and file."
Turner (1962) p.289
To which we would add a fourth - the employers and increasingly, 
a fifth - the state through its intervening agencies.
(3) These three aims are linked in the sense that they are all central 
to the wage workers' interest in self-protection which is also, 
since the commodity is indivisible from the individual, an interest 
in preserving their capacity to labour. There is nothing, bar 
their struggle, to stop the employer destroying this capacity by, 
for example, "consuming labour" at too rapid a rate or subjecting 
workers to injurious conditions. 4
(4) "We do believe that it is useful to subject agreements to analysis 
in terms of both sides of the employment relationship: achievement 
and reward." (McKensie and Hunter (1973) p.116)
emphasis in original

CHAPTER 3 INTRODUCING THE FIRM AND ITS WORKFORCE
This chapter is an introduction to the firm and the workforce 
which made it successful. It is divided into three parts. First, 
there is a brief profile of the company: outlining the product, 
where it was produced and where it was sold. It is soon clear 
that this market environment posed some tricky problems for the 
manufacturer. But BSR, for a decade flourished, rather in the 
manner of a cuckoo, in this highly competitive "nest". The
company's development is charted in a short history which, taking 
us up to 1981, is marked by three periods of rapid and dramatic 
growth, decline and re-establishment. While the story still 
continues, the stage has now been shifted to the other side of the 
world. Our study is situated in what turned out to be BSR's 
two most successful years of production in this country.
The workforce was (and still is) predominantly female. In 
the second part of this chapter we outline the labour force structure 
and ask, why did this employer require women workers? Noting that 
the employment profile of female labour generally is,in many ways, 
distinctive, we are particularly interested in what patterns the 
employers' requirements and, therefore, his demand for (female) 
labour in the market. We find that aspects such as price and 
availability are important considerations, as are the costs of its 
utilisation or consumption in the labour process. But the 
analytical focus cannot stop at this point. And we argue that it 
is only when the employer's use of labour power in the labour 
process and demand in the labour market is seen in relation to 
those other markets wherein they are sellers, that the specific 
characteristics of female as averse to male labour power can be
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comprehended. Broadening our focus, therefore, to a perspective 
which views how both labour and product markets are mediated through 
the labour process, we look at how BSR's labour-force "requirements" 
were patterned. One consequence of this perspective is that 
questions about the costs for the employer of "stable" and "unstable 
characteristics" attributed to different sections of the labour 
force, have to be re-posed. For example, labour force "stability", 
where the employer requires "flexibility" is problematic. We then go 
on to look more closely at how the different pattern of "requirements" 
is translated by the employer into a complex and changing labour force 
structure, by examining the use of full-time and part-time workers 
at BSR.
But maintaining a focus on the needs and requirements of the 
employer is insufficient, if we are also interested to explore the 
problems and needs of the workforce. Can we assume that the 
flexibility and stability which the employment of married women in 
particular affords, is unproblematic from the latter's point of view? 
Indeed we find that a shift of perspective again has the consequence 
of re-posing questions: and this time about the meaning and costs 
of "flexibility"in relation to the recruitment of women workers.
(In later chapters we go on to note the costs (to themselves) of 
the flexible utilisation and disposition of their labour power as 
well).
It is not surprising to find such shifts in meaning associated 
with an alteration of perspective. Because in both instances where 
we note this occurs, the focus of attention is on relationships 
which are essentially contradictory under the capitalist mode of
production. In the first place there is a contradiction between
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the order and regulation prevailing in the workplace and the 
anarchy of market relations outside, and this underpins our view 
of how both markets are mediated through the labour process. In 
the second place, there is a fundamental contradiction between the 
interests specified and priorities imposed by capital accumulation 
and those of our human condition. And this underpins our view of 
women workers' position as being the most crucial of all, because it 
is through them that these contradictory needs are mediated.
Thus each of the following chapters is divided into (at least) 
two parts, and the implications of management's production policy is 
in each case (re)considered from the (women) workers' point of view.
We begin, however, with this introduction to the firm and the workforce
which was recruited.
In 1977, when the study began, BSR employed 16,000 people. 
There were 10,000 full-time workers in addition to which, some
6,000 - a high proportion - were employed on a part-time basis.
They made record-changers and record player mechanisms for 
"original equipment manufacturers" (known as the OEM sector), 
that is the production of parts for incorporation into record 
players produced by other manufacturers with their own brand name.
As it had grown, the group had diversified into household 
consumer goods - holloware (pots and pans) and electrical 
appliances - so they now also made Swan electric kettles and 
Goblin "teasmade" and vacuum cleaners. But the sound reproduction 
division remained dominant, employing some 10,000 people, most of 
them women in five factories. Four of these were grouped within 
a few miles of each other in part of the Birmingham "Black Country" 
Cradley Heath and Stourbridge; the other, opened in 1964, was 
located at East Kilbride, situated in the new town's trading estate 
It is with the Birmingham factories, that this study is mainly 
concerned.
THE FACTORIES
The bulk of production came from three of the four factories. 
From these was produced complete record changers - the reliable, 
"mass-produced" low cost units - which were the basic, electric 
motor driven, mechanical models. The largest output and greatest 
number of "lines" came from the Stourbridge factory, with Old Hill 
(the original plant) next and Waterfall Lane (from 1969) producing 
on a much smaller scale. However, these three plants were also
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technologically inter-dependent: the automatic machine shop at 
Old Hill produced most of the turned metal parts, the motor s were 
made at Waterfall Lane, and the polystyrene plant at Stourbridge 
produced packing materials for the group. The fourth factory, 
Garratts Lane, was a new site, only opened in February 1976, 
where production of new models to compete at the "top end” of 
the electronic hi-fi market (and also vacuum cleaners), was just 
beginning and not yet fully established.
Two characteristics of the "Black Country" factories are 
worth noting from the outset. First, the majority of BSR's 
Sound Reproduction Division employees were women. Of the 8,000 
people working in these Birmingham factories, under 2,000
were men. Secondly, the workers made and assembled record-player 
components from scratch and in such large numbers, that very few 
parts were bought in from outside.(Management boasted at one time, 
that the only thing they couldn't make cheaper themselves, were 
the screws).
PRODUCTION AND ASSEMBLY
The largest amount of fixed capital in terms of plant and 
machinery was utilised in the basic production processes, whereby 
individual parts were created from the raw materials. These processes 
included: plastic moulding ^  (machinery operated by women
workers)> polystyrene expansion (plant operated by male workers); 
and metal working (performed by men and women workers) which involved 
machining, stamping and pressing components, most of which went 
through further treatment processes, e.g. plating or painting 
(involving both men and women workers), prior to assembly.
In contrast to the basic production processes, assembly 
operations were highly labour intensive and entirely carried out 
by women. In the sub-assemblies individual parts were put together 
with glue, screws or solder, using little machinery. In the main, 
the women worked with smaller bench tools or by hand alone, 
constructing the basic components of the mechanism such as the turn­
table or the pick-up arm. They mostly worked in groups at benches, 
passing the work along* Out some, particularly the smaller 
components, were assembled by individual women working at separate 
stations. Final construction of the whole mechanism was done 
by women assembling the basic components on a moving track. This 
was considered by both management and workers as the hardest and 
most stressful work, and young girls were especially liable to find 
themselves on this job. The unit was built up, held in the framework 
of a jig, at stations along the conveyor. Tested and inspected on 
the way, it was packed complete as it came off the end of the line.
MARKETS
About 90% of record player production was exported: 70% going
to the USA and around 10% each going to Europe and Japan. But
while European sales seemed relatively steady over the decade 1969-
1979, rapid expansion in the Japanese market indicated that this
was developing as the company's second largest export area.
Producing in very high volume,low cost units with a narrow profit
margin on each,by the mid-1970's BSR had managed to establish virtually
a world-wide monopoly, supplying record changers and components to
manufacturers of complete record players at the cheap end of the
( 2)market.
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Ability to produce units in sufficiently high numbers was 
a crucial aspect of success both in terms of the maintenance of 
profit levels (as the margin on each unit was cut) and market 
dominance. A commanding position, whereby most major customers 
would be fully supplied, seemed to require production levels of 
around 150,000 to 185,000 units per week (at the "right price") 
in the early - mid-1970's. BSR management built up productive 
capacity under stringent cost controls in order to achieve this.
Output levels increased staggeringly. In 1962 the group produced 
around 30,000 units per week. In 1977-8 they made 250,000 per 
week, supplying 20-30 different types of record changer/player.
In this competitive arena, however, market dominance can bring 
only fragile security. BSR faced two particular problems: the 
control of retail outlets by large-scale corporations and seasonal 
product demand. Apart from the fact that such consumer goods 
markets as this are notoriously unstable, this sphere was 
dominated by massive retail corporations, such as Tandy, both in the 
USA and Japan. With international chains controlling the bulk 
distribution outlets, these retailers - powerful customers, from 
the producer's point of view - constitute the market itself.
They deny, even to a monopoly producer, that degree of security which 
can be derived from some direct market control and competition between 
customers. Indeed, such is the retailer's power, where they exert 
dominant control over distribution, that the producer can be put 
under constant pressure. These powerful customers then, taking 
huge bulk consignments on short-period orders, could instantly pass 
on the consequences of a fall in demand or loss of competitiveness 
with devastating results for the producer.
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Moreover, the pattern of demand was far from even. The 
peak selling period was Christmas. Accordingly, orders built 
up in the spring and summer and hopefully, production was full- 
scale into autumn. In December and the New Year, however, the 
market was dead for at least three months, picking up in the 
soring - April,May - then again after the June Trade Fair, 
where new styles were launched^ in what was also a fickle and fashion 
conscious market. Where retailers are unable or disinclined 
to hold stocks, large-scale producers are forced to do so themselves; 
if only because they could not otherwise fulfill the massive orders 
in time when they eventually came.
For this reason, BSR wholly-owned a dozen subsidiary 
distribution companies covering every part of the world where the 
product was sold in appreciable numbers. All production in the 
early part of the year was built for stock - a time of tension until 
orders flowed once again. Hit by the American recession in 1974--75, 
for example, the company was left holding some 10 million units in 
stock. Production for stock imposes, if anything, greater pressures 
on cost control, since warehousing increases the unit cost and it 
may, ultimately, be necessary to lower prices still more, in order 
to clear them.
It is apparent, therefore, even from this brief over-view, 
that BSR management were continuously under a great deal of pressure 
to maintain efficiency in order to preserve both their profits 
and their markets; in a sphere of intense competition between 
existing producers jostling to find space for further growth through 
market expansion. In addition, the possibilities of production at
the "lower-end” of the market proved a constant attraction to
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manufacturers in third-world countries. Initially, no doubt 
because the relatively low levels of technology involved with 
mechanical players and the labour, rather than capital, intensive 
nature of the production process.
"We had some visitors from Korea the other day - 
we only showed them a very small part of 
our production area, but now we have it on 
good authority that they will only be customers 
of ours for a couple of years. Then they will 
become our competitors".
Tony Stuart (Industrial Relations Director)(3)
BSR: A Short History
Given problems such as these, the firm succeeded to quite an 
improbable degree - as a short history of the company will show.
This can be divided into three immediate periods which followed upon 
some lO years of steady growth.
The original company, founded in 1932, by a Dr Daniel Macdonald 
made medical equipment and only began making automatic record 
changers in 1952, before going public in 1957. 10 years later a
"palace revolution" installed John Ferguson, the company secretary 
(ex-Ceylon tea plantation) as managing director and chairman of
the Board. However, it took until 1971 to buy the Macdonald
(4)
family out of BSR, and in the meantime the founder had set up 
another company, Glenburn, in direct competition with the original 
firm - declaring that he "was only in production of record 
changers to reduce the swollen heads of others in the field".
An aggressive, anti-union and autocratic employer, Macdonald finally 
sold Glenburn to BSR for E4 million in 1975 and took himself off
to Switzerland
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p e r i o d OF RAPID GROWTH: 1971-1976/77
The company maintained an impressive record of growth 
in the decade to 1976. Profits in 1966 were £1.8million.
Around 1971-2 however, they rtally started to take-off, and by 
1976 profits reached a record level of £28.8 million.
At this point, the firm owned a string of companies, having 
bought up some essential suppliers as part of a process of 
vertical integration; set up subsidiaries abroad which were 
basically selling organisations; and taken over manufacturers 
such as Bulpitts (Swan brand) in 1971, and Goblin in 1975, in 
an effort to diversify into household goods. These latter
efforts, however, failed to rescue the company from excessive 
reliance on a very narrow base,partly because of the domestic market 
doldrums in this period.
Production of autochangers for export markets on the other hand 
expanded rapidly. Between 1972 and 1976 the company's turnover 
increased by over 25% and profits by nearly 50%. The Sound 
Reproduction Division continued to contribute some 80% of total 
turnover and a good 90% of total profits in these years. The main 
centres of production for this division were two factories in the 
West Midlands, Old Hill and Stourbridge (both of which were 
enlarged 1971-72), and one at East Kilbride.
Highly susceptible to fluctuations in the American economy,
BSR was hit by the 1974-5 recession. 1800 workers were made 
redundant and the rest put on a short working week from January, 
until stocks were cleared and orders picked up - well into the 
Spring. Management made the most of this opportunity to rationalise
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their operations and quickly shed "unnecessary" labour.
Ultimately business picked up extremely rapidly and maximum profits 
and output were achieved between 1976-77.
The company, holding 60% of the world market for record- 
changers, now looked "up-market" for further growth, launching, 
in February 1976, an expensive unit called Accutrac incorporating 
new electronic features. Record tracks could be selected 
automatically with a remote control transmitter, by means of an 
electronic eye in the pick-up arm and a computerised memory bank. 
Production began at Garretts Lane, a newly built factory - but it 
was not easy to break in to the competitive hi-fi arena.
RAPID DECLINE 1978-80
Sales slumped again in 1978 with another American recession, 
but now the high pound and interest rates cut back cost- 
competitiveness, and the Japanese began to move in - aided by a weak 
yen and selling at a loss (it was believed) - to capture the low- 
price markets. From April 1979 BSR's workforce was on a short 
week and in November one of the 3 plants at East Kilbride was 
closed with the loss of 1,000 jobs. The company made a loss that 
year, but took steps to cut back production at an extremely rapid 
rate. The situation did not improve. By 1980 the yen was 
weaker and the pound stronger against the dollar, further diminishing 
cost-competitiveness/ reflected in loss of sales.
In addition, other trends were working against the company.
The U.S. hi-fi market was especially depressed because the 
"youth bulge" had worked its way through, diminishing the younger 
(15-25) age group which bought so-called "medium-fi" players.
More significantly, over the past 2 years fashion had definitely beg 
to swing away from mechanical auto-changers to low-cost electronic 
music»centres incorporating single play, direct drive turntables 
(as in hi-fi) and cassette players.
Looking to develop new products, the company bought into a 
Hong Kong electronics firm, Astec International, and advertised 
two new lines: DBX "hiss suppressors" for tapes (in competition 
with Dolby) and X-IO remote control "energy-switches" for electronic 
equipment and lighting, which had been developed with the Accutrac 
hi-fi unit.
But their main-stay,the changer-market, was dead and throughout 
1980 workers were on short time and management continued to 
"shed labour", the vast majority of them women. In February
1980, 1200 in the West Midlands were made redundant and in June, 
the Waterfall Lane factory (once employing 1,500) was closed 
when a further 2,300 were laid-off. 1,700 of these redundancies 
were at East Kilbride, where changer production was finished 
altogether and the "Macdonald Electric" factory closed down (BSR 
with a workforce of 2,500 - mostly young women, had once been the 
new town's second largest employer).
The rapidity with which these adjustments had been made 
impressed the stock market which continued to show confidence in 
the company, despite appalling financial results. They liked what 
they called the company's "leaner" appearance. In October 1980 
BSR were still producing 90,000 units a week,(with even cheaper new 
lines) and following stringent rationalisation, even more 
"efficiently" than before. In addition, the household products
division (also "slimmed down")had held up fairly well. Over the 
year the total work-force declined from 15,418 to 10,95g, with 
the loss of 4,500 jobs.
At the beginning of 1381 BSR announced greater financial 
losses, £17*3 million. Sales of both audio equipment and consumer 
products had continued to fall - the latter being sold at a loss 
in order to maintain market position during the current UK recession. 
For shareholders, there was at last,however, a ray of sunshine - 
in the East.
RE-ESTABLISHMENT 1981 -
"BSR is tackling the problems of a falling market 
and a strong pound by moving out to use cheaper 
labour in a different product area".
Financial Times 9.5.81
The company had begun a rapid evacuation of capital into 
the new international (non-consumer) electronics field with the 
acquisition in May 1980 of a majority-holding in Astec International, 
the Hong Kong computer power-pack subsidiary - where business was 
booming. This factory, caking microprocessor (chip) controlled 
switchgear and computer equipment and selling to North American 
based computer companies, had been considerably expanded within 
twelve months of its purchase. And in May 1981 it was announced 
that BSR was buying Capetronic International Corporation, with five 
factories in Taiwan and one in Chicago. At the time of acquisition 
the firm produced a range of cassette-receivers, clock radios and 
other "high-volume" consumer items. It was planned to run this side 
of production down as the computer business expanded. The company 
was to be integrated with Astec International to produce a range of 
computer - peripherals; switching systems, monitors, printers and
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terminals. Announcing this purchase the chairman, John Ferguson, 
noted "the resulting far-eastern division of BSR will have 0.7m 
sq.ft of factory space and employ more than 5,000 people"
(Financial Times 6.5.81).
In one bound, it seems, b SR had shifted capital to a new
labour force, new territory, new political state, new technology,
new product, and new customers in non-consumer markets. As the
Glasgow Herald ruefully observ’d:
"In a short space of time BSR will effectively 
become a Far Eastern electronics group".
Glasgow Herald 6.5.81.
We now go on to introduce the workforce on which the company's 
development in this country had been based.
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PART 2 : THE WORKFORCE
A predominant characteristic of the capitalist mode of 
production is the contrast between order and regulation prevailing 
within the workplace and the cnarchy of market relations outside.
BSR provides a good example of this relationship: the firm’s 
position as seller in a highly competitive, unregulated and unstable 
product market called for a high degree of regulation and control 
within the production process. Prior to this, however, a producer 
has also to operate in the market as a buyer, purchasing both 
materials and labour power.
In this part, the relationship between the firm as a buyer 
and consumer of labour power is examined in order to explain some 
aspects of the labour force structure. Why did this employer 
require women workers?
STRUCTURE
BSR was heavily dependent on women workers both full-time and 
part-time. Just how dependent they were on the latter is shown 
in table 1.
From 1965 to 1977, the numbers employed part-time never fell 
below 35% and usually it was closer to, or above, 40%. This was clearly 
a conscious policy to expand part-time working since the actual 
number of part-time workers trebled in this period.
Such overall figures tend to obscure local variations and Table 
2 shows the disproportionate dependence of the three main Black 
Country factories on part-time work. In 1977, some 55% of the hourly 
paid workers did less than 374 hours per week, the vast majority 
being women workers, of whom 65% worked part-time. As Table 3 shows.
THE WORKFORCE
TABLE 1: BSR WORKFORCE 1968-79, SHOWING FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME
WORKERS.
Total Employees
Full-time Part-time TOTAL %Part-time
1968 2910 1992 4902 41
1969 2990 2276 5266 43
1970 3126 2451 5577 44
1971 6413 3440 9853 35
1972 7897 4388 12285 36
1973 10326 5702 16028 36
1974 10239 6474 16713 39
1975 8135 5319 13454 40 )
1976 10090 5932 16022 37 ) steady
1977 10106 5593 15699 36 ) reduction
1978 10841 5238 16079 33 )
1979 11600 4731 16331 29 )
Source: Company Reports.
Table 2: COMPOSITION OF BSR LABOUR FORCE BY SEX AND HOURS
WORKED IN 3 WEST MIDLAND FACTORIES AT OCTOBER 1977
Hours per week Old Hill Waterfall
Lane
Stourbridge TOTAL
40 813 268 1191 2272
27*3 247 34 393 674 )
224 367 199 504 1070 )
21'» - 215 _ 215 > a i m20 343 144 820 1307 ) 4191
174 354 197 374 925 )
2124 1057 3282 6463
40 342 45 304
6 9 1  > 1 1 Q S374 150 215 139 504 ) 1195
224 _ 9 _ 9 )
20 27 - 14 41 ) 69
174 - 7 12 19 )
519 276 469 1264
2643 1333 3751 7727
Source Inbucon (1977)
TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE BSR WORKFORCE EMPLOYED FOR UNDER 30HRS 
PER WEEK AT 3 WEST MIDLAND FACTORIES (OCTOBER 1977)
Old Hill Waterfall Lane Stourbridge
Females as % females 
employed 62% 75% 64%
Males as % males employed 5% 6% 6%
TOTALOO hrs as % 
total employed 55%
Source: Inbucon (1977)
in one factory. Waterfall Lane, 75% of the women worked part-time. 
Taking the three factories together, 84% of the workforce were 
women.
RECRUITMENT
"The company has (also) been very flexible in 
its recruitment policies and has attracted 
and retained a lot of its workers by tapping 
sources not much drawn on by other companies.
It recruits a lot of older women. Although 
it prefers full-time employees for most jobs, 
it offers part-time work as well and is very 
flexible about the hours that can be worked 
in order to attract married women with young 
children (...) the company has undertaken 
recruitment drives at places up to IO to 15 miles 
away. By these means it has been able to 
achieve the increases in manpower (sic) ... 
despite the difficulties in recruiting women 
for full-time work in East Kilbride".
CIR (1970) p.5
BSR required stable reserves of low-priced labour from which 
sufficient numbers could be drawn to facilitate rapid expansion 
when required - both for seasonal variations and to fuel the 
company's period of growth. Women workers provided such a reserve.
First, seasonal requirements were traditionally met by the
crop of female school-leavers who were regularly available just
at the time the company was planning full production to meet the new
season's orders. The chairman's comments (in February 1976)
illustrate this pattern:
"I'm confident for the rest of the year. If 
the economy picks up, we'll have to increase 
production still further, but we're not taking 
such action yet. We'll get a boost from school 
leavers and then we'll boost production in the 
second half of the year. But now - at the 
moment, we're concentrating on building up stocks".
John Ferguson(Managing Director ( (7)
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But, secondly, growth in the longer term required more 
complex developments. By 1979 BSR as a whole employed over
16,000 people (see Table 1) , some 300% above that of ten years 
earlier. This expansion had taken place at an extremely rapid 
rate: between 1968 and 1973 - in five years alone - growth in
employment was around 270%. The BSR approach was to seek and 
achieve an expansion of the labour force, as the CIR points out, 
in three main ways: widening the sphere of recruitment; laying 
on coaches to bring workers in from outlying areas; and by
running a variety of part-time shifts which brought in the women
(8 )who were not available for full-time hours.
Consequently, labour force structure was extremely complicated.
Just over one third of 6,500 hourly paid women workers in the 3
West Midlands factories worked full-time in 1977. The full eight
hour day ran from 8 a.m. - 4.45 p.m., with %hr unpaid lunch and a
ten minute break in the morning and afternoon. Nearly 50% of the
part-time women workers were employed on "Morning" (8 a.m. - 12.30 p.m.
and "afternoon" (1.15 p.m. - 4.45 p.m.) shifts, making up "full-time
(9)equivalents". A further 16% worked the "school mothers"
shifts (9.30 a.m. - 3.30 p.m. with 30 minute unpaid lunch break) of 
27*j hours. Finally, one third of the women part-timers worked 
a four hour shift (6.0 a.m. - 10 a.m., 10.0 a.m. - 2.0 p.m., 2.0 p.m.
- 6.0 p.m. or 6.0 p.m 10.0 p.m) which meant a 20 hour week (10)
WBI
The employer's demand for women workers
Given the need for labour which is both abundant and cheap, 
it is not difficult to explain this employer's decision to purchase 
female labour power, if only 1ecause of its price and availability 
in the market. But are these the sole criteria underlying this 
choice? When, for example, the company opened a factory in 
Londonderry, employment subsidies were only available for young 
males - also in cheap and abundant supply. These workers were not 
found satisfactory however, and it is clear that BSR preferred 
to employ women workers in certain areas of production. It would, 
therefore, seem necessary to examine more closely the structure 
of employers' demand for female labour.
It is apparent, for example, that large areas of employment 
are closed to women in general such as certain industries, types of 
work and work relations. They are largely excluded, for instance, 
from employment which entails some degree of autonomy or authority 
and particularly so, from positions of control - either direct, or 
mediated by the operation of machinery - over the activities of men. 
Crowded as women then are, within the narrow range of occupations 
open to them, the type of work which is offered varies little.
Thus manual factory work designated "women*s"everywhere involves 
repetition of "minimal" tasks in a controlled environment for low 
pay. Thus, structured demand and the consequent lack of alternatives, 
do to an important extent, themselves ensure a high degree of 
availability (and therefore "docility") of female labour for such 
kinds of work. It does not, however, necessarily explain the kind 
of work made available, and neither does the women's availability 
by itself explain the employers' demand for them to do it.
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The consequences of gender divisions in the labour market 
for female workers are plain to see - because women occupy such 
highly specific areas of employment (they are also the most highly 
exploitative) . But the causes of this patterning and the 
processes underlying it are less adequately understood. The main 
reason is probably because such explanations as are provided fend 
toward circularity, relying or. a description of (women's) supply- 
side characteristics — from which the employer's demand patterns are 
simply read off. (i.e. they "demand" the type of labour which is 
available), e.g. Barron and Morris (1976). But what precisely is 
required? And what patterns these requirements? Hence the 
usual approach does nothing to explain why some employers are more 
dependent than others on female labour. Nor why employers in 
specific industrial sectors are increasingly so dependent. Both
of which, female growth patterns in national and International labour
( 12 )force statistics indicate to be the case.
We would,therefore, argue that in order to analyse women's 
employment patterns more adequately it is necessary to examine more 
exactly how the "demand and supply sides" of the female labour 
market are linked. This, of necessity, must also entail taking a 
more sophisticated view of the former, especially. Thus,while the 
purchase and sale of labour power, taking place in the sphere of 
circulation, can be considered separately, at the theoretical 
level, from its utilisation or consumption within the, labour process, 
there remain,nevertheless, definite links between the pattern of 
employers' demand for and their use of labour. The main criteria 
governing the purchase of labour power in the market concern its 
availability and price. Ultimately, however, it is the cost of 
labour in relation to the final product (i.e. its productivity)
which is crucial to profitability. In this way, the labour 
market (purchase of labour power) and labour process (consumption 
of labour power) are brought together.
An example of how the two are conceptually linked already 
can be seen in relation to absenteeism and labour turnover. These 
terms, which refer to quitting and layoffs occurring at the 
instigation of workers rather than employers, together largely 
constitute the concept of "labour (market) instability". And 
the dominant conception has this inextricably linked with labour's 
higher costs of consumption. Thus, while both are aspects of 
workers' labour market behaviour (when and where their labour is 
offered) they are nevertheless, considered to incur costs for 
employers through a destabilising impact on the labour process 
(which is ultimately reflected in lower productivity). We would 
argue that there are problems with this assessment.
What are the sources of such "instability"? This tends to 
vary with gender: such "instability" among male workers is usually 
associated with (temporary) labour market features such as high wages 
and full employment; whereas amongst female workers, explanations 
focus on fixed supply-side characteristics viz their domestic 
responsibilities. Perhaps the main reason the latter are judged the 
more costly to employ is because they deviate furthest from the concept 
of "free wage labour".
The specific employment characteristics attached to different 
groups of workers - male, female, married, single -selling their 
labour on the market can all be more broadly related to the common 
underlying factor of economic need, the support of individuals or of 
non wage-earners within the family, being primarily (although 
to a varying degree) dependent on the wage income of "free wage
labourers". It is this dependence that underpins the 
concept of workers' "commitment to employment" - most directly 
associated with notions of "labour stability" and its "costs of 
consumption" for employers. Clearly, however, this will vary with 
workers' differing relationships to this support system (and that 
provided by the state, for example). Viewed at this level, women 
workers, whose economic dependence on an employer may be offset, 
to some degree, by their economic dependence on a husband, and 
whose own dependents may, in addition, constitute a strong alternative 
commitment in competition with their own employment,must serve to 
qualify a simple free (male) wage labour model. But because they 
are viewed as "deviant", the specificity of their situation and the 
implications of this (does it necessarily make their labour more 
costly to consume?), together with differentiations within their 
own ranks, remain unexplored beyond a superficial level, both 
theoretically and empirically. As a result the nature of employers' 
specific demand for female labour remains inadequately explained.
Yet neither, it would appear, is the specificity of the employers 
situation examined in any way that can adequately explain (beyond its 
low purchase price), why some are more dependent than others on 
female labour. As a result, in many discussions about the employment 
of female labour, the impression is given that this choice by employers 
is in the nature of a last resort. That under "normal circumstances" 
they would prefer male workers, but because of full employment, for 
example these workers are unavailable and/or too expensive. A female 
workforce is more readily available and at a lower price, but at 
considerable cost to themselves, employers have to tinker with 
working hours, and tolerate higher absenteeism and labour turnover.
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Women workers are, therefore, considered contradictory in that 
their labour power is cheap to buy but, apparently, more expensive 
to consume.
"In these circumstances (recruiting older women 
and women with young children) it was only to be 
expected that one of the prices the company has to 
pay has been a relatively high rate of labour 
turnover". CIR (1970) p.5 (my emphasis).
On the other hand, there may be more complex links between 
the employer's demand for and use of female labour. This is 
where arguments referring to women's apparently inherent, sex- 
related attributes of "docility" and "dexterity", are often to be 
found. Although comparative studies confirming that lower labour costs 
do, consistently, derive specifically from these sources (rather 
than the low pay rates these valuable attributes are rewarded with), 
are difficult to find. In any case, we need to ask:
are these "special attributes", or indeed, any other so called sex- 
specific skills (like "caring"), the only positive reasons - apart 
from low wages - that would lead employers to prefer women workers?
We would argue that it is necessary to go beyond a focus on 
the labour process, and that only when the employers use of labour 
power and demand in the labour market is seen in relation to those 
other markets, wherein the employers are sellers, can a full enough 
picture emerge. One moreover, which allows us to understand the 
increasing use of the labour of married women in general, in the 
context of complicated developments taking place in the structure 
of production and product markets in advanced capitalism.
We have already noted the characteristic disjuncture, which 
prevails overall, between "anarchy" in the commodity - labour and 
product - markets and regulation in the labour process. But how are 
both markets related and mediated through the labour process? We
return to the example of BSR
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The costs of stability?
As we have seen BSR's recruitment policy was tailored as 
far as possible to meet production needs with*the constraints of 
labour market supplies. Wo len workers, in general, offered 
the advantages of cheapness and availability in terms of market 
reserves, which could readily be drawn upon when required. At 
this point we can take up our earlier discussion about the links 
between employers' demands for and use of labour. What costs , 
for instance, were associated with the utilisation of women 
workers? What was the nature of the "labour stability" 
required?
Two points are worth considering immediately. First, that 
female labour is considered more expensive to utilise because it 
is more "unstable"; secondly, that the pattern of BSR's demand for 
labour was itself, largely unstable.
In this discussion we shall therefore have cause to question 
the opinion of the CIR that the high turnover of women workers was 
"a price the company had to pay".
In the "bad old days", Macdonald had a straightforward method 
of coping with unwanted workers. He simply sent them down the 
road.
"Actually, when I went to Fry's I came here for 
an interview for a job and I could have had a job, 
they were just starting this factory then. And I 
know: I lived at Old Hill, where the factory was -
(it was) before they built this one (...) And he 
used ... the girls up there used to - they'd walk 
home, middle of the day, and he'd sacked 500 of them 
like that - Macdonald. He'd just have a fit and 
he'd sack 500. Then he'd open up the factory and 
start everybody back on again, you know. What a 
funny fella to work for!" Madge (Moulding Shop) (14)
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It could be argued that both then and now, the labour of 
women workers is easier to dispense with. If styles of 
management have changed or, in the years of expansion, the number 
of occasions necessitating similar action diminished, this does not 
alter the underlying rationale which still remains. Female labour 
power can be utilised more economically because the numbers employed 
(or total labour hours) can be rapidly adjusted according to output 
requirements.
".... we wanted more labour at that point in time, 
and we took them on. In actual fact it was an 
accident. They put the advert in for Garretts Lane - 
they intended the advert, for Garrett's Lane, and put 
Stourbridge's address. But we were looking for 
labour at the same time, so we just reaped the labour 
in when we wanted them. And at that time we were 
pushing up to a fairly high level of production for 
the Christmas period. It will drop off afterwards - 
we're not taking anybody on at all now. So natural 
wastage - we're losing about 20 a week, so natural 
wastage allows it to drop right down again. Then 
possibly round about April, March - when we want more 
output - take labour on. We are very fortunate, in 
the fact that there is a fairly high wastage amongst 
females - we can pinch further output back then, 
quite conveniently".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (15)
This latter feature - especially the downwards flexibility it 
afforded - was of utmost significance to the company, given its 
market environment.. While periodic crises might require rapid 
mass redundancies (as in 1974-5), cyclical slumps could be taken 
care of by natural wastage in a regular and rather convenient way. 
Given the pressure on profit margins per unit, the amount of labour 
used in relation to output had to be closely controlled and 
constantly adjusted. Stability for a firm producing in this 
product market depended essentially upon the kind of flexibility 
which the employment of married women workers in particular, could
afford (This is not to suggest that the company's and the women's
preferences matched. As we shall see below, "natural wastage" 
can be a rather misleading term). Furthermore, the consistently 
high turnover made redundancies relatively inexpensive if they 
were required.
In addition to this, the employment of part-time workers 
especially, provided further means of adjusting the amount of labour 
utilised. With employees working, as a matter of course, a variety 
of different hours ranging between 174 - 40 per week - some fairly
fine tuning could be effected by developing or cutting an ne of
half a dozen different shifts. While on "special occasions" 
a twilight shift could be, and was, started or stopped as required.
The company employed women rather than men because of the low 
price and the flexible availability of their labour: availability 
not only in terms of the periods for which it was required, but 
also because they were considered more suitable for the type of 
work which was demanded. This second point was clearly an important 
consideration which apparently overrode other aspects of female 
employment commonly considered a cost from the employer's point of 
view, such as absenteeism.
".... Women, obviously, coming back to our eternal 
problem - tend to have, by force of circumstances, 
more time off. Why it should be in this day and 
age, the men don't have time off to take the 
children to the doctors, and things - I don't know - 
but they don't. Obviously, they're considered still, 
to be the breadwinners. (Although, I will say this, 
there is a tendency for men to take time off, at all 
levels - to take boys to the doctors, children to 
the doctors ... I don't know if they'll wait in to see 
the gas-man - but, traditionally,this is the woman's 
responsibility). It's always been considered that 
women earned pin-money - therefore, they tend to have 
more time off than men." (No other disadvantages?)
"No, I don't know of any more disadvantages. Generally 
they're very hard working. By their very nature, they 
can accept a monotonous job,or tend to ... do a monotonous 
job with easier mind than a man, possibly. They work that 
much ... well, they tend to work that much more consistently 
consistently. One thing they - particularly
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the young ones. (Of course, not having very many boys, 
it isn't so obvious) but, the young girls particularly, 
are ill-disciplined. And it's a difficulty to 
discipline them".
Barry White (Factory Manager)(16)
In the quotation reprod iced above, it is clear that "stability" 
in terms of the job relates (as does the question of labour hours) 
to the issue of managerial control - here expressed directly as 
a matter of discipline. Moreover, the concept of "women in 
general" in this manager's observations is soon differentiated. And, 
indeed, it is precisely the group most likely to produce the greatest 
"disadvantages" - in terms of their "unstable" labour market 
behaviour that render the greatest advantages of stability in 
terms of the actual jobs.
"The factory managers prefer middle-aged women - 
over 25 years. The marrieds seem to come back 
more stable than 16-18 year olds. So we're trying 
to balance it out - there's many more young girls 
looking for jobs than older women. On the other 
hand, you get trouble if you've too many young girls - 
like on the main lines, for example".
John Ferguson (Managing Director)(17)
The women workers clearly were not considered by their 
employers (as they tend to be in the literature) as a completely 
homogeneous group. The main distinctions generally made differentiated 
the younger and older workers. Managers suggested the dividing line 
lay "around 30". Although the (female) convenor specified marriage 
rather than any particular age as being significant.
"It sounds strange this ... We know the younger 
element have got to be given a chance, but it's a 
very strange thing in this factory - you find 
that its when the girls start to mature. ... There 
are girls that I can take you to, that I've known, 
that have left and I've worked with them when they've 
come out of school, and then watched them. They've 
got married and you've watched them mature, and its 
very surprising how different the girls react to work, 
after they have, sort of, matured into,sort of, being 
an adult”.
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(How are they different?)
"When they're younger, somehow they've got a sort of 
'couldn't-care-lesc' attitude towards the job that 
they're doing. They don't seem to be able to 
respond to the typo of discipline that's necessary— 
to being told anything."
Pearl (Sub-Assembly and Convenor) (18)
"I mean, each has got their own advantages and 
disadvantages. The older women come, they plod 
along with a good steady pace with a very good sense 
of responsibility - but they tend to have more 
time off because of their families. The younger 
ones, they're damn good workers when they're here 
and they put their minds to it - it's just a matter 
of motivating them and setting their minds to it".
Barry White (Factory Manager)(19)
The company's labour policy, informed by such (contradictory)
considerations, obviously differentiated women workers quite finely
and, thereby, structured the workforce - albeit within the
constraints of the labour market at any particular time. Thus
the composition of the workforce overall, reflected a search for
"stability" in the labour process by achieving a "balance” between
the different groups of women workers. The examples above show
such consideration in respect of age and marital status. It also
informed their racist recruitment policy:
"By virtue of the nature of the majority of white 
girls - you don't get, sort of ... gangs in - for 
want of a better word. ... We try to keep 2 or 3 
coloured girls to approximately about 20 or. 30 
white girls, and they mix in very, very well indeed. 
There's been absolutely no trouble at all with 
coloured girls here, particularly the Asians, they 
get on very well indeed. The African coloureds - just 
that little bit less inclined to work as hard as the 
Asian coloureds, but certainly no problems to deal 
with at all. In fact, I enjoy working with the 
coloured girls, they are very, very good. The white 
girls get on just as well with the coloured girls.
The coloured girls do tend to sit down and have lunch 
together. Yet they've got a common language, 
obviously,and naturally they should sit together - but 
that's the only ... I mean going on the lines and going 
down to the toilet, enjoying their work - they mix 
very well, so there's no problem there".
Barry White (Factory Manager)(20).
A PRICE THE COMPANY HAD TO PAY"?
The discussion so far has indicated how an employer's demand 
for labour power may be identified in terms of labour market, product 
market and labour process criteria. Price and the flexible 
availability of labour power may be aspects as important to labour's 
economical utilisation as its- "stable application" in production 
itself. Yet as the examples above suggest, what is meant by 
"stability" in this respect needs careful defining.
Those features of female labour so commonly deemed both a 
cost and source of instability, such as high turnover and reduced 
availability for full-time hours, constituted for this employer, an 
absolutely essential flexibility - in terms of their recruitment, 
utilisation and dispensation of labour. Since there was no other 
means of mediating product market instabilities - a lack of 
flexibility in any of the above respects, would have increased the 
costs of production for the firm, which it could not have absorbed. 
Thus the "instability" of the female labour force underpinned the 
stability of the labour process itself. And, as we pointed out 
earlier, this can only be seen when the employer's use of labour 
power is seen in relation to the market wherein they are sellers.
It also has to be seen in relation to the market wherein they 
are buyers. While we have pointed out the availability of workers 
for different "sets" of hours as constituting an important aspect 
of flexibility, in respect of (female) labour's utilisation; we 
have also indicated the importance of stability, afforded by 
women workers in relation to the type of work made available.
The sources of this stability, specified in terras of these 
workers' steady and conscientious application to what is, in 
effect, mindless work clearly lie less with their innate 
"femaleness", than their particular position in the labour market 
and the degree of "commitment" to their employer. Since this 
suffers a marked change on marriage we would suggest, therefore, 
that it is the peculiar vulnerability (i.e. instability) of
married women in the labour market which underpins their "stability"
( 21)in this, and equivalent, labour processes.
An interesting point arises from the factory manager's 
comments, wherein the "advantages" of the "mature" women's 
consistent application to the work were set against the apparent 
disadvantages of this group in terms of their higher absenteeism. 
With reference to our discussion above, which calls for more 
specific analyses of employers' "costs" and requirements in 
relation to various "instabilities" (and other attributes) of 
different groups of workers in the labour market; we might note 
here, that absenteeism can be taken as a case in point. For 
while the unpredictable nature of the women workers’ absence 
could, certainly, be problematic from management's point of view, 
the general level of absenteeism was by no means to be seen as 
a straight cost to the employer. As we shall see, absenteeism 
in fact, afforded management further opportunities to intensify 
the workload and reduce unit costs. It also provided a ready 
basis for applying disciplinary controls, which underpinned 
further strategies for increasing female labour's productivity.
In conclusion, we have noted above that the employment of 
women workers is almost exclusively discussed in terms of their
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peculiar supply-side characteristics. (And generally all 
are assumed to be married). yet a close examination of the 
employers' requirements militates against simply "reading-off" 
his demand patterns. Not only may costs for one employer 
become "benefits" for another ; b ut as we shall go on to examine 
with an example concerning BSR's policy regarding part-time 
workers - there may be contradictory considerations to assess, 
when an employer's labour market transactions are viewed in 
relation to both the consumption of labour power in the labour 
process and the product market.
Recruitment policy - full-time or part-time workers
It has already been suggested that there were positive 
reasons for the company setting out to attract the particular 
group of women who comprise the majority of part-time workers 
(i.e. those with domestic commitments); namely, their stability 
in terms of the job and the stable, yet flexible nature of their 
availability in the market. Yet it would seem that from the 
mid 1970's at least, efforts were being made to reduce the 
numbers of employees on part-time hours.
The steady fall in part-time workers can be noted in two 
respects. First, in BSR as a whole between 1968 and 1974 the 
numbers of part-time employees increased by 300% in absolute 
terms, but proportionally from 1970 their share of employment 
had begun to fall quite rapidly from a level of 44% (see above, 
Table 11, This trend continued to the end of the 1970's, with
only a slight hiccup around 1974-5 when large numbers of
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workers - especially full-time office staff, were made redundant. 
Indeed, from 1974 onwards, the numbers of part-time workers had 
begun to fall in absolute terms, while after 1975 full-timers 
steadily increased. This trend was particularly marked
around 1977-8 when the percentage of part-time employees 
fell below 35% for the first time in ten years. Secondly, 
looking at the employment figures for full-time and part-time 
workers in the two largest West Midland factories, as Table 4 
shows, while between May 1976 and May 1977 the numbers in all 
groups (apart from the four hourly shift) showed a reduction, 
this was greater in respect of full-timers, possibly reflecting
the market downturn which followed the 1975-6 high point.
However, between April 1977 and October 1977 the impact of the 
seasonal upturn can be seen, where only full-timers and, again, 
the 4-hourly shift, showed an increase in numbers. All the 
rest of the part-time shifts continued to fall in number.
Why this apparent preference for full-time workers?
The Stourbridge manager gave these reasons:
"We are employing only full-timers at the moment.
That means that any part-timers that leave are 
not being replaced as further part-timers.
(Why is that?) Well, because its easier to 
control a factory with full-timers. If there's 
sufficient full-timers on the labour market, then ... 
it's much easier to run a factory if you have as 
stable a labour force as possible. (Aren't 
your part-timers stable?) Well, the way its 
easier is by the fact ...
Now, you've got a line with 70 people on it, and 
you have 30 part-timers (there's less than that, 
but say there's 30 part-timers) and you have 10 
absent in the morning and 15 absent in the 
afternoon - then you've got to re-lay the line 
out at 12 o'clock or one o'clock, when they start 
work again. But if you have 70 operators on 
the line, and 20 of them are away, for any reason - 
and it does go as high as that on occasions - then
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TABLE 4: Fluctuations in full and part-time working
amongst women workers at Old Hill and 
Stourbridge Factories, May '76-Oct '77
Nos. employed % change 5/76-5/77
% change 
4/77-10/77
May 76 Apr 77 May 77 June 77 Oct 77 (Market
variation)
(Seasonal
variation)
HOURS
WORKED
Part-
time.
27*jhrs 718 663 658 651 640 -8.4 -3.5
22>jhrs 967 903 894 887 871 -7.5 -3.5
20hrs 1083 1103 1092 1086 1162 +1.0 +5.4
17*jhrs 838 769 760 751 728 -9.3 -5.3
Total
Part-
time 3606 3438 3404 3375 3401 -5.6 -1.1
Total
part-
time
(excl
20hr
Shift) 2523 2335 2312 2289 2239 -8.4 -4.1
Full­
time
40hrs 2034 1845 1800 1764 2004 -11.5 +8.6
Total
empl­
oyed: 5640 5283 5204 5142 5405 -7.7 +2.3
Source : Inbucon (1977)
you know at five past eight what the situation is 
for the rest of the day. Therefore, you have 
a much more stable situation ..."
Barry White (Factory Manager) (22)
The manager's arguments against the part-time workers were 
not directed at their higher level of absenteeism as such. Indeed, 
in his hypothetical case it is suggested there is not much difference 
in this respect, between full-timers and part-timers. The main 
difference lies in the extra difficulty and the complications entailed 
in coordinating production, given such a wide variety of workers' hours. 
And, since part-time workers in general were paid pro-rata for 40 hours, 
this was a disadvantage not outweighed by any obvious cost savings. 
Except, that is, in one department.
The only part-time shift which did not show a steady reduction
over 1976-77 was the four-hourly (20 hour week) shift, which was used
in plastic moulding (see Table 4). In this case, the four-shift
system gave management definite cost gains. It allowed 16 hour
utilisation of expensive machinery (from 6 a.m. until lO p.m.) without
the need to pay operating labour premium rates which two standard
eight hour shifts would entail:
(Do the women get a shift premium?)
"Yes, they do a little - it's a set premium, not 
a percentage ... for 4 hours, the money's very 
good really ..."
(How much do the women get?)
"20 pence"
(Per hour, or per day?)
"Per week"
Pearl (Sub-Assembly, Convenor) (23)
The way part-time and full-time workers were distributed, and 
following the company's policy of reducing the former,
re-distributed within production, is again illustrated by 
the Stourbridge factory manager. The complications introduced 
into the organisation of the labour process by the utilisation 
of part-time workers is, once more, apparent; as is 
management's policy of differentiation and grouping to achieve 
"balance" and stability together with their reliance on movement 
of labour to achieve it.
(Are you actually going to cut down the number 
of part-time workers?)
"We're just not recruiting any, because we
have sufficient for production anyway. (And)
by gently and carefully maneuvering the operators
around ... We always talk in equivalent full-
timers , so that providing you marry up your
morning and afternoon operators, then you have the
equivalent of one full-timer on that particular
job. If you've got a hand-press, and you have
a morning worker working the hand-press, an afternooner
comes and works on the same hand-press. Now,
if you lose one of them, then you put the half-
timer somewhere else, and put the full-timer in her
place - so you're not taking part-timers on, so
you balance the factory out that way, so it makes
you more efficient. This is why Stourbridge is
more efficient than the other factories, because they
pay a lot of attention to detail - well, we think
we're that much more efficient than the other
factories".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (24)
It would seem that the search for stability within the labour 
process was based on somewhat contradictory requirements.
It was the younger girls who constituted the main source of supply 
for 40 hour female workers on the labour market. But the older 
workers, most of whom worked part-time, applied themselves more 
consistently and were easier to "manage" - although their hours 
were not. The employment characteristics of both groups of women 
arose from their position in the family - which made the second a 
more "captive" and dependent workforce, but reduced the hours they
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were available (i.e. the hours which their labour power was offered 
for, on the labour market).
The contradictions involved in the employer's demand for 
and use of labour which are indicated here point to the inadequacy 
of any simple assumptions concerning employers’ requirements and 
a "functional fit" of women workers on the labour market's supply 
side. Moreover, contradictions arise between different aspects 
of the employer's priorities in relation to different control needs 
within the labour process.
How are these apparently contradictory changes to be explained? 
As we shall see BSR were rescued from the paradox of their 
contradictory requirements by wider circumstances which had an 
impact on the labour supply side.
In the early 1970s changes in the economic environment had 
begun to put greater pressure on the women to altei their pattern 
of employment to suit the firm rather than vice versa. There is 
no doubt that the rising cost of living and sheer necessity of two 
wage earners to keep a family, must have forced many women to 
accept employment under terms they might otherwise have refused.
Such alternations in the pattern had already been observed locally, 
as inflation and recession combined to put a premium on regular 
employment and on keeping hold of a suitable job once it could be 
found. The firm's (temporary) crisis saw these changes consolidated 
at BSR:
"At one time when there was plenty of employment 
in the area, you would get them coming in probably, 
from August until Just after Christmas. And then 
from March until after July - to put money away for 
holidays etc. But of course, a lot of that was 
stopped. (How was that?) By the people themselves. 
They got that - instead of doing a job when they felt
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like it, they came into BSR, and came regularly 
and stopped that nonsense of coming and going".
(When did that pattern stop?)
"After the redundancies (1974-5). Strange how 
so much altered after that. The company didn't
stop it....  I would blame the rising cost of
living as much as anything else.
Pearl (Sub-Assembly and Convenor) (25)
The- problem of finding reasonable part-time work (there 
was a waiting list for all the part-time shifts at BSR) and 
anxiety not to lose the job they had, was frequently mentioned 
by the women at BSR. And, it would seem, part-timers in many 
areas were increasingly put under pressure to accept full-time 
hours in order to keep the jobs they were on. If they did not 
do so they were liable to be moved onto other work which they
were not capable of doing. Despite the factory manager's
. . , „ manoeuveringdescription of "gently and carefully the operators around..."
the judicious use of movement of labour could be used to ensure
that unwanted workers did not have to be sacked - they were simply
"manoeuvered" out of a job.
"They moved some people out of the department 
onto the main lines, and they were middle 
aged women, you know. And they put up a struggle 
but they still had to go in the end.... But 
they've left. The one's left that's done 15 years 
service. She was in that department 15 years, part-time 
afternoons. They put her on the main line, but she's 
left ... none of them was satisfied you know.
Mind you, she was in her late 50's - say she was 
about 55. Well, I mean, it was a shame for that 
age, to put her on a job, you know, the lines."
Carol (Moulding Shop) (26)
It is likely, therefore, that the firm were increasingly able 
to recruit the more "committed" "steadier" and "less mobile" workforce 
they required - that is the women with domestic commitments - for 
full-time hours when they needed them.
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Having examined, in some detail, the company's recruitment 
policy, we go on to look at the kinds of problems faced by the 
women workers BSR recruited - whether for full-time or part-time 
employment.
PART 3: THE DOUBLE BURDEN
"I'm always tired ... its every-day things, 
pressure .Things do get on top of you, you know.
I think ... you go to work and then you've got 
your washing, ironing, shopping - everyday 
pressures you know. I mean anybody1s got 
those anyway, haven't they? (well, women?)
Yes! now, oh well-women! And this is where 
they get a lot of absentees, which can't be 
helped anyway can it? I mean, they've got to 
expect it, if it's a woman's factory".
Tracy (Final Assembly) (27)
There is at least one fundamental difference distinguishing 
the position of women and men as "free" wage labourers on the 
labour market and in employment. This basic distinction arises 
from their position within family and household relationships.
The complex sphere of domestic relations, with its
characteristic sexual division of labour, is one which significantly 
'frees' male workers' disposition of their labour power in terms 
of the employment relationship at the same time as it binds them as 
"breadwinners" more closely to it. But the commitments and 
substantial responsibilities from which they are freed are those 
requiring their physical presence (rather than economic support), and 
these remain within the household (to the extent they are not 
socialised) and rest on women. Two important consequences arise 
from this. One is, of course, the notorious dual role peculiar to 
women workers. Another is the characteristic organisation of the 
employment relation itself (e.g. the working day). This is based 
on the availability of "free" male wage labour (i.e. those free of 
competing commitments, as well as competing sources of support), 
and, therefore, the material exclusion of non-wage relations.
Where male workers maintain or follow this pattern, these two
circumstances combine to constitute the dual role for women as a
double burden.
In this part of the chapter some of the problems which 
arise from married women's position as wage workers with domestic 
commitments are examined. These commitments are presented 
as having two distinct aspects: the women are shown to be not 
only housekeepers, but also "carers" responsible for the well­
being of others. Some general questions concerning the 
organisation of waged work in relation to domestic responsibilities, 
are then raised in terms of the position of married women in the 
labour market. This is viewed firstly by illustrating the women's 
distinctive patterns of employment from which some general aspects 
of their labour market requirements can be identified; with a 
closer look at more specific problem areas, such as the way 
pay levels (also) constrain/determine working hours.
The discussion which follows differs in two respects from
the examination of the employer's demand for female labour. In
the first place it is conducted at a more general level, and
although we look at the problems and job histories of individual
women, these can also be taken to both exemplify and illustrate
what kind of impact the double burden has on wage-working
women's lives more generally. In the second place, whereas it
was necessary to consider aspects of the consumption of female
labour power (i.e. its utilisation in the labour process) in the
analysis of the employer's recruitment policy - and clearly this
women
has implications for the way the were able to combine both 
waged and domestic work - we leave consideration of their actual 
experience on the shopfloor, until the following chapters.
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Here, therefore, we are following up our previous discussion 
where we have noted the way female labour was crucial to the 
employer because of its characteristic flexibility in essential 
respects: its recruitment, its utilisation and its dispensibility.
This flexibility was the only basis by which market instabilities 
could be mediated in the labour process and stability - fundamental 
here - maintained. We find that in every respect, although women 
workers apparently "supply" this flexibility - almost, it seems, as 
a natural feature of their labour power and the conditions under 
which it is offered - there is, in fact, no easy fit between the 
employer's requirements and their own. Here, we are looking at the 
aspect of recruitment. Later, we go on to examine the impact of 
"flexible utilisation" and "dispensability". In every respect, 
"flexibility" from the point of view of the workers is problematic.
This stability for the employer, has to be seen as a cost which 
is borne by this workforce, rather than an agreeable match of demand 
and supply-side requirements.
The only way these costs can be identified however, is by 
examining precisely, the nature and basis of these requirements.
To the extent that the needs and priorities imposed by the capitalist 
mode of production are contradictory to human needs, we might expect 
the nature of the flexibility required by women on the one hand 
(who largely cater for these human needs) and the capitalist 
employers on the other, not only to differ but to be fundamentally 
opposed.
Two points can be made at the outset. First, women cannot 
be written off as the unfortunate victims of their circumstances, 
trapped forever within a vicious circle the double burden forms.
A number of contradictions break this circle, and women*3 own struggles
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to do so have been, and are, significant, both historically and 
politically. The task itself is enormous, however, which leads 
to the second point. Although the impact of the double burden 
is a question seemingly specific to the situation of women workers, 
the implications go far beyond this and relate to the division of 
labour and organisation of work in society as a whole.
The nature of women's domestic commitments and problems regarding 
the organisation of waged work.
Edna worked full-time (8 a.m. - 4.45 p.m.) on 
the main (final assembly) line test section.
She was 26 years old and her son was 6. She 
lived three miles from the factory. Her husband 
was employed at another firm as an electrician.
(How does your job affect your life outside work?)
"Well, it affects it in a lot of ways really.
Because by the time I get home and I've done the tea, 
and I tidy up, you know, you have a quick clean 
round - get the little boy ready for bed, and tell 
him a story and we have a chat: it's round about 
twenty five past eight.
And then I go under the shower, so by the time I'm 
clean and everything else, its about a quarter to 
nine ... well, its too late to do anything - so .. 
you just haven't got time to do anything. And then 
on a weekend, you're sort of catching up on your 
washing and your ironing and on your general house 
things. The only treat I could say I really have 
is like say on a Saturday evening. And I think if 
Mike didn't take me out some Saturday nights, I'd 
still find something to do then !
Well, some days you get that tired you feel quite 
low, you know. I get not so much depressed - as 
I feel ill, you know, from tiredness. I sit down 
and I think I could actually be sick if I really 
thought about how tired I was. That's how it can 
get.
(Have you ever been to the doctor about it?)
"No, they sort of, know the problem don't they
really? I mean, I'm bound to get over-tired. When 
you've got a lot to keep up with. I mean, he can't 
really do much for me - only tell me to pack up 
work. And if I pack up work, where's the money 
coming from? So, I've sorted my own problem out"
Edna (Final Assembly) (28)
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The women who did two jobs - one paid at the factory, the 
other, unpaid housework, at home - worked extremely long hours 
and suffered a general, permanent fatigue. Barbara (21) for 
example, came on a coach laid on to bring workers from Bromsgrove.
She lived 20 miles from the factory. She left the house at 
7 a.m. and returned at 6 p.m, an initial working day of 11 hours.
She had no children, but her daily pattern - rising at 6 a.m. and 
not resting until 9 p.m. was common among the married women whose 
ranks she had recently joined. Women with housework to do put 
in a regular 15 hour day.
"Yes, it does get on top of you.
Well, it's lack of time. I'm working 40 hours a 
week, I go home cook food you know, tidy around, 
its half past eight - nine o'clock before I sit 
down. And then you've got all your washing and 
your housework again on the week-end. I don't 
really have a rest. I don't have a week-end really.
I'm very tired! You know, by the time I get home,
I don't know, I need the money so I've got to go.
(Has it affected your social life?)
Yes, it has actually. I've been that tired I 
haven't wanted to go out when I've gone home.
(Has that always been the case , since you've worked 
here?)
No. More or less since I got married like. Going 
home and then I've got the house and food to cook 
and that.
(So you were alright before, when your mum was....?)
Yes, it was there when I got home you know, and I'd 
only got to get ready to go out then."
Barbara (Final Assembly line) (29).
Apart from the long hours and fatigue attached to the constant 
round of physical work, a crucial aspect of women's position generally, 
is their responsibility for the care and well-being of others and 
the binding nature of the commitment which is therefore involved.
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The strength of this is especially due to the kind of physical
dependence that others - particularly children and the infirm -
have on them. This kind of responsibility and commitment which
rests on women goes beyond house upkeep and personal servicing by
wife for husband, although it is, of course, also integral to
family relationships as a whole.
"One on leads section again, (on mornings).
She worked 'cos her husband's not on much 
money. She's got an elderly mother-in-law, 
nearly 80, who is crippled. The girl is 
frightened to leave her on her own. She often 
has had to spend all day with her.
She's asked me once or twice. She says, 'Pip, 
what on earth can I do? We've tried to get my 
mother away because she isn't safe to leave 
on her own, and I have to come out to work', 
she says, 'and I just can't cope'. Eventually, 
she got her mother-in-law into a home - after a 
hard struggle".
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (30)
"A friend of mine, her father's ill - he's 80.
But the firm have been very reasonable with her; 
she's had a day off a week, since March - but she’s 
had to cover herself with a doctor's note, kind of 
thing. Not each time, but the doctor wrote a note 
stating that she was needed at home, at her father's 
home, one day a week - because they ... they're 
sisters - they take it in turns looking after the 
old man."
(Is this arrangement O.K?) "She says so. She goes 
down a couple of times, during the week at night you 
know. I mean, that's a hell of a full time job.'
And it's a full-time job she's got here and she's 
got a family at home - these are the problems!
These are the problems ... you've got women that have 
got daughters with marital problems,you know - they 
suddenly descend with the kids - there's lots ... 
lots of problems."
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (31)
The organisation of employment patterned by the requirements 
of commodity production, productivity and profitability £n opposition 
to human needs, presents for women workers especially a source of
immense stress. To the extent that employment can be organised
to fit in with domestic responsibilities, the pressure derived 
from these competing commitments may be somewhat relieved - 
even if the workload itself is not. But, as the examples quoted 
above, and indeed,the whole of this section is intended to show, 
such organisation on the employers' part, has to go beyond simply 
presenting part-time jobs at a variety of "convenient" hours in 
order to attract the labour required. What this means in concrete 
terms is discussed in more detail below, when the question of 
flexibility in the organisation of production at BSR is raised in the 
context of the women's problems.
First, however, the way in which some women's employment 
patterns were shaped by their changing domestic circumstances is 
briefly described in order to indicate the general nature of women's 
requirements in the labour market, and it is suggested that these 
are not totally fulfilled by the provision of part-time work alone, 
nor is this provision unproblematic. These general problems which 
women face in the labour market are the background against which 
those specific to the workplace must always be considered.
Even in terms of the employment profiles of just sixteen women 
(those who gave in-depth interviews) the discontinuous and complex 
work patterns associated with marriage and especially child-raising, 
are immediately obvious. All of these women had gone into full-time 
employment from school. Of the fifteen who were married, seven 
had left their jobs at this point, the other six leaving on the 
birth of their first child. (Although two of the women had also had
to leave work in a previous period, to look after members of their
(32)parental family ) . Of the thirteen women with children, ten
had then taken up some form of part-time or casual (specifically short 
term) jobs which fitted in with child-care arrangements. The other
three,having once left full-time paid work, stayed out of employment 
altogether until resuming, full-time, at a later date. While 
the single woman and the two who were married but without children, 
had remained in full-time employment without a break.
Within this small sample alone, a wide range of labour 
contracts can be identified in the different patterns which incorporate, 
in varying combinations: continuous or discontinuous full time, part-time, 
casual and short-term employment. For any one woman in the workforce 
the pattern might cover almost the whole range: full-time work,
a break from employment altogether, resumption with part-time 
and or temporary jobs, followed by a return to full-time paid work 
- their employment requirements altering over time, according to 
domestic circumstances and needs.
On the other hand, for any one occupation, the pattern of 
employment available is unlikely to match this range. Pursuit 
of many "careers" for example, seems to require continuous 
employment throughout a working life (for no totally irresolvable 
reason) . And much employment is simply not to be had on a 
"part-time" basis at all. Clearly, the availability of employment 
which is suitable for men or women to combine with domestic 
responsibilities is problematic. And the general question which 
is raised here, about the organisation of waged work and family 
life, goes beyond any one individual firm where special arrangements 
might be made.
We return to BSR however. A company which seemed to offer 
the relatively rare opportunity for women to take up, in the context 
of one company, employment to suit their domestic circumstances.
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They could pursue a continuous 
after periodic breaks in their 
employed on any one of a range 
of hours. Yet even here, the 
was problematic because it was 
women's needs.
or discontinuous pattern - returning 
employment, and they could be 
of part-time shifts - for a variety 
availability of work on such terms 
subject to criteria other than the
Thus when the firm required extra workers in 1973-4 they were
recruited from Telford for the attractive 9.30 a.m. - 3.30 p.m. shift
and brought in by coach - only to be made redundant in early 1975.
Thereafter, the labour market had eased considerably and the offer
had changed - it was full-time work or nothing.
"They come from such a distance, they used to be 
9.30 workers but now they've been put on full-time.
They have to start out extremely early - it's 24 
miles to Telford;
There's no work around Telford - and those women have 
got to live, just the same as us. They started to 
come - they put a coach on for them when we needed the 
work so much - until the redundancies".
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (33)
Not only is the availability of employment for hours enabling 
men or women to combine domestic responsibilities a general problem, 
but the pay also. The way in which wage-rates relate to the cost 
of living, translates into how many hours workers need to labour, 
and this also constrains the kinds of choices that people can make.
"If I could work shorter hours - I would have done 
shorter hours, but at the time I came for the job, 
we were buying our own house and I needed the money, 
so ... They'd only got full-time at the time I came 
down, so I took it. We sort of managed, so ...
(But you'd really rather do part-time?) Part time, yes. 
(Which hours would suit you best?) I think 8 o'clock 
till half past 12, because my sister takes my little 
boy to school - that's not so bad, but I would like to 
be there when he came home. You know, I would like to 
see more of my little boy, but ... "
Edna (Final Assembly) (34)
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The provision of employment at convenient hours, is certainly
an important requirement as far as women with domestic responsibilities
are concerned. But their needs cannot be assumed to stop here.
Part-time work does not provide a living wage. Madge (35) was
divorced and had two children aged twelve and fifteen at home. She
worked from lo a.m. - 2 p.m. earning £23 gross per week. And her
biggest problem was lack of money:
"It costs as much for U£ to live as a family 
without a big wage-earner ... My friends can 
take their money home as pin-money. Mine has to 
go to keep a house and myself. My maintenance 
doesn't keep the children in any case. There's 
just me as a wage-earner and I've got exactly the 
same lighting and heating bills. In fact I have 
to economise to the point that we can only have 
the bath on twice per week!
I can't really afford the time to work full-time.
If I go full-time something else has got to go, 
something that I can't fit in ... But I gave an 
awful lot of pleasures up in the first place. I 
can't go out and buy clothes. I couldn't tell you 
when I last went in a shop - I can't remember ever 
going in a shop and trying a dress on and buying it !
It doesn't bother me, because I consider myself 
as well dressed. But these things make a difference; 
it makes the difference between coming to work and 
working happy".
Madge (Moulding Shop) (35)
Nor does the provision of shorter hours alone, resolve the problems 
such as child-care.
"One girl I know left two months ago because 
she couldn't get anybody to look after the child 
on the afternoon shift - she worked on the afternoon 
shift, 1.15 - 4.45 p.m. She was stuck, her sister 
wouldn't look after him and she was stuck with him".
Carol (Moulding Shop) (36)
Conclusions
These are just a few of the problems facing women in the 
labour market who seek to combine waged and domestic work and 
these structure general demands concerning the terms on which 
employment is provided. They arise because in significant ways, 
employment terms and relationships are organised on the assumption 
that workers will not combine commitments to labour in both 
spheres. The free waged workers offering their labour in the 
marketf^^ree" of those commitments or rather, in theory, are 
presumed to be. Yet the wage form, patterned as it may be, by 
notions of "bread winners" wages and its complement - "pin-money" 
contains no guarantees of family or individual maintenance within 
its structures; rather the opposite. Nor has it, in any
(37)historical period, proved adequate in this respect.
On the other hand, as we have seen,the women v/orkers were 
recruited on the basis of characteristically "unfree" aspects of 
their labour - such as their alternative means of financial support, 
and their pattern of availability determined by competing commitments
Married women workers have long taken their place in the "active 
labour force - to keep themselves, to keep their families, to keep 
their independence. What problems do they find within employment 
relationships at workplace level? If they are specifically engaged 
as married women with domestic commitments, are the difficulties 
experienced in the labour market, which are associated with this 
"special status" left behind at the factory gate - particularly one 
that is especially designed so as to admit them?
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In this section, some assessment has already been made 
of the impact of the double burden. This must be viewed, not 
only in personal terms - the toll of fatigue and stress, but 
also more broadly. The problems which arise are largely specific 
to women and central to their experience of the employment 
relationship. Their needs inform both their immediate demands 
and the direction of future change; but their ability and 
willingness to make such changes is also structured by their 
position.
In the following chapters we goon to examine how production 
was organised at BSR and how the labour of the women workers 
specifically was utilized, identifying in the second part of 
each, the particular needs and problems which resulted for the
women workers.
THE FIRM AND ITS WORKFORCE
Footnotes
(1) The plastic moulding shop at Stourbridge, with nearly 200 
machines, was claimed to be the largest in Europe.
(2) In this country, for example, they supplied Fidelity, which had 
80% of the British market. By 1976 they had pushed out 
Garrard and bought up Glenburn (a competitor) in order to close 
it. Manufacturers abroad went out of production altogether
in this market sphere: for example, RCA and General Electric. 
Others bought-in cheaper BSR components to use in their own 
products: for example Matsushita (Japan) and Telefunken in
West Germany. A potential competitor, MASA, set up in Mexico 
with State funding failed to establish a foothold in the market 
where the major customers demanded high volumes of a reliable 
product on the basis of flexible but prompt delivery.
(3) Interview 19.1.1977
(4) The name was changed from Birmingham Sound Reproduction in 1962.
(5) The company had once ventured into tape-decks but withdrew 
when these seemed slow to take-off. Subsequently the factory in 
Northern Ireland was closed in 1967 (but not before some trouble 
with the government over their milking development grants
and employment subsidies)
(6) See Financial Times 28.6.1980 for the fate of Garrard (sold as 
a 'shell* to Brazilian company Gradiente).
(7) Discussion, February 1976.
(8) Some part-time male workers were also taken on, particularly for 
security jobs, plus a few for labouring on the women's shifts. But 
while it is apparent that nearly a half of the 1264 men employed 
in October 1977 in the 3 West Midlands factories worked under 40 
hours - the vast majority of these (504 out of 573) were on a 37*j 
hour week (see table 2) On the other hand, of the 6,463 hourly 
paid women employed, the two thirds (4191) who were part-time,
all worked less than 30 hours per week (see table 2) .
(9) So those working 'mornings' did a 22*j hour week and those on 
afternoons 17*j hours. Some operations were not symmetrically 
paired, so more worked on the 'morning' shifts than the 'afternoons'
(10) They were mainly employed to operate the plastic moulding machines 
and they constituted the largest number on any one shift system.
Two thirds(820 out of 1307) of these workers were employed at
the Stourbridge factory. Some factories ran, on occasion a 
'twilight shift' from 5.30 - 9.45 p.m. (21*j hours per week).
This was a regular feature at Waterfall Lane, where it 
constituted the largest single shift in October 1977, employing 
over 200 women.
(11) As Paul Thompson (1983) put it: "When Mexicans who can no 
longer live off the land come to the border region, they meet
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US companies in search of cheap labour for their assembly 
plants. Yet they are not willing to accept all those who sell 
themselves at a low cost. One advertisement specified:
'we need female workers; older than 17, younger than 30; 
single and without children, maximum education secondary 
school; minimum education primary school; available for 
all shifts'(quoted in Hilsum 1982). There is something 
clearly special about the characteristics associated with 
female wage labour" pp. 181-182 Emphasis in original.
He concluded that there is a "necessity to focus on why 
employers bring women into the labour force and how they 
are used to carry out particular tasks in the labour process" 
p. 184. Emphasis in original.
And see Elson and Pearson (1981) for a useful discussion.
(12) See Herzog (1980)
(13) In Chesterman's study quoted above, a job experience scheme 
gave a mixed intake of school leavers the opportunity to learn 
wiring (a job solely done by women workers, mostly Indian,
in the employing company).The boys were found to learn the job 
quicker than the girls.
Wild & Hill (1970) found job turnover particularly high in 
the electronics firms they studied. An area where women's 
dexterity and docility are supposed to be significant.
(14) Ref MB 12/S2: 85-95
(15) Ref BW 21/S1: 423-944
(16) Ref BW 4/S1 : 81-100
(17) Ref JF Discussion 28.6.1978
(18) Ref PB 32/S5: 374-405
(19) Ref BW 5/S1 : 121-127
(20) Ref BW 21/S1: 898-923
(21) As Chesterman (1978) noted of the workforce at G.E.C.:
"It would seem probable that the female dominance of wiring 
jobs has less to do with their dexterity, than with the limited 
job opportunities for women in Coventry manufacturing, and 
their consequent acceptance of poor pay and monotonous work".
p.151.
(22) Ref BW 21/S1: 944-977
(23) Ref PB 11/S2: 613-660
(24) Ref BW 22-23/S1 977-1018. The discussion continued as follows 
(Are you changing part-time jobs for full-time?) "We marry 
them up you see. So if a morning operator leaves, then we might 
find we have an afternoon to marry up, and you change around - 
you put her on a new job, and then a full-timer goes in that 
position, so you gradually build up a line with full-timers on, 
without any aggravation at all. (Will there be fewer part-time 
jobs?) There's no part-time jobs as such. The only part-time
jobs we’ve got are the moulding machines, and they are 4 hour 
shifts. You've got 3 or 4 different types of shifts. You 
have the full-timer, which works from 8 a.m. till 4.45 p.m.
Then you have 2 part timers, which one works in the morning 
and one works in the afternoon, now that constitutes what we 
call an equivalent full-timer. So that's giving you 3 
shifts. Then you have a 9.30 shift, which is an animal all 
by itself - which starts at 9.30 a.m. and finishes at 3.30 p.m. - 
now, there's 2 main assembly lines like that, and a section 
upstairs like that. So, gradually, over a period of time 
they've all been moved around, people one at a time, moved 
around until we've got those in those particular areas - so 
that's 4 shifts you've got. Then you've got the evening shifts, 
or what we call 'shift females', which works from 6 a.m. to 
lO a.m., lO a.m. till 2 p.m., 2 p.m. till 6 p.m., and 6 p.m. till 
lO again. So that gives you another 4 shifts - 8 altogether.
Now, those are the only female shifts, all the rest are what 
we call the equivalent full-timers - in that case, 2 part-timers 
make up a full-timer. So that means, if you've got a morning 
worker leave, you look round to see if you can find an afternoon 
space, or a morning vacancy, and marry it up with another afternooner, 
so you then finish up with an equivalent full-timer".
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
Ref PB 33/S5: 561-589
Ref CB 17-18/S2: 105-135
Ref TS 8/S1: 777-825
Ref EW lO/Sl: 606-643 and EW 23/S3: 397-420
Ref BB 8-9/S1: 470-479 and BB 4/S1: 188-199
Ref PW 26/S3: 203-219
Ref SB 17-18/S2: 440-485
(32) For example Edna when she was still single:
"I left in 1968, because my mother was ill, she was very ill - 
she was going through a lot of bad depression and she couldn't 
do anything, you know and she ... Like I said, I came from a big 
family - there was still 4 of us lived at home, I had 5 brothers 
so ... And, of course I left my job to do the housework every 
day and look after my mother - when she got better I came back.
I think I left about 5 months. Edna (Final Assembly).Ref EW4/S1 : 189-199
(33) Ref PW 37/S4: 1-20
(34) Ref EW 1/S1: 47-58
(35) Ref MB 2/S1: 167-197
(36) Ref CB 15/S1: 949-960
(37) See Barrett & McIntosh (1982)
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c h a p t e r k PRODUCING THE BSR WAY
"We think that if produced in the BSR way - 
I mean by that, cut down waste and increase 
efficiency, we can come to the market-place 
confident we can make that product and also 
that we should be able to sell it."
J.Ferguson (Chairman). (1)
As we have seen, the company had historically been extremely 
dependent on one product - the auto-changer - and on one market, the 
USA "a changer-market traditionally." (John Ferguson). "Ferguson 
believes there is such a big market in the United States, that is 
where the company should sell. And if the product is good enough, 
they can sell there". (Union Official). As it happened, the market 
did collapse, but even then the product itself was still finding 
supporters.
"The company's founder, Dr Daniel MacDonald 
introduced a record changer mechanism in 1968 
whose basic design remains good".
(Financial Times 5.11.79).
"What BSR is suffering from, then, in main-line 
business is not, like Garrard, poor products ...
For BSR is not Garrard. Hi fi buffs are deeply 
contemptuous of Garrard equipment. They do not 
admire BSR, but then they are not really meant 
to, for that is not the end of the market that 
BSR is in. The stuff it does make is very 
cheap". (Guardian 11.9.80).
The firm operated a high volume, low margin production policy 
in a highly competitive market, which was also unstable in relation 
to economic fluctuations and consumer demand patterns. Dealing 
with powerful customers, the trans-national retailers in a position 
to exploit strong competition between producers and controlling bulk 
distribution outlets, market dominance offered little protection 
from these fluctuations for the manufacturers, in terms of either 
output or pricing flexibility. These points are illustrated by 
Ferguson's comments on the Chicago trade fair, where a Japanese
competitor was discovered under-cutting one of BSR's lines.
"At the show we said that if customers could 
give a firm commitment to 100,000 manuals, we 
would guarantee a lower price. We had to drop 
the MlOO $2.60 - we are making a loss at that - 
to prevent them getting into the market. If 
they get in with these, they'll then start making 
changers. They hold customers to taking numbers 
at certain dates - we leave customers flexible. 
Therefore, this is a potentially dangerous 
situation". J.Ferguson. (2)
It is clear that profitable production in this environment must 
demand an extremely high measure of control over costs and output. 
Production policy and the main methods used by BSR's management 
to this end, are discussed below. Thus in Part 1 management 
structure and the system of centralised control is briefly outlined.
It is followed by an overview of the production policy and main 
methods used to maintain productivity and required output levels.
This leads to a discussion of the way production was organised by 
management, looking at the division of labour in the labour process 
and within this, the way the labour force was distributed, 
maintaining an overall view of the implications for managerial control.
In Part 2, we go on to see what implications "producing the 
BSR way" had for the women workers. Some of the problems which 
management's production methods raised - for the female labour force 
in particular - are identified, along with the kind of needs to
which they gave rise.
-1 1 6-
competitor was discovered under-cutting one of BSR's lines.
"At the show we said that if customers could 
give a firm commitment to 100,000 manuals, we 
would guarantee a lower price. We had to drop 
the MlOO $2.60 - we are making a loss at that - 
to prevent them getting into the market. If 
they get in with these, they'll then start making 
changers. They hold customers to taking numbers 
at certain dates - we leave customers flexible. 
Therefore, this is a potentially dangerous 
situation". J.Ferguson. (2)
It is clear that profitable production in this environment must 
demand an extremely high measure of control over costs and output. 
Production policy and the main methods used by BSR's management 
to this end, are discussed below. Thus in Part 1 management 
structure and the system of centralised control is briefly outlined.
It is followed by an overview of the production policy and main 
methods used to maintain productivity and required output levels.
This leads to a discussion of the way production was organised by 
management, looking at the division of labour in the labour process 
and within this, the way the labour force was distributed, 
maintaining an overall view of the implications for managerial control.
In Part 2, we go on to see what implications "producing the 
BSR way" had for the women workers. Some of the problems which 
management's production methods raised - for the female labour force 
in particular - are identified, along with the kind of needs to
which they gave rise
PART 1 : m a n a g e m e n t ' s p r o d u c t io n  p o l ic y
Management Structure and centralised control
Management's problem was to maintain output at levels necessary 
to meet customers' demands and keep a very tight control over 
production costs in order to remain competitive and make a profit.
The extent to which they succeeded can be judged from the company's 
results over 20 years, and their reputation for consistent efficiency 
and high productivity which had long echoed around stock market 
circles . ^  BSR's management ran what was known as "a very tight 
ship”.
THE TIGHT SHIP
BSR was a business organisation where money was very tightly 
controlled indeed, and decision-making highly centralised.
The company's chairman John Ferguson personally maintained almost
(4)total control, "he runs it like a one-man band”. The Board
wasof Directors very small - seven members including himself.
The policy of centralised control was reflected in the overall 
business strategy which was to have,as as far as possible, no 
borrowing at all, the company being financed, in the main, by 
retained earnings. There was also a conscious attempt to keep 
share prices down to prevent take-overs: the policy being
to have a greater number of shares - well spread around. To this 
end, for example, at the peak of the 1972-4 boom £6 shares were 
split into £3. Ferguson's and the directors' holdings in the 
company were small.
"He doesn't need it for control, only he can 
run the company. The shareholders don't 
know what's happening. But he's been 
successful, therefore it doesn't matter”.
Paul (Union official). (5)
The policy of centralised control was also reflected in the 
company's structure, which was extremely self-contained. Vertical 
integration, in order to safeguard themselves in relation to 
suppliers, saw the addition of numerous small firms to the group; ^  
and on the distribution side, the company operated through wholly 
owned subsidiaries in each main sales area of the world.
The management structure itself became rapidly concentrated 
above department level, with a Works Manager and an assistant 
who was also the Chief Production Engineer. There were four lower 
levels of management (although not all four were to be found in each 
area of operation ). They were: department head (superintendent);
foreman; assistant foreman/senior chargehand/ 
senior supervisor; chargehand/junior supervisor. The first two 
categories were on staff conditions and were weekly or monthly paid; 
the last two categories were hourly paid.
Reflecting top-level direct control, higher managerial positions 
reporting directly to the board of executives carried massive 
responsibilities, yet little autonomy or scope for any decision-
(7)making which might have policy implications. The only factory
manager with any degree of independent authority was John Smith at 
Stourbridge who held a director's post.
Women were conspicuous by their absence from this hierarchy,
which was entirely male above the level of supervisor, apart from a
handful of forewomen who had recently been made up on the main
(8)assembly lines. In general, managers were recruited from the
skilled grades, men with BSR shop-floor experience (such as setter- 
chargehands) being preferred. Few were brought into management from 
"outside", the company favouring internal promotions and transfers
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within the group. These men had been trained "to produce the 
BSR way", and understood what their positions entailed. They 
were expected to be "on the floor" organising production, not 
sitting at an office desk. To this end they, along with all
except purely administrative staff, worked from glass-walled offices
(9)on the factory floor, which they rarely inhabited.
Priority of production, financial stringency and direct,
centralised control, were also reflected in the remarkably minimal
staff and administrative side. This feature had been particularly
noted (with some dismay) by the CIR in their investigation at East
Kilbride in 1970, in respect of the personnel functions.
A department comprising two people in a factory employing over 2,000
was fully occupied with recruitment and record-keeping alone a pattern
which was not (despite CIR advice) elaborated in later years.
Administrative leanness was also noted by the consultants Inbucon,
called in to set up a productivity scheme in 1977. Surprised by the
lack of data generally considered essential for efficient managers,
the consultants1 task, on this occasion, apparently required rather
more imagination in constructing the figures, than usual:
"One of the reasons for the strength of BSR's 
competitive position is the maintenance 
of strict controls over the level of clerical 
and administrative staff and associated 
administrative routines.
In some areas, however, there appeared to be a 
lack of data which is vital to the effective 
operation of the business. It was impossible, 
for instance, to obtain comprehensive 
information on lateness and absenteeism both 
of which are considered to be major problems, 
and the lack of a reliable measure of actual 
hours worked made it difficult to assess changes 
in the level of labour productivity. (11)
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Finally, management—union relations were also clearly structured
i 121by the company's pattern of centralised,personal control.
Bargaining was consciously confined to one union, the GKWU;
(although as it turned out, the AUEW had sole negotiating rights for 
the Scottish plants at East Kilbride.) In the West Midlands, the 
100% membership agreement had produced one of the largest single 
branches in the country and a single-company group which constituted 
some 10% of the GMWU's membership in the Birmingham Region.(100,000) 
Conscious of the significance of his company's presence, the Chairman 
was assured of prompt attention from the top-level of the regional 
hierarchy. Ferguson kept bargaining close to himself, negotiating 
and making decisions on all matters of consequence with the full­
time official at the final stage of bargaining procedure. The 
penultimate stage of negotiation, wherein the full-time official 
met top-management, was conducted with the industrial relations 
director, Tony Stuart, who operated above the level of individual 
factory managers. (He covered East Kilbride as well). This 
penultimate stage comprised, in reality, the first significant stage 
of negotiation on all bar the purely "domestic" issues, since at 
the factory level,management's scope for decision-making was limited, 
with all decisions and bargaining being monitored by John Ferguson.
He worked in liaison with Tony Stuart, who was closely briefed for 
negotiations. Ferguson kept in touch with the issues and maintained
contact with the officials,regularly providing them with reports
... . (13)on the company's position.
The management structure described above reflects the policy 
of centralised control which allowed little scope for autonomy or 
the use of discretion anywhere except at the top. The organisation
of production itself reflected this principle, by removing as
far as possible, scope for the use of discretion on the part of
the workers. Factory managers were vested with a great deal of
control over the production process itself. But in relation to
the workforce, they were few in number. How then were they able
to operate a labour process which relied on the application of
direct control so effectively?
(Was there a lot of pressure on management?)
"Tremendous amount of pressure. From the time 
we come in, before we officially start work, 
and it goes on after we go - I mean I'm talking 
about the normal finishing time ... We are 
under pressure all the time. The units drive us.
I mean this is the problem, you’ve got the units 
coming off the end of the line and you've got 
to be at all those lines at the same time - Now 
there's a tremendous amount of control from the 
managers themselves. Each area is divided up 
under various managers." (Is there too much 
pressure on management?) " You get used to it.
It gets occasionally, a bit hectic, when everything 
goes wrong at once - but then you ride over the 
top of it and you go down the other side ..."
Barry White (Factory Manager). (14)
We go on to look at BSR's production policy and methods.
The main elements of these are given, in brief outline, in the next 
section. They are taken up for discussion in more detail later 
on, where they form the themes of the subsequent chapters.
Production policy and methods: the units drive us
"We operate in a high volume market, with a 
small profit on each component, all depends on 
sheer quantity of output. Success or failure 
hangs by a slim thread, because if units are 
produced with no profit, how^ever many are 
turned out it will make no difference.
Our biggest markets are the United States and 
Japan. Competition is very tough".
Tony Stuart (Industrial Relations Director).
The two main production control needs facing BSR's management 
centred on unit costs and output. Unit costs were lowest when 
maximum output was achieved from the labour and capital employed. 
But because demand was so unstable, in a short period, the 
maximum output levels required could fluctuate markedly. Given 
a narrow profit margin which could be quickly eroded whenever 
output was reduced in relation to the amount of labour and capital 
being utilised, the company's policy was to maximise output at all 
times; to keep the amount of fixed capital to a minimum and to 
employ a largely female labour force. The last two items are 
frequently linked, in the sense that employers are seen to make a 
rational choice between the low purchase price of the latter in 
relation to the former. We would argue, however, that management' 
considerations rested far more on the different nature of their 
variability in terms of utilisation or consumption within the 
labour process.
Given the firm's environmental constraints, its viability 
depended on maintaining a maximum level of output for all levels 
of "input" and in maintaining the continuity of this maximum output 
rate throughout each working day and year. Output requirements 
fluctuated however, and falling levels immediately threatened 
profitability. One answer was to reduce the level of output by
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reducing the workforce, rather than the rate: i.e. to allow the
"inputs' to vary the output level, while preserving the same
output rate. As noted above, high turnover on the part of women
workers offered management the potential of greater "downwards"
flexibility in terms of labour input. But this feature could
not be reliable if simply left to circumstance or under the workers'
(16)own control. And as we shall show in later sections
management did not simply sit back to reap the advantages of 
"natural wastage". The most important characteristic of the 
women workers for management was perhaps not so much this feature 
as their easier dispensibility. High or higher turnover could be,
and was, engineered by management in various ways which are examined 
more fully in the chapters which follow. High turnover was also 
a "by-product" of a number of characteristic features of management's 
production policy with regard to the women workers. It is important 
to realise that managerial strategy with regard to the utilisation 
of the female labour force had many distinctive aspects. Some 
features scarcely applied to male workers at all, or else applied to 
very few of them. These differences are described more fully in 
the later chapters, which take up again the methods outlined below.
The most striking thing about this labour process was the pace 
of work. This was remarkable not only because it was so fast, but 
because it was also sustained. "We are under pressure all the 
time - the units 'drive us'" was the comment of one manager. Of 
course management aimed to drive the workers - how?
In the first place management demanded high levels of output 
and penalised workers if they failed to reach the required count.
(This is discussed more fully in the chapters on discipline and the 
payment system). On top of this (we have already noted the
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constraints on management which would demand it) they instituted 
a continuous process of speed-up and intensification of work, 
and this was attempted in two main ways. One involved altering the 
jobs themselves: by directly increasing the counts, speeding up 
machinery or increasing the number of tasks allotted to the job.
The other involved consistently under-staffing the labour process 
and redistributing the work, so that extra tasks were allocated 
to the operators present - a process known as "doubling up".
(See pp 168-170).
The use of all of these methods was under-pinned by the 
implementation of movement of labour. (Chapter 5 ) .
Labour mobility was management's most clearly explicated and most 
closely protected principle, which no precedent or circumstance 
(such as unionisation) was to be allowed to qualify. All women 
workers on the shop floor were recruited as "operatives".
Management retained the right to put them onto any job at any time:
"no job is yours". It was argued that this flexibility was essential 
because of the women's high levels of absenteeism. In a sense 
it was, but the "absence” of workers on the shop floor, could be 
seen as much the consequence of management's'’recruitmentMpolicy - 
understaffing, as the workers taking time off. Indeed the two were 
not unrelated.
Another feature which underpinned the high pace of work was 
the payment system. (Chapter 7 ) . A complex piecework bonus
scheme, with a low incentive element, was operated on the shop floor 
in combination with fixed performance and ’no-value1 jobs in some 
areas. An important aspect of the bonus system especially was the 
obscure relationship pertaining between earnings and effort, which
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permit ted manipulation by management. Further features included 
the significant areas of non-or-discretionary payment - also 
strongly protected by management. These allowed various 
production costs otherwise accruing to the employer, to be 
passed on and thus borne by, the workforce instead. In particular 
the system whereby rejects were not "counted" should be mentioned 
as this facilitated another form of work intensification whereby, 
when lower output was required, management could introduce bad 
parts into assembly, in order to effect a quantitative reduction in 
both the end product and the wages bill, without allowing the pace 
of work to slacken, i.e. pay less wages for, effectively, the same 
amount of work.
Finally, discipline must be noted as a crucial feature of 
management's production policy. High levels of intimidation were 
sustained on the shop floor generally, by management taking 
disciplinary action on a regular basis. (Chapter 6 ).
Disciplinary action was also used specifically to enforce each of 
the methods for instituting speed-up and intensification of labour 
described above.
The principles and methods outlined here, aimed at controlling 
the workforce in order to maintain or increase (high) levels of 
productivity, informed management's practice on the shop floor.
It should not be assumed, therefore, that they were consistently or 
entirely successful. The degree to which they might be at any 
one point in time would obviously vary, not least with the workers' 
responses; and in the chapters which follow these questions are 
more fully examined. But it is important to note the basis on 
which these managerial strategies were applied, because the
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effectiveness of both their application (by management) and the 
workers' responses was governed by the underlying organisation 
of the labour process. This structured the way workers related 
to each other individually and collectively. It also structured the 
kind and degree of control they could exercise over their jobs: 
again, these two things are related.
It is a commonplace that the division of labour has implications 
for managerial control. In the following sections, we go on to 
look at the way production was organised, paying particular attention 
to the ways in which the workforce was structured. This points 
forward to a later discussion of workers' own job controls and 
organisation on the shop floor. Since, however, it is management 
that first forms workers' collective organisation, we look first at 
the way this was shaped in relation to their own control needs, 
through the division of labour and the organisation of the labour 
process.
The sexual division of labour and social relations in production
In Chapter 2 we discussed the company's recruitment policy 
and examined the preference for women workers. Men were, of course, 
employed as well and as is commonly found, the
distribution of male and female workers in the labour process formed 
a distinctive pattern (see Table 5 ). It is to an examination of 
this that we now turn.
The company's labour force was divided along sex lines and 
segregated in terms of at least three important dimensions: actual 
job and type of task; operating area ; and authority relations.
These aspects can be illustrated with reference to one of the
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TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION MALE/FEMALE WORKERS: STOURBRIDGE 
FACTORY 1978. (Approximate figures)
EMPLOYEES (approx figures)
Basic processes -
Male
lOO
Female
llOO
Total
1200
%M
9
%F
89
D
I
Moulding - 770 770 - lOO
Machine shop 20 50 70 40 60
R
Press shop - 80 80 - lOO
E
c
Paint,plating & 
stripping 40 200 240 20 80
T EPS plant 40 - 40 lOO -
Assembly : - 2050 2050 - lOO
Sub assemblies - 1200 1200 - lOO
Main lines - 850 850 - lOO
TOTAL: DIRECT PRODUCTION lOO 3150 3250 3 97
I Maintenance 30 - 30 lOO -
N Toolroom 30 - 30 l o o -
D
Carpenters/Building 
maintenance & garage 30 _ 30 l o o _
I Stores/warehouse 30 - 30 l o o -
Quality control/lnsp. l o IO 2 0 50 5 0
R Setters IO IO lOO -
E Service a general 
labouring 1 3 0 _ 1 3 0 l o o _
c Canteen/cleaners - 2 0 20 - lOO
T TOTAL: INDIRECT 2 7 0 30 3 0 0 9 0 l o
First-line supervision 50 1 2 0 1 7 0 29 71
TOTAL: DIRECT & INDIRECT + 
SUPERVISION 4 2 0 3 3 0 0 3 7 2 0 11 89
Source Research Notes
factories, Stourbridge, where the factory manager also provided 
some revealing comments on each of them.
The factory employed some 3,000 women and 400 men. Apart 
from a few men operating large plant in the polystyrene or plating 
shops or engaged on metal machining, no other male workers were
engaged in direct production - either on basic processes or
. . (18) assembly.
"we very seldom employ men on women's work, 
or women on ... Oh, I'd better rephrase 
that. We very seldom employ men on what 
is traditionally, women's work, and we very 
seldom employ women on, what is traditionally, 
men's work. (Why is that?) Because its not 
similar jobs. I mean, a man invariably, does 
heavy work - therefore, naturally a woman is 
not going to go onto a heavy ... is not ... 
not capable of doing a heavy job ... er, that's 
the only reason. (What about the other way 
round?). Er, you don't use men on women's 
work, because you see obviously - they haven't 
got the nimbleness of fingers. They haven't 
got a ... er, not degrading women when I say 
this - they haven't got the ability to have a 
monotonous job all day long. And ... it just 
doesn't work. I mean ... "
(Have you ever employed men as production workers?)
"Oh, yes. On the night shift we employ all 
men you see. We don't run a night shift - night 
shift runs from 10 p.m. till 6 in the morning.
The rest of the shifts are evening shifts. But 
we used to employ men on nights, because you 
weren't at that time allowed to run women on 
nights. Oh, we used to employ 200,300 men on 
nights. (And they were doing assembly jobs?)
No, they weren't doing assembly jobs - they were 
operating moulding machines. O.K. - there are the 
moulding machines, in the moulding shop - I expect 
you've seen those. All sorts of moulding machines, 
the very small ones and the very big ones .. 
and simply, the women would work with them up to 
lo o'clock - from 6 o'clock in the morning until 
lO o'clock at night, on 4 shifts - 4 four-hour shifts.
The men would take them over at 10 o'clock at night - then 
work them through the night until 6 o'clock in the morning. 
And they would take over directly what would, normally be 
considered to be a woman's job.
(So, you’ve never tried to use men on the 
assembly*type jobs?)
"Not on the assembly jobs, no. I can't 
visualise men - doing that light assembly 
work, and that intricate work. I ... we've 
never tried it, therefore, I don't know what 
the problems would be in doing so - I 
just don't reason ... I cannot imagine a man, 
doing that type of work ...
(What happened in Ireland? They only got 
employment subsidies for giving employment 
to men?)
"Oh, they used men over there, Yes,Yes ... er, 
but they used to use boys, they didn't use men.
They used 14 or 15 year olds at that time.
And obviously they phased out ... er, when they 
were about 18 or 19 the boys didn't like this type 
of work, so they tended to either leave the company 
and go elsewhere ... er, or go on the dole ...
(They'd rather go on the dole?) Well, I gathered 
they did, anyway - they'd get the employment sub. 
back. But its a monotonous job to get men to do..."
Men and women workers, segregated in terms of their jobs and
type of work, were also physically separated in terms of their areas
of operation in the factory. The areas where men worked were
either separate, enclosed areas, walled off from the main body of 
wasthe factory, which otherwise "open plan", or outside the main 
building altogether (e.g. stripping shop, EPS plant and the garage). 
Some of these areas, for example EPS plant, maintenance dept., toolroom, 
carpenters and building maintenance, garage, stores and warehouse 
would have been 100% male areas. On the other hand, apart from the 
canteen, no area was exclusively female, on account of the fact that 
male setters, maintenance, servicemen and management, would operate 
there. Nevertheless, their numbers, in relation to the women workers, 
were very small. On main assembly, in one section of 8 lines, 
there were 8 servicemen (1 per line), 3 men in stores and 3 or 4 
Inspectors working with 500+ women. Of the 800 employed in plastic 
moulding, some 15 - 20 were men - supervisors and servicemen. Even so
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it is true to say, that wherever the men worked, they all had 
"their own area", whether it be an office, a separate "shop" 
or a few seats in a corner set apart:
(Do you have any problems between men and women 
workers?)
"We've got very few men working in with the 
females. But even then, there's no problem 
of them working together - except at Christmas 
time. And of course when they get the drink 
in them, from outside - the majority are from 
places outside - then you do have problems.
In which case, you hammer the males very hard 
indeed. In fact, we lock them away in their 
departments and don't let them out. And we 
say, "That's your area, and you stay there!
If we find you out ..." No matter what their 
responsibilities normally would be, we turn round 
and say, "That's your area - you stay there - 
if you're seen outside, you're suspended!"
And that's the only way you can do it."
The majority of men were employed as indirect workers: on 
machine-setting, on labouring, on maintenance and in the toolroom, 
on quality control and above all - in management. As we have 
already seen, there were no women in the managerial hierarchy at all, 
above the level of forewoman. Even this position was a comparatively 
recent innovation. Forewomen had been "made up" in main-line 
assembly, where labour-control was most problematic and there were 
a larger number of supervisors (one per line plus two juniors— 
all females) to draw from. The forewomen over-saw two lines and 
reported to the superintendent of their section - all of whom were 
male. A significant proportion of first line supervision over women 
was male. Female supervisors were mainly employed in assembly, but 
wherever machinery was used, male setter-chargehands occupied 
supervisory positions, combining labour supervision with machine­
setting and plant control. This technical/skill bias, unaccompanied
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by any notion that women might be trained, is reflected in the 
Stourbridge Manager's discourse on women in management. The 
interesting thing about this, however, (apart from a give-away in 
lines 17 -20) is his slide into a discussion of race - which
would seem to indicate, indeed to pinpoint the aspect of discrimination
(19)characterising the whole account in a peculiarly clear way.
"Wait a year, maybe. And I sincerely mean that.
There is no bar at all to a woman taking up a 
management position in 3SR. First of all, it 
is better to have women in charge of women.
Any where you need technical work, you'll need 
men, obviously - in the machine shop, you'll need 
men. But, I think with a few exceptions ... I 
think most of the foremen are women. Except where 
there is a definite technical bias, in which case 
there's men - the machine shop is the obvious one.
You've got a tremendous number of machines there, 
a few men operators, and quite a few female operators, 
therefore, its logical that the supervision at foreman 
level, should be male, and they are. On the main 
assembly lines, you've got all women on the lines, 
and ... I would say ... 6 of the foremen or
forepersons are female, and one is male. So, 
you've got to bring sufficient males in, to keep 
a more ... level of top management, fairly ... 
males, fairly high. Because, I can't imagine 
at this stage, seeing a female factory manager. Not 
at this stage! But I'm not ... that doesn't mean to 
say that ... I've certainly got no objection to 
one, I've no objection to a factory-area manager ...
I've no objection to female superintendents. Its 
just that the time isn't quite right to make them 
up into ... er, into those positions. It's a very 
slow growth and generally, female emancipation has 
only been going on for a relatively short period 
of time. So, I honestly see no reason at all, 
that in the future there won't be female superintendents, 
or even higher"..
(In what way are the women not ready yet? - to be 
superintendents or above?)
"I'm not saying there's any particular reason.
I think BSR moves as fast as any other company.
But, we just haven't reached that natural level of 
evolution, that's all. They've got to be there 
at the right time and the right vacancies, and 
the right person has got to be available - and they 
just haven't been there at this time. But its 
certainly no policy not to have women any more than
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there's no policy not to have coloured girls.
We just keep the coloured girls to a certain 
percentage, that's all. Or at least, I won't 
say a certain percentage, we just keep a ... a 
balance. (What sort of balance do you keep?)
We don't ... we haven't got any percentage to 
work to ... er, we wouldn't like to see a ...
You see, the problem is when you start employing 
coloured girls, you can get ... er, groups of 
coloured girls - which are then going to form 
cliques and clans. And we don't let that .... 
Barry White (Factory Manager). (20)
In this section we have looked at how the company's labour force 
was divided along sex-lines. When this distribution is examined 
we find that men and women can largely be differentiated according 
to power and authority relationships, the actual job and type of 
task and the operating area where these are carried on. What kind 
of implications arise from this?
We would first argue that the sexual division of labour with
men in positions of power has important implications for the nature
of managerial control over a female workforce, for the type of
production methods used and for their style of application. This
is not to say that females in management would be "better", but to
recognise that sexism is a distinctive feature in the social relations
(21)of production. Moreover, such a view must be extended to the
shop floor where men and women are not only separated according to 
their different physical location, roles in and experience of the 
productive process, but also differentiated in terms of wider 
social roles and unequal power relationships prevailing between the 
sexes. What are the implications of male/female inequality and 
sexism within the workforce for managerial control? This question 
is examined subsequently where these divisions are seen to have 
debilitating consequences from the point of view of shop floor 
organisation, solidarity and the nature of both men and women's
responses to management ( 2 2 )
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responses to management (22)
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Meanwhile, we have seen that the distribution of men and women 
workers in the labour process at BSR was patterned distinctively along 
sex lines. One consequence of this is that as the roles of 
men and women in the labour process tend to differ, so will their 
experience of it, and also the nature of the problems that they 
each have to confront. Insofar as the labour process itself is 
organised differently according to the different areas of production, 
then it can be assumed to throw up different kinds of problems for 
the men and women workers in them. Moreover, if as we have 
suggested the effectiveness of managerial tactics (such as speed-up 
and work intensification) might also tend to vary according to the 
nature of the underlying organisation of the labour process, then it 
can be assumed that the problems for men and women workers which 
arise from those tactics, will be thrown up and, therefore, experienced 
on a different scale.
We, therefore, go on to examine some aspects of how the labour 
process was organised in relation to the women workers especially. 
Specifically, we are going on to consider what might perhaps be seen as the 
more "technical" side of the division of labour - to the extent that it is, 
apparently, structured in accordance with the productive system.
Since, however, it is clear that the latter is far from being 
patterned on a purely "technical" basis, our focus remains on the 
structure of social relations within it, concentrating on the 
particular areas where the women were employed.
We consider first, the aspect of separation and fragmentation 
consequent upon management's division of the production process into 
its constitutive elements. We then go on to identify some of the 
different forms of cooperation found in the labour process which, again,
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structures social relationships. Both of these aspects of 
the divison of labour have implications for both management and 
workers' patterns of control.
The division of labour and forms of cooperation in the labour process
This section looks at BSR management's methods, in terms of 
the division of labour and the organisation of production. Their 
aim was to maximise labour productivity - if possible, to increase 
it, and at all times to maintain vigilance against workers' activities 
which might have an opposite effect. Management, therefore, required 
a high degree of control over the labour process. To a significant 
extent this was attempted by breaking down operations such that 
labour could be cheapened and at the same time their activities more 
closely controlled. Without assuming the inevitable "success" of 
these methods, three aspects of the division of labour are identified 
as having important implications in terms of the way workers are 
"collectivized" on the one hand and differentiated on the other, within 
the labour process.
In the first place, the breaking down of productive functions 
results in spatial separation of groups of workers. Secondly, the 
extensive sub-division of the labour process tends towards homogenisation 
and also fragmentation of workers. Finally, within each area, the 
way workers relate to each other is structured, not only in terms of 
their physical proximity, but also the way that their jobs inter-relate 
and in this respect a variety of different forms of cooperation can 
be identified which both integrate and differentiate the workforce.
FACTORY LAYOUT
While a formal or technical interdependence can be established
with respect to each part of a differentiated production process,
proximity and the way that workers are physically grouped is,
of course, a crucial aspect of their inter-relationships. Through
the division of labour the factory space is sectioned off - in a
manner which tends to follow the production sequence, if rather
imperfectly. The basic design of the BSR factories was of the
large, rectangular, open-plan warehouse type (high walled and with
no windows), which permitted flexible utilisation of floor space.
demarcation of the different areas being simply by white painted
floor lines. However, the Stourbridge factory, which had been
considerably extended, had a couple of dividing walls, and both
Old Hill and Stourbridge, had upstairs sections. Such divisions
limited the possibility of workers seeing the factory as a whole and
created through their restricted mobility large areas of "the unknown"
"After my accident I was transferred off the 
line to work upstairs. Well I'd never been 
up there in my life - but I managed to find 
my own way in the end". Pip (Sub-Assembly).
Exceptions to the "open-floor" work areas were the separate 
shops serving indirect functions - stores, maintenance department, 
toolroom and carpenters for example, all located around the periphery. 
And then there were the walled-off sections (at Stourbridge in 
the centre of the factory) housing large process-plant such as 
painting and plating. It has already been pointed out how sexual 
divisions structured production functions, and clearly, thereby, they 
also structured the utilisation of space. "It so happened" that 
most of the male workers had resort to a smaller, concretely bounded 
space, and the majority of the women were massed on the open floor.
-136-
But they were not, as a superficial glance might suggest, simply 
amassed.
The women workers were divided into departments (designating 
factory area and main productive function) and within these,sub­
divided into sections. Sections could comprise one major or a 
number of smaller, working groups. Division of the labour process 
structured these social divisions and also the tasks the workers 
performed.
FRAGMENTATION IN THE LABOUR PROCESS
Apart from supervision, all the women's jobs in the factories 
had been broken down to their simplest elements and it was all 
fast repetition work. Work cycle times give the best indication 
of this though they varied of course, depending on the type of model 
being built, and for individuals in a team, depending on the operation 
performed. On the main lines the average job cycle was around 
15 seconds. But at Old Hill where basic models were built, it was 
nearer to 12 seconds. On sub-plates a team producing 400 an hour 
made one every 9 seconds. An experienced operator on a heavy press 
turned out 1 main-plate every 8 seconds. Reaching forward to 
place the main plate onto the tool to press out the holes, sitting 
up to pull on the bar operating both guard and tool , stretching forward 
again to remove the plate, clear scrap from the tool and replace another 
plate, she rocked rapidly backwards and forwards in perpetual motion.
In paint inspection 5 girls took two main-plates each from a jig 
carrying 10 which arrived every 15 seconds. For each one they 
inspected both sides,examined 4 cups, initialed and packed them within 
7 seconds. On individual assembly, women putting together umbrella 
centre spindles had to produce a minimum of 1 every 15 seconds. Flat 
out they might do 1 every 12 seconds. On the other hand, the construction 
of the speed-change arm assembly, consisting of more than a dozen 
small parts, springs and washers would take an experienced operator 
45 seconds. Management had tried, unsuccessfully to break this 
job down:
"Originally, when I first went on this job, we 
worked in a team; and then about 3 years 
ago they came and changed our method of working - 
individually - which, incidently, is an improvement".
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(As a team, although they all got on with each other, 
they had not been able to make a'go'of the work.)
"You'd get one that was slow and one that was 
fast, and the one that was fast would get rather 
frustrated with the one that was a bit slow - 
some of the girls just couldn't get the hang 
of it." Sally (Sub-Assembly). (23)
The advantages to management which accrue from extensive
sub-division of the labour process are held to be obvious (too
often, unquestioningly so). It is assumed that such methods yield
a reduction in labour costs through its cheaper price as a result of
de-skilling, together with greater productivity as a consequence of
increasing both the speed of the worker and the scope of management
(24)control. These aspects are briefly considered, in relation
to BSR management's production policy.
Leaving aside the question of how skills are defined, the extent 
to which this component governs or is reflected in the wage/price 
that labour can, in any period command, is extremely problematic.
But this is not to deny that the process of "de-skilling" or "job 
degradation" can effectively cheapen labour. With jobs broken down 
to their simplest elements, no training is required beyond a few 
minutes demonstration and time to pick up speed. To a certain 
extent, the skill level is thus "homogenised" and jobs rendered 
increasingly interchangeable. And so, in that sense, is the workforce, 
since in theory, anyone should be able to do any job. At BSR, no 
woman had a job she could consider "her own" - the pithy phrase was 
often repeated: "no job is yours". And this interchange - 
ability was, as we shall see, crucial for effecting speed-up and 
for intensifying the use of labour. In addition extensive 
subdivision of the labour process offered management two possible 
advantages, arising from the restriction of workers' activity to
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the mechanical repetition of a small number of movements. Firstly 
an increase of speed and secondly a reduction of the operator's 
scope for controlling her work. This, specifically, in terms of her 
exercising choice and variation in both pace and mode of execution, 
which might affect the rate and continuity of output.
FORMS OF CO-OPERATION IN THE LABOUR PROCESS
Subdivision in the labour process: breaking down production 
in terns of its various constitutive functions and beyond this# 
breaking down and reducing each job task to its nost basic elements, 
divides up the workforce. It does this in terns of sectioning 
parts which go to make up the productive system and individually, 
in terms of separating tasks performed. In some senses these 
resulting social divisions may be seen to advantage a management 
seeking to advance their scope for control, by breaking down the 
basic collectivity of their labour force. But this is to
ignore the other side of the division of labour, which does not 
end with the process of subdivision but simultaneously entails 
(re) grouping. This aspect is seen as having crucial implications 
for managerial control and worker’s inter-relationships. It is 
discussed below, using the concept of cooperation by which means the 
labour force is at the same time integrated, and also divided again, 
according to the variety and arrangement of its many different forms.
The different forms of cooperation are inseparable aspects of 
the division of labour patterning the labour process, and structure 
the workers' relationships with each other. For example, a number 
of workers may be grouped together while being separately engaged 
on the same type of work: either simultaneously duplicating production 
of identical pieces or, alternatively, a variety of different items, 
none exactly similar.
Then again, workers may be engaged in doing similar tasks 
simultaneously, yet find themselves, nevertheless, differentiated, 
because their otherwise indistinguishable operations take place at 
different stages of an on-going (and possibly automated) process.
FORMS OF CO-OPERATION IN THE LABOUR PROCESS
Subdivision in the labour process: breaking down production
in terms of its various constitutive functions and beyond this,
breaking down and reducing each job task to its most basic elements,
divides up the workforce. It does this in terms of sectioning
parts which go to make up the productive system and individually,
in terms of separating tasks performed. In some senses these
resulting social divisions may be seen to advantage a management
seeking to advance their scope for control, by breaking down the
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ignore the other side of the division of labour, which does not 
end with the process of subdivision but simultaneously entails 
(re) grouping. This aspect is seen as having crucial implications 
for managerial control and worker's inter-relationships. It is 
discussed below, using the concept of cooperation by which means the 
labour force is at the same time integrated, and also divided again, 
according to the variety and arrangement of its many different forms.
The different forms of cooperation are inseparable aspects of 
the division of labour patterning the labour process, and structure 
the workers' relationships with each other. For example, a number 
of workers may be grouped together while being separately engaged 
on the same type of work: either simultaneously duplicating production 
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none exactly similar.
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different stages of an on-going (and possibly automated) process.
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On the other hand, and in contrast to either of these cases, 
workers may be engaged in performing quite different operations to 
each other. But these are part of a closely linked sequence 
which brings the people together as a single collective unit, 
or "team".
Finally, groupings such as any cf these described here, may 
be "repeated" or duplicated; with for example, a number of 
"teams", separately, but simultaneously, engaged in producing either 
identical or dissimilar components, being grouped together.
What these various forms of cooperation have in common is 
the arrangement whereby workers are linked, being simultaneously 
integrated and separated along a number of different lines: task, 
product, sequence. And this variety of forms of cooperation could 
be found in production and assembly at BSR, structuring the different 
ways that the workers, while engaged in their tasks, related to one 
another.
In the press shop, for example, the women sat at individual 
machines grouped in a large section, separated and isolated from each 
other by space and noise. Work was similarly arranged in plastic 
moulding where, although it was quieter, the sheer bulk of these 
massive machines hid the women from each other. On the other 
hand, operators of the individual,smaller machines could be found quite 
closely grouped together, since shortage of space was a significant 
characteristic feature of all of the BSR factories.
( 26 )Sections such as painting and plating were different in
that much of the plant was automatic and the processes were of a 
continuous nature. Women loaded the individual parts onto constantly 
circulating jigs (a system of hooks suspended from an overhead conveyor)
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and these were tended, unloaded and re-loaded as they moved through 
the sequence of processes, being taken off, finally, for inspection 
and packed into trays. The workers, operating individually or 
in groups at various points, were all linked as parts of this 
chain, and also, inside the shops - where some worked on separate, 
"off-line" operations - by physical proximity to each other. On 
the other hand, some operators, although linked by the line, worked 
outside the walled-off sections that the conveyor passed through, 
and therefore, outside the social milieu of the shop. Like, for 
example, the girls on the initial "jigging up" operation (hanging 
parts onto moving hooks), or on final removal and inspection.
In the sub-assemblies there were women who put together a 
complete component (mainly the smaller types), from separate parts 
placed in trays before them, counting off the finished ones into 
pans or boxes. These women sat at small individual tables set 
in a straight line one behind the other, separated from an adjacent 
row by a gangway (usually piled with boxes). Wherever it had been 
found feasible to arrange the work in sequential tasks, the women 
on sub-assembly operations worked side-by-side as a team. The 
work was passed on by hand, as soon as each particular operation was 
completed, and at the end of the line the component was inspected 
and counted-off into trays. A sub-plate, for example, (which was 
the foundation of the whole mechanism) was constructed by a line of 
17 women, who, if they were experienced and the parts they were using 
were good, could put them together at a rate of 450 per hour.
All components destined to be incorporated into complete
(27)units finished up at the main lines where the basic frame,
clamped into a jig, started a journey along the conveyor belt
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flanked by 50 - 70 girls sitting at stations alongside, one 
behind the other. These workers lifted the unit off as it came along 
the line beside them, worked on it and set it back again, hopefully 
before the next one arrived. (If, for any one or more possible 
reasons, the operation took too long, the continuously arriving units 
had to be piled up on the floor, around the increasingly frantic 
girl). Further along the line, below assembly, the units were 
plugged into power and tested by women standing in front of electrical 
instruments. (Mal-functioning units were sent on to line-repair 
girls). No unit was counted or,thereforeypaid for until it was 
packed into boxes as it came off the end of the line. The women 
on the line were linked by the constantly moving conveyor and shared 
its pressure. Although seated in line-astern the women at either 
end remained in sight of each other.
Although it was fairly noisy and the stations along the belt 
located a yard or so apart, conversation was just about possible.
It was easier on repairs and the test, where the women, standing, 
worked side by side and closer together. If the line was "doubled" 
that is, womanned on the opposite side, then a neighbour on assembly 
would be sitting alongside - although she was separated by the conveyor 
itself and the fact that she was engaged in her own sequence - a 
separate team and a separate workflow.
Breaking down the production process as a whole into its
consecutive elements, and spatially segregating these in terms of
"functional" areas, separates and divides up a workforce which is
still, of course, at the same time, wholly interdependent. Breaking
down the work into the smallest detail-tasks has a similarly fragmentary
effect, (not only on the workforce one should note, but also on the
(28)worker herself). Nevertheless, each person's work remains totally
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interdependent within the production process. It is the nature
and form of this interdependence which a view of cooperation
provides. From management's point of view, seeking to maintain as
far as possible, a consistently, and predictably, high level of
effort from every worker a crucial aspect of the different
forms of social cooperation lay in the extent to which individual
workers could be kept exposed to the pressures entailed in this
inter-dependency, and the degree of immediacy of those pressures
themselves. Management^ recognition of this was reflected in their
preference for team as averse to individual jobs; a preference which
aimed to reduce the scope of workers attempts to cushion themselves
from the immediate pressures of interdependency and to increase the
space within which they could exercise some choice and control over
(29)their activity. A press operator, on an individual job,
expressed this pressure and the need/attempt to combat it:
"The most irritating thing about this job is when 
they come and fetch them 2/3 at a time. When 
they're waiting for them - to put the cups on.
I like to get a few by me, but when they come and 
fetch them 2 and 3 at a time you don't get a 
chance really". Sarah (Press Shop). (30)
(
It would appear that whatever the pattern or form of cooperation, 
the greater the degree of immediacy in the sequence, the greater 
the pressure on the operator, whose scope for controlling her own 
pace of work is thereby reduced.
Conclusions
In the first part of this chapter we have considered management's 
structure and production strategies and the organisation of the 
labour process. In considering how the effectiveness of the 
former may be related to the latter, we have noted that two particular 
aspects of the division of labour might serve to reinforce managerial
control. Firstly, fragmentation in the labour process can be 
linked to the high pace of work and to the reduced scope for workers 
exercising choice or variation within it. Furthermore, the 
consequent homogenisation of job tasks can be seen to increase 
the degree of interchangeability in the female workforce as a 
whole. It is held that this, in conjunction with movement of 
labour, firmly underpinned managerial strategies aimed at intensifying 
work and speed-up.
Secondly, the different forms of cooperation in the system of 
production expressed, in different degrees, relations of interdependence 
within the labour force. One aspect of this we have identified as 
highly significant from the point of view of managerial control.
Where relations of interdependency are immediate, as in closely 
sequential operations, workers put pressure on each other to sustain 
the rate and continuity of their effort. And again the scope for 
individual workers' use of discretion and job control is thereby 
reduced.
Bearing in mind the sexual division of labour, we might note that 
both of these features of the organisation of the labour process 
were characteristic of those areas or jobs where only women workers 
were employed, like assembly. Thus we can see that, insofar as 
the labour process was organised differently in the different production 
areas, in terms of which}wc?rkforce was also sexually divided, the 
women workers were confronted with different kinds of problems to 
the men.
Beyond this, however, we have suggested that the effectiveness 
of managerial tactics for controlling labour's effort and increasing 
productivity might vary according to the underlying organisation of
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the labour process. Moreover, we have shown how two aspects of 
the division of labour affecting the women workers in particular, 
might serve to enhance or reinforce such strategies. The conclusion 
must, therefore, be that the female workforce was confronted with 
problems which differed from those of the men in terms of both 
their nature and their scale.
Finally, we have suggested that another reason the effectiveness 
of managerial strategies for controlling labour and the levels of 
effort it expends, might vary, lies in the nature of workers' 
response. This itself, might vary for a number of reasons which 
this study goes on to explore. However, it is also significantly 
linked to the organisation of the labour process because this structures 
both the way workers relate to each other individually and collectively; 
and the nature and degree of control they are able to exercise over 
their jobs.
We have identified some distinctive features of the utili satiori 
of female labour at BSR. To the extent that patterns in the sexual 
division of labour found here are repeated elsewhere, we could argue 
that employers' utilisation of female labour in general is distinctive. 
Therefore, we might see that women workers are confronted on the one 
hand with specific kinds of problems, and on the other with certain 
’common' kinds of problems, but to a much greater degree.
In the next section we go on to look at some of the problems
of the women workers in the labour process at BSR.
PART 2: W IE N 'S  WORK
"It doesn't use you as a person. It's 
terribly boring - you know, I think you 
tend to get very dissatisfied with boredom".
Madge (Moulding Shop). (31)
This section begins by setting out the women's problems, in 
order to identify the nature of some of their needs and thus, 
the basis of their demands. This part is specifically addressed 
to those problems arising from the nature of the work and the way 
it was organised at the point of production at BSR; although it is 
clear, at the same time, that the impact of these problems and the 
way they were experienced can in no sense be disassociated from 
the women's position outside the sphere of employment relations.
We begin by identifying some general aspects of the women's 
situation, in terms of the most characteristic features of their 
jobs. While these in themselves, must clearly give rise to needs 
and demands related to broader social and political questions - 
such as the kind of work people might humanly do in society, and under 
what conditions; we merely point here to one immediate need, the miti­
gation of stress, which stands out as a consequence of the women's 
situation.
Following on from this, we identify a key area of struggle 
within the labour process for the women workers at BSR, and the main 
problems associated with it. Discussion of some of these struggles 
themselves, is again left for a later section.
"It gets boring at times, doing the same thing 
over and over, but I look at it as a job, you 
know - money". Kathy (Paint Shop) (32).
As has already been made clear in the discussion of the labour
process above, the women's jobs at BSR had been broken down
to short-cycle, detail tasks, as a result they were repetitious
and monotonous, not to mention, fast.
"Oh yes, you get tired. I think its more 
or less the repetition, I suppose. You get a 
bit tired but ... And of course, the pace 
you have to go, you know”. Sally (Sub Assembly).
"You see any one as stands there 8 hours and 
does the same job - 8 hours, 40 hours a week 
you know - they’ve got to think,you know,
'My God, is there no end to this?".
Tracy (Final Assembly). (34)
"Sometimes it gets £o monotonous, and you 
can hear the noise, the noise will vibrate 
like a big hammer. And sometimes, if you're 
sitting there quiet and - you can hear this 
row ... I get up and go round and talk for 5 min­
utes and it takes my mind off - I'm still 
working my machine you know, but can have a 
chat - and then go back round and - you're not 
conscious of the noise then".
Madge (Moulding Shop) (35).
This kind of work is both stressful and tiring. The
(36)
compensations of employment are money and for married women especially 
sociability and escape from (what may be even more) stressful 
isolation in the home. There is nothing in the work itself which 
affords such compensations however - rather the opposite.
Madge works on an "individual" job - operating a moulding machine
which isolates her from other women.
"I've got no-one to talk ray worries and troubles 
over with and I bring them to work and mull them 
over in my head at work. And it doesn't help 
when you've got a boring job! You've got a lot of 
time to think. When you've got a job that you're 
doing mechanically more or less and that's what we do.
(They say women like a boring job because then 
they can think about their homes?). N6 l 
No, I'd much rather have an interesting job, 
and I think the majority of women here would ... 
Madge (Moulding Shop) (37)
It is the sociable context of the work which is important
and any small chances of relief from repetition and monotony of the
jobs themselves are eagerly siezed: Jenny worked in a group on the
test section of an assembly line.
"It gets a bit boring at times, but they're 
not a bad lot of girls that I work with, they're 
jolly and we have a laugh and are gay when 
we're working. It doesn't interfere with the 
job. I rather enjoy it as a matter of fact.
(What is the most frustrating thing about it?)
"Well, the repetition, I think. But, you know, 
one of them will go to the toilet or something 
like that, so you get a chance, for a few minutes 
of doing someone else's job - it breaks the 
monotony just that little bit".
Jenny (Final Assembly) (38).
"There's a lot of repetition work ■ you 
expect that in this kind of factory. Well the 
job I have, I like it, the Molex .... Of course 
I mean union duties does take me off it a bit, 
which helps a lot ....
Well the repetition, it can play on your nerves, 
you know, very much. Pip (Sub-Assembly). (39)
Although some jobs seemed slightly better than others, the repetition
in general was clearly recognisable as a source of stress.
"Well, we have our off days you know. But I don't 
dislike the job - I quite enjoy it. Yes. I'm doing 
repairs at the moment on assembly and you're not 
doing the same thing all the while, every time you 
pick a unit up you're doing something different .... 
but on assembly - yes well, you do the same thing 
more than 200 times in an hour, and you can get a 
bit fed up....
I used to do it, mind you... You used to - when you
got into it and that - you was talking and that, you
only looked - you were that used to doing it, you didn't
even have to look at it half the time. (Did it still
make you fed up?) Yes .. Very ... Barbara (Final Assembly) (40)
But another problem with this kind of work was that although
the tasks were repetitive and of minimal content they often
required constant attentiveness and/or concentration on the part
of the operator. Kathy, for example, was taking off parts from
a moving line of hooks on a jig, examining both sides and stacking
them in trays at the rate of 480 an hour, or one every 7 seconds.
(Can you talk while you're working?)
"No, you can't talk. Well, if you really 
start talking and that, like have a 
conversation with somebody, you find that 
you're letting the work go past, you can't 
catch up with the track then. You can pass 
a few words occasionally, but you can't really 
have a good conversation when you're working".
Kathy (Paint Shop) (41)
Pip had an individual job, working on electrical leads. The
wires were as fine as delicate threads.
(Can you talk while doing your job?)
"Yes, I can. But some people can't, they've 
got to concentrate on what they're doing.
It needs a lot of concentration, fine work
does, and it is^  fine work". Pip (Sub-Assembly) (42)
Consistently maintaining the required degree of concentration and
attentiveness clearly added to the stressful impact of the repetitive
work. But the women were frequently subject to outside pressures
which compounded their difficulties:
"Because when anything's happened at home and I 
come here, I can't get it out of my mind - and 
it can affect your concentration".
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (43)
Marital breakdowns soon translated into work problems, for
example, on Barbara's line:
"There's a couple actually (Has it affected their 
work?) They seem to get fed up you know and I 
think its because their mind's on it, they're not 
really concentrating and they do get stock on the 
line. One woman has had time off. Not a lot, you
know, but I think its just that much on her mind,
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and she knows she's not doinq any good at work 
so she just has a day off. Barbara (Final 
Assembly) (44)
Everyone said, of the jobs themselves - there was nothing
to them (that was the trouble). You could be shown how to do most
in a couple of minutes, but ...
"It isn't so much 'learning the job', 
because most of the jobs are very, very easy 
to pick up. It's just a matter of getting .... 
of working to the speed, you know, picking up 
speed. (Is that what most people find difficult?)
I think it is, yes. Jenny (Final Assembly) (45)
(What was the hardest thing to get used to here?)
"Keeping up with the speed and the people (...)
I was put right on a main line, which - the main 
line is the fastest in the whole department, you 
know - and I was put on there, and I couldn't keep 
up, obviously, because you’ve got to learn the job.
I mean, coming to a factory and that, and doing it, 
it was hard to bear - but I wanted to do it because 
I liked the hours, you know, and it got me out of 
the house. But I mean, after a coupie of months, 
it just got easier, because every job - once you've 
learnt a job it gets easier and I accepted it after, 
you know. ... Hard at the start I And .... the 
attitudes of supervision and people that I worked 
with, they wanted you obviously, you've got to keep 
up and that's it but pushing you all the while.
.... As I say, it was hard to accept really for 2 or 
3 months. And I was shattered for 2 or 3 months after 
I'd got home, and because I'd never done anything like 
that anywhere. And I think, I don't care what job 
it is - if you're on the main lines you work, work hard,- 
same as ... The department I'm in now, it's sitting down, 
it's clean but its still tiring work, because it's close 
work and you've got the fumes as well from the moulding - 
no proper air ... it's probably doing the same thing 
all day long that makes you tired. Anyway - we put it 
down to the atmosphere and the fumes".
Carol (Moulding Shop) (46)
It was the astonishing pace of the work which most distinguished 
these factories within the locality. And it was the pace of the 
work, together with the repetition which took its toll of the women. 
Considered fastest on the moving assembly lines, it was hardly less 
so on the benches or individual jobs - as the level of the 'counts'
ensured
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(What is the main reason for people leaving?)
"Hell the counts on the job. Well a lot of 
people on the small presses can't get the counts 
in you see. And I know sometimes, they don't give 
it a fair trial, but you know, they've only 
to see the counts, and I think it frightens them 
off" Sarah (Press Shop) (47)
It was not an exageration for Sarah to say that the women 
were "frightened off". In a real sense the pace of work was 
feared, especially the pace on the moving assembly line.
".... a lot of these women, they panic - when 
they come on the line, they panic. The mere 
mention of the line to some of the women upstairs 
they go absolutely to pieces. ... I think 
they hear other women go home on the bus and say 
'Oh - ain't we had a day today ! Oh, I'm done in 
like - with the pace on the line'. And these 
other women, as work upstairs, they think. Oh I 
whatever is a-going on?". Nora (Final Assembly) (48)
One of the reasons for anxiety among the older women, apart 
from pressures associated with not being able to keep up, was 
also concerned with the exhausting effects of such fast work. 
"The preservation of their capacity to labour", was not exactly 
an abstract consideration for those who went home only to start 
working again, and who still had to present themselves for paid 
work again on the following day.
"If it (the work) went through vjhich ... you can do it 
some days, you'm like a rubbing/By the end 
of the day - you'm no good for nothing. I 
mean, I know I'm old, but the young ones are the 
same. When you get young girls, 17 or 18 and they 
come back and say, I had my tea and went right to 
bed last night. Well, what life is that? That's 
no life. And this is what happens if you've done 
a really good day's work here."
Eunice (Final Assembly) (49)
Above all, it was the stressful nature of the work, and the 
way it was organised which the speed further compounded, that
constituted the heart of the problem:
"One girl, away for a week,came back last 
Monday. I asked what she was away for - 
'Were you ill?'. She says, 'Oh yes, I had 
another turn with me nerves, I just went to 
pieces'. You see these women are working at 
such a stress there's 210 - 220 units coming 
down on her, and they get stocks on the floor, 
and they’re all tensed up. And as I say, different 
people - some might see stocks on the floor - 
one person, and she'll say, 'Oh blow it:
Let it stop - somebody'll have to come and clear 
it up'. But you get another one that worries - 
you know and of course, gets all tensed up.
We often get the women throw tantrums, and put 
their jackets on and walk out. And we have to 
go after and them; 'Don't do that: Put
your ba^ down, calm down, go down the nurse', and 
something like that ...'Don't walk off:'-'cos 
the attitude here is, once they walk off the job, 
that's it. They've left, which is wrong ... "
Nora (Final Assembly) (50)
Apart from taking a personal toll of the worker, the tension
and stress generated also inhibited performance of the work itself.
There appears to be a central contradiction involved in doing this
type of work quickly: it actually requires relaxation.. A lot of
the jobs were fiddly and demanded a deftness and accuracy that
tension in the worker only destroyed:
"I was on the mats at the time and I couldn't 
keep ... I wasn't much good on the mats you see .
Now that's - you've got to be very relaxed for 
that job you know.” Carol (Moulding Shop) (51)
Carol was on an individual job, and she couldn't make the required
count. On any team job, the work just kept on coming, anyway:
"Some of the screws are very small and you just 
can't do it if you are tense and worrying. Before 
you know where you are you've got a pile of work.
I wonder some of them don't have a nervous breakdown!" 
Ethel (Final Assembly) (52)
And then the pile of work itself became a source of tension:
"Its not a matter of learning the job its 
getting the speed up. And if you've got to 
put them on the floor, well, you're nerves are 
all upset. I mean I've been on the lines - I've
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worked on the lines, but if I've got to put one 
on the floor I feel as if I aren't doing my work - 
and you don't work so well. So a new girl is 
going to feel even more frustrated".
Eunice (Final Assembly) (53)
The problems and pressures associated with the work and the 
way it was organised stand out with particular clarity when 
viewed in terms of a newcomer. As might be expected, it was 
particularly difficult for new employees. They were invariably 
put straight onto the sections requiring more labour - more often 
than not, the main assembly lines. (They were given four weeks 
to pick up speed, under conditions that were hardly conducive to 
it. They were sacked if they could not "prove their worth" 
to the company, at the end of this period).
".... Some didn't come up to the mark, and they 
had to go. We had 7 on our line, straight from 
school, no training, they just had someone with 
them for a while to keep an eye on .... It's a 
bit sad really, some of them they had to get rid of - 
because they'd either come right from school,or out 
of a different environment altogether. But to walk 
into the BSR .. There was one young kid I remember 
and she wasn't good enough and she did, in the end, 
have to go - because they give them 4 weeks. And 
her said to me, her said, 'I'm taking me a bit of time 
to settle down. When I go to bed on a night, every 
time I close me eyes the workfe coming at me1.
And this is what it's done to some of them. Some 
adapt more easily obviously, we're not all the same.
But it does take some longer. That's why I think 
the 4 weeks should be extended, to cater for those 
few. Because they can do the job, but it's just the 
pace. If they start worrying about their job you 
can guarantee they'll have a stock on the floor.
But that's not taken into consideration when the 4 
weeks are up - they either make it or they don't"
Ethel (Final Assembly) (54)
As pointed out earlier in the chapter (see Part I ), a very 
important source of pressure, particularly on team-work jobs seemed 
directly to derive from co-workers. (Although the actual sources 
of pressure emanated from the organisation of the labour process,
and the employer's driving which co-workers mediated). This 
pressure too is felt most strongly by newcomers, although it is 
there for all.
"Its frightening really, because when you're at 
school you're so innocent aren't you? - of 
people. I mean you're playing around really, then 
all of a sudden you come into a factory - you've got 
to work and ... sometimes you'll get people that'll 
help you out (but) there's times there's people 
by you that ... they think you're a hinderance you 
know - in the way. You can hear them moaning about 
you, you feel ... and you're trying to really rush 
and you can't . . you know: its terrible I 
It's an awful feeling". Edna (Final Assembly) (55)
The experience of newcomers throws into sharp relief the 
pressure of naked exposure to the work and work relationships, 
without any controls or protections in respect of either. However, 
these may be built up over time, and they appear to comprise two 
important elements. Firstly, technical co-crdination: that 
knowledge and habituation to the job which gains the worker 
relaxation,and often, more time. (Especially if she alters or 
refines some of the movements) . Secondly, social coordination: 
that experience of mutual cooperation and organisation which gains 
for group members mediation and regulation of the pressure deriving 
from management's driving and their own interdependence.
In this section so far, we have identified some of the problems 
arising from the nature and organisation of work at BSR. Both 
job content and the work rate were experienced as being stressful, 
and a common need expressed by the women concerned gaining relief 
from this. Particular requirements, therefore, entailed gaining 
relief from the repetition and monotony and gaining control over 
the pace »rhythm and effort-demands of the work. It is clear that 
the impact of this labour process, as it was experienced and
expressed by the women workers at BSR, was not confined to the sphere
of waged work alone. Thus, the demands of the married women 
regarding the nature and organisation of their work, for example, 
sprang from and also combined their experience as workers, wives 
and mothers.
Since we are interested in examining the women's efforts to 
impose controls over the labour process in relation to their needs, 
it is important to specify these more closely and to identify some 
priorities. While broadly their demands concerned both job 
content and work rate, it is the latter which assumed overwhelming 
importance :
"The rat-race; Working piecework - the pace 
it's never altered. I'd worked piecework 
before, but I'd never seen anything like this.
It's too hard. And we want it changed ...
Take yesterday, we never stopped - they keep 
you going all the while, they think you're 
Robots". Lorna (Final Assembly) (56)
The reasons for the over-riding significance of work-rate over 
job content, and the women's need to exercise control over it can be 
briefly stated. It was because they were continuously subjected 
to speed-up and labour intensification backed up by disciplinary 
action. The specific question of job content is certainly linked 
to work-rate, in the sense, for example, that the term "deskilling" 
describes processes of dividing work which are integral to speed-up 
and intensification of labour. But in this labour process the major 
struggles over job content: the process of devaluation and 
degradation of skills, lay in the past - with the onset of modern 
large-scale mass production; and in a different form in the future, 
with the onset of more fully automated production processes. In 
this period the ratio of fixed capital employed at BSR remained
relatively low and stable, and productivity increases were made 
through speed-up and intensification of labour. Nevertheless, 
here and there new types of machinery and technology were being 
introduced. In terms of the original product itself, for example, 
micro-electronic controls were being built in to older-style 
record players, where they sat beside mechanical switches, 
and already, "pure" micro-electronic products were being developed.
But these changes, piecemeal at this time, did not impinge on the 
mass of women workers with the same immediacy as the processes of speed­
up and work intensification. And these related directly to the 
major problem experienced in this labour process - the pace of work.
Speed up
As indicated in the first Part of the Chapter, speed-up and 
intensification of work were integral aspects of management's 
production policy. Some instances of the first are considered here, 
in relation to different work processes: individual, group, automatic 
and manual jobs. In terms of them all, however, a consensus of 
opinion pointed to faster, harder work - particularly dating from 
when the piecework system was extended to cover most operations early 
in the 1970's.
"....  It wasn't so fast then, when I came -
because there wasn't piece work. I was on tape 
decks - they were making tapes, and it wasn't 
really piece work you know - they didn't come 
down like they're coming now. I think if I was 
a new starter now, I think I'd be terrified - 
I think I'd go back home! You know, the way 
they're coming down the line now - this piece 
work, but before, it wasn't so bad.”
Edna (Final Assembly) (57)
Madge was put into the moulding shop:
"I was on inspection and we used to have a 
laugh. We had used to have a laugh! You 
don't get laughs now". (Did you find that you
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relative ly low and stable, and productivity increases were made 
through speed-up and intensification of labour. Nevertheless, 
here and there new types of machinery and technology were being 
introduced. In terms of the original product itself, for example, 
micro-electronic controls were being built in to older-style 
record players, where they sat beside mechanical switches, 
and already, "pure" micro-electronic products were being developed.
But these changes, piecemeal at this time, did not impinge on the 
mass of women workers with the same immediacy as the processes of speed­
up and work intensification. And these related directly to the 
major problem experienced in this labour process - the pace of work.
Speed up
As indicated in the first Part of the Chapter, speed-up and 
intensification of work were integral aspects of management's 
production policy. Some instances of the first are considered here, 
in relation to different work processes: individual, group, automatic 
and manual jobs. In terms of them all, however, a consensus of 
opinion pointed to faster, harder work - particularly dating from 
when the piecework system was extended to cover most operations early 
in the 1970's.
"....  It wasn't so fast then, when I came -
because there wasn't piece work. I was on tape 
decks - they were making tapes, and it wasn't 
really piece work you know - they didn't come 
down like they're coming now. I think if I was 
a new starter now, I think I'd be terrified - 
I think I'd go back home! You know, the way 
they're coming down the line now - this piece 
work, but before, it wasn't so bad."
Edna (Final Assembly) (57)
Madge was put into the moulding shop:
"I was on inspection and we used to have a 
laugh. We had used to have a laugh! You 
don't get laughs now". (Did you find that you
were under pressure?) 'No - the others were 
all on the lines. I wasn't. Our shop is very 
good actually. But still its more difficult now 
than it was, you've got a lot of pressure from 
the count. We are all working an awful lot harder 
than what we used to work."
Madge (Moulding Shop) (58)
The new system involved the imposition of a minimum count.
There were, in fact, many jobs in the factory which were not on
piecework at all, in the sense that earnings might be made to
vary with output. These were paid on a 'fixed performance'.
As far as possible though, for all jobs, a minimum output was
specified by management and this 'floor' was held up by disciplinary
controls. For example, on the moulding machines:
"when you get a new job on and they change 
the tool, the first day they don't expect a 
performance out of you, they don't say anything.
But if you don't get the performance 3 times in 
a week, then you're in for a warning".
Madge (Moulding Shop) (59)
But in some cases the work requirements were so varied that it 
was impossible for management to specify a minimum output. Carol's 
job on de-flashing was like this. Her task was to trim extraneous 
plastic from moulded parts with a sharp knife, and the amounts plus 
difficulty of doing so varied constantly. Nevertheless, her account 
illustrates the way speed-up was imposed on "individual" manual 
jobs wherever possible.
"Well, they do come round, not very often, and 
see.The time and study come round, but he hasn't 
been round for quite a bit. My opinion is they 
know full well that they can't put us on a 
piecework rate, because some days - it's the 
same with the mat cutters - some days, they can have 
lovely mats the next day they're tough. The same 
goes with putting us on an hourly count, because 
the work is different every day. They have tried.
Carol (Moulding Shop) (60)
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s p e e d UP OF MANUAL JOBS (INDIVIDUAL)
Carol was working on the mats to start with - a job which 
many people were tried on but few could do. It entailed cutting 
out a perfect shape by hand with a sharp knife, circumscribing a 
glass pattern. The condition of the mats and the style required 
varied considerably and the job required skill and experience.
Work study men came to set a minimum count while Carol was learning 
to do this job:
"The people that were good mat cutters, I 
think they did 90 - lOO (an hour), and they 
were expecting 150! (How many were you doing?)
As I say, some days I could do them, other days I 
couldn't. I bet I only did about 70 - as I 
say I wasn't no good at the job, that's why I was 
took off after and put on the other job. I'm on 
about the average mat-cutter, they cut about 90 - 
lOO and they were expecting about 150 - which they 
couldn't do anyway. There was a couple of women 
that did do it, but I mean, they only worked mornings 
and they'd done it for years, about 9 years, and they 
showed as they could do it, but I mean its rubbish 
because every continual hour nobody can do that much. 
Because the first couple of hours you work well, 
but towards, say the end of the morning, such as 
11 o'clock to half 12, everybody's reflexes are 
getting a little bit tired and you start fresh on an 
afternoon. But, I mean, you couldn't keep up with a 
count like that, every hour ..."
Carol (Moulding Shop) (61)
The concept of an "approved performance" at BSR meant one that 
had "been proved" i.e. it had been done, therefore,it could be done. 
The use of part-time workers to speed-up full-timers was generally 
recognised as a problem. As Nora said of the 9.30 - 3.30
shift workers:
"It's a good shift that is as well, because you'll 
find the women working shorter hours - they get 
more out of them. I mean you get to 2 p.m. and 
they're all tired and things like that".
Nora (Final Assembly) (62)
The procedure of setting the minimum count was clearly 
integral to the speed-up imposed on the women rather than piecework 
per se. One area which was particularly notorious for its 
"impossible" counts was the leads section upstairs. Here the 
level of performance required to earn the minimum day work rate 
was so high that most workers had to have their money made up.
The implication of this was that if they were paid what they actually 
earned , it would come to less than the guaranteed minimum wage and 
the company was therefore,"paying the women for coming". In 
practice, it meant that the women were working flat out for minimum 
pay, and it would be thought,could be speeded up no more.
The company were still looking to reduce production costs, 
however, and on one particular operation, had introduced a new 
machine. The job entailed separating out fine wires in a skein, 
twisting the ends and feeding them into a machine which crimped a
small terminal on the end when operated with the feet. Molex had
offered to supply to BSR's specifications, machines which were 
much cheaper than the other short-amp machines in use. Over several
months, they had sent engineers to sort out problems and make
modifications until at last the older machines could be phased out. 
But the older machines were quicker. The gap from the tool to the 
work was shorter.
"They are maintaining these new machines should 
be able to turn out as many as the short-amp 
machine - and its impossible.
I had one woman who got a lOO performance on the 
short-amp and she can't get anything near that on 
the Kolex. And they've tried to make it the same 
count. Can you tell me that's right?
.....  we were on the job six months before they
came and timed it. What they do - when they put you 
on a new machine, you have to write down your output 
every day. This gradually builds up over time.
Then, after say six months, they ask BW to come and
time it. He keeps a check on the figures.
The women have been working the machines for eight 
months, and they still can't make the times they're 
supposed to.
The short amp machine can do 7o more an hour.
Management wanted 160 per hour from the Kolex - and 
it's impossible. The women won't accept it - they'll 
do lOO per hour for day work (the minimum wage)
But not 175 - that's nearly double!"
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (63)
SPEED UP OF MANUAL JOBS (TEAM)
Even on group work, minimum counts were established and 
demanded. Downstairs a team of women on bench work were brought 
together to build up a section of the turntable. They were timed 
and set to produce at a 95 performance level, a process which took 
3 months to organise and coordinate. Later another line, of 
younger girls, was put in to do the same operation. For six weeks 
they had been on the job, paid at a 75 performance (i.e. as a no­
value job, rather than according to their output , which would have 
increased with practice )• Management reckoned they should be 
producing the same number as the first team. But the first 
operation of the original group was on an automatic press, while the 
younger girls were using a manual one ... They would have to work 
much harder for the same money as the original team, and meanwhile, 
because they were being paid as a "no-value" job, they received 
no more money for the increased output they had already achieved 
with greater coordination and habituation on the job. Instead 
of using "incentive," management had, in fact, chosen to adopt a 
disciplinary approach to achieve the speed-up they required.
"He's trying to say it wasn't the manual 
(press) that was holding them back - it's 
themselves - that they're not working as a 
team, they talk more and that's because they're 
younger". Pru (Sub-Assembly) (64)
On the assembly lines, as pointed out above, the counts had
gradually been pushed up over the years ("187 (per hour) used
to be a good count a few years ago, but now its over 200")
Pearl (Sub-Assembly). But the performance levels at which the
women were paid, had dropped:
"they require the same count for the new unit 
as the standard one - they did 240 an hour for 
110 performance for the day. The new unit has 
a higher value but they're still expecting 
240 - and the operators are only getting a 96 
performance". Jill (Supervisor: Final Assembly) (65)
To some extent the count per hour would tend to rise as organisation 
and coordination in the labour process improved. But as this had 
happened, performance (or pay) levels had been dropped, so that they 
were producing the same count for less money. v 1 Also the 
rate of production had been forced up by demanding, for example, 
that the new unit value rated at 1.5 per minute, be produced at 
the same rate as the old one, value rated at 3 per minute.
Whereas, on the automatic paint flow-line, the workers' workrate
might be increased to the extent the machinery itself was speeded
(67)
up, the operations on the assembly line were manual and workspeed 
could only be pushed up by means of a faster conveyor, to a limited 
extent. It was the operators themselves who had to work faster 
to increase output.
Nora's (9.30 - 3.30) line were on the new unit, and management
were pushing for higher output:
"On our line they want 220 an hour. They can 
do 210 - but the women are working at such a 
pace they couldn't possibly do any more - not 
every hour. You see some hours you may get 
240 out but other times - 160. (But) ... 
no-one on this unit can get a good performance.
We're either waiting for parts (from upstairs) 
or just working flat out to earn lOO performance.
The women don't think they get value for the
amount of work turned out. And this is the
unit they're selling most of". Nora (Final Assembly) (68)
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Under pressure of full order books, management needed the
new units and had already arranged that the women on this line
would be paid at 100 performance if they produced 1000 per (5*j hour)
day - without taking into account the number who worked on the
line (otherwise extra workers might achieve the output but lower
the pay all round). But they wanted the women to work faster as
well - so they tried an old trick:
"Well the supervisors came up and said, if we 
did llOO that day the women would get 120 
performance. So they worked very hard and got 
1128 that day. But the performance on the board 
on the Monday was only 105. Well, the women 
came back to me like a ton of bricks ! I had 
thought meself - believe when you see it. Mr 
Smith has always said - they'll never pay you 
here for work not done. Anyway, I went to see 
the superintendent and he said he hadn't told them 
that - but I said what the supervisors had told 
the women - 'Oh', he said, 'that was only a big 
joke. It was just a joke between me and Mr 
Vhite ....' " Nora (Final Assembly) (69)
As it happened, the superintendent got into trouble for this, as 
the women threatened to stop work and dropped their performance.
It didn't help the company to pay them at the lower level since they 
needed the output, at the time, so in the end they reverted to the 
original arrangement of paying lOO performance for 1000 per day.
At a later date, however, that'proved'output of llOO would be 
demanded as the normal, required count.
SPEED UP OF MACHINE-PACED JOBS (TEAM)
Kathy worked on the continuous process paint line.
(Has it gone faster since you started?)
"Hard to tell, they used to put 5 main plates 
to a jig and now they've got a new paint machine 
and there's lO on. So we're taking more off.
But we've got more people on - 5 instead of 4 on 
the job. But when you ask them about it, they 
say that's right,they say they was being generous 
when they gave us 4 to 5 main plates".
Kathy (Paint Shop) (70)
As an inspector she is paid at a fixed performance (90) while
operators in the paint shop are paid on the piece-work system.
"But the office pointed out that they always 
leave 5 on inspection whether they've got 1 
or 2 paint machines going. They say 
well, you're still being paid your 90 
performance, but you're not earning it, because 
you're not getting as much work coming down'".
Kathy (Paint Shop) (71)
One day she came back from lunch and found the women
complaining that some men had been down and speeded up the line:
"X told them they had to go through procedure, 
and as the supervisor wasn't there, the women went 
to the foreman about it. He said it hadn't been 
speeded up and to leave it for a day. The women 
still weren't satisfied, so I went to find out 
more and they said it was moving 1 second faster 
than oormal. I know it doesn't sound much, but 
those seconds mount up .... What the second is, 
is 1 second shorter interval between each jig.
The women said they would go on strike if it wasn't 
put back right. But they (management) said, what 
had happened was, that the track had been going 
slow for months and therefore they had to bring it 
back up to its proper speed. Well the women in the 
paint shop who actually put the main-plates on, said 
it was going faster, because they couldn't fill 
the jigs up. Instead of getting lO they were only 
getting 8 or 9 on. Therefore it proved it was 
going faster. But they tried to say that it 
wasn't. Anyway, we tried everything we could you know, 
and they says - the one gaffer says 'Oh it was going 
faster and T've had it put back right now, but nothing 
was said about it'* Kathy (Paint Shop) (72)
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s p ee d UP OF MACHINE-PACED JOBS (INDIVIDUAL)
On the moulding machines which worked on a fixed cycle, 
the women - all paid on a fixed performance (85) - had to take off 
the finished piece before the process could be repeated. The 
job could be speeded up by shortening the machine's cycle time 
(but there were technical limits to this) or shortening the time 
between cycles by speeding up the women engaged on operations such 
as trimming, inspecting and packing the parts. This work varied 
according to the nature of the parts and so did the machine-cycle 
time. On the job presented here to illustrate speed-up in this 
department, the women had to insert a metal spindle into the 
machine's tool to begin the cycle. Onto this spindle plastic 
fitments were then moulded automatically.
. "This is the horrible thing about it, they're 
not supposed to retime without the job being 
altered. But we've just come, and they've 
altered the count, they've put another card in.
There's a card on the machine tells you what an 
85 perf. is. You'd come and your count had gone 
up, you'd got to do a few more. (We had it a 
lot all round the factory, it usually happens just 
before our pay rise is due actually - each year)
With this particular job the count was about 112 
an hour and it went up to 117 and then up to 123, 
then it went up to 130 - something, and you know 
they just ... And these counts were going up and 
the girls were saying - 'We cannot get it outj No 
way can we get it out'. The women were forgetting 
to put the spindles in - the machine would get 
blocked up and have to go into tool-room and the women 
would get a warning. (That hasn't happened much lately 
but it used to happen a lot). But, when you get them 
out, they're red hot, and you've got to de-flash and 
put them on a gauge check, clock them in like, and 
then pack them into trays. And in the finish, they 
were so^  hot - they wear 3 pairs of gloves - and by the 
time they'd took them off the machine and put the spindles 
in shut the machine up for it to mould again, deflashed 
off, clocked it up and put in the tray - they were 
setting fire to the tissue paper in the tray! And of 
course the women were going mad. 'I can't get the count 
out'. They were going home absolutely shattered, 
those women,literally exhausted, you know. And I said,
'Barry, this is no good, they can't keep this up'. And 
it's - 'Paul's done the timing ' you know. I said, 'I 
don't care, they can't work that hard'. They come here 
to work. I said 'they don't come to slog themselves into 
the ground Barry'. (His reply was) 'It's possible for them 
to do it, so they’ve got to do it'. Madge (Moulding Shop) (73)
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Work intensification
The moulding shop with its expensive machinery was a 
relatively highly capitalized sector of production. It was a 
particular target area for raising productivity by SDeed-up 
and work intensification. The latter involved increasing the 
utilisation of the operator's time by allocating additional work 
"to fill in the spaces of the working day", as well as raising 
the rate at which work was carried out. Ultimately management
( 7 4 )hoped to have one woman operate more than one machine, 
but in the period of the study, this had not (yet) been put 
into practice.
Meanwhile, the job of machine-tending had had many tasks 
added, which were crammed into the gap between one cycle finishing 
and another starting. This period varied according to the 
nature of the product - from anything under a quarter to well over 
a minute. Now, in addition to setting up the machine at the 
start of each cycle and taking finished work off, the operator 
might also have to "de-flash" (trimming with a sharp knife), 
gauge/inspect, sort, (a number of different, smaller parts could 
be produced at once )ypack and stack as well as fetch trays and bags 
for scrap.
"It isn't the machine cycle time that's the 
problem, it's the bits you have to do in 
between". Madge (Moulding Shop)(75)
The process of intensification had been accompanied by labour force 
"rationalisation", while some de-flashing was still done separately 
by girls "at the tables", the women on separate inspection had been
disbanded and put onto the machines.
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"When we had equal pay, they did a bit of 
a dirty trick. We'd got inspectors that were 
women, and they wouldn't pay them the rate 
of the men, and they made them come off and 
go on to machines. (What happened?)
Well the women couldn't fight it - because 
the only way they could have fought it was by 
doing shift work - 8 hour shift work.
So they did come off (They were on 10 - 2)" 
Madge (Moulding Shop) (76)
"Now moulders do inspection as well. It's 
basically the same job. But there's no 
separate inspection section at all - I think 
it finally ended when we had the redundancies 
(1974-75). And the fellow that was over that 
was made redundant'*. Madge (Moulding Shop)(77)
This continual process of seeking to utilise labour hours
as economically and, therefore, as intensively as possible, had its
impact all over the factory. First we look at its main source
which lay in managament's labour (recruitment) policy. Then we go
on to look at its most common manifestation - on the main assembly
lines - where it took the form of "doubling UP" and also
"bad parts". It should be recalled that underlying the intensive
utilisation of labour in production was a labour-power recruitment
policy which relied on the high turnover (rapid loss) and stable
reserve (ready availability) of women workers. Factory (wo)manning
levels were maintained, at a point as low as they possibly could be
before jeopardising the output required in any given period, and
absenteeism could push even these levels further down again.
Both absenteeism and labour turnover rates were, however, uneven
across different sections of the factory and the labour force - it
was relatively higher on the main assembly lines.
"When people have been leaving they haven't 
been bringing new labour in and the lines were 
really down very very low at one time. They're 
not much better now, I mean we've had people start, 
but through people being pregnant and finding 
other jobs, and all that you know it soon dwindles 
away. And then you've got the absenteeism and that's 
very very bad."Ethel (Final Assembly) (78)
"Problem is, management's slow to make up 
replacements - I have to really push them into 
it. Otherwise they're dragging one off another 
line. It's taken me 3 weeks to get the lines 
filled. Today the last shortfall should be made 
up - for a while". Jill (Supervisor:FinalAssembly)(79)
With "rationalisation" in addition, some jobs had simply disappeared. 
They used to have more floats and inspectors for example. Nora 
(on line inspection) was trained by an inspector who stayed with 
her for 2 or 3 days:
(And now?)
"They haven't got the women now - nor the spare 
floats; they do try to put a float in between 
a 'bottom' inspector and a 'top' inspector to help but ..." 
Nora (Final Assembly) (80)
The shortage of labour impinged unpleasantly in many ways.
"This problem of going to the toilet. I mean, 
they're coming down and your work's there. Now,
I mean where one woman will help, and do that 
person's job while she goes to the toilet, another 
one won't, so therefore she either has to go to 
toilet and risk being told off because she's got 
a stock when she comes back, or she just has to stay 
there and suffer". (Can't you get a float/relief?)
"Not always, no". Jenny (Final Assembly) (81)
Since the upshot of this situation was that most of the women 
spent the whole of their statutory ten minute break
queuing for the loo, this can be counted among the many examples 
of labour intensification facilitated by the labour shortage which 
management maintained.
DOUBLING-UP
The procedure of doubling-up which occurred with greatest 
frequency on the main assembly lines, provides a clear example 
of how both labour shortage and absenteeism were used as the basis
of labour intensification
"Then there's what they call doubling-up on 
jobs. Well, like if someone's away and they 
haven't got enough women to put on jobs, say if 
you've just got a job doing'heights' - that's 
'highing' the arm on the record-player.
They might put you 'weights' on it - so you've 
got to 'weigh' the arm as well, and things 
like that". Edna (Final Assembly) (82)
(Have you had to deal with cases where people 
have had to double-up?)
"Yes ... when we've had very bad absenteeism ... 
Like we had enough labour to run the line, it 
was only this week - Tuesday I think, when a 
girl went home and they had to split her job up 
between the other girls - because she'd had a pass- 
out like. It does slow your line down".
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (83)
Since each person in the assembly seqence had only been timed 
for one job, doubling-up could put an enormous amount of pressure 
on those concerned, as the others tried to maintain their usual 
pace. The doubling-up process was not simply used in
emergencies, it was repeated daily. And as Jill's description of her 
job as a supervisor indicates, "balancing the line" i.e. doubling- 
up was (the most?) important component of it; moreover, in a closely 
integrated sequence of operations, it was not always easy to do. 
Sometimes science, in the shape of the time-study man, had to be called 
to the supervisor's aid".
(Doubling-up?)
"Well, we do that anyway ... all the time - 
that is a supervisor's job anyway. ... But as 
I say, sometimes supervision come unstuck, 
because of the capability of the person she mis­
reads the lady’s capabilities. But, I mean she 
soon rectifies it because she does get the time 
and study man out to say - 'Oh, time this job, I 
might have put too much on 'er, and not enough 
on that other lady'". Jill (Supervisor - Final 
Assembly) (85)
But most of the time, the job was done simply on the basis of the 
supervisor's judgement backed up by the mobility of labour rule
-1 7 0 -
whereby no-one could refuse to do any job they were put on
to do - even if they were not capable of doing it ...
"I put one woman who was an inspector 
on to motors .. she couldn't 'ave done 
it in a month of Sundays. So I 'ad to move 
her onto a job which I thought - she can't 
even do thatj Can't even see the 'oles!
And ... I mean, I could ride the woman - I 
could really get on 'er back .... then she'd 
walk out. But that's what BSR want!
You know, so I thought - one day I can
suffer it..." Jill (Supervisor»Final Assembly) (86)
Apart from the fact that doubling-up entailed additional work, 
it was also more tiring and stressful because the changes in work 
pattern destroyed any relaxation and rhythm which might have been 
achieved previously by habituation to the same movements. For 
these reasons alone, it was much disliked by the operators. But 
they were also subjected to another kind of intensification which 
had a different impact.
BAD PARTS
Anything which slowed the output of the line would be reflected
in the workers' pay packets as a result of the lower performances.
On the whole, doubling-up did not necessarily have this effect,
since the smaller number of operators, a few of whom worked harder,
might gain financially in the end, because there were fewer of them
to share the line's earnings. On the other hand, a full complement
or extra workers on the line meant a greater number of units had
to go through for the same money. In that sense it was harder
(faster) work for everyone.
"They'd given us the extra labour to get
the count out, but we'd also got to do a
damn sight more! We'd got to pay those as
well fee helping us to get the count out. Our
count went up - we were doing 800 - 860 (per
hour) for 100 performance and now we had to do 900 -
lOOO to get a decent performance....”
Barbara (Final Assembly) (87)
If "doubling-up" was a form of intensification for which
the workers might apparently receive some financial compensation, 
the situation that resulted in "bad parts" was not. The workers 
were only ever paid for working on parts which passed inspection. 
On the assembly lines, for example, they were not paid for the 
number of units built, only the number packed at the end of the 
line.
(Performance on your job?)
"We're s ’posed to do 200 per hour ... but 
you don’t - they come down, but of course, 
they've got to be packed off the bottom of 
the line. Then of course, there are so many 
repairs coming back that they just don't go 
off the bottom of the line".
Jenny (Final Assembly) (88)
It was a continuing source of bewilderment to the women
workers that management should drive them for output on the one
hand, but do little to cut down the bad parts going through, which
slowed the rate of production on the other:
"Management could be much more helpful - and 
they would get more work out ! They don't 
seem to solve the problems which are theirs 
as well, even though they do affect the 
women a lot" . Edna (Final Assembly) (89)
"It's the bad parts that they have to work with - 
that hinders them to get ... you know - to get 
their performance - they can't get their money - 
they're losing money. And they've told me, 
you know - 'Sally, if nothing's done, we're gonna 
down tools!' And, I've gone through the motions - 
seen inspectors and foreman-inspectors and ... 
told them the women are getting restless, they are 
gonna stop work. And then eventually, they've 
done something, you know".
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (90)
"Bad parts - every day. It's never sorted out ...
A month ago we had a big fuss, got all the 
superintendents onto the main lines to sort it 
out .. If you complain enough about the bad parts -
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pick up arms or sub-plates, they have the 
superintendent off the section and he's 
told to put it right. They check all the 
parts send them back off the line if they're 
not right. But then they can be just as 
bad again - Why? nobody knows".
Lorna (Final Assembly) (91)
(What issue have you raised?)
"Well, only like the bad parts and things 
like that on the line, but they haven't been 
dealt with... They always come again.
They're OK for a couple of weeks you know, 
after you've jumped up someone's back...
But then, Oh, just a few weeks - it's gone 
again you know". Barbara (Final Assembly) (92)
The problem affected production and assembly workers throughout 
the factory because it lowered their count and/or made their jobs 
more difficult to accomplish. It was particularly frustrating on 
final assembly where the same units might circulate, apparently 
endlessly, through assembly?test-M:epair-»breakdown-»assembly ...
"How are rejects a problem?)
"Well, the unit may come to you with a fault, 
you send it to the repair bench and it comes 
back, but it may have different faults - it 
could come past 6 times but you're only 
being paid once - when it's packed.
(If compensation was sorted out - would it still 
be a problem?)
"Yes, because nobody likes that kind of work - 
you've got work all hanging round your feet.
You've got it on the track above your head, 
it can be annoying. I've sometimes been down 
the line and couldn't move for rejects - 
management try to blame workers; a small 
amount may be due to not paying attention - but 
not all by any means. Parts produced on 
automatic machines, for example, if they're 
a fraction out - they can cause a lot of 
problems on the lines."
Ethel (Final Assembly) (93)
Why was the problem apparently so intractable? The instance 
given below, of labour shortage and "doubling-up", this time 
between male setters and inspectors, shows how bad parts could arise
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as a direct result of management's policy of using labour 
intensively. In this example, the men (inspectors) were being 
disciplined because thousands of rejects had been produced on 
an automatic machine:
"There's not enough labourers in the press 
shop in the evening so the inspectors clear 
the scrap away for the women, so that they can 
carry on while they're doing that. Well, they'd 
got 36,000 - 2 shifts worth of these damn 
things hadn't they! And when we asked them, turns 
out the inspectors had been doing this labouring. 
They'd also had other jobs which had been set up 
and they'd had to inspect the first-offs and then 
apparently they were short of a setter on that 
shift and one of them had gone to do his job as 
well. So we had an argument about it, and in 
the end they warned them. But I put a strong 
protest in about the fact that they were doing 
labouring, even though it was to help out.
They told them not to, but they still do it now 
because it's the only way the section can run".
Terry (Maintenance Chargehand). (94)
Using bad parts or materials intensified labour because
operators had to work faster, to keep up the count and also
harder, to cope with extra problems not allowed for in the time,
to earn the same money. Management could use rejects in
production to keep down wages (and output if this was required)
and at the same time off-set some of the costs to themselves -
of scrap, a surplus, or a shortage of components. Bad parts
were, in that sense, a manifestation of management's policy of
using both labour and material intensively.
"Last week, they came, they'd got switch boxes.
And they'd changed the switch boxes - instead 
of putting them in with 2 screws, they had to 
tip them in. And they were very hard to get in.
They could get the one side in, but the other side 
wouldn't go in, and it was hurting their thumbs.
And apparently, they'd complained and they'd been 
down there to the quality control and they'd put 
grease on them and filed them and they still 
couldn't get them in, they were still getting 
difficulty. Well, they didn't come to me - it 
was 25 past 3 when we were going home, and I asked 
them how long they'd been like that, and they
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said - all day - you see. X couldn't do anything 
till next morning. I saw the supervisor who 
said 'well, they've worked like that all day -
1 told them to come'. Well the foreman was 
brought in.... An hour later they came and said 
'Oh great you've done a lovely job - they've 
brought some of the others'. Apparently there were
2 lots. One were shining and the other were dull.
So they brought another lot down, which were the 
dull ones, which went in easy. And then they 
asked them if they'd put one of the shiny ones
in occasionally to use those up ..."
Jenny (Final Assembly) (95)
"They've got a nasty 'abit actually of passing ... 
knowing - bad parts, components ... For 
example, sub-plates. P'raps because of a 
shortage, management's using rejects from months 
ago. Then they're brought onto the line, you 
build your unit up, and its a hard job to repair 
that component - you 'ave to strip it, and it's 
really bad". Jill (Supervisor -Final Assembly) (96)
In the first section, job content and work rate - the 
repetition, monotony, pace and effort-demands of the work were 
identified as constituting important problems for the women at 
BSR. The impact of these aspects of the labour-process were 
experienced by the workers as stressful, giving rise to needs and 
demands regarding the nature and organisation of their work, which 
aimed to mitigate these pressures. The most significant area 
requiring control concerned the pace of work, and indeed, as we 
have seen in the second section, this was a crucial issue.
The women were continuously subjected to speed-up and intensification 
of work in this labour process. Their effort to control the pace 
of work had, therefore, at the same time, to be directed against 
these tactics, backed up as they were by the weight of management's 
powers to organise and dominate the labour process.
In the following Chapters we take a closer look at the use of
these powers of organisation and domination: specifically
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movement of labour and disciplining. In themselves, these 
constituted significant problems for the women workers and their 
impact was, again, stressful. They gave rise to further sets 
of needs and demands regarding the organisation of the labour 
process and the nature of the employment relationship.
As we have seen, at a broad level, these needs included the 
mitigation of stress, protection of the individual's "self" 
and preservation of their capacity to labour. More immediately, 
perhaps, it will be seen that the women workers' needs and demands 
regarding the exercise of management's organisational and 
disciplinary powers, were directed, quite crucially, at preserving 
employment security and job controls. These constituted the 
only basis on which the women could attempt to break the vicious 
circle whereby they were both hired and penalised on the same basis 
- their domestic commitments. To achieve this break they had to 
push back management's disciplinary offensive and push forward their 
own requirements. These being for terms and conditions of employment 
which were positively oriented to the demands of social reproduction 
and "people-care". in order to do either, they had first to
establish a stronger position in the labour process and this depended 
on increasing employment security and job controls: both of which 
were linked, and both of which were continuously being undermined.
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K PRODUCING THE BSR WAY
Discussion 2/76.
Discussion 2/76.
For example stockbrokers Rowe & pitman's reference to 
"BSR1s undoubted long term strength and its quality of 
management" (Irish Times 22.12.1979)
The Financial Times reference to "the company's undoubted 
management skills" (Financial Times 13.9.1980), and 
The Times' financial editors reference to BSR's 
"sound management" (Times 13.3.1980).
Comment of Union Official (Paul Silver)
Discussion 2/76.
Particularly in relation to the consumer products division 
and the acquisition of Bulpitts (1971).
These positions appeared to be particularly stressful: 
two years prior to my visit one factory manager had died from 
a massive coronary. His predecessor suffered from bad 
nerves and was on tranquilisers. The young manager of the 
new plant had been found, on occasion, clearly distressed.
Two older factory managers whose companies had been taken over, 
were ill.
See above pp. \~bO - \1>2.
When the newly built factory at Garretts Lane was started, 
no such facility existed. "He (the Manager) can sit on a 
stool in a corner, until that factory is producing" quoth:
John Ferguson, "until then what business has he in an office?"
CIR (1970) pp. 12-16
Inbucon (1977) p.17
Management-union relations are fully explored in Part Three 
of the thesis below.
Perhaps it is worth noting at this point, a num r of parallels 
with Japanese management policies (as averse to American 
styles, predominant, within management training schools,at least 
in Europe). Albeit, in this case, stripped of their more 
culturally specific and benevolent/paternalistic aspects.
Such parallels can be seen, for example, in the insistence 
on management's shop-floor presence, working experience and 
practical skills/abilities.
"Everyone knows that our managing director can do any job on 
the floor here". National Panasonic employee quoted in "The 
Rising Sun Shines in the Valleys": Alan Road Observer Magazine, 
May 1981 p.36.
And also in the low status, security and conditions of 
administrative staff:
"Production workers were paramount in Japan, says Pat Davies.
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( 13 )
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
( 2 0 ) 
( 21) 
( 2 2 )
( 23 )
cont'd. (AUEW Shop Steward: GEC-Hitachi). She saw plants
where the secretaries barely' had elbow room to operate 
their typewriters, but the production line was spacious.
Back in Britain Japanese managers all find this quite 
logical. The object of their operation is the production 
of television sets or hi-fi equipment, not bumf.
Office staff may be necessary to this operation, but they 
are not central to it"
and a one union, closed shop (ibid p. 32,34 & 37) 
industrial relations policy:
"These methods, the last two especially, carry implications 
for workers (particularly white collar) and unions in 
Britain; which it is clearly important to recognise and 
confront. The more so, as Japanese manufacturers begin 
to follow up their market penetration by expanding 
production operations in Western Europe, in ’depressed1 
areas (such as South Wales, cited here) where cheaper 
labour can be found."
Ref 12/51: 373-410, 5.12.78
Discussion 19.1.77.
See above pp 97-98, The turnover of the female labour 
force is constrained by increasing dependence on waged work.
Ref: 5.12.1978
See Table 5 : Distribution of Male/Female workers:
Stourbridge Factory 1978.
For this reason, the transcript is left as it continues 
on, although the further questions which are raised are 
the subject of discussion below in Chapter 5.
Ref 20-21/51: 830-898.
See Barker and Downing (1980)
The consequences are not necessarily without contradiction 
because, as Cynthia Cockburn has noted, sexism may be seen 
as comprising a strong component of male workers’ internal 
solidarity and effective assertion of control against 
the employer, even if this is also a component of their lack 
of solidarity, and thus a source of weakness, within the wider 
collectivity. See Cockburn (1983) and Hardman (1983) 
for a discussion of Cockburn’s work.
Ref: 5/81: 312-337.
In plastic moulding however, it seemed that management
were trying to ’build the job up’ (rather than break it
down) by the addition of extra tasks to be fitted in with
the machines' cycle. Was this an example of job enrichment?
Although much that goes by this name is of a similar nature,
we would argue that the process was one of labour intensification.
And to increase the number of repetitive tasks which have
to be completed in a short-fixed period of time, is simply
to increase both workload and pressure on the individual
operator (i.e.) stress. "I don’t feel enriched. I just
feel knackered".
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(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
Whether these results occur -in practice however, must 
be contingent upon a large number of other conditions, 
affecting, for example, flexible downwards pricing of 
labour and control costs on management's side.
Collectivised in the sense that individual workers 
have been brought together by the employer
Fewer women worked in Plating them Painting.
Rather than sold as separate components (e.g. cartridges) 
or in 'breakdown' form to be asserted elsewhere.
See Marx (1976)
i.e. producing individual items at an isolated work 
station, not immediately linked to another as in a team 
sequence.
Ref 3/Sl: 121-192 19.1.1978.
Ref 15/S2: 245-50
Ref 3/Sl
Ref 9/SL : 728-738
Ref 4/S1: 386-407
Ref 22/52: 822-853
And those who are single and have lost contact with their 
friends, e.g. girls unemployed for long periods after 
leaving school.
Ref 22/S2: 802-820
Ref 4/S1: 188-204
Ref 7/SI: 604-620
Ref 4/S1: 204-220
Ref 7/S1: 285-292
Ref 8/S1: 631-639
Ref 13/S2: 199-209
Ref 16/S1: 989-1018. The reference to 'stock or the line' 
relates to the units piling up on the moving line and then 
they stack up around the operator on the floor.
Ref 5/S1: 241-248
Ref 5-6/Sli 247-248, 6/S1: 320-530
Ref 13/S1: 865-875
Ref 10-11/S1: 860-928
*
*
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(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
(6 0 ) 
(61) 
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
( 6 6 )
(67)
(6 8) 
(69)
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
Ref
24-25/T351: 360'
13/52:: 64-85
7/S1: 350-360
13/T2S1: 452-
28/T3S1: 670-68!
12/T2S1: 354-450
2/S1: 100-120
2/S1: 183-205
2/S1: 130-140
13/S2: 110-116
14/S2: 187-190
7/S1: 335-350
7/S1: 360-370
lO/Sl: 839-40
30/S3: 420-487
10-11/S2: 170-1£
5/S1: 393-410
• \
"Well, like everything in life, things get bigger... 
and the performances have gradually crept up, by 
nature of skills, and easing of problems - when you 
start something off - lo years ago, then you sort 
problems out over the next l o  years, and it makes it 
easier to produce. The components are more standard 
and they go together better ... Gradually, the performances 
are creeping up. Now, I like to see a performance, 
although its ... I'm a workstudy engine , and its wrong 
to say this - I like to see a performance around about 
90 - 95 and maybe 100. That gives the operator a good 
wage and it gives the company a good output."
Barry White (Factory Manager). Ref: 13/S1: 440-450.
Jill, the supervisor, first noticed this phenomenon 
following the women's pay rise under phase 1 of the Heath 
Government's incomes policy (four years earlier).
Although not altogether: the jigging-up girls could not 
fully fill the jigs (see Kathy above).
3/S1: 200-220 and 23/S3: 240-250
20/S2: 800-860
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(70) Ref 4/S1: 145-158
(71) Ref 6/S1: 225-235
(72) Ref 5/S1: 179-210
(73) Ref 17-18/S2: 402-
(74) Inbucon (1977) Appendix XI-6.
(75) Ref 35/S4: 120
(76) Ref 14/52: 187-200
(77) Ref 13/S2: 116-129
(78) Ref 10/T2S1 : 155-200
(79) Ref 22/S3: 135-140
(80) Ref 3/Sl: 231-249
(81) Ref 27/S2: 524-540
(82) Ref 9/S1: 582-606
(83) Ref 20/S2: 234-240
(84) ... Nine times out of ten it is that the job is too 'eavy.
Because some supervisors - well, all of us to be quite 
honest ... Its alright on a piece of paper, but when we 
come to practise it, we find its more difficult, because 
you've got different attitudes of different women. So 
we tend to give an extra part to a woman - who we thought 
would be capable of doing it - but we find out that she isn't 
capable. So we usually 'ave them timed there."
(Do they ever reduce the amount that they have to do?)
"Oh they don't do that! They just put the part somewhere 
else. When the time and study man comes out ... for one 
job there might be 4 components - he times individually, each 
individual component 'e puts on. So, say .... 'e's allowed 20 
seconds for this component, but 'e finds that that job is 
20 seconds over - you know, too much ... 'e'll then find a 
job down the line, fter 'es timed it: "Oh, that could 'ave 
that 20 seconds on:“ - So 'e moves that component to there.
You know, and 'e balances the line out."
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly) Ref 28/S3: 775-840
(85) Ref
(86) Ref
(87) Ref
(88) Ref
(89) Ref
(90) Ref
28/S3: 775-840 
28(b)/S3: 850-870
17-18/S2: 96-108
5/S1: 208-218 
9/SI: 473-490
27/S3: 203-214
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(91) Ref 7-8/S2: 36-80
(92) Ref lO/Sl: 585-595
(93) Ref 11/T2S1 s 310-345
(94) Ref 15/S2: 1019-53-
(95) Ref 24/S2: 314-347
(96) Ref lO/Sl: 1018- S2
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"The process of manufacture and assembly of 
components has been broken down into simple 
tasks, wherever this can be done, which makes 
it possible for the most part, to recruit 
relatively inexperienced people and to train 
them within a short period to high performance 
levels. The same factor also makes it easier 
for employees to know more than one job which 
facilitates the movement of workers between 
jobs to meet changes in production needs and 
absenteeism. Flexibility and movement of labour 
are regarded as very important by the company.
Combined with a high degree of production planning 
and control , this makes for high utilisation 
of resources and high volumes of throughput which 
are important ingredients in the company's success."
CIR (1970) p.5.
Movement of labour was the secret of BSR's success, except that
it was no secret. Labour mobility was key to management's intensive
utilisation of female labour, forming the cornerstone of their
production policy and system of labour control. Certainly the
interchangeable nature of the women's jobs facilitated the
"interchangeability" of this workforce, offering advantages which
management exploited as fully as possible by insisting on adherence
to the movement of labour rule.(l )Refusal to do the job they were
put on constituted (self) dismissal of the worker. Managerial
prerogatives in this area were the most heavily defended of all and,
as we shall see, when BSR agreed to unionisation, a "full labour
( 2 )mobility" clause was incorprated into the agreements.
The non-negotiable status of this rule reflected, on the one hand, 
its centrality in terms of management's production strategy and 
on the other, the high degree of both latent and manifest opposition 
to mobility encountered in the workforce.
Management demanded complete and full flexibility in their use
CHAPTER 5__________ MOVEMENT OF LABOUR
of female labour and gave as the main reason for this the need to
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management exploited as fully as possible by insisting on adherence
to the movement of labour rule.(l )Refusal to do the job they were
put on constituted (self) dismissal of the worker. Managerial
prerogatives in this area were the most heavily defended of all and,
as we shall see, when BSR agreed to unionisation, a "full labour
( 2 )mobility" clause was incorprated into the agreements.
The non-negotiable status of this rule reflected, on the one hand, 
its centrality in terms of management's production strategy and 
on the other, the high degree of both latent and manifest opposition 
to mobility encountered in the workforce.
Management demanded complete and full flexibility in their use 
of female labour and gave as the main reason for this the need to
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maintain a "balance" of production between the different sections
and departments, to facilitate the organisation and flow of work.
It was held that this balance might be upset for two reasons, either
because the pattern of production was changed and different products
and/or different quantities were required, or because, as a result
of time-off, sections and/or departments ran short of labour and
the spaces had to be filled.
"Day to day movement of labour is entirely due to 
absenteeism. Because ... if we're starting off a 
particular section, and we want 15 operators on that 
then apart from very, very local - very simple 
movement of labour - then you would only need to move 
the labour, to enable you to set up that particular 
line. So, basically, day to day movement of labour 
is directly responsible ... er, caused by - absenteeism.
Now if you have a varying degree of automatic changer 
products - whereas you want complicated changers one 
month, simple changers the next month, plus a few 
modules and then cartridges. If your requirements 
go up and down all the time - then you would have 
a different problem altogether. Movement ... from 
one section to another, and training them in new 
skills. So, the two problems are disassociated 
basically. You'll have the day to day movement due 
to absenteeism - which is the majority of our problem.
Then you'll have the policy changes, where our
products change, and you have to move labour from
one part to another". Barry White (Factory Manager)(3).
In practice, however, movement of labour offered management much 
more than this. A view of its application and enforcement shows 
that apart from facilitating the flow of work, movement of labour 
constituted the central plank of management's strategies to increase 
productivity and control labour.
First , in the context of under-staffing, as we have already 
seen with doubling-up, the activity of "balancing", involving both 
the movement of workers and alteration of job content, was the main 
means of systematic intensification throughout the factory. In
the second place, in the context of a fragmented labour process and
highly interdependent system of cooperation, mobility was an 
important means of control over labour. It could be used by 
management, for example, to undermine individual and collective 
job controls, which facilitated speed-up; to discipline workers 
directly to increase the rate of "natural wastage ” and to eliminate 
the "inefficient". These are the aspects of movement of labour 
examined here. In Part I , we look at a further example of how
management applied mobility in order to use labour more intensively.
( 4 )Then, in the light of earlier discussions, we examine how
the social relationships in production patterned the distribution of 
costs which resulted from this intensification, within the labour 
force itself. This is followed by an outline of how movement of 
labour could be used as a means of managerial control over workers 
in several other respects; using, for example, its destabilising 
effect on workers' relationships, both to the job and to each other; 
and/or its punitive aspects.
In Part II of this chapter we examine some of the implications 
of movement of labour for the women workers, looking in particular, 
at the problems of employment and earnings insecurity and the impact
on job controls.
PART 1 TV!E FLEX IBLE U T IL IS A T IO N  OF (FEMALE) LABOUR 
BY MANAGEMENT.
Labour mobility and intensification
Amongst any number of examples which might be used to 
illustrate management's use of movement of labour as an integral 
aspect of labour intensification, perhaps the question of line­
servicing raises most clearly the complex of issues involved.
One service-man was allocated to each line to deliver 
components from the sub-assembly and production areas to each 
station along the conveyor belt. If any contingency occurred to 
delay the service-man, the line would eventually be stopped when 
an operator ran out of parts and then the women lost whatever bonus 
they had already earned as their hourly average dropped.
A frequent cause of hold up was insufficient component stocks.
This could be due to a number of causes: machine breakdowns, bad
management organisation, insufficient machines or labour on a job
etc. Whatever the cause, it would usually necessitate a greater
number of trips to the different areas of the factory for parts.
(There was no room for much stock to be held on the lines).
Since it was, in fact, part of management's production policy to
work "hand to mouth", this situation was not at all uncommon:
"No way! There is not enough servicemen in this 
factory to keep a supply goin',especially when 
parts are short. It's impossible for any 
h\mian bein' to be in 3 or 4 places at once!"
Jill (Supervisor-Final Assembly)(5)
In order to keep the lines running with the low level of 
stocks and service-manning required by management, supervisors 
whose responsibility this was, had to enlist an extra labourer 
from the line or fetch the parts themselves. Many chose the latter 
course because there was no-one at all to be spared.
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"Like they take girls out and they're fetching parts - 
well to me that's a serviceman's job. I mean 
supervisors even have to fetch parts, they 
shouldn't have to. And our supervisor does you 
know, 9 times out of 10 you look for her and she's 
down what they call 'the pen' fetching the parts.
It's wrong because she should be there on the line 
to run it". Barbara (Final Assembly) (6)
Jill, who was the union representative for supervision, was
aware of the animosity which could exist between line operators
and supervisors. Part of the reason for this, was she thought,
the fact that supervisors were selected on the basis of their
willingness to fetch and carry not their ability to organise
production on the line - on which of course the operators* money
was also, ultimately, dependent. (7)
".... unfortunately, we're gettin' some young 
girls, who put a blue coat on and think, 'oh, 
as long as I keep the line runnin' - fetchin' and 
carrying parts - I'm great; • But she doesn't know 
one unit from the next, and I can understand the 
members and their shop stewards grumblin' about 
those particular people".
".... Some supervisors will do it - for the sake 
of the girls, not losin' money. I won't - you 
can't do the job properly while you're running 
after parts".
(Who else does it, if you refuse?)
"Well, if the labourer can't then you ... you 
bring out girls. The superintendent will say - 
'If you're not gonna do it, you'd better get 2 
girls out'".
"I'm in trouble all the time". (Recalling an 
occasion when the superintends nt wanted 2 women 
for servicing and she refused). He says 'Oh, I'm 
telling you, if I can find them a job, they do it'.
You can go to any of the girls and they'll tell you, 
I won't let 'em be abused." Jill (Supervisor- 
Final Assembly) (8-11)
But with the movement of labour rule the operators could not
refuse to do the job if they were asked to do it. And they were, in
fact, "abused".
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"There's one thing I don't agree with. We get 
shortages of components and in order to keep the line 
running, they have to take 2 - 3  girls off the line 
to get components from A to B (the supervisor asks this) 
to keep the line running. Some parts can be very 
heavy e.g. main plates, trays of sub-plates and 
turntables. They are carried on trolleys, but its quite 
a distance over a concrete floor which is grooved 
and you're liable to spill the parts. But of course 
its that girl's responsibility not to get them 
damaged. In my opinion its too heavy a job. In 
the last few weeks its happened practically every day.
It happens because they can't build sub-plates etc 
fast enough - can't get the components. If they 
have an abundance of parts, service-men fetch a rack 
of main-plates and sub-plates and there are plenty 
available. But if we have to wait for the lad to 
keep fetching parts we don't get the work, and there 
are 9 lines competing with each other for counts.
If individual lines don't get the count out, the 
superintendent kicks us. So we sent the girls up 
to queue for components. Sometimes we are waiting 
for pick-up arms etc - waiting 5 minutes at a time.
There are so many parts in the unit, you need a good 
stock to keep the lines running. Some of the girls, 
they sweat blood. There’s nothing I can do about 
it because its "movement of labour". My heart 
bleeds for them.
I had one girl, who refused to carry the sub-plates, 
she cried buckets. I went to the superintendent - 
he said 'I'm sorry she'll have to do it or go'.
I said I was not satisfied, I didn't think she was 
strong enough, she was only 7 stone and 4'll". So he 
said - 'see personnel'. I went to see personnel 
she said 'it's out of my hands - superintenasnt wants 
it done - can't we come to some agreement to do it 
on a rota basis ?' so I went to see Ellen (Convenor)
She recognised the problem - and felt sorry for the girl, 
she said to see the line supervisor and ask if they 
could do it for one hour each (3 of them), so they 
wouldn't get exhausted. The supervisor agreed to 
this". Gwen (Sub-Assembly)(12)
And of course, when an operator was moved onto servicing,her job on 
the line had to be shared out among the remaining workers who were moved 
and "doubled-up" to cover the absentee.
REDISTRIBUTING THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION.
Management's aim was to keep "input" costs per unit to a 
minimum by using labour, materials and machinery as intensively 
as possible. In a highly complicated and tightly integrated 
system of production this could lead to a shortage of components, 
the lack of buffer stocks laying sections bare to the immediate 
pressures of interdependency generated in the system.
There was always a "cost" risk attached to this policy of course.
A misjudgement, for example, resulting in production being halted 
early in the sequence, leaving large numbers of workers on waiting 
time. In general, however, by maintaining waiting time pay at 
the lowest rate, keeping it as "discretionary as possible" and 
minimising the occasions it might be claimed or paid, these 
"costs” could be deferred by management onto the workforce who 
"paid" with lower wages. (It was, moreover in the final stages 
that such shortages usually occurred). When we look at labour 
intensification, we see that there are other costs involved. When 
management "saved" on wage costs by not recruiting or replacing 
sufficient workers, the workforce "paid" by expending more effort:
- one worker covering (all or most of) the work of two. Some of the 
costs of production which might otherwise be borne by the employer 
were, thereby, (re)distributed downwards, to be born by the 
workforce instead (which expended more effort for the same amount 
of pay).
It is interesting to ask how these costs are distributed 
thereafter i.e. which particular group in the workforce bears 
them? And with what effect? We can then see that the way these 
costs were distributed between the different sections of the workforce
was structured by the prevailing social relations of production.
In the process, their impact could be shifted and so could their 
consequences.
The main burden or impact of management's "minimising" 
policy in the example of intensification given above, should have 
fallen on the servicemen themselves, who would have to increase 
the number of trips they made in a day to keep the lines supplied. 
But for a number of reasons: to do with sex-related differences 
of position in the labour process on the one hand, and authority 
related differences of position in the managerial power structure 
on the other, the greatest part of the burden was redistributed 
"downwards" to be borne by the female operators. The differences 
between the men and the women in the labour process is examined 
first.
In contrast to the female operatives, the male servicemen 
were paid on the basis of a flat, semi-skilled day rate, so their 
pay was not affected by variations in the output of the lines or 
their own work effort. Again, unlike the female operatives (and 
in common with all the other males employed) they were not 
subjected to inter-changeability and movement of labour of the 
same kind. They were employed to do a specific job, and in 
slack periods they were less likely to be moved onto other jobs, 
just as in busy periods, no other men were likely to be moved 
onto theirs. They had the security of their own, constant job; 
within which and over which they could, therefore, maintain a certain 
degree of control - particularly regarding the expenditure of effort. 
In this respect, again, in contrast to practically all of the women 
workers, the npn had the advantages of physical mobility and the
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scope to exercise a certain amount of discretion in the execution 
of their work. They gained, thereby, certain defences against 
"driving". The main pressures on them derived from the 
women line-workers. Even if the servicemen did try to co-operate 
by working harder, these pressures were to some extent avoidable, 
in a way that for the women operators they were not, and so it 
was on to the women line workers themselves that the pressure was 
greatest and on to whom the impact of management's production 
policies was shifted.
As we have seen, the supervisors were faced with a choice - 
to double their own workload, or to "pass it on". Although to some 
extent, the criteria and method of their selection for the job as 
supervisor seemed, increasingly, slanted towards the former "choice", 
the alternative still remained. And since supervision was, 
after all, first line management, with powers of direction over 
the operatives, the buck stopped at the primary work group - held 
by the movement of labour rule. (And pressured by the fact that 
it was their own pay which was being affected).
Although, even within this group, it was likely to be the most 
junior (or perhaps a "trouble-maker") who was delegated to do the 
job (i.e. to whom movement of labour was applied); others would 
have to "double-up", and the group as a whole took on an increased 
workload. Thus the social relations of production can be seen 
to pattern the distribution of costs which have been passed on 
to the work-force by management, i.e. to have consequences in terms 
of who, in labour's ranks, should bear them. But we have also asked 
with what effect? What further consequences might flow from this?
In order to consider these questions it is necessary to look at the 
impact of movement of labour in relation to management's (and in
Part 2, labour's) interests in job control
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Movement of Labour and job control
Movement of labour can be seen to constitute for management 
a crucial means of labour control within the fragmented labour 
process with its highly interdependent systems of co-operation.
Some of the principles behind this argument are outlined briefly 
below, while the impact on the women workers in practice, is described 
in more detail inPart 2.
It is generally acknowledged that all workers regulate their 
own work effort to some extent, and in "team" or collective work 
it is clear, this must also entail regulating the work effort of 
others. Indeed mutual controls are necessary in order to achieve 
the basic co-ordination required to produce collectively at all, 
but from management's point of view, the productivity gains which 
accrue from such systems of co-operation are, at the same time, 
constantly under threat from this very same source. Because 
workers can use the same mutual controls and coordination in order 
to restrict their work effort and build up effective protections 
against"driving." In the interests of "efficiency", in a system 
of production such as this which relies, for its effectiveness, 
on minimising the workers' scope for discretion and autonomy, 
but yet has relatively limited opportunities for machine-pacing 
or automatic regulation, it may be necessary for management to 
control, as far as possible, the degree of cohesion groups of 
workers achieve.
"Ifou see, the problem is (.like) when you start 
employing coloured girls, you can get .... er, 
groups of coloured girls - which are then going 
to form cliques and clans. We don't let that ...."
Barry White (Factory Manager)(14).
Systematic movement of labour in principle and in practice provided
a means for controlling the collective strength of work groups,
and of undermining job control practices developed both by 
these and by individual workers. It was easier, for example, to 
raise the count or alter the job content when workers were being 
moved around.
As we intend to show in the second part of this chapter, 
the question of what consequences arise for the workforce, from 
management's application of labour mobility, is a very important 
one. In short, we would propose that the main impact on and of 
workers being moved is disruptive - of both their relationships 
individually and collectively to their jobs and to each other. And, 
overall, the effect of this is to reduce job controls and thus 
diminish the bargaining strength and resources of the individual 
or work group.
Therefore, in terms of the example of line-servicing, we can 
see that the greater resources for job control accruing to one 
group, the servicemen, made them "strong enough" to avoid and, 
therefore, to "pass on" the costs of work intensification - to be 
borne by another group, the women workers. This group had insufficient 
bargaining resources with which to combat management's application 
of movement of labour and,therefore absorbed the costs of their 
labour shortage or "wage-saving" policy. One consequence of this 
might be seen to be yet (further) reduction of the women operatives' 
job controls.
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Movement of labour; pay discipline and dismissal 
PAY
Apart from offering management the means for systematically 
intensifying the work - and thus, the utilisation of labour, 
movement of labour could also be used by management to reduce 
wage costs directly - because there was no guarantee that earnings 
would be maintained.
"Last week, three women were asked - sweep up.
They had been getting 86 performance on their 
jobs and instead of asking if it would affect 
their pay, they got the brooms and swept up.
I personally have always told them not to, they 
should get someone in to do it ... we've argued 
with Smith about it before and tried to stop it.
But of course they still do it. And when they 
drop their pay they soon moan don't they?
Their pay was dropped to 76 performance and 
the case is still going on, and now Pearl has 
been brought in. But - we're not contracted as 
sweeper-up - we're contracted as assemblers, not 
sweeping up". Pip (Sub-Assembly)(15)
Workers who were moved onto different jobs might lose 
money in a number of ways. Where earnings varied with output, 
it might take some time before she picked up sufficient speed to 
"make the job pay". But still there might not be the possibility 
of getting the same performance on the new job. It might be 
"lower paying" in terms of the performance that was achievable 
on it. On the other hand, it might be a fixed performance job 
and the performance was a lower one. Or else it might be a "no 
value job" which was paid at the minimum day rate. And there 
was no guarantee that a worker on a new job would be paid the 
rate for it either - if management considered insufficient effort 
was being made to achieve the count during the learning period.
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Informal custom and practice arrangements over pay and 
movement of labour had been established by workers in some areas. 
These differed between factories and even between departments 
and sections. Management had long held off attempts on 
the workers' side to standardise practices, or more specifically, 
to establish the payment (maintenance) of average earnings for 
workers who were moved. From management's point of view this 
would of course detract from the disciplinary aspects of mobility 
and its usefulness for lowering wage costs generally. Perhaps 
more significantly, it would remove the driving effect on workers 
who had to struggle to maintain their earnings when put on to new 
jobs.
The problem was made complicated by management insisting on 
differentiating their practice according to the particular 
circumstances of each "type" of move, i.e. whether it was "permanent" 
or "temporary" (a rather fine distinction where no woman had a 
permanent job); or whether it was from bonus work to: other bonus 
work, a "no-value" job or one with a fixed performance. By playing 
off the different arrangements found in each factory, management had 
succeeded in stringing out over a long period, negotiations at 
"convenor level" which were aimed, it would appear, at standardising 
to the level of "best practices". These negotiations were
eventually overtaken by strike action in 1977, but the resulting 
agreement did little more than establish a set of principles on 
pay for movement between certain kinds of work. In practice, it 
largely left managerial discretion intact, regarding payment for, 
and most importantly, selection of the workers to be moved.
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Of course it was not always necessary for management to
physically move the workers in order to put them onto other jobs.
They could simply move the jobs: the effect was the same.
"I've got a problem with the women that work 
on what we call the control arm line. They 
work very hard, they are all women in their 40's, 
and they're very,very hard working girls - and 
they've found that over the past fortnight, their 
wages have been ... have dropped, you know - to 
the tune of £3, £3.50. Now, this is because, 
being short of parts, they've had to wait - and 
they get what they call "waiting time". Also 
they've been put on another job, which has no value 
in - and our rate of pay for a "no-value" job, is 
a 75 performance. Now, these girls are getting a 
90 - 95 performance, on their own job so, 
consequently, when they're moved off, and put on 
this other job - their money drops. They lose 
money, they're unhappy - I'm unhappy. So, I 
had a little word with the superintendent, and with 
the head of department - and he said he was going 
to look at the problem. But he hasn't said 
anything to me yet, you know - he hasn't come 
back to me today. I had this word with him on 
Friday. I said, 'I'm looking for something for 
them, I'm askin' for you to be sympathetic'.
(What do you think they'll do?) "I don't know, 
they are tight - they're tight fisted you know.
I don't know, they may make them an allowance - 
then again he may say, 'We're creating a precedent 
if we do this; you know, 'have to do it for 
every one' - which I think they should do.
It's no fault of their own is it?".
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (17).
In Chapter 7 below, we look in more detail at how the payment 
system facilitated management "passing on" costs to the workforce. 
It is clear, however, that since a good third of the jobs were 
not bonus paying and a significant portion were "no-value" or 
simply day-rate, there remained, over all, plenty of scope for 
management to cut wage-costs when necessary, through movement
of labour.
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DISCIPLINE
In the second part of this chapter, the women describe 
another, highly significant, cost arising from the application 
of management's strategy: movement of labour was highly stressful 
from the workers' point of view. Clearly, therefore, in terms 
of stress and loss of earnings alone, movement of labour could be 
used punitively by management and made to serve as a direct means 
of control over the women workers.
Indeed it was used in this way and the threat was ever 
present. The convenor illustrated its effectiveness well, 
recalling an occasion when she had seen fit to warn a woman about 
the likely consequences of her taking time off...
"And so, very quietly, I had a little talk to 
her. I said, 'well you like your line work, don't 
you?' and she said 'yes'. I said, 'well, you'll 
be having the saune treatment as Sally and I don't 
want that to happen, because when you're here, 
you're an excellent worker'. You may not believe 
it but that stopped her - the thought of being 
moved off that line. And she would have been moved, 
no doubt about it". Pearl (Convenor) (18)
As another steward pointed out: as a punishment it could 
often be more disruptive than the "crime".
"They had a phase - on the line, if someone 
came late «mother was put on their job and they 
were to be moved off their job for the day.
But that didn't make sense, because they were 
putting an experienced woman off and an 
inexperienced one on - and given the speed, 
the work piled up; and everyone was held up”. 
Nora (Final Assembly) (19)
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d i s m i s s a l
As an extension of this punitive aspect, movement of labour 
could be used to expel "inefficient" or "superfluous" workers 
by forcing them to leave: Jill, a supervisor had tried to
avoid this.
"I put a woman who was an inspector onto motors —
.... she couldn't 'ave done it in a month of 
Sundays. So I 'ad to move one of my own ladies 
onto that job - and put 'er onto a job which 
I thought ... She can't even do that! Can't 
even see the 'holes'.And . . I  mean, I could ride 
the woman - I could really get on 'er back ...
Then she'd walk out. But that's what BSR want!
You know, so I thought - one day, I can suffer it ... 
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly). (20)
But incidents where workers had been forced to leave by
management'suse of movement of labour were very common indeed:
"Oh many a time, and often for health reasons":
(Can you think of any examples?)
"Oh, about five on the leads section. Because 
they were on bigger jobs, and they were put 
upstairs on the leads section. Listen, they 
put me on you know! And I couldn't see to do the 
j o b ....
they were people used to stripping rubber mats - 
and they came to try and thread a tiny 'cotton' 
through a little 'bead' because that’s what its 
like ...
They were forced to leave, again - that's through 
movement of labour." Pip (Sub-Assembly) (21)
Pip had been fortunate, because she had managed to secure 
a transfer onto another job. This was very rare however - as 
we will see when we look at more of the women's experiences in 
Part 2. The labour mobility rule was backed up by a general 
refusal to consider workers' requests for job transfers. As a 
result it could be used effectively by management to speed-up
'natural wastage’ in particular areas or just generally - whenever
( 22)this was required.
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Conclusions
Movement of labour was crucial to the intensive utilisation
of BSR's female labour force. It was justified by management,
on the grounds that (extra) flexibility was required because of the
women workers' absenteeism, and also because of changing
production requirements. We have noted that this flexibility was
also required in order to maintain the flow of work, because
management maintained low staffing levels and looked to sustain the
same high levels of output, i.e. to reduce costs by intensifying the
work. As we have noted, levels of demand for the product varied
on a seasonal basis, falling abruptly once the Christmas orders had
been completed. Management virtually stopped recruitment from mid-
December until early Summer and relied on a fast drop-out rate to
diminish the workforce, so that a smaller output would be produced
while the pace of work was maintained. In this period, as the
workforce became increasingly depleted, the scale of labour mobility
was stepped up. Whole sections of workers "over-producing" in
some areas, were broken up and redistributed to fill the "gaps"
which were disrupting production, elsewhere. As the rate of
intensification increased, so did the rate of absenteeism and
dropout - increasing the rate of labour mobility and intensification
in the labour process still further. It is no accident,therefore,
to find that most of the stoppages occurred in late Winter and early
(23)Spring . And since this also was the period when management
were under least pressure from customers, for deliveries (with most 
of the output going into stock), they were under fewer constraints 
to modify their production strategies.
The CIR noted how the organisation of the labour process - 
specifically its fragmentation and the breaking down of job 
tasks, facilitated the interchangeability of the female labour 
force. However, as we have noted, there were other features 
which might have been seen to diminish this. Jobs were not 
necessarily equivalent, in terms of either pay, hours available 
or skill requirements. This unevenness facilitated management's 
use of labour mobility as an important means of labour control.
Another feature of the organisation of the labour process (not 
noted by the CIR) was its tightly integrated systems of cooperation 
which were labour intensive in the areas where women workers were 
employed. With little machinery to regulate the pace of work, 
the workers' own systems of individual and collective regulation 
increased in significance. Movement of labour, therefore, provided 
management with an important means of undermining the development of 
such job controls by the women.
The impact of movement of labour on both individuals and work 
groups was disruptive and, as we shall see, it was experienced as 
stressful. Management's use of the mobility rule (in conjunction 
with no transfers) enhanced its disciplinary aspects. It thus 
increased insecurity for the workers with regard to both earnings and 
employment, and placed more power in management's hands.
PART 2 MOVEMENT OF LABOUR: 
"NO JOB IS  yo u r s " .
" if we do have movement of labour, I 
mean, they know the rules - the rules are 
clearly laid down - full movement of labour.
Now we use these humanely, I'm confident".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (24) .
"Well, you're just a clock number you know.
You're moved, you're not even thanked, they just 
tell you they've got another job for you and 
that's it. They don't consider anything, like 
how long you've been here - no I think you're 
just another clock number ...
... they don't look at a person and take into 
consideration whether a person can do a job - 
whether they're too old or .. I don't think they 
look at that. You're just another number, and they 
want someone on ajob, and that's it".
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (25).
In view of what has already been said about the importance of 
movement of labour to management, particularly as a means towards 
intensifying labour utilisation and increasing control over the 
workforce, it clearly constituted a central problem from the workers' 
point of view. What kind of impact did the practice of mobility 
have on that section of the labour force most subjected to it - 
the women workers? The rest of this chapter is concerned with 
examining such implications in respect of two major areas. These 
are linked together, but will be considered separately. First, 
the problem of employment (and earnings) security; and secondly 
the question of exploitation within the labour process itself.
Job controls are related to both of these in a complex way; since 
a certain amount of control or stability is necessary in relation 
to either one, in order to achieve it in the other.
-201-
For example, an increase in the rate of exploitation which 
raises productivity, can lead to a decrease in the amount of 
employment available - either altogether or in particular 
areas. On the other hand, a high(er) degree of competition 
among workers in the labour market and the labour process, 
serves generally to inhibit the effectiveness of collective 
organisation and control over managerial practices such as 
speed-up and intensification. For a number of reasons this 
situation is characteristic of most women workers, whose 
restricted access to training and confinement to a narrow range 
of jobs together with restricted physical mobility increases their 
dependence on, and competition within, local labour markets.
Whereupon the unspecialised nature of the work available tends to
increase its accessibility to large numbers of similarly placed
. (26)workers.
While bearing this context in mind, our purpose here is to 
focus narrowly: to look more closely at the labour process itself- 
at the impact of managerial strategies (here, movement of labour) 
on the controls which the women at BSR exercised over their work in 
an immediate sense. Also to examine the implicatons both of, 
and for, employment (in) security within the firm.
Every woman interviewed for this study mentioned movement of
labour as one of their biggest problems. A question such as -
if you had the chance to move to another job here, what would you
do?-was singularly inappropriate at BSR.
"1 don't know, they don't give you that chance 
(laughs), It's a silly question here! Yes, it 
definitely is here! They don't ask you, they tell 
you here. And you can go on fighting - it don't 
make no difference if they say they've got to go, 
they've got to go and that's it!"
Nora (Final Assembly) (27)
The position of the women was spelt out by the convenor:
"Now when a person is enrolled into BSR, you know 
that you have no job. No job is yours.
There are many more people in the factory that 
have got movement of labour than what 
have got their own, set job. There are very 
few people - even the moulding machines are 
moved around". Pearl (Convenor) (28)
The principle applied to all hourly paid women workers who 
were recruited as production operatives. Male workers were taken 
on for specific jobs or for work in specific areas. The only 
women so recruited might be found in, for example, the press 
shop, where the necessary training, skills or experience had to be 
acquired outside the firm. But even these workers could be 
given different work to do if occasion required.
To the extent that these workers might be considered to have
relatively well demarcated jobs (referred to as "permanent")
compared to everyone else, their position was envied.
"And they go on about these newcomers you know, 
as they like, go on to different jobs - and 
why should they? But I mean, they've come as 
press operators, and they'm entitled to go on to 
the jobs, I think meself. But they're always 
complaining about the new people going straight 
onto the presses. But they've come as press 
workers". Sarah (Press Shop) (29).
Why was the issue of "a permanent job" so important to the workers
concerned?
Movement of labour and job security: what happened to the "school mothers"?
"By gently and carefully manoevring the operators around ..." (30) 
A brief examination of movement of labour applied by management
to effect their policies with regard to the deployment of full-time and
part-time workers, can be used to illustrate some of the problems to
begin wit* - providing, as it does, a more coherent context within
which its general impact on the workforce may be viewed.
As discussed earlier, managers were constantly re-arranging
the way work was distributed among workers employed for
different hours in order to "optimise" their mix of part-time
and full-time labour. Apart from facilitating recruitment,
the variety of employment hours was clearly a great boon in certain
respects; for if total production - that is, labour hours were
being cut in some sections (meaning workers were to be moved off
those jobs) the size of the cut could be adjusted. If only a few hours
less were required, a part-time worker on afternoons might be moved,
reducing the daily labour-hours employed in that section by 3*j. A
morning worker moved would reduce daily production or labour hours
there by 4*i and a "school mother" by . On the other hand, more
output might be required from a section, in which case part-time
workers could be brought in to provide the appropriate number of
additional hours. Alternatively full-time workers might be put on,
to replace part-timers already there (in this case, bringing the
added advantage of greater "administrative" convenience). The other
side of this useful flexibility from management's point of view, was
stress and insecurity for the worker. The following accounts refer
to the impact of movement of labour on part-time workers who were being
particularly subjected to mobility at the time of the study.
"Movement of labour is a problem. People don't like 
being moved around. First they move part-timers 
then full-timers - now they've decided to have all 
full-timers, so they push the part-timers around.."
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (31)
It was one group of part-time workers especially who were being 
"rationalised" at this particular time - the 9.30 - 3.30 workers 
on what was called the "school mothers'" shift. This was described 
by management as "an animal all by itself", because two
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part-timers on the other shifts - morning (4*5 hourly) workers
and afternoon (3*5 hourly) workers, or the four-hourly shift
(32)workers - together made up a "full-time equivalent". It was
easier to co-ordinate the production from those workers with
full-timers because the same hours were being covered. The
9.30 - 3.30 workers posed more problems in this respect and so
they tended to be grouped altogether, in particular areas. It
was these areas which were being "rationalised" in order to
finally comprise one main part of the sub-assembly upstairs
and two final assembly lines downstairs. This involved considerable
movement within and between production areas.
"Upstairs they are moving 9.30 - 3.30 workers 
off. They haven't started any new workers on 
this shift for 2 years or so. They fill the 2 
lines downstairs from upstairs".
(Are they phasing this shift out?)
"He says not. But they're taking them off 
upstairs or replacing them with full-time workers".
Nora (Final Assembly)(33).
Janet was facing the problem of movement upstairs:
"At present I'm thinking about what to do about them 
moving the part-timers onto my section.
I should like to be able to stop them from moving 
them there, but you just can't, you know. They're 
gradually moving part-timers off the other sections 
and they're now all on mine - and there's only 
two lines downstairs. I think they'll gradually 
get rid of them all - make them leave or go 
full-time - when vacancies ccxne up now downstairs, 
they are moved off my section and sent down there.."
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (34)
As Nora on the final assembly line downstairs explained - there
was a difference, when it came to "interchangeability” in the
theory and the practice.
"It creates problems because - we know they are 
'experienced BSR women', as management put it.
But they're experienced on a different job.
And if I went onto their job, I'd be 
exactly the same, and of course a lot of these 
women they panic - when they come on the 
line they panic ..." Nora (Final Assembly)(35).
From the point of view of the women workers on the 9.30 -
3.30 shift (as it did for all of the women in fact), movement 
of labour posed a very real threat.
(Movement of labour?)
"Yes, get that ... they're every day problems, 
those are . They move women to do jobs that they 
can't do. No v;ay can they do it, you know.
(Has that happened recently?) Yes, on the leads 
section. They moved a couple of my members onto 
the leads section, because they were 9.30 women 
you see. And then they moved them from the leads 
section onto the cartridge section. I think 
they can almost do that - you know, the job now.
But movement of labour, we have trouble every day"
"Sometimes there are cases, say where a woman is 
physically UNABLE to do a job, you know. Such as 
a woman - they put her on the cartridge section, and 
she had this thyroid problem, and it affected her 
eyes, and her eyes were literally ... you know 
they'd been operated on, and they were literally 
stitched together - the one eye was literally 
stitched, and the other one was open, and she wore 
dark glasses, and ... she was in a terrible state!
And no HAY could she do cartridges, but they 
expected her to sit there and do it, you know.
(Why on earth did they move her?) Because she was a
9.30 worker, I s'pose. And I just saw red!
And I went across and fetched all her stuff off her 
you know - all the stuff away from her. I said 
'You can't see it ... you can't do it!' So they 
fetched her off the job, and put her on a job with 
a little press - that she CAN do, and now her eyes 
are much better - but they haven't put her back on".
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (36).
(my emphasis in lower case, otherwise emphasis in original) 
Neither was long service a protection:
"They moved some people out of the department and onto 
the main lines and they were middle-aged women, 
you know, and they put up a struggle but they still 
had to go in the end .. but they've left. One's 
left that's done 15 years service. She was in that 
department 15 years part-time afternoons. They put 
her on the main line but she's left. Mind you she
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was in her late 50's, say she was about 55.
Well I mean,it was a shame for that age to 
put her on a job which, you know, - the lines".
Carol (Moulding Shop) (37).
It would appear that most of the 9.30 - 3.30 women who were moved, 
gave up their jobs altogether. Should this be seen as a sign 
of their "low commitment to employment" ? As in the example above,
it is probable that many were long service workers, because 
employment at these hours was hard to come by. Some of the reasons 
why mobility was difficult to cope with in general are examined in 
the following sections.
In security of employment and earnings
"Of course, that's naturally resistance to 
change - whether its temporary or permanent.
Look! Its not a big problem. The shop stewards 
are obviously going to say there's a resistance 
to change, they're bound to, because it affects 
them and it affects their members. But generally 
it's accepted, and it works very,very well.
We don't normally have much trouble with it at 
all". Barry White (Factory Manager) (38).
One thing which the above case study illustrates clearly is the 
way movement of labour could constitute a permanent threat to the 
women workers' security of employment within the company. While 
all the jobs might have been considered interchangeable (because 
"unskilled") in theory, in practice they required different attributes 
and aptitudes - both natural and learned, on the part of the worker.
For example, some of the work on small electrical components demanded 
deftness and a degree of consistent close attention akin to needlework, 
as well as good eyesight. Other jobs were physically demanding, 
lifting, fetching and carrying, standing all day - which required 
robustness and energy. And as pointed out above, if no job was 
intrinsically difficult, all were in terms of the speed at which they 
had to be done. It was always, therefore, within the realms of
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possibility that a worker could be put on to a job which she 
could not do, and as a consequence be forced to leave her
"There is a lady moved over from my 
section, and put over onto the far end of the 
room. She was moved from a little toggle- 
press thing, to working with fine leads, fine 
wires - but ... the lady had got arthritis 
in her hands, and she couldn't handle it, you 
know. And ... she was on the job about a month, 
and she used to sit crying, but eventually we 
got her moved - because there was no way that 
she could do the job! So I said, 'Well, just 
sit there then - do nothing! Till they finally 
realise that you can't do the job'."
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (40)
"I've got one now, who was transferred from 
downstairs - she can't see well and suffers from 
very bad nerves - she was put on leads!
"They're forcing a lot of them to leave - and 
this is what happens at BSR".
Pip (Sub-assembly) (41)
(42)Nor did having your own set job necessarily afford protection:
"One of the new ones on the job at the moment • 
she's asked the superintendent to take her off, 
she doesn't like it. His reply was 'she came 
as a press operator, so press operator she's 
going to be'. But this machine, it does frighten 
a lot of people and I do wish as I could get 
something done for this girl; because it's an 
automatic one, it goes by light — you don't press 
a button or anything, it goes by light, and she's 
frightened. She's petrified of this machine, and I 
do really wish that I could get something done for her.." 
Sarah (Press Shop) (43).
We have noted in Part j of this chapter how labour mobility 
afforded management a flexibility in regard to the workforce which 
was essential to their practices of intensive utilisation and 
labour control. In respect of the latter, we have seen that the 
punitive aspects of movement of labour could be used strategically; 
serving both as an ever-present threat, and also as a means of 
speeding up "natural wastage" and expelling unwanted workers.
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A major consequence of this was that it engendered for the women workers,
a pervasive insecurity, the sense of which was almost tangible in
the factories. As Pip described it, it was an'atmosphere.'
(What were your first feelings about working here?)
"The pettyness really. I mean, some of the women, 
if you were doing a job, they’d ... they'd got 
the feeling you were taking the job off them.
That's the feeling I had here.
(Why was that?)
I don't know, but that is an atmosphere here.
If you're doing another person's - say a person's 
been away, and they put you on that job for a short 
time - they'll tell you its only for a short time, 
until she comes back - you feel guilty, you've got 
that guilty feeling you're doing somebody else's job.
That's the only thing I can put it down to.
Pip was, herself, off work due to ill-health (heart-trouble) at the 
time.
(While you are away do you feel concerned about 
getting your job back?)
"Well, I do at the moment, because I mean, this 
is one of the things ... you know, I keep ...
I keep thinking, 'Oh, I hope I ’ve got my job - 
I've still got my job, because I ... you see, 
this is the job I've been on - I've never been on 
a job so long as this one - I've been on this job 
12 months. And its the only job I've been on for 
that long". Pip (Sub-Assembly) (44)
This fundamental insecurity in relation to their employment had, as
might be expected, important implications for the development of job
controls in the areas of production where the women workers were
located. We go on to examine this further in the final section.
But first we look at the threat labour mobility posed in relation to
the women's pay.
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pay
Movement of labour was an Important source of earnings
insecurity for the women workers. This was because different
jobs carried differing rates of pay and also because earnings
on bonus work depended upon the acquisition of sufficient speed:
"It's a problem if you're not allowed to stay 
on a job long - you can't get enough speed-up to 
earn the money". Janet (Sub-Assembly) (45)
The worst kind of move, from an earnings point of view, was on to
"no value" jobs. These were paid at a minimum rate and carried
no bonus, so that even as speed and output increased with practice,
no extra money could be earned. As Janet put it:
"You finally end up with less, 'cos you've 
no chance of getting any more".
Janet (Sub-Assembly)(46)
"Lady of the line - I don't think she was one 
of my members, but she came to me because there 
wasn't anyone else about. And she'd been moved 
off her job onto a no-value job, and her wages 
had gone down - so she came and asked if we 
could help". Jenny (Final Assembly) (47)
The women had been trying to establish an acceptable procedure to protect 
their earnings if they were moved, but the agreement only referred 
to "permanent" moves and most were designated "temporary" anyway.
In any case, average earnings would only be paid if management 
considered that "suitable efforts were being made". In other words, 
the decisions were arbitrary and to that extent, always remained to 
be negotiated:
"Now, sometimes the company's idea of effort 
and my idea of effort, you know - differs. I 
think they've made a good effort, the company say,
'We don't think so - so we are paying them day 
money'. But sometimes, you know - I had 2 cases 
yesterday, as a matter of fact - and I got a 75 
performance for 2 members, and I got a 70 for one.
But they were going to pay them 66 you know. And 
they were doing jobs alien to them, you know what 
I mean?" Sally (Sub-Assembly) (48).
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The women were forced under mobility rules, to move or to leave, 
and to protect their earnings, had to be prepared to haggle as well. 
They were always liable to lose money however - it was just a question 
of how much.
"The one was the same as the job that she always 
does. The other 2 ... er, they told me they were 
satisfied. I was a bit upset about the one particularly, 
because she gets a 99 performance, and they boosted 
it up from 66 to 75, you know. And she said, 'Don't 
bother, you know, I'm happy'. So, you can't really 
force their arm up their back, can you? And the 
other one, she normally got a 75 and they gave her
a 66 - and then they took the paper back, ....
I told her to, you know, ask for more, and he came 
back with a 70. And she came to me, she said 'I'm 
satisfied' - well, I could have gone up, p'raps, and 
got 75 for her". Sally (Sub-Assembly) (49).
We appear to have here some clear illustrations of women 
workers' fabled unwillingness to stand up to management and negotiate 
their pay. Can we, perhaps, identify an outbreak of economic 
fatalism*similar to that which was uncovered by the government's 
investigators?
"There were many instances where factors 
completely beyond the operators' control reduced 
their earnings, and in nearly every case a form 
of economic fatalism prevented them from 
complaining". NBPI (1968) p.19
In approaching this question, we would want to assess the 
basis from which the workers are entering into a bargaining 
relationship with management. What bargaining resources do they 
have at their disposal? We have already noted that the strength of 
the women workers position at BSR was, in general, considerably 
undermined by the high degree of insecurity engendered by management's 
use of labour mobility. As we will now go on to see, their bargaining 
resources were also reduced directly by the impact of movement of 
labour on the development of both individual and collective job
controls
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JOB CONTROL
It is clear that management's utilisation of movement of labour, 
had a significant impact on the women workers' job security. The 
consequences of this had important ramifications for their position 
in the labour process itself, and this again, movement of labour 
affected directly.
We have already seen how management used movement of labour to 
effect speed-up and labour intensification. As we have seen with 
doubling-up, the movement of workers and alteration of job content 
were two sides of the same coin. Speed-up also, was facilitated by 
moving workers from one job to another so that it was difficult to 
keep a track of what the count had been. In the case of the moulding 
machines, both the jobs and the workers were switched about in this 
way.
"If they want to put the count up or anything like
that, they take the tool out of the machine, and
put you another tool in - a different job.. And then
that tool will go to the tool room to be cleaned
or something, and then, when it comes out again, it
goes on to another machine, and they slam another count
on it you see....(It happened to her) ... after a
month, they took the job off the machine and moved it
somewhere else, and this is what they do. If they
want to put the count up, they take it off one machine
take it back into the toolroom and when it comes out,
put it back onto another machine, so nobody's got a
check on what the counts are ...." Madge (Moulding Shop) (50)
Movement of labour was effective for management's purposes to 
the extent that it undermined the workers' potential for resistance 
to demands for increased effort, by breaking job continuity and 
fragmenting the knowledge they required in order to exert control over 
the work. But continuity and knowledge are not the only elements to 
job control, and this section goes on to examine the crucial question 
of the work group and the impact of labour mobility on the workers' 
collective controls which were continuously developed within the labour
process
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The division of labour/fragmentation of work tasks, the different
patterns of co-operation and the "incentive" aspects of the payment
system, were all designed so as to subordinate the workers'control
over their activities and expenditure of effort to management's aims.
But each of these, while breaking down one potential barrier to this
goal, served to recreate another. Thus, the jobs were "de-skilled",
but given the nature of the work and the speed at which it had to be
executed, still required a significant degree of technical
coordination. A level of competence had still to be acquired, together
with a degree of habituation which permitted the relaxation necessary
for workers to produce consistently at a high rate. More importantly,
cohesive work groups were continuously created in this labour process,
either because the women were required to operate as closely
coordinated work teams; or because, although on individual jobs, they
were placed in close proximity to each other in the relatively confined
factory space. This labour process therefore, characterised, as it
was by a high degree of interdependent operations, also required a level
of social coordination, in addition to the technical co-ordination
mentioned above. Furthermore, operators on bonus work, for example,
were permitted some leeway in deciding their levels of output, (albeit
within narrow limits and above a set minimum). And this again,
required a high degree of mutual regulation and organisation which is
evident in Pearl's description of work on sub-plates. A team of
17 operators regulated production to maintain an earnings/output
target despite constantly changing conditions and contingencies:
"If you had achieved 66 and were trying to get 
an 80 you'd need to do 450 for this. If you're 
used to the job you'd get this easily - unless 
parts were bad or there was a shortage. This 
would give you waiting time. So, in this hour, with 
lO mins waiting you'd only have got a 76 performance.
You'd look and see 325 booked instead of 450, and 
you'd book 325 and waiting time lO mins. But then 
you'd got 452 and know an 80 was 450 an hour, you'd
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put those 2 aside for your next hour. You try 
to set a target each hour and work to that.
But it's very hard to do. So many things can go 
wrong to upset your calculations.
Pearl (Convenor and Sub-Assembly)(51)
It is clear that the successful operation of management's 
production policy required particularly of the workers in "teams" 
a high degree of cohesion, mutual coordination, regulation and 
organisation, simply in order to put production into effect, i.e. 
to maintain the flow of work. However, we have also noted that 
the various systems of cooperation were designed to maximise the 
immediate pressures of inter-dependency within the labour process 
for each operator in order to minimise the "space" within which they 
could exert choice and control over their effort. Regulation of 
work effort, therefore, clearly had also to include regulation of 
the pressurebuilt in to, and mediated by, the cooperative relationship 
itself. Since there were a variety of different systems of 
cooperation in the labour process, each engendered different kinds 
of pressure and called for different means in order to control its 
impact on the part of the workers involved. So we return, briefly, 
to look at the different patterns of cooperation in the labour process 
at the way these structured work relations on the one hand, and 
problems of work regulation on the other - before returning to examine 
the impact of labour mobility on workers' job controls.
The pressure of dependency, increased by its degree of immediacy, 
was greatest in those sequential tasks where the performance of one 
was directly dependent on that preceding it, and everyone's actions 
were thus initiated from sources external to themselves. Direct 
social pressure was greatest where work was passed from hand to hand. 
And it required, on the part of these workgroups - as it did, in some
sense, of them all - collective efforts to ameliorate its impact on 
every individual concerned. This meant, in effect, that 
in order to regulate her own effort, each worker had also to 
regulate the efforts of others and was therefore party to the 
collective regulation of the immediate work group (the boundaries 
of its effects might be wider than this however, depending on the 
circumstances and environment of each section).
As a means of overcoming this kind of regulation managements 
have tended to find machine-pacing of sequential tasks more effective 
than inter-personal social pressure alone. But only two areas were 
organised in this way at BSR, and they both operated slightly 
differently. The continuous paint and plating lines connecting each 
automated process, set the pace for the operatives attending it, 
who adjusted their work-rate to the line rather than directly to 
each other. Any alteration in the line-speed depended on the 
intervention of setters; so to some extent, the line mediated 
the pressure the women might put on each other. On the final assembly 
line, however, the work itself was done off-line, and all the tasks 
were different. The unit was removed by the operative each time, 
then put onto the line again, to be conveyed to the next station.
The pace of the work depended to some extent on the speed of the belt, 
but it depended as much on the speed of the individual operatives.
A quick worker at the top of the line set the pace for those below.
A slow person in the middle caused a bottleneck and slowed it down, and 
two people clearing a bottleneck doubled the pace again for those 
below them. This combination of machine and worker pacing seemed to 
make linework especially stressful. One of the reasons for this was 
the fact that the speed and also fluctuations in the rhythm of the work
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lay beyond the control of each individual herself. While this was 
the case for all linked-sequence tasks, final assembly on the main 
lines was subject to more fluctuations in pace and rhythm than work 
elsewhere, and this made it, as was commonly agreed, one of the most 
frustrating and difficult areas of work in the firm.
Management's production policy therefore engendered the need
for, as well as the means of workers developing controls to stabilize
their work effort. And insofar as tasks were organised on a collective
basis (e.g. teams working on linked sequence operations), workers'
job regulation necessarily assumed a collective character. It is
clear that the more stable the membership of the work group, the
more effectively these controls could be exercised to restrain the
pace and intensity of work. Movement of labour could be used by
management to undermine work group stability. But the results were
contradictory from management's point of view since mutual coordination
and regulation were as much a requirement of workers achieving high
output in this system of production, as it was a means of their
restricting it. Similarly, from the point of view of the workers,
the rules concerning labour mobility which officially denied them
"their own job", contradicted the obvious fact that experience and
habituation were also necessary to achieve the required output;
"Some women have been on a particular job 5,6,7 years.
They look on it as their particular job. But it's not - 
They're told they're a team ... But they know, those 
used to the jobs get quicker". Nora (Final Assembly) (52)
What was the impact of labour mobility on the women's efforts 
to regulate the pace and intensity of their work? In the example 
presented below, which details the consequences of moving workers 
engaged in team-assembly, it is clear that there are three aspects 
to consider: the impact on the individual who is moved, the impact
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on the group which is left, and the impact on the group which is 
joined, i.e. on "residents" who are given newcomers to work with. 
BREAKING DOWN THE LINE
All of these are illustrated in this account of the "breaking down
of the lines" at Old Hill. This procedure was used by management
in periods when labour (and output) was being cut back to the
extent that there were not enough workers to run all the lines.
Then a line would be "broken down" - half of the workers would be
taken off and dispersed to fill spaces on other lines - to work
among people and on jobs they were not necessarily accustomed to.
we look at the impact on those workers who were left on the line:
they were doubled -up on their jobs:
"Unless you work on the lines, you can't really 
explain it you know, because there's - oh I don't 
know how many different jobs, say there's ... 
actually there should be 68 girls to run the line 
and so many floats - I think its 72 or 75 to run 
one line correctly. But, you've got your good jobs - 
you've got simple jobs ... well, the girl on the front 
job has got nothing at all extra to do, when you ' re 
broke down, only put a little bit of grease on.
The girl on the next job has nothing at all to do extra, 
unless they're on springs and she automatically puts 
a spring on - which is nothing. Now, the one on the 
next job, she's got 2 jobs to do, and the one on the 
next job she's got 2 to do. Its a double job with 
only 1 girl on - the other girl is took off and you 
see, there's more work for some than others. You see, 
you’ve got a lot of girls with a lot of extra work 
to do, on *j a line, and a lot of girls that can sit and 
twiddle their thumbs. So, therefore, these girls that 
are working - some are working damned hard and some are 
just getting the same money and doing nothing extra." 
Eunice (Final Assembly) (53).
Secondly, there is the impact on the person transferred to
a different job on another line to be considered:
"They could put you on a job that you hadn't been on 
before, and if you couldn't keep up - I mean you can 
imagine the aggro you can get off certain parties, 
because they've got no patience with you, you know - 
if you can't do your job that's it ... and they can't 
do those jobs you know. But they've still got to go 
and try and do them - and they come back and they've
First
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got blisters on their fingers - when they come back 
on to their own lines. And actually, I was on a job 
before the holiday and I got a blister as big as a 
>5 pence on my hand from 1 day's work - from doing a 
job that I wasn't used to doing and not holding the 
tool properly. You're just put on it and they say 
'Oh, that's just an easy job you can do that.'But 
they don't tell you how to hold the tools - they do 
nothing. And if you're told - I was told after I'd 
been on it 2 hours, after I'd got the blister, what 
to do." Ethel (Final Assembly)(54)
Finally, there is the impact on the "residents" and the problematic 
relationship between themselves and the newcomer.
"You've got test girls. Well, they're only used to 
test work. If there's no test job for them, then 
they put them on the assembly line - which is 
another thing that causes problems. Well they don't 
know the job. Its alright if you know a job, but if 
you're put on a job and they say 'Oh do your best ...
But if you're on a double job ... when I say a double 
job - you've got the track - the first job is a single job 
down to the fourth. Now the fourth job, there has 
to be 2 girls on that job. So therefore when you go 
onto another line ... if there's already a girl on that 
job on the line - as can do the job, and then there' s 
a test-float or someone as can't and they say 'do your 
best' - that one. And that's
what it is, on _ ____  's what causes
a lot of problems, with the breaking down of the lines. 
And the girls that come on the jobs, they think, well, 
they aren't pulling their weight. I mean, you'd feel 
it. If you're a girl - conscious of your job - which 
there is some. I'm not saying all of them, but there 
is some and they think 'Oh, it isn't fair, I'm making 
her do all the work - which you are if you aren't 
pulling your weight. Its only little niggly things,but 
they're niggly things that cause conflict amongst the 
girls". Eunice (Final Assembly) (55)
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Conclusions
Workers develop and utilise job controls in order both to
facilitate the execution of their work and also to regulate
the expenditure of effort entailed. To the extent that such
regulation is defensive and takes protective forms, these will
constitute resistance to demands for increased expenditure of
effort; whether these derive from the employer or other workers.
We would maintain that it was the diminution of job control in
general that constituted the most significant impact of movement
of labour on the women workers at BSR. But we need to specify
some of the elements of individual and collective regulation more
closely, in order to assess what kind of impact management's use
of mobility might have on job controls.
"I mean - you lose friends, and you lose touch.
You don't know how much you have to do. Some jobs 
are left-handed. Some people can't sit down for 
long periods - they get stiff - some can't adjust 
themselves to it at all".
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (56)
The impact of job transfer on the person who was moved, is 
itemised here in terms of the following: loss of social group, that
is known relationships; loss of knowledge about the job; and 
loss of "work adjustment" i.e. habituation and acquired skills. 
Whether in individual or teamwork, these three elements - the social 
group, job knowledge and job habituation/skills, together made up 
the basic components of work regulation. The most significant 
impact, therefore, of job transfer on the person who was moved was 
disruption in relation to all three. The consequence was, 
therefore, (an albeit, temporary) loss of individual job control.
There is a further consequence to be considered where team work 
is concerned however, and that is the impact of movement of labour
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on the work group. We have noted two aspects to this; one concerned 
the removal of workers altogether which led to a heavier workload 
for some of the remainder, and the other concerned the substitution 
of "new" workers, which also tended to increase the work load of 
original team members. But the extra work and pressure entailed was 
not distributed or borne evenly with n the group - it always fell 
far more heavily on some workers, rather than others. Because of 
the loss of balance and coordination which could result from this 
disruption of rhythm and work-flow plus the fact that personal conflict 
and frustration were all the more readily engendered; it is clear 
that to a significant extent also, the impact of job transfer on 
the remaining group resulted in some loss of collective job control.
The account of "breaking down the lines" expresses the exposure
of workers to group pressure, experienced as a driving force behind
the high pace. It was this that chiefly distinguished individual
and teamwork jobs and set the different parameters of job control.
(Although individual jobs were not necessarily free of this pressure
which appeared to derive, in an immediate sense, from other workers).
(When you first started here, what was the hardest 
thing you found to get used to?)
"The pace. The pace of work. I was on a line, 
and it was very fast - very fast working you know, 
this I found". (How long did it take you to get 
used to it?) "Oh, I don't think you ever do ... 
and the older you get, the worse it gets".
(Is it faster now than it used to be?). "Well, 
of course my pace has slowed down becuase I'm 
working individually - for myself ... on a job 
that I don't need to keep up with the girl next to 
me. But, I think it's got faster ... the demand 
is greater - they demand more of you."
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (57).
In this section we have identified three major areas of 
consequence to the women workers arising from management's use of 
labour mobility. Movement of labour destroyed job continuity, 
knowledge and expertise, making speed up and work intensification 
harder to resist. Movement of labour broke up work groups and teams. 
As a result it destroyed, in the short-term, the coordination and 
mutual regulation necessary for smooth production, on a coooerative 
basis. And at the same time it undermined protective strategies 
which were also continuously developed, both individually and 
collectively, which served to shield workers from pressure and stress 
engendered in the labour process.
As we noted with the position of the new recruit, there is,
in the workers' accounts of the experience of labour mobility (eg.
breaking down the lines), a description of work in this labour
process in the (initial) absence of such protections. Since the
immediate impact of movement of labour is to disrupt job knowledge
and habituation, together with whatever interpersonal regulatory
mechanisms are established in systems of social relationships, these
elements can be identified as forming the basis of protections against
stress and driving and therefore, of job control.
"Nobody likes to be moved. Everybody likes to work 
in their own set like... If people think they're 
going to be moved they often won't come in".
Ethel (Final Assembly)(58).
Finally, we have argued that the diminution of job controls has 
implications for workers' bargaining relationship with management, 
because it directly reduces the bargaining resources available to 
individuals,groups or whole sections of the workforce. Other 
aspects of this question in relation to the women workers are pursued 
in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5 MOVEMENT OF LABOUR
FOOTNOTES :
(1) But this interchangeability was limited, see Part II of this chapter.
(2) See Chapter 10 and clause 25 of the 'Blue Book" Agreement
in Appendix 1.
(3) He continues "And as it happens - breakdown packing is dead.
Now break-down packing is where we send the record changer 
out in component form. Now that is ... dropped right off -
12,000 a week gone down to 1,000 a week. So that labour
has to be reallocated to other duties. So, you have a problem -
moving it round. Do you move it around permanently, or do 
you move it around temporarily. So, in that case - you have 
2 sets of circumstances to work to".
Ref 12/S1: 17-38.
(4) See below, pp. 126 - 144
(5) Ref 41/S4: 950-959
(6) Ref 20/S2: 212-218
(7) (Selection of sunervision: in early days picked on merit. Foreman 
asked senior supervisor on line to recommend.)
"Now I was chosen exactly the same, you pick on merit, and on 'ow 
versatile they are and 'ow quick they pick up a job. But now 
you've got a manager, Mr White, interviewing 'em; and he 
interviews 'em for a 'Yes or no sir! you know. Those who're 
gonna do 'is biddin'. And they're not as supervisors, when they 
put the coat on, all they think - they are glorified labourers.
They think that's their job - its to fetch and carry. In 
actual fact, its spoilin' the supervisors' reputation, because 
by then you've got the girls nigglin’: "Oh she doesn't know 
as much as me, all she's used to is fetchin' and carryin'."
Because the poor girl 'asn't 'ad the opportunity! you know.
These supervisor ^ Browbeaten by management into doing this as part 
of their job, - to keep the lines going. TheyVe not able to 
look after the girls properly, so you get a bit of unrest 
against the supervision". Jill (Supervisor-Final Assembly)
Ref 8/S1: 820-870.
(8) Ref 21(a)/S3: 020
(9) Ref 7/S1: 580 -
(10) Rei 21(b)/S3: 30
(11) Ref 9/S1: 906-950
(12) Ref 4/
(13) Thus workers put each other under pressure to speed up.
(14) Ref 20/S1: 876-898
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(15) Ref 31/S3: 528-551
\
(16) The only circumstance where the payment of average earnings 
had been established by custom and practice in some areas, 
was for a move designated "permanent", onto bonus work, 
and payment was for four weeks although probably with the 
usual proviso of: "subject to suitable effort being made".
(17) Ref 20/S2:: 619-687
(18) Ref 44/S6: 931-941
(19) Ref 9/S1 : 720-743
(20) Ref 28(b)/S3: 880-
(2 1 ) Ref 32/Ss: 599-610
(22) See above on moving part-time workers from particular areas
in order to replace them by full-timers. With more workers 
on particular shifts than the number of jobs (now) being made 
available for these hours, management calculated that those moved 
would be forced to work full-time or leave.
(23) See Chapter 14.
(24) Ref 2/S1: 38-47
(25) Reg 5/S1: 586-627
(26) Arguing against these writers who identify such a lack of effectiveness 
and attribute it to women workers'attitudes, Kate Purcell
draws attention to " .... the lack of industrial bargaining power of 
the majority of women, deriving from their own position in the 
labour market and the market position of the industries in which 
they are concentrated.
Unskilled labour is rarely a scarce resource and, as such, has 
little industrial muscle." Purcell (1979) p.125
(27) Ref 5/S1: 402-408
(28) Ref 45
(29) Ref 18-19/S2: 298-317
(30) Factory Manager quoted above p .96
(31) Ref 9/S2: 300-310
(32) See footnote p. 113 - 114.
(33) IO/SI: 839-880
(34) 15/S2: 857-882
(35) Ref lO/Sl: 850-875
Nora recalled a previous occasion when workers had been moved 
downstairs and put on her line. Workers being moved now, could not 
expect a similar reprieve.
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(35) cont'd. "2 years ago they moved 9.30 - 3.30 workers from upstairs
when we weren't short. We had a lot of trouble a couple 
of years ago with unnecessary movement - moving them 
down, then putting someone else on their job. Well, 
they moved 2 down who'd been told that their work was 
not wanted anymore, and ■jhr later they put others on it!
The next morning they went upstairs and found women on 
their jobs ... (the women complained ...)
The women were taken back upstairs. The excuse was, that 
it was an emergency order that had come in ...."
Ref 18/S2: 605-650.
(36) Ref 23/S2: 863-931
(37) Ref 17/18
(38) Ref 2/S1: 38 - 47
(39) The movement of labour rule forbade a worker to refuse to move
on pain on dismissal and job transfers requested by workers were 
not permitted except on rare occasions.
(40) Ref 21/S2: 751-771
(41) Ref 20/S2: 760 - 794
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
This might be possible for a press operator
Ref 16/S2: 120-140
Ref 3/S1: 203 - 231
Ref 3/S1: 345-350
Ref 11/S2: 516-520
Ref 26/S2: 395-400
Ref 24/S3: 40-58
Ref 27/S3: 214-236
Ref 19/S21, 532-561
Ref 12,13/S3: 000-044
Ref 17/S2: 598-610
Ref OH 19-20/T3S1: 10-65
Ref OH9/T251: 144-160 and OH 19-20/T351: 10-63
Ref OH 19-20/T351/10-65
Ref 14/S2: 750-760
Ref 4/S1: 246-270
Ref OH9, 14/T2S1 110,690.(58)
CHAPTER A DISCIPLINE AND THE CONTROL OF LABOUR
In this chapter we look at BSR management's disciplinary 
practice in respect of the women workers. Material which might 
provide some basis for comparison with other workplaces is not 
available, but to all appearances, the disciplinary load in these 
factories was high overall - and especially so for the women, 
compared with the men. ^  A question underlying our discussion 
therefore, is to explain this.
Capitalist employers' power in the workplace is founded on 
their control over access to the means of subsistence. Their 
ultimate sanction is the deprivation of a workers' livelihood.
The concept of "labour discipline", therefore, expresses the 
fact that all waged work carried out as a response to economic 
needs is, to some extent, coerced. This is so though the degree 
of dependency - on employment in general, and on specific jobs in 
particular - may vary between workers and change for individuals 
or groups over time. (Nor does this fact of coercion disappear 
when workers find or make their labour more congenial). Looking 
at the aspect of economic dependency alone, it is clear, that from 
this common basis of coercion, a variety of material and social 
conditions may differentiate wage workers in relation to their 
employment, i.e. in terms of the nature and degree of their 
"commitment", at any one time. Thus employers and their managers 
are presented with control problems of a different nature and 
degree according to who is employed, when, where and how.
W K
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"I mean, I can remember many years ago, when
the main lines were running say 95*100 performances.
And the sub-assembly were on 125 performances.
Because they were all married women, who came solely 
for one purpose only, to earn money. And they 
earned money! And, now you tend to have the 
younger girls on the lines - and coming back to an 
earlier question, I don’t think as they get older, 
they get any more mature, I think they still ...
The younger generation coming in, live their life 
as they started it. In other words, they don’t ...
The older women, the old chain makers - they were 
the GRAFTERS of the Black-Country. They came in, 
and they grafted, and they worked, and they wanted 
money - they didn't come in for anything else, they 
just wanted money. Now, the younger girls today, 
don't seem to have that desire. Their wages are 
higher anyway, therefore, a lot of them just don’t 
know ... the youngsters, the teenagers - certainly 
just don't know what to do with their money. I mean 
they literally give their mother £6 per week, and take 
home £50 per week, and spend it on anything they want. 
They're just not interested, money's of no importance 
whatsoever to them. They can afford to take the day 
off when they want to - again we're coming back 
to our old problem of absenteeism."
Barry White (Factory Manager)(2)
In this discussion, variations in material and social conditions 
arising from age, marital status, generation and historical period, 
are all mentioned as having significance from the point of view of 
management control.
But these control problems do not simply derive from the labour 
force alone. They arise in the context of other control needs which 
have their sources elsewhere. We have seen, in the first place, how 
strong competition and market constraints, in terms of fluctuating 
demand and upward-price inflexibility, gave rise to pressures for close 
managerial control over production, which the organisation of the 
labour process, to some extent, facilitated. Yet this itself, also 
posed particular control problems, demanding "external" regulation to
a high degree.
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The exercise of disciplinary power by management over the 
labour force must, therefore, be seen as an integral aspect of overall 
control strategy, and viewed in the wider context of their production 
policy as a whole. It will vary, for instance, according to 
how the product market, the organisation of the labour process, 
payment system and the nature of the labour force fit together.
For example, widespread use of machine pacing or automatic work­
monitoring in the factory may change the nature and content of 
management disciplining, as may "incentive" as averse to "measured" 
work payment systems. Management at BSR operated a labour 
intensive, closely integrated production process which was broken 
down to a high degree, and a payment system, characterised by a 
low "incentive" element and linked to fairly inflexible - because 
maximum (from the workers' point of view) - output requirements.
The employment of women workers on the grounds of their cheapness, 
availability for the type of work and flexibility, fitted in with 
the overall production policy aimed at controlling costs and output. 
But the employment of women also gave rise to the need for 
managerial controls in particular respects:
"I mean, each has got their own advantages and 
disadvantages. The older women come, they plod 
along at a good steady pace with a very good 
sense of responsibility - but they tend to
have more time off because of their families.
The younger ones, they're damn good workers 
when they're here, and they put their minds to 
it - its just a matter of motivating them and 
getting their minds to it."
Barry White (Factory Manager)(4)
This production process, labour intensive, highly fragmented 
yet tightly integrated, had as its motor-force a generally
insufficient number of workers who, for the most part, were subject
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The exercise of disciplinary power by management over the 
labour force must, therefore, be seen as an integral aspect of overall 
control strategy, and viewed in the wider context of their production 
policy as a whole. It will vary, for instance, according to 
how the product market, the organisation of the labour process, 
payment system and the nature of the labour force fit together.
For example, widespread use of machine pacing or automatic work­
monitoring in the factory may change the nature and content of 
management disciplining, as may "incentive" as averse to "measured" 
work payment systems. Management at BSR operated a labour 
intensive, closely integrated production process which was broken 
down to a high degree, and a payment system, characterised by a 
low "incentive" element and linked to fairly inflexible - because 
maximum (from the workers' point of view) - output requirements.
The employment of women workers on the grounds of their cheapness, 
availability for the type of work and flexibility, fitted in with 
the overall production policy aimed at controlling costs and output. 
But the employment of women also gave rise to the need for 
managerial controls in particular respects:
"I mean, each has got their own advantages and 
disadvantages. The older women come, they plod 
along at a good steady pace with a very good 
sense of responsibility - but they tend to
have more time off because of their families.
The younger ones, they're damn good workers 
when they're here, and they put their minds to 
it - its just a matter of motivating them and 
getting their minds to it."
Barry White (Factory Manager)(4)
This production process, labour intensive, highly fragmented 
yet tightly integrated, had as its motor-force a generally
insufficient number of workers who, for the most part, were subject
to competing commitments outside the factory. Or, for other 
reasons,which must include the production process itself, low 
commitment to their jobs. In these circumstances management 
chose direct labour disciplining as their main control strategy.
This it must be assumed, was considered cheaper and more effective 
than more "positive" alternatives (such as employing sufficient 
workers). But there were also "costs" attached in the sense that, 
on occasion, taking disciplinary action could, itself, prove 
as disruptive of the labour process as the indiscipline it was 
supposed to control. And more broadly, disciplining tended to 
destroy co-operation between management and workers, and reinforce 
the alienation and resistance already engendered within the 
fragmented labour process. Indeed we find that management's use 
of disciplinary action was not simply a method of minimising the 
impact of specific problems, such as absenteeism or undisciplined 
behaviour, which derived from sources outside the factory - and 
had disruptive effects on the organisation and flow of work 
within it. The labour process and nature of the authority relations 
themselves engendered resistances, which took on similar forms of 
"indisicipline", such as absenteeism. The use of disciplinary 
action by management can, therefore, be seen as aimed, crucially, 
at pre-empting opposition and breaking down such resistance.
In part one of this Chapter, these arguments are developed in 
respect of the three main areas where management used 
disciplinary action - attendance, factory conduct and job 
performance. This discussion is preceded by an outline of the 
methods which were used: a combination of personal determination 
or bullying and the systematic use of a procedure agreed by the 
union. Victimisation as a particular aspect of management's methods
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can also be identified. Although this is less a method in 
itself as the selective application of the other two.
The main impact of management's disciplining fell on the 
women workers, and this was not necessarily because there were 
more of them. In the first place, the women posed particular 
problems of control,deriving from the special nature of their 
commitment to employment. And secondly, women workers filled 
the most tightly constrained sections of the labour process, which 
generated a high degree of resistance, but which required a high 
degree of control. Most of the men, on the other hand, occupied 
positions which carried some authority and/or were subject to 
looser surveillance. And this was a consequence of both the 
nature of the work they did and its relationship to that sphere 
of the labour process occupied by women.
In part II , we examine the implications of management's 
strategy by using direct disciplining as a means of labour control. 
Our conclusions are that this can be seen as both a consequence, 
but also to an important extent a cause, of the women workers'
more vulnerable position in the firm.
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PART 1 : D ISC IPLINARY PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES
Disciplinary Methods; Personal and procedural 
PERSONAL DOMINATION
BSR management's arbitrary exercise of punitive sanctions
against its workforce hart a long and inglorious history, stemming
from the days of Dr MacDonald, the company's founder. Stories
abound of his virulent anti-unionism and his practice of sacking
whole sections or shifts, on the spot, for some perceived
misdemeanour or show of recalcitrance. ^
"Oh, he was a terror, he was ... I've 
seen him sack a man for picking a piece of 
firewood up and putting it to one side.
He was a terrible man".
Jim (Moulding Shop Serviceman) (6)
But by 1970, following a fierce recognition struggle in
Scotland and the intervention of the CIR and accompanying the exit
of Dr MacDonald, the company had agreed to concede unionisation.
This heralded some major changes in management's methods:
"It was a traumatic period, we had to get ... 
the old ways that we were indoctrinated with and 
trained with, and accepted. .. We just had to ... 
er, accept that it was another situation to be 
dealt with - and we just dealt with it. We 
just had to learn the new techniques ... took us 
a long time, possibly about 3 or 4 years. But, 
gradually, I think, we work with it reasonably well 
now". Barry White (Factory Manager((7)
The procedural changes accompanying union recognition, removed 
the power of summary dismissal from foremen - such decisions being 
referred to the level of departmental manager. But management's 
tyranny had not thereby been relegated to the past . Many managers 
and foremen still remained who had learnt their bullying under 
Dr McDonald; such as the machine-shop foreman Jenny had to see as 
a shop steward, for example:
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"As a matter of fact nobody likes the man that 
sacked the lad, he's an arrogant man, you know.
And he shouted at me and said it was nothing to do 
with me. And I said, 'well, it is I think, because 
he's come ... 'it's still nothing to do with you' 
he says, 'there's nothing you can do. You can't 
do anything about it', he says. 'I sacked him and 
that's it* he says, 'I don't want him on these grounds'. 
And — they said to me don't let him brow—beat you, 
because he will if he's got the chance, you know".
Jenny (Final Assembly)(8)
The style was widely known:
"I just don't tell people that I work at BSR 
and that I'm a supervisor! (laughs). Put it 
like that!
Not because of being ashamed, but people say,
'Oh you're one of them little hitlers are
you? They have this reputation because some
of them are." Jill (Supervisor-Final Assembly)(9)
PROCEDURAL DISCIPLINING
In the West Midlands, the company had agreed to recognise the 
GMWU and conferred sole negotiating rights on this union, on the basis 
of an agreement known as the "blue book".  ^  ^ The agreement contained
provision for employees' representation and a six-stage grievance 
procedure. Usefully, from the point of view of managerial control, 
the union had agreed to ratify the company's rule book (Clause 28) 
and clauses stipulating managerial prerogatives over disciplinary 
employees (clauses 31 (ii) and 34). Management's unilateral 
disciplinary powers were now, therefore, "mutually agreed". More 
significantly, perhaps, the exercise of those powers was also 
formalised.
The blue-book agreement saw the introduction of a disciplinary 
procedure:
.to. A disciplinai) procedure lias been miinduced. the pm pose ol which is lo protect the mieiests and safely of the employee ami the < ompam m .1 nisi manner Ii is, therefore, essential that employees should he aw.lie ol and abide In ihe following rules and standards ol work and the pioceduie 10 he followed when such slandaids arc not ohseived
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"Safety of the employee" was taken care of under a paragraph 
entitled "(a) Action constituting a Hazard". The remaining
clauses "(b) Action not constituting a Hazard" and "(c) Performance
and Conduct" listed various other labour problems management might 
come across in the course of their duties, along with the
appropriate sanctions which were open to them. Clause (c) was 
of particular interest. This placed on a formal footing, control 
by the direct exercise of management's disciplinary powers - in 
the three key areas relating especially to women. Namely, work 
attendance, job performance and factory conduct.
(c) Performance and Conduct:In the normal course of their duties Foremen are expected to make employees aware of short­comings such as: —
(i) Output performance(ii) ConductOil) Absenteeism and bad timekeeping (the latter includes clocking in punctually by the recognised shift starling time and clocking out not before the recognised shift finishing time).
Employees arc reminded the above arc examples only and not intended to be sole reasons for disciplinary actions.
In cases of persistently poor performance or conduct, absenteeism and bad timekeeping, the following formal procedure shall be used:—
Management could use a system of warnings - to be delivered 
to the employee and witnessed by a shop steward. The first warning, 
delivered orally, was nevertheless, to be entered on the workers' 
record and the entry signed by the employee. The second "final" 
warning, accompanied by a written f• >rm and tl real of suspension 
and/or dismissal for further offences, was also lodged in the record. 
Warnings were supposed to be deleted after a "clear" period of six 
months. In practice# the procedures did not seem to cause too
many problems for management, as this shop steward explained:
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"For warnings - the shop steward is supposed to 
go in. But if the person doesn’t ask for one, they 
don't bother to call you. So they often do get 
warned without one there. I've told them not to 
sign unless a shop steward is with them. They've had 
me over that - for telling them not to sign. I said, 
'Yes X have' - because it tells you - in the book 
in my book, that any warning verbal or written, must 
be in the presence of a shop steward.
They frighten some into it, and they tell them 'Oh, 
it'll be ripped up in 3 days. But you don't know.
I've told them, not with this management, not the 
way they are here. Myself, I think that goes on 
your record. So if they want to re-apply for a 
job - its all on their record."
Nora (Final Assembly) (11)
And it is clear that the process, though formalised, had lost little 
in terms of intimidation:
"It frightens people - it does quite honestly. I 
know its part of the agreement, but I've gone in 
with them, and as I've been walking with them I've 
said 'well, you'll have a warning, you'll see a 
piece of paper, but whatever you do, keep calm' 
because you can see they are starting to get all 
irate or upset."
Pearl (Convenor)(12)
The procedure provided management with a systematic means 
of applying discipline, (and, as we go on to show, it was also 
used as a means of systematically disciplining the female workforce). 
But the other side of the procedural system was, of course, that it 
limited the possibility of summary dismissal. And unless/until 
"inefficient" operators "sacked themselves", "weeding out" might 
take several weeks.
For this reason the system of recruitment and selection was 
important, and it was designed so as to minimise control problems 
(such as those above), which might ensue. New workers were 
interviewed by Personnel and given a basic dexterity test - 
fitting pegs into holes. But selection was really only made after
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recruitment, the worker being put on a month's trial or probation. 
During this period, their attendance, performance and conduct 
was monitored and reported by first-line supervision who gave their 
opinion as to whether their employment should be continued. Since 
it had been agreed with the union that these workers would not be 
represented (even though they were paying subscriptions on 'check­
off') to a significant degree the procedure for new starters 
helped to restore - if not the traditional hire, at least some of
the summary "fire" - powers of the immediate supervisory levels
, . (13)of management.
"Our old problem of absenteeism"
Questions concerning the employment of women workers, their 
"commitment" and the problems of management, seem to come together 
most frequently with "absenteeism". The struggle over attendance 
(for management) and time-off (for workers), which this concept 
amalgamates, is not, of course a matter solely confined to women.
But their particular relation to employment, especially when they 
have dependent children, raises the issue forcefully and in a specific 
kind of way.
Wheresoever the causes lie though, workers' "unregulated" 
time-off constitutes a control problem for management: "Absenteeism 
tends to render the most carefully designed work assignment systems 
academic". Herding (1972) p.168. Given the nature of the labour 
process at BSR, we should not be surprised to find this notion
echoed by management there:
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"Invariably ... one of the biggest problems we've 
got is absenteeism. VJe can load the labour onto 
the sections - we have a certain desired level 
of output - we put the necessary labour onto the 
section — and it doesn't come into work. Now this 
varies between lo and 15% a day. Sometimes its a 
little bit lower, possibly 8 or 9 - usually round 
about 10%. So, obviously you've then got - not 
just a loss of operatives on a section ... (but) 
a loss of skills. So ... you've got an imbalance.
If you had 10% of your labour absent at any one time, 
your output would be expected to be down 10%. But 
if you've got a disproportionate number of 
operatives missing from one particular section ... 
the lines, particularly the main lines are divided 
into various areas. You've got your basic sub- 
assembly, and you've got soldering and inspection, 
and you have the tests and the packing. And if you 
have the labour missing disproporationately from those 
various sections - the whole thing is unbalanced.
And this is one of the biggest problems we've got - 
it's basically absenteeism.
Barry White (Factory Manager)(14)
If the commonly held view associating high(er) levels of absenteeism 
with women workers is accepted at face value, there would seem to be 
contradictory considerations in respect of their use in this labour 
process. What strategies might management therefore use, in 
order to overcome the potential problems?
The manager's comment that a 10% drop in labour could be reflected 
in a 10% drop in output , might suggest that it was worthwhile 
employing more labour, especially since absentees were not paid 
wages and absenteeism levels were quite stable. On the other
hand, the most disruptive aspect of absenteeism seemed to lie in the 
uncertainty of its distribution. And one way round this was to 
employ a system of floats. Both of these suggestions had been 
rejected.
"(If) you said, 'Now look I'll put another 10 
operators on that line to cover absenteeism', 
well, first of all you've got to have lo people 
who've got to know all the skills. Which then
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leaves you in the situation where they're ... 
they're sort of super-skilled, in that sense."
And
"It just doesn't pay you to overman to cover 
absenteeism". Barry White (Factory Manager) (16)
Management's strategy was, instead, to use disciplining as 
an attempted means of control, rather than more labour. And then 
to utilise absenteeism as a further basis for work intensification 
- with movement of labour. (Which could, of course, be blamed 
on the miscreant absentees). Perhaps as we shall now go on to 
suggest, this strategy was in some sense a recognition of the fact 
that the women workers' absenteeism was as much a problem of the 
labour process as for it.
Although it is tempting to do so, where women workers are
concerned, the "causes" of absenteeism should not be seen to lie
entirely outside the workplace . Some studies have shown that women
workers do not necessarily have higher levels of absenteeism per se,
and that these are more closely associated, for both sexes, with
the type of work they are employed to do. There is much evidence
(but unfortunately no figures) to suggest that absenteeism was
strongly associated with the nature of the labour process at BSR
and it rose markedly in periods when recruitment stopped and the
general rate of intensification was increased.
"There's 77 off the lines today (mid-January).
It's terrible - I've only got 3 solderers on 
each station, there should be 4. We can't keep 
the counts up - they are down for every line.
You can't just put anyone onto soldering".
Bert Long (Factory Manager)(17).
The constant reshuffling necessitated by unpredictable 
absenteeism was certainly a chore managers felt they could do 
without. But it can be seen as arising as a consequence (or "cost")
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of the high(er) levels of "absenteeism" management itself sustained 
in the labour force by means of its deliberate "labour shortage" 
and (periodic) non-recruitment policies. The latter, in 
particular, resulted in"unpredictable" absences and gaps in the 
workforce, producing the problem of "imbalance" mentioned above.
The women workers'voluntary absence could not, therefore,
be "controlled" and, in the context of management production
policies, it would not be controlled for:
"So, absenteeism is one of the biggest problems 
we've got, in trying to nail them. We just 
keep picking away at it and pecking it away.
We're NOT very successful at it. But the point 
is we don't know how bad it would be, if 
we didn't do it. The trouble is, we don't 
show a great deal of progress in curbing absentee­
ism ... circumstances, the wage packet and 
life generally - seem to determine the absentee 
rate - rathery%3. But, we just don't know how 
bad it would be if we DIDN'T take some action 
about it." Barry White (Factory Manager) (18).
To the extent that the labour process required a high degree 
of managerial regulation, and this generated resistance in the 
workforce, management's strategy was to maintain high levels of 
intimidation by the use of systematic disciplinary action. We 
would argue that the rationale for this choice cannot simply be 
found in terms of its utility regarding control over attendance, 
since it did not facilitate this (it was ineffective, for 
example, when sick children required the presence of mothers at 
home). This strategy was aimed rather more at attacking the 
women's use of absenteeism, as a form of resistance. And this 
can be seen more clearly in the context of these and other areas 
where high levels of disciplining were maintained as well.
Factory Conduct: the problem of compliance
"Indiscipline" on the shop floor was, along with
work attendance or time—off, one of the more problematic areas for
management to control through the direct exercise of their disciplinary
powers: all three methods - procedural disciplining, personal
domination and victimisation, were brought to bear. But none seemed
wholly adequate to the task. It was more of a war of attrition.
"Just keep at it. There's no answer to it at 
all* If you see somebody do something wrong then 
they've got to be picked up. Now, today, there's 
the (Christmas) season coming along - balloons in 
the air - flick them up in the air and blow them from 
one line to the other. So as soon as you see them 
... burst them. Don't say anything to them. You don't
criticise them - you don't use the big stick and 
say, 'We'll take you through procedure' - it's just 
a waste of time. It's just time off the lines for 
the workers. And that's a position where you've got 
our opinion versus the labour's. As you walk down 
- you don't even stop! Burst the balloon - and then 
a big howl will go up. Then let's find another one 
and blow that one up! And, eventually, you wear them 
down - like that.
You will have, on occasions, to take them through 
procedure ... , I mean, there's the occasion when 
we get fighting on the shopfloor between two girls - 
and in which case, you obviously treat both the same.
You have to take that through procedure. That sort 
of discipline, you MUST take through the procedure.
But the other discipline, you have to use the force 
of personality of the individual supervisor - just 
to keep things on the straight and narrow. And 
that's basically where it comes down to the force 
of the personality of the supervisor - no procedure 
in the world could operate, because you've got 
to understand them".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (19).
Although, in many respects it was more readily (but not 
exclusively) associated with the younger girls, "indiscipline" 
was not, of course, a recent problem. Some features were apparently 
new. But other aspects, such as its intractability, seemed, on the 
face of it, unchanging. Part of the reason for this seeming
( 2 0 )intractability to management was, that like absenteeism 
indiscipline on the shop floor appeared far more susceptible to 
influences outside the factory than their own activities within 
it. Indeed, the very causes seemed to emanate from beyond the 
workplace.
I wouldn't say it was a recent problem ...
On hind-sight, I s'pose you would - since the easing 
off of discipline in schools, and it has eased 
off tremendousbly. I think they're coming into 
industry with a lack of sense of discipline. Whereas 
the older people - with older people, we're talking 
about anybody over 30 - whether they, because of 
the older generation, they're more disciplined; or 
whether they (are) because they're older and more 
mature - its very hard to tell. But, I'm just trying 
to cast my mind back, as to whether the people I 
remember as young people, are better disciplined now 
as they've got older or ... No, I can't ... I 
wouldn't like to say. But certainly, I would say 
this — that young people tend to be ill-disciplined.
"... They're rebellious about listening to 
instructions, or about being criticised for doing 
bad work. They tend to want to walk around when they 
feel like it. They have to be told repeatedly to 
stay: 'this is your section, you stay on your section,
you have to ask permission to leave your section. You 
don't just wander round the factory where you like'.
.... er, particularly at Christmas time ... alcohol is 
a big problem. Not so much in the factory - I've no 
doubt about it ... I know it goes on, but its very, very 
carefully concealed... but outside - particularly during 
the lunch breaks, for the days up to Christmas - they 
tend to drink a lot of alcohol, and of course that 
brings a problem back on the shopfloor. In that sense 
they haven't got a sense of responsibility or sense of 
behaviour . But at the same time, having said that, 
some of the young girls - if they put their mind to it, 
are some of the finest workers you've got.
Barry White (Factory Manager) (21).
Thus the well-spring of management's problems appeared to exist 
wholly independently of themselves. Like the alcohol, indiscipline 
was something which was brought into the factory from sources which 
appeared to lie outside the gates. Management identified workers' 
rebelliousness regarding instructions, as a particular problem of
indiscipline which they encountered. Less frequent, but sometimes
a dramatic extension of this, was the problem of workers fighting —
against supervisors or for different reasons, amongst themselves.
Overall, there was the question of generally rebellious conduct,
most often found among the young girls. This kind of indiscipline
could prove a tricky problem for management, in the sense that their
sanctions could frequently be found unavailing. And it was even
more of a problem when they were seen to be. Kim committed a
'capital offence' by making just this point.
"Well, we know, like, when they've first left school 
and they're still, you know - childishness. And 
they tend to think that they can do what they want.
Because I know I was the same when I first started 
(....) But once, once you've got to keep going
down the office and getting into trouble for it, you 
suddenly realise.
Well Kim, she didn't want to know! You know, she
wanted to do what she wanted to do. And they 
suspended her over doing something and she didn't 
come in the next day either. They suspended her 
for 3 days and she decided to have an (extra) day off.
So when she came back to work they sacked her. (What 
was she doing - what were her antics?) She was like, 
well, naughty. You know. She didn't want to do anything 
she didn't want to work, she didn't want to speak, 
she wanted to shout at you and hit you - you know, 
it was entirely up to her. She could do it, that 
was what she thought you know".
Kathy (Paint Shop) (22)
"The more hazardous ... well, not say hazardous, but... 
aggressive forms of ill-discipline - are not a big 
problem. Maybe once every 3 months, you might have 
a couple of people fighting - in which case, depending 
on circumstances - we usually suspend both, and then it 
settles down again. It usually flares up then goes 
down just as quickly".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (23)
A surprisingly high number of incidents - physical fights 
women workers were mentioned by the shop stewards interviewed.
between
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"I've had a couple of girls fighting - got them 
off with suspension. Swearing - there's not a 
lot, because as I say, they're mostly sensible married 
women, you know."
(Are they automatically suspended for fighting?)
"Well, it depends who you're fighting! I mean, if 
you fight a supervisor ... No, I think its automatically 
suspended - Yes. Sometimes, yes - there has been 
one or two sacked".
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (24)
"Everybody falls out really don't they, under 
strain. I mean there's some days you have a big old 
argument and you can hear it going on, you know.
And the next day, they can be talking again".
(Is it worse on the lines?)
"Yes, I imagine so, but there has been quite a few 
arguments on the other parts of the section. I 
mean there has been fighting in other parts of the 
factory. It's never really got down to fighting 
on our line. Arguments yes. There again, I 
should say that would be up to whether supervision gets 
in quickish like, you know.
Edna (Final Assembly) (25)
(What is the thing they fall out over?)
It's the work, you know, they say 'you're not
taking your share of the work on'. Well, if
you get a bit angry with somebody and you start telling
them a bit, you know, they lose their temper and have a
go at you and so you start arguing - and you fall out".
(So you think its the work that causes more aggro?)
"Yes"
Kathy (Paint Shop) (26)
"It's the atmosphere they work in, and the tension ... 
instead of counting to ten, they land out ..."
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly) (27)
It is not difficult to locate the sources of such "mis-conduct"
withinthe labour process itself. And the same is true of the
problem of workers' rebelliousness regarding instructions. In fact,
this appeared to be overwhelmingly related to management's practice
of movement of labour and intensification of work. On the final
assembly lines, for example, it was the first-line supervisors,
responsible for the daily, and hourly organisation and adjustment
of the labour process, who gave the most direct orders to operators
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regarding their work allocation and job performance. As we have
noted, the most significant part of a supervisor's job was called
"balancing the line". This entailed filling the spaces left - by
the temporary absentees or those who had left and management had
failed to replace - by moving operators from one job to another
and also by doubling.up the work. This meant that an "unwomanned" job
was shared out among some of the operators present, who were allocated
an additional task to do or component to fit.
"They sort it out like - from whoever's in. Like 
the girls that are already in - they sort of double­
up and things like that, or they move, you know.
And there again, they've got 4 repair girls but when 
people don't come in, they use us as well".
(So who does the repairs?)
"They pile up when we go"
(What is most common 'bad behaviour,') "I think it's 
disapproving of, movement of labour. Answering back, 
you know, - 'I'm not going to do it"'.
Edna (Final Assembly) (28).
Although "doubling-up" of the kind described was more likely to 
happen at group assembly than individual or machine production jobs, 
these last could also be (and therefore, were) intensified by the 
addition of extra tasks; for example, labouring - fetching and carrying 
materials or gauging and inspection between operations. In every 
area, it appeared, the operators almost universally objected to being 
moved and being given the extra work.
It was certainly a difficult job for the supervisors to do and 
the system did lend itself to victimisation and favouritism. Thus 
the most important qualities required of a supervisor from the worker's 
point of view, was fairness and impartiality - against a bad 
supervisor there was no redress. Thus "the discipline problem" at 
this first-line level might occasionally reveal the fundamentally
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coercive relationship between operator and management bared to its 
violent roots:
" .... she used to be a supervisor: she was one 
of the world's worst - for victimisation.... Yes, 
terrible. If a girl's face - when they come - didn't
fit, she used to play 'ell...... It was the Telford
lot, I was telling you about, - I 'ad to get 2 off 
'er throat - one day - you know, they'd got 'er pinned 
up against the wall. When she was on line 1 and... 
it was 'er attitude see, towards people - she, actually 
'ad got the attitude like BSR 'ad got - you're a 
number, and you're a name, and she used to treat them 
like that - and very often she was abused".
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly) (29)
Leaving aside, for the moment, the problem of workers falling 
out with each other, the main issues identified under the heading 
"indiscipline" on the factory floor concern a general problem of 
compliance to the rules and rigorous constraints on freedom in the 
factory: "This is your section, you stay on your section...";
and to management's orders regarding the allocation of work. Just 
as disciplinary action could not secure attendance, no more could 
it secure cooperation with respect to these, in any positive sense.
It was aimed, instead, at attacking potential or actual opposition.
Workers "lack of compliance" and outright rebelliousness can be 
seen of course, as resistance - both to the general unfreedom ("they 
call this place Belsen") and to management's driving,speed-up, 
mobility and intensification of work. Disciplinary action was taken 
against those who transgressed - as a punishment and as a warning 
to others. Thus, in a specific sense, it was used to underpin 
management’s general production policy regarding the "productive" 
use of female labour by undermining the resistance its application 
engendered.
Taken in the context of the other areas where disciplinary action 
was applied as well, however - such as absenteeism and job-performance,
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it can also be seen as a further contribution to the maintenance 
of a high general level of intimidation on the shop floor. 
Management were clearly reliant on this to ensure an adequate level 
of overall compliance and to forestall explicit resistance to their 
rigorous control demands. This was because once it became "too 
late", (e.g. the "balloons incident" cited by the factory manager), 
disciplinary action could not be relied on to secure control and 
in other respects it might also be "counter productive".
One area where taking disciplinary action was considered 
effective in a direct sense, however, was in regard to job 
performance.
Job Performance
"We have a little bit of trouble with operators 
not doing their jobs properly. In other words, 
they have to be taken through procedure - because 
they are either negligent or deliberately 
malicious..."
(So you find it effective, to give warnings and 
things, for that?) "Oh yes. Now that _is effective.
If you've got an operator that does a bad job, 
then you can take her through procedure - and we've 
never had one go to the limit, through bad work ...
Then, you have the low performers - at a 66 performance. 
You have them below that actually, that's when you 
have to try and get them to ... (66 is the minimum
earnings level). And then you have the high flyers 
at 120. Anything above 120, we investigate 
immediately, to find out why they're earning 120.
We assume they must be either short-circuiting the 
job or ... fiddling".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (30)
As noted earlier, the agreement specifically covered the
contingency of management being required to use discipline in order
to control the way operators performed their work. The procedure
is outlined in this incident which occurred on paint inspection:
"We had to go down to the office with Lyn yesterday,
... because three main-plates came back which really
' were bad, you know. You could really see what had
been happening. She'd been talking, took them off 
and just looked and marked them on the back, and 
of course - she was given a warning for it ...
This warning lasts for three months. If she passes 
any more bad work within three months she'll get a 
final warning. If she doesn't, then she's O.K., 
and this one will be, like, scrapped. And if she 
does it again like, after three months, then, she'll 
get another warning.
(Do you think three months is too long?)
"No not really, 'cos it should be 6 months, but they 
normally break it down to three".
Kathy (Paint Shop) (31)
This was an example of disciplining for "bad work", which,
in contrast to poor performance, where workers failed to produce
the required output, seems to have been relatively rare, from
management's point of view.
"I wouldn't actually say that there's a lot of 
bad assembling - it's mostly bad parts".
Jill (Supervisor- Final Assembly) (32)
One reason for its low incidence was that the closely integrated
method of working tended to maximise the immediate pressure of one
worker on another to maintain the quality of output.
"Well, you see they can't turn out work which is bad.
Say another member passes a bad job onto another, 
right? And that person can't do it because its bad 
off the person in front of her, well we have to go 
through all that ... But, well now, how can you make 
a good wire out of a bad one? and sometimes - more 
often them not, this is what we find. It goes through 
inspection, right through to the main lines, through 
bad wire in the beginning”.
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (33)
It also, of course, resulted in pressures to maintain the work 
rate as well.
"It'll happen - if you get a slow or new person, the 
one next to her will start grumbling. And when the units 
start piling up, they say 'Oh I shall have that lot 
next - when someone comes to help clear it off' - which 
is quite true".
Nora (Final Assembly) (34).
Yet, despite the advantages to management of a system where 
workers tended to drive each other to reach and maintain the pace, 
we have noted in one discussion of the payment system, that it was 
discipline rather than any other managerial strategy which 
management chose for their main intervention. While this might have 
been expected, perhaps, in respect of non-teamwork johs and/or those 
with fixed performances (on moulding machines, for example, workers 
were paid at a fixed performance rate and received warnings if they 
failed to reach the count three times in a week) - it was by no means 
confined to these wherever they worked, the women were always liable 
to be disciplined for poor performance.
"I had a woman who'd been here ten years pulled up 
over poor performance . She said she'd never been 
told she had to achieve a basic count - on crystals,
42 an hour - to get day-rate. She'd been paid day-rate 
and been on the job ten years - but had never been 
taken into the office about her work before. They had 
always insisted on the good quality of work from that 
department before, and in this respect, her work was 
satisfactory. I told the woman, if that was what they 
wanted - to give them quantity. But it's bad.
Some people feel embarrassed about going into the office.
I personally feel its because they're putting pressure 
on to get rid of the part-timers there. Because I_ 
was never told to get a count out. All they said was, 
as long as they're good ones, that's what we want. And 
she's never had to be taken into the office before about 
her work".
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (35).
As we have seen management were continuously looking for methods 
of speeding up and intensifying the workload. Disciplining for 
poor performance was therefore a crucial means of driving up the pace. 
For instance, in the moulding department, an area where management 
was particularly anxious to increase productivity - the practice was 
to move tools from one machine to another, at the same time, increasing 
the count required. Although in this particular example, disciplining 
failed to establish the new pace, in cases where the count was not
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actual ly impossible, it would clearly help to do so:
"For eighteen months I was on the same job at the 
same count. But now they're changing tools a lot 
more often. And I was given a job and failed to get 
the count. He came and brought me a warning and 
I signed it. And I said, 'Right — now you cctne and tell 
me how to get it out.' ' I'll give you half an hour' 
he says. I says 'alright - half an hour will do'.
He came and there was no way I could get the count out 
he was asking for. So he stayed a further half an hour 
and instead of powdering every time, I had to powder 
every other time, and I got four more in that half 
an hour. And then for weeks and weeks and weeks, my 
name was on the poor performance sheet. But after 
a month, they took the job off the machine and moved it 
somewhere else and this is what they do. If you can 
prove - or they want to put the count up, they take 
it off the machine, take it into the toolroom and when 
it comes out, put it back onto another machine, so 
nobody's got a check on what the counts are you see..." 
Madge (Moulding Shop)(36)
While it is clear that disciplining poor performance could 
be used, quite specifically to underpin management's practices regarding 
speed up and work intensification, and to undermine opposition to 
these, we can again, note that an overall consequence of this, was 
to increase the general level of intimidation on the shop floor.
Thus we can see the way that a high disciplinary load, maintained by 
systematic use of the warnings procedure, kept up a generalised 
pressure on operators:
"Oh, I think it could be better, the way they treat 
them, yes. I mean over this value on the jobs. When 
they get them to sign papers to say that they've been 
warned because they haven't done the count - they 
don't take everything into consideration. I mean 
there could be a machine broke down, and ... you 
know. And they're ... when they do have you, to tell 
you about the value of your count, you know - they're 
sort of 'OFF' you really, after that. They'm looking 
for the smallest fault after you've signed that paper."
Sarah (Press Shop) (37)
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This pressure had other, more specific applications too.
Operators considered "inefficient" could be forced to leave by
being subjected to reprimands. Especially if they were moved onto
a different job which they found difficult to do, and found
themselves unable to escape (further) punishment:
"They took her off her machine and put her on 
another job that she couldn't possibly do. So after 
that - she says 'Pip, I can't do this job. She was 
had in the office Cto be disciplined for poor performance 
J.H), and she says, 'Oh, I'm going to leave'. So I 
says, 'Well you're a fool'. But she left".
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (38)
From management's point of view, the system seemed to operate 
fairly effectively, so that, in fact, they rarely had to terminate 
workers' employment. The phrase used at BSR was that "they had 
sacked themselves".
We have been looking to explain the high and sustained levels 
of disciplinary action taken by management in respect of the female 
labour force at BSR.
Clearly, the disciplinary load is variable. And to the extent 
that it is seen as a response to events by management it is liable 
to vary both with the nature and frequency of the problems arising, 
from the employment of women in the workplace, and the significance 
of these problems in terms of other criteria. Chief among the 
latter we have identified the mode of organisation of the labour 
process, which to a large extent determines what kind of disruptive 
impact the different problems might have, and therefore, the degree 
of necessity for their minimisation.
Nevertheless, we have noted that the responses chosen by 
management are not necessarily the only or even the most appropriate 
means of minimising either the nature or the frequency of the specific
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problems that arose. (For example, disciplining absenteeism does 
not facilitate the attendance of women with domestic commitments).
We have noted, instead, that management's responses could be more 
appropriately viewed as being aimed at attacking and forestalling 
oppositional activity on the workers' part. And this is the sense 
in which the disciplinary control strategy fitted in with the effective 
pursuance of production policy. Indeed, the disciplinary load could 
be seen to vary, in line with this, on a seasonal basis. In slack 
periods, when recruitment stopped and the labour force was run down 
and used even more intensively, management's reorganisation and 
"balancing" - which the workers opposed - was increasingly necessary, 
and thus, resulted in an increased disciplinary load.
In proposing, however, that workers' resistance is a significant 
aspect entwined in "discipline problems" which appear to have other 
kinds of sources, and that this is the element managerial strategy 
is more concerned to address, we do not move away from the view of 
disciplinary action as a managerial response. But we need to 
note, first, that as a response it is not inevitable; it is in fact 
"strategic". Management can and do always exercise choice as to 
whether, when and how to respond with disciplinary action. Thus, 
secondly, to this extent disciplining can also be used in an "offensive" 
way. The level of the disciplinary load is not necessarily, 
therefore, simply a measure of the nature and frequency of the problems 
that arise - from employing particular types of worker in a particular 
kind of way. It is also determined by management's choice and ability 
to initiate actions which facilitate their overall strategy or 
particular aspects of it.
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"Yes, poor performance. This is something that 
I haven't had before - and it's only recently 
that they've started hauling them in on this charge, 
you know. It's been the last few months, it's 
been since we've had our wage rise. I think 
they're out to sort a few out, you know".
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (39)
We can, therefore,propose that the level of the disciplinary load 
is itself strategic. That management chose to maintain relatively 
high levels of intimidation in general on the shop floor by taking 
disciplinary action on a syst ematic basis. Furthermore these levels 
(or the "size of the load") was varied strategically "being topped 
up” by the occasional "purge" - as a preliminary, perhaps to a speed­
up and intensification drive.
We cannot, however, assume these control strategies were always, 
and ever, successful. We need therefore, to examine the impact 
of managerial disciplining on the women workers themselves; in 
order to assess what kind of problems it engendered the implications 
for their ability to respond in terms of these, and their position 
in the company overall.
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PART 2 THE PnOEIJ?1! OF EMPLPYf'ENT RELATIONS: DOMINATION
AfiD DISCIPLINE,
"It's the petty rules and tyranny - like only 
three minutes to go to the toilet - that upsets 
the women, to be told anything like that".
Nora (Final Assembly) (40)
"Well, I think sometimes they treat them like 
dogs. Some of them, I won't say all 
Pip (Sub-Assembly)(41)
Disciplinary action taken against workers throws up in the 
starkest way, the issue of capitalist power and authority in the 
workplace, because by its practice, employment relations are 
revealed in inter-personal terms. In this Part we look at the 
impact of the employment relationship, characteristically coercive 
and marked by power inequality, on the women workers. The forms 
it took were, to some extent a consequence of both their sex 
and their vulnerable position as workers in the labour market, which 
are, of course, linked. But we carry the investigation further, 
going on to see how these employment relations, specifically in tit- 
form of management's disciplining, operated also as a cause of 
the women workers' particular vulnerability by increasing their 
employment insecurity.
We have proposed that management's use of discipline should be 
seen as a central component of their production policy and their 
means of organising the labour process. Its effectiveness derived 
from the fundamentally unequal and coercive nature of the employment 
relationship itself, but its impact on the labour force was borne 
unevenly. This was due to the fact that different groups of 
workers stood in a different relationship to the employers on the 
labour market, and also because groups stood in a different relation
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to each other and the employer in the labour process. The main 
axis of differentiation in both of these spheres lay along the 
sexual divide; but within each sex, groups of workers were 
differently placed as well, in the main according to family 
circumstances for the girls and women and age/skill levels for 
the boys and men. So having first identified general features 
of the employment relationship which might be considered specific 
to the women workers, we go on to examine the impact of their 
particular expression in the form of management's practice of 
disciplining. First with regard to work attendance or time-off, 
and secondly in relation to the execution or performance of their 
work; bearing in mind the important question of job control, 
and the context of management's pressure for speed-up and labour 
intensification. This gives a clearer basis for establishing 
the women workers needs and demands regarding employment relations 
both at BSR and generally.
Sexism in relations of domination: "the men just wouldn’t stand for it"
In our society, employment relations in general are
characterised by power inequality - the domination of capital over
labour. Male or female managers hold positions of power over the
workforce which finds expression in many forms.
"Our foreman used to always shout at the women.
I told him, they wanted to be treated like 
human beings. We had an incident arose over 
the fans. There's cold air blows down on some 
parts of floor. But other parts are too hot.
People complained - we had a lot of illness on the 
lines - but the foreman shouted at the women 
for asking for the fans to be turned off - 'Bloody 
women! Never bloody satisfied..'"
Janet (Sub -Assembly)(42)
(Do you think they choose the right people to 
be supervisors?)
"Not always. You get some very ... you get 
some vicious ones, you know. You get some, 
they make the women's lives a misery - some of 
them. Some can be very nasty ...”
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (43)
WORKERS AS WOMEN
Since the social relations of production in general and the 
management/worker hierarchy in particular are structured along 
sex as well as class lines, they also incorporate sexism. This 
is the social and ideological expression of sexual inequality and 
the practice of oppression. The combination of sexism and the
employment relationship is as powerful as it is pervasive; and 
it is difficult to disentangle the fusion of strands which result. 
The fusion for example constitutes, in this particular instance, 
a male manager's contempt, tackled by a female shop steward.
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"I say's to him - 'well Charlie, fancy telling 
the women a thing like that; I said. I said 
'What do you think them women am on that line?'
And, of course, then he smirked, he said, 'I 
know what them am! Ho ho ; As if to say, 
well they were soft you see. So I said, 'Don't 
you! Don't you ever let me see you put that 
smirk on your face again, regarding the women on 
that line! I said, 'because if I come in here and 
see that smirk on your face which - I know what 
you were going to ....' He said, 'I didn't say it'
I said, 'No, but your bloody smirk was enough ...'
I said, 'you've got good women, and you've got 
good workers,' I said, 'and it's about time you 
people appreciated them'".
Nora (Final-Assembly) (44)
The fusion of sexism and the exercise of capitalist power and
authority in the workplace means that the social relations of
production have a particular form, nature and content where women
workers are concerned. Something of this is expressed by two
women quoted below (including a rather nice observation by one of
them, on management training).
"It's the way they go about it. It's the way they 
approach the woman - their manner, they wouldn't 
speak to their wives like they speak to the 
workforce. They think you're just ...
One girl was singing. She was working, but she was 
singing. J.H. went across to her and she happened 
to make a mistake on some job on a pick-up arm. He 
shouted at her in front of everybody, so she cried.
She cried all morning ... He shouldn't have shouted - 
he could have had a quiet word with her. What if 
somebody had shouted at him in front of everybody - 
would he have liked it? NO! They wouldn't stand 
for it, they'd give you a back-handed one!
But it's the approach. And as a matter of fact, 
they have to go - every now and again - management 
to know how to .... they have to have lessons, to know 
how to approach the people. Well it's a bad thing when 
they have to do that. Shows a bad up-bringing!
It shows how they've been dragged up"
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (45)
"Some of the management talk to the girls as if they're 
dirt and I know this has happened - I mean, it's 
been brought up - but I mean, let's face it we’re 
all human beings. Well we're supposed to be all 
equal aren't we? So one's no better than another and 
if you've got to be spoke to you you should speak 
to people as you'd like to be spoke to. But there is 
one or two of them, that are inclined to think some 
of the girls are dirt, and they shouldn't do.
The one I've heard - he talks to the girls as if 
they're rubbing rags - one of them does.
Eunice (Final Assembly)(46)
Moreover, the women perceived that there definitely were
aspects of their relations with management which were peculiar to
themselves. More often than not they observed that men would not
be treated in the same way. But this observation was generally
accompanied by an explanation in terms of the women's position -
their relative "weakness", rather than in terms of their being
specifically female . Might it, in fact, have been the case
that the treatment itself was also, qualitatively different?
Some recognition of this was, in fact, present in their discussions.
(If management were dealing with men, would they 
behave the same?)
"No way! Well, they wouldn't get away with it ...
the way they talk to the women .....  You're not
a face, you're not a human being you're a number - 
a name and a number to them: which is wrong, you 
wouldn't treat a dog like that - well, I don't think 
so".
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly) (47)
(Do you think they behave differently because they 
are dealing with a large number of women and girls 
rather than men?)
"Oh yes" (In what respect?). "I think they exploit 
'em. I do really - or they try to. I think they 
try to bully 'em ... in a lot of ways, that they 
wouldn't do to men - because the men would put their 
coats on, and they'd be through the door, you know.
Because we're women, I suppose they think they can 
do this, you know - and they 'ave done for so long".
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (48)
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It is interesting, at this point, to look at a male workers'
comments on this question. He was the shop steward for one of
the four-hourly shifts in the moulding shop, although he himself
worked an eight hour shift as a serviceman there. His constituents
were all female. His observations anticipate our discussion of
the nature of the male workers' appreciation of the women's
problems. The interesting thing about his comments is the way
he reveals - by a dichotomy within his discussion, the dual nature
of the employment relationship for women. He distinguishes
unconsciously, explicitly, and also by a break in his "flow",
between those aspects of domination common to all workers and the
"other element" which we have identified as sexism, that
specifically characterises men's relationships with women.
(What do you think of management's attitude to 
the women and girls?)
"I think they're pretty fair, you know, generally.
There is the odd one that, you know, they might 
pick on - but I think they deserve it though."
(Do you think they would treat those workers 
differently if they were men?)
"Oh they would. I think they would yes. (In what 
way?) Well, same of these chargehands in these 
moulding departments, I think they try to bully the 
women. They'll pick on - they'll see a woman who 
is a little bit scared, and they'll pick on her to 
bully her - you see what I mean? And, like, make 
her look a fool, and things like that. Where I 
think if they'd got men ...
£  Here differentiating between women and men and 
specifying aspects specific to women, arising from 
unequal male/female power relation^ J
"Well, I think it would happen the same with men 
if they picked ... If they got one a bit timid, you 
know. It happens in every factory, things like 
that - don't it?"
-256-
¿fiere referring to aspects general to men and 
women as workers arising from unequal capital/ 
labour power relationsJ.
We would argue, therefore, that women workers bear the 
brunt of both aspects of the unequal power relationships - between 
men and women, capital and labour, which become entwined. To 
this extent therefore, relationships between (male) management 
and women workers are specific; and not wholly generalisable 
from male workers' experience.
WOMEN AS WORKERS
However, the women's perception that they were subjected to
worse treatment than the men because they were "weaker" as
employees did also have an objective basis, besides the sexism
incorporated within social relationships at the workplace. The
women workers were more vulnerable on the labour market and their
employment within the firm was less secure.
(What do you think about management's attitude 
to the women and girls?)
"They're not interested in them - only in getting 
the work out. They'd treat 'em differently if 
they were men. I tell you - men wouldn't stand for 
half the women stands for here. A lot of things, 
everything! The pace, they wouldn't stand for that".
(Why do the women stand it?)
"I don't know. I can't sort the women out meself, 
you know, for working like they do. I s'pose they're 
frightened of losing their jobs".
Lorna (Final Assembly)(50)
The fear of losing their jobs was a general one, but it was 
particularly true of part-time workers who could not have found 
work at such convenient hours for the same pay elsewhere. There 
was a waiting list for every shift - on Madge's in the moulding shop
(lO - 2 p.m.) women had had their names down for 2 - 3  years.
"This is the one bad thing about the moulding 
department that the women will tend to put up 
with anything to keep their jobs, and keep working.
They're not militant, not at all militant. You 
might just get that odd little few, that are 
militant sort of thing, but the others - basically, 
if the roof fell in they'd help .... I told the 
management this before, I said, 'You treat the 
moulding shop like I don't know what' I said,
'but if the roof fell in they'd help you move the 
rubble', and then carry on working the machines!
And that's about true."
Madge (Moulding Shop)(51)
But the part-time workers were not simply vulnerable
in terms of having to keep hold of their jobs. Their employment
was doubly insecure, since the existence of the jobs themselves
was manifestly uncertain:
"We don't get a lot of problems on our line 
(9.30 - 3.30) I don't know why it is, but 
the women on my line, they've got to be very pushed 
before they get het up and start: they've got 
to be really pushed.
Mind, they do get a little bit excited about 
rumours. I do try and go to find out straight 
away - by finding out and telling the women, it 
sets their minds at rest. If it accumulates a little 
bit more, then they get het up and everybody has 
to suffer".
(What kind of thing?)
"Well, they're moving the 9.30 - 3.30's about a lot 
upstairs and a rumour came down that they were 
finishing the line. The women decided 'well that's 
it then, if that's how he feels about us, we ain't 
going to Dan^his work out, so ...'. So I checked 
with Mr Smith and he said, 'My dear, as long as that 
line, your line, is working as they are working, 
that job is there.' He explained that he was moving 
the ones upstairs because he could buy in work they 
were doing. And then problems arose moving part- 
timers onto jobs which directly fed full-timers 
because they're not there all the time...”
Nora (Final Assembly)(52)
While these part-time workers were clearly in a most vulnerable 
position, none of the women workers could command, in the labour
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market, the same range of job choice at a wage equivalent 
to the one they now earned, in the same way as a man might do.
And so the women had to stand for what they assumed 
the men would not, in the way of bullying and humiliation as an 
integral part of the employment relationship. We would argue 
that while male workers similarly placed in relation to their 
employment as the women were, might equally be subjected to 
degradatory treatment by male managers, this would still be 
qualitatively different, to some degree, as a result of the sexism 
which is also embodied in the employment relationship where 
women workers are concerned.
What impact did management's strategy of disciplinary control 
have on the women workers? What particular problems arose as a 
result of its strategic application? And what were the broader 
implications of this sustained disciplinary offensive for the women 
workers' position in the labour process • their employment, security 
and job controls - which might affect their ability to respond 
effectively to this and any other aspect of management's production 
policy? We now go on to examine some of these questions.
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The Disciplinary Offensive
"I hate them giving warnings actually.
I think it's degrading. It's degrading,
I mean when you're doing your best. I 
think when you're doing the best you're 
capable of doing, they should give you best".
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (53)
If particular manifestations of the degradatory and punitive 
side of the employment relationship followed in some sense, from 
the women's especial vulnerability in the labour market and in 
the firm, it was also, to an important degree a cause of it. To 
see this it is necessary to examine the impact on the women workers 
of management's disciplinary offensive, in more detail. We look 
at this question first in relation to absenteeism or, from the 
workers' point of view, time-off; and secondly, in respect of 
their actual job performance.
TIME OFF
As we have already noted, underlying the problems of absenteeism 
from management's point of view, was a labour recruitment policy 
which entailed running r0ciUC^^0rwith 5fnSiimum possible workforce 
and cutting production, by stopping recruitment and reducing the 
workforce by "natural wastage" at certain times of the year.
This policy directly exacerbated both absenteeism and labour 
turnover. First, because of the way it was linked to the 
intensification of work, and second, because of the overall (and 
increasing) inflexibility in the system regarding work attendance: 
a reduction in lee-way which resulted from the lack of "cover".
This inflexibility increased employment insecurity for women who 
had domestic responsibilities, even though they were, at the same
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time a special target for recruitment. They were forced to 
leave whenever it became impossible to keep up the attendance 
demanded by the firm (and also their co-workers).
Alongside this recruitment and production policy, management 
utilised systematic disciplining to “control" the "attendance 
problem" which ensued. A close view of the way these powers were 
exercised, however, suggests that rather more was entailed here 
than simply getting people to come to work. Management's response 
to time-off was in every sense a strategic decision; this was so 
whether the choices involved "regular" disciplining, the timing 
and focus of their periodic purges, and/or the timing and seriousness 
of their occasional endeavours to lower the disciplinary threshold.
Put into practice by means of personal domination, the procedure 
and victimisation, disciplining for time-off constituted in fact, 
the vehicle of a managerial offensive. What implications did 
this have for the women workers' position • their; needs- and demands, 
together with their ability and willingness to pursue them?
If, from management's point of view, the struggle over attendance
or time-off was one which they felt they had little choice but
to engage in, the manner of this engagement could certainly be
varied. Apart from regularly disciplining women who were absent
without a doctor's note for three days or more, in a 3-4 week period,
they could institute periodic "purges" - pulling in large numbers
across the factory or in particular sections:
"We've had more (disciplined) just lately 
because they've just had a binge on it - they 
say it's because of productivity bonus. And 
of course, a lot of women have to take weeks off 
to go on holiday with their husbands, and this is 
one of the reasons why they put the purge on at 
this time of the year".
Madge (Moulding Shop)(54)
The timing of these purges can be seen, clearly, as 
strategic. So also were attempts by management to impose a 
shorter disciplinary threshold both officially and unofficially.
From June 1976, for a 12-month trial period, an agreement was 
drawn up whereby an employee absent twice in three weeks would 
receive the first warning and if absent once more during the next 
four weeks - the final warning. One further day in the next four 
weeks made the person liable to the two-day suspension, the same 
again could incur dismissal. A "clear" four weeks was required to 
delete one warning and eight weeks to delete them all.
This "official" attempt to impose a shorter disciplinary 
threshold, accompanied negotiations wherein the union was attempting 
to get the company to accept the introduction of a sick pay scheme.
Informal attempts to lower the disciplinary threshold - in
line with a general policy of maintaining a generally high level of
intimidation by periodic "assaults" - went on all the time.
"Well, sometimes I think when they are making the 
rules to suit themselves, I wonder where they get 
them fromJ You know, they come in and say - 
two days before you bring a doctor's note in.
Now all of a sudden they come round and they say 
you can't have one day without a doctor's note.
Now I mean, they are 80pence - for a doctor's note.
(And) you don't know what's going to happen from 
one day to the next, so how can you keep going 
down to the doctors and saying I want a doctor's 
note because I've had to stay at home today, and 
pay 80 pence for it".
Jenny (Final Assembly) (56)
Intimidation was used against whole groups or individuals:
"Well there again. I wasn't called in on that.
She came out the office and she was crying. And 
someone said - 'The blasted management'. And I 
said, 'what's the matter now'. (And this was 
going out of procedure ). She said - 'I’ve had 
to sign a piece of paper - he's telling me I've got 
to sign it'. She says, 'my dad'll kill me'. And
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you know she got really frightened of losing 
her job. She was really petrified - she 
couldn't stop crying. And I went out of 
procedures. I went into Mr G and I said 
'Why has she signed a paper without me being 
there'. And the foreman said - 'Oh, we told her 
it was nothing, and in 3 weeks time it would be 
'ripped up'. I asked 'why has she had to sign 
it?'. One said, 'She's had so many days off. 
And they were going out of procedure . Because 
she hadn't had enough ... you're allowed 2 days 
off in 3 weeks, she’d only had the 1 day off. 
She'd had 1 day off - but they said she'd had 
a lot of time off previously".
Edna (Final Assembly)(57)
REDUCTION IN JOB SECURITY
What impact did such managerial offensives have on the 
women workers? Apart from increasing job insecurity in general 
as a result of maintaining overall high levels of intimidation, 
disciplinary action for time off (or any reason) could increase 
it directly. First, the system of warnings outlined in the 
procedure led to suspension and dismissal by stages, and these 
could be "activated" at any time management chose to fully pursue 
them.
In the second place, however, employment security could be 
undermined in a rather more fundamental way, because of the effects 
of the women's "access to return". The characteristically broken 
or discontinuous employment pattern of women workers, combined with 
their high degree of dependence on local employers, makes the 
opportunity for them to return to previous employment especially 
significant.
The warnings procedure had made management disciplinings more 
systematic by "standardising" the mode of their response across 
the shop floor. It also provided them with the means of keeping
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records on the workers they employed, as Janet a shop steward
who had once been a supervisor, explained:
"It goes on your records, so if they leave 
and want to come back, they'll be refused...
When a person leaves, one supervisor fills in 
a form - stating if she does bad work, is a 
bad time-keeper - has a lot of time off, 
causes any trouble etc it goes on the 
personnel office file. It's bad. That's 
something which in my opinion should be stopped.
You see, I think meself, this was done because 
they were leaving and coming back and they have 
the same problems every time with them.
When I was a supervisor, the forewoman used to 
come for a report on the workers who'd left, and 
as a supervisor you have to state if you'd be prepared 
to take a woman back.
I often wonder if they put on that you've been a 
shop steward. I mean, you've got to cause some 
problems haven't you? I mean sometimes you stick 
out,say when they say they want to take a woman 
into the office ..."
Janet (Sub-Assembly)(58)
Use of the warnings procedure, according to its formal design, 
ensured that management's disciplinary action (and workers' default) 
was recorded because the "papers" were automatically put on file. 
Formal methods of disciplining increase the scope and variety of 
means available to management however, because there still remains 
recourse to "informed."methods as well. So managers could "go 
through the motions" of giving a warning (i.e. threatening the 
worker) without actually getting a paper signed. Occasionally they 
were forced to do it like this because shop stewards or the workers 
themselves would refuse to "accept" a warning; (by not signing it). 
In such a case however, the end result might be little different 
as far as the record was concerned.
"We don't sign ... umm, the ... er papers.
Now this again is confidential because I ask ..
I go in with the superintendent - if you get a 
baddy superintendent ., although you don't sign 
the form, it still goes onto your record.
If I can get a good superintendent, work round 
'im, put a bit of charm on, 'e won't fill it in."
Jill (Supervisor- Final Assembly) (59)
"They frighten seme into it. And they tell them,
'Oh, it'll be ripped up in 3 days'. But I don't 
know. I've told them, not with this management; 
not the way they are here. Myself, I think that 
goes on your record - so if you want to re-apply 
for a job - it's all on the record".
Nora (Final Assembly) (60)
In the personnel office was a filing cabinet with three 
drawers; each one clearly labelled on the front "Males",
"Females", and "Unwanted Females".
Since there was, therefore, no safeguard of future employment 
opportunity, management's disciplining constituted an attack on the 
women's job security.
The issue of time-off was the one most often chosen with which 
to mount their offensive - perhaps as a preliminary to increasing 
speed-up or labour intensification, or to facilitate its progress; 
perhaps to undermine a build up of opposition to movement of labour 
or to push up the quit-rate, perhaps to break down an emerging 
growth of confidence and assertion on the part of a section or across 
the factory as a whole.
While the general level of intimidation could exert pressure 
on workers to abandon job protections, and facilitate speed-up, 
there were also specific means which were used by management to
achieve this
-265-
p e rf o r m a nc e
The women workers were commonly subjected to disciplinary 
action by management for "poor performance", and this was 
usually to do with their rate of output. Again, it is clear 
that management's decisions regarding such disciplinary action 
were also strategic - in the sense of having wider objects than 
simply the maintenance of production levels and their continuity. 
They made choices as to the timing, the area of impact and the 
scope - specific or general - of disciplinary actions taken. And 
these decisions were often related to drives : instituting speed-up 
and/or intensification of work across the factory as a whole, or 
in specific sections. There was thus a similar sense in which 
these decisions also constituted a general managerial offensive 
against the workforce.
"Last week I had a lot of warnings. My women 
were being warned for low performances. And they 
don't want to know your excuses. The one woman 
was working an automatic machine! They were ever 
so incensed about it....
The woman on the automatic machine was working slower 
because the machine wasn't working properly. And 
she was having to stop it and take the things off - 
she was doing it part-manually, but of course it 
wasn't working as fast as what the count was then 
you see."
Madge (Moulding Shop) (61)
REDUCTION OF JOB SECURITY.
The impact of disciplining workers for poor performance can 
be identified on two levels which are linked, even though here 
considered separately. It increased employment insecurity on the 
one hand and had effects which could directly undermine job 
controls, on the other.
Employment security was particularly undermined whenever 
disciplinary action for poor job performance was used, in 
conjunction with movement of labour and the women were put onto 
work they could not perform "adequately". The warnings procedure 
provided for dismissal at the final stage, but generally before 
this, the worker would have "sacked herself", after being punished 
for failing to perform on a job she could not do.
REDUCTION IN JOB CONTROLS
Disciplining poor work performance, again used in conjunction
with movement of labour - which broke job continuity and dispersed
job knowledge and information, could further undermine job controls
by making it even more difficult for workers to establish and
maintain "normal" output rates, while under the pressure of threats
"I mean now, there's this girl that came 
into the shop, like my members - and I mean, 
p'raps they've been here about 5 weeks -
and they tell them, if they don't get the performance ... 
But it isn't .. on the small presses in our 
shop, you see... they're not on the same job every 
day. Well, they're different values. But I 
think they've (the women) got the idea that because 
one is 700 an hour, every job is 700 an hour ... 
but they don't put them in the picture you see, and 
tell them that they're like, different counts.
And I think it's all wrong”.
Sarah (Press Shop( (62)
The use of disciplinary action for poor performance on a 
regular basis, could be used, therefore, to drive operators; 
forcing them to attain or maintain the extremely high levels of 
output required. Of course it could be used to increase these 
levels too, whenever new counts were imposed under direct threat 
or just general intimidation.
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Not only did the use of such disciplinary action inhibit the 
development of job controls by those subjected to it. It 
could also lead directly to their abandonment. Under heavy 
disciplinary pressure, individuals or groups or workers 
might have to give up, temporarily, protections in respect of 
work effort in order to protect themselves against intimidation.
"The most common thing is that, my members are 
telling me, that the value in the job that they've 
got is too high. You know,they are expected 
to produce 'x' amount ... the count is tco high.
And I have to tell them, that probably ... it's 
probably been valued, you know, 5 or 6 years - and 
I have to say, 'Look, that job has been proved - 
someone has done it', - because this is what they 
say to me, you know : someone's done it'".
Sally (Sub-Assembly)(63)
Under what conditions had "someone done it"? Someone may have 
done it because normal job controls had broken down under the 
pressure management could exert. Such strategies of desperation 
on the workers' part might include for example, - attempts to in«.¿.«aso 
the length of the working day and decrease its intensity - by taking 
the work home.
"I was put on soldering retrads: very fine work 
four wires, tiny dots - need a steady hand and 
good eyesight. Also, put on an earth tag, a 
fifth wire.
One girl used to take them home and fit on all 
the earth tags - this was before the performance 
rates came in. They thought that by taking them 
home it would help them with the performance rates.
Well when I went on - I says 'How on earth do you 
get this count - 58 an hour for these T etrad 
plugs. I could only manage 40. And they were 
taking them home and doing half the job at home, 
so of course when they used to bring them back 
next day with all the earth tags put on, they could 
do it couldn't they! And they thought it was helping 
but it wasn't.
The people who did this have all left now, but the 
count still carries on. It’s still 58 and that's just 
for the daywork". Pip (Sub-Assembly) (64)
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Since, under management's driving, this pressure was continuous,
it always posed a threat to established rates, if it succeeded in
undermining the more vulnerable groups.
"I mean, I did go and see about the 
welders' counts being re-timed. But 
what answer did I get? Well they do it on 
the twilight'. And then I find out that the 
twilight are doing 4 hourly counts, but they'm 
working 4 and a quarter because they're starting 
before the shift starts! Yes! And I was 
very annoyed about it last Friday. He told 
me as they was doing good counts, and I mean, 
a couple of times he has shown me the cards, of 
what the twilight's doing. And then I find 
out as they're starting 20 minutes before the 
shift starts". Sarah (Press Shop) (65)
"I had two Asians - worked through their dinner 
time - so I had to go and stop them. They 
haven't done it since.
Another, because they're members on trial, was 
working hell-for-leather, and working in her break.
So I had to put a stop to that as well".
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (66)
Desperation might also manifest, in a different way:
"The superintendent sometimes comes to see me, 
to warn me about a case where a worker is 
over-booking. If it goes on - I go and warn 
the worker about it. She could be dismissed on 
the spot! The workers do it because they're 
pressurised to get out the count - they wouldn't 
do it for fraud". Pru (Sub-Assembly) (67)
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The Disciplinary Offensive: Impact on the women workers.
We have argued that the impact of management's policy of 
control by the use of disciplinary action on the position of the 
women workers was both general and specific. A high disciplinary 
load was maintained by management taking disciplinary action on 
a systematic basis in three main areas: time-off, factory conduct
and job performance. The overall effect of this was to sustain 
high levels of intimidation on the shopfloor generally, which 
undermined the development (and maintenance) of job controls by 
the women workers. And as we have seen, both job controls and 
employment security - which are, to some extent necessary conditions 
for each other - could be undermined directly by disciplinary action 
as well.
Since the social dimension of job controls are as significant 
as its technical aspects, we have argued that it is important to 
consider the implications of managerial strategies on workers' 
relationships with each other. We can consider this briefly by 
focusing on the problem of victimisation
VICTIMISATION
"Oh, that's bad! No but that's bad, not just 
because of my case. I've had experience of it, 
so I could speak on that fact. I was ... sort 
of didn't get on with my supervisor for 18 
months and like if your face doesn't fit as they 
say in the factory way, - it's bad. Its really 
depressing! and I'm just one, out of probably 
quite a lot. There's quite a lot of girls, I 
know, that have been, you know, their face - like, 
a supervisor doesn't like a girl's face and she's ... 
you can't say victimisation because it's a very 
hard word to prove, but it is sort of in that way - 
they're using their coat against them".
Edna (Final Assembly)(68)
The issue of victimisation was one of particular importance
to the women workers. And it is clear that a workforce run
down to low levels entailing a large number and frequency of moves,
readily lent iself to this tactic on management's part: by means
of selective imposition on groups of workers.
"We've got it all the time, I mean. You get 
people picked on, and all for nothing, and its 
generally to do with moving. I mean, people can 
be spiteful and catty can't they."
Edna (Final Assembly)(69)
"I had a girl complain about being picked on.
She was moved onto this line from another, but she 
was put on the same job she was doing before. But 
she said she'd been put on the right-hand side 
instead of the left-hand side she was used to and so 
she couldn't keep up. The forewoman only asked her 
to do her best, but she took no notice like ... so the 
forewoman asked me to have a word with her like.
When I went up she just stormed out - she walked out.
We stopped her at the door, like, you know, and she 
was accusing the supervision of picking on her and 
things like that you know, but she did come back to 
work". Barbara (Final Assembly) (70)
Indeed, selectivity on some kind of basis, was, in one sense, 
a condition of success or effectiveness. For example, on the 
question of doubling up.
"Now, I've always agreed - I 'ave got a few supervisors 
what go at it - a bull at a gate - they do. Some of 
'em when they put this coat on - they're little 
'itlers, you know. And I can't go round to ' em all 
and say, 'Calm down . This is 'ow you should be like...' 
Because they should know themselves, anyway. Because 
you've gotta be a bit of a psychologist - to be a 
supervisor. I mean, I can go up to one girl and say,
'DO that job*. I can go up to another one and say,
'DO that job' and she'll tell me to .... go. You know, 
you just 'ave to pick - who you can ask and who you should 
tell. Because we should always tell them - but the 
majority of the supervisors ask, you know, and you get 
more ... better results, that way".
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly) (71)
Selectivity, also, could be made to operate as a means of 
maximising from management's point of view, the impact of 
disciplinary action.
"I think its just the fear of the warnings really 
with a good many. I mean, they've had ... 
you generally find management have had a lot of 
practice in people, and they know people and they 
know characters and they sort of know which one s 
to pick on to make them afraid and make the other 
ones - who're like, on the lines - realise,you know 
what I mean? They know those that are hard and 
think 'blow you mate - if I'm having time off, I'm 
having it, you'll have to sack me then'. You know - 
so it's sort of ... that's how they get the job isn't 
it? They know characters, they know which ones to pick". 
Edna (Final Assembly) (73)
Thus from the workers' point of view, the impact of management's 
disciplining fell unevenly and this could certainly have consequences 
for the kind of defensive action groups of workers might take on each 
other's behalf.
Moreover, the issues were not strictly clear cut, and apart
from the problem of unevenness in its impact, managerial disciplining
was also, to some degree, facilitated by the organisation of the
labour process and the way the women related to each other within
it. Thus, to the extent that disciplinary action addressed problems
they experienced as workers, the importance of production continuity
for instance, it facilitated management disciplining individuals, for
example over poor performance. Then again.
"A girl complained because she came in two 
hours late. Someone had been put on her job.
She didn't like the job she got instead. It 
caused a lot of bad feeling all round".
Barbara (Final Assembly) (74)
One of the sources of this bad feeling was that the person who 
was moved onto the late-comer's job, considered she was being
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punished too. And this view could be commonly found among 
workers moved to cover the jobs of absentees. They were being 
penalised for coming in to work, they were the ones who were 
being punished as a result of the other person's absence. There 
was a sense, of course, in which this may well have been true. 
Because movement of labour was used punitatively and lent itself 
to victimisation as well. Under these circumstances, the 
ability of the women workers to protect their employment security 
collectively, and to defend themselves against disciplinary action 
could all the more easily be undermined.
"We had one woman, she was never in on a Monday - 
came on Tuesday,Wednesday,Thursday and Friday - 
pay day. She had severe nervous asthma, home 
problems, diabetic son and other things, I 
imagine. And this was the reason for her 
absenteeism. Then she suddenly got ill and was 
away a long time. The women on the line were 
absolutely fed up with her being absent all the time. 
Because that woman would be replaced by a novice, and 
a novice will pull a line back ...."
(Did she have warnings for her absenteeism?)
"Oh, yes. Oh, persistent warnings, till she was 
coming up towards suspension. When she was about 
to be suspended, she started bringing doctor's notes 
in, and there was nothing you could do".
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (75)
Domination, degradation and intimidation are built in to 
employment relations under capitalism. The degree to which workers 
can protect themselves depends on their vulnerability in the 
labour market and within the individual firm. Wherever employers 
can succeed in undermining job security, they also increase this 
vulnerability and thus, workers' exposure to domination. To the 
extent, therefore, that its impact may result in undermining workers' 
employment security and job controls and thereby increase their
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vulnerability, we might view the exercise of managerial powers in 
respect of disciplining workers directly, as important, 
strategically, as their exercise in say, the movement of capital, 
or the organisation of the labour process and the introduction 
of machinery.
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DISCIPLINE AND THE CONTRÒL OF LABOUR
Footnotes
(1) "Going into the office" i.e. accompanying members who were 
being disciplined appears to have constituted the most regular 
and frequent of the female representatives' duties.
(2) Ref 14/S1: 480-518
(3) In fact, as we have noted, output requirements in terms of 
market demand for the product fluctuated markedly, but this was 
not allowed to be reflected in fluctuating output requirements 
of the individual worker. This remained at maximum, and the 
number of workers was reduced instead.
(4) Ref SI: 121-127
(5) "But about the best laugh I had with him - I was 
just coming off shift at Old Hill, and I heard him shout 
to this man. 'What are you doing there?'. He replied 'I'm 
standing here waiting to be unloaded'. He says, 'Get your coat', 
he says, 'you'm sacked'. And when it come to the P.ut-to,
the bloke didn't work there! He was one of the steel blokes 
from Hulbert's that had brought some steel in for him. 'Course 
he couldn't get into the warehouse for it to be unloaded at the 
time, it was full. He was waiting so as he could back in 
and get it unloaded. No matter - the bloke took his steel back 
and he wouldn't - nobody wouldn't come down until he went up and 
apologised. He had to go up and apologise in person to the staff 
He was a terrible man". Jim (Moulding Shop Serviceman) Ref 14.
(6) Ref : 14
(7) Ref 7/S1 : 187-197
(8) Ref 21/S2-. 476-496
(9) Ref 12/S : 234-238
(IO) See Appendix 1
(11) Ref 11-12 /SI: 964-1024
(12) Ref 26/S4: 606-628
(13) Looking at some aspects of this procedure in more detail:
The supervisors' record-sheet noted that,'hfter every instance of 
lateness and absenteeism the employee must be warned verbally 
and reminded of the 1 month probationary period."
It asked for comments under each of the following headings: 
dexterity, speed, interest in work, adaptability, personality, 
co-operation.And added the requirement that:
"If an employee's speed is slow or co-operation is nil for 
example you must warn them verbally to this effect at the end 
of the first two weeks and remind them of the 1 month probationary 
period".
Finally, the immediate supervisor was asked:
"In your opinion should we continue to employ this employee?"
This decision was usually made by the end of the third week 
when the doubtful ones were warned of possible termination.
They were finally told on the last Friday. Since all workers 
began paying union subscriptions by checkoff from their first 
wage packets, this period of probation had to be by agreement 
and the shop stewards were told that they could not intervene 
on matters concerning new workers during the four weeks.
Usefully, from management's point of view, the period was not 
inflexible either:
(Is the month's trial long enough, would you say?)
"If it isn't ... if it isn't long enough - if its a marginal 
case, then we usually see the union and say, 'Look - this 
person's here for a month ... she's marginal - she's improved 
in the last week - her first 3 weeks were shocking - we are 
prepared to give her another fortnight or three weeks, by 
arrangement". We MUST do it by arrangement, because the 
union's going to turn round and say, "Well look - she's a member 
from now, and we're looking after her interests". In which 
case you've got to go through the LONG procedure which exists 
for employees. So, we say, "Look - we definitely ... she’s on 
another fortnight - after that, we make a decision one way or 
the other. So, in that sense, we are a little flexible
- particularly on very, very complicated jobs. If you have a 
very complicated job, then we try and be a little bit more 
lenient." Barry White (Factory Manager) Ref: lO/Sl: 298-313
The system devised, therefore, offered a means by which 
management's control problems could be eased - at least in their 
initial dealings with workers, by avoiding the disadvantages 
accruing to procedural disciplining - specifically the longer 
'built-in' time periods, and possibility of having to negotiate 
decisions-which were a consequence of official representation.
(14) Ref 1/S1: 000-017
(15) This was noted by the management consultants. Using the (far 
from comprehensive) statistics available, they found the highest 
levels of absenteeism on the main assembly lines - between 10%
- 14% per day. Absenteeism in production and sub-assembly 
areas (Stourbridge figures only) was slightly lower, ranging 
from 6% - 10%. Inbucon (1977) p.24
(16) Ref 11/S1: 329-355
(17) Ref OH/19.1.77/010.
(18) Ref 9/S1: 260-279 5.12.78,
(19) Ref 5/S1: 127-143
" ... circumstances, the wage packet and life generally - seem to 
determine the absentee rate - rather than US". Barry White (quoted 
above).
(20)
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(21) Ref 4/S1: 100-121
(22) Ref 26/S2 : 310-322
(23) Ref 9/S1: 285-291
(24) Ref 22/S2 : 817-833
(25) Ref 13/S: 195 -
(26) Ref 25/S2 : 268-280
(27) Ref 30/S3 : 1002
(28) Ref 15
(29) Ref 22/S3: 198-220
(30) Ref 13/S1: 431-470
(31) Ref 29/S2: 438-452
(32) Ref 32/S4: 81
(33) Ref 39/S4: 72-89
(34) Ref 16/S2: 385-396
(35) Ref 10/S2: 324-370
(36) Ref 19/S2: 545-561
(37) Ref7/S1: 361-379
(38) Ref 40/S4: 109-127
(39) Ref 23/S2: 931-964
(40) Ref 7/S1: 551-555
(41) Ref 12/S2: 120-123
(42) Ref 9/S2: 122-135
(43) Ref 7/51: 552-572
(44) Ref S2: 918-940. The instance of speed-up as a result of
management's false promise (see above).
(45) Ref 34/S3 : 796-844
(46) Ref OH 22/T3S1/150-188
(47) Ref 11/S: 199-207
(48) Ref 8/S1: 616-638
(49) Ref lO/Sl: 631-653
(50) Ref 4/S1: 458-500
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(51) Ref 28/S3
(52) Ref 14/S2
(53) Ref 14/S2
359-373
137-203
784-790.
(54) Ref 30/S3: 468-474
(55) Against these attempts, the women stewards and membership 
became increasingly determined to hold to the previous 3-day 
custom and practice. The union officials, however, tried to 
maintain adherence to the new absenteeism agreement, even after 
the 12 month 'trial' had expired. Management took advantage 
of the confusion and lee-way which resulted. Different rules 
were maintained in different sections and changed according to 
the prevailing balance of power. The overall significance of 
the issue of disciplining time-off as a focus of struggle -
a moving battle line between management and the women workers 
is signified in the factory manager's statement:
" ... the union (members) want it loosened off and we
want it tightened - and it sort of waves backwards and forwards
all the time". Barry White (Factory Manager). lO/Sl: 313-329.
(56) Ref 8-9/S1 : 457-476
(57) Ref 15/S1: 356-386
(58) Ref 22/S3: 652-719
(59) Ref 13/S2: 342-367
(60) Ref 12/S1: 997-1024
(61) Ref 7-8/S1: 792-823
(62) Ref 4/S1 : 209-220
(63) Ref 19/S1: 574-595
(64) Ref 6/S1 : 475-493
(65) Ref 18/S2: 260-270
(66) Ref 17/S2: 570-580
(67) Ref 12/S2: 480
(68) Ref 7/S1 : 422-440 ar
(69) Ref 15/S : 386-393
(70) Ref 19/S2: 180-200
(71) Ref 38/S4: 317-365
(72) For these reasons, and in recognition of the seriousness 
of the impact of victimisation on individuals and groups 
many of the shop stewards said they were interested in the 
possibility of becoming supervisors themselves. "X may be, 
yes. Why would I be interested? To treat the women more 
fairly". Sally Ref 7/S1: 530.
Edna had her own experience of being victimised to draw on:
"I think it's because the supervisor doesn't take to a person 
and she can use her coat. That's why,as I say, if you're a 
fair-minded person, then I reckon you can do a damn good job, 
because if you're fair minded, you don't take parts like that 
do you?" Edna (Final Assembly) Ref: 14/S2: 214-224.
But Ixjrna had a less idealistic view:
"They use their coats against the shop stewards. I couldn't 
be like they are - if your face don't fit, they just keep moving 
you - and I couldn't do it. Everybody'd be the same to me". 
Lorna (Final Assembly) Ref 4/S1: 426-443.
(73) Ref 18/S2: 839-844
(74) Ref 20/S2: 218-234
(75) Ref 44/S6: 831-903.
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CHAPTER 7_____________ THE PAYMENT SYSTEM
In this chapter the payment system, ever an important adjunct 
of employers' control, is examined in terms of identifying features 
which tended to facilitate management's production needs. These, 
as we have seen, included: a high degree of control over individuals' 
levels and continuity of output, full and intensive use of operators' 
time and constant vigilance to minimise all other production costs.
The company used a payment system which combined features of 
measured daywork and piecework bonus incentive; both of which 
required time study, on the basis of which a minimum output or count 
might be established for each job. The system, covering all production 
and assembly operations, covered therefore almost all the women shop- 
floor workers, but few of the men. ("Indirect" males and those filling 
skilled and/or supervisory grades were paid on time-rates).
Much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages 
to management regarding the use of different payment systems - and 
again the way .they work in practice would seem to owe more to the 
prevailing complex of conditions, both general and specific, than 
to intrinsic features of the systems themselves.. ^  Having 
said that, it was in precisely these terms that the Stourbridge factory 
manager explained his preference clearly. The context of this being 
management's most crucial task, to constantly maintain output 
throughout the factory at the levels required.
"I was the biggest advocate for measured day work at 
one time, and I went to a lot of trouble to go into it 
and ... One thing, in organising a factory of this 
size - you've got to have control. Now, if you've 
got measured day work - you've supposedly got control 
by having a certain level of output for a certain 
level of payment. But, you have not got the 
discipline of piecework, to give you the control you need.
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n o w , I don't mean control from the point of view of getting 
the output. But if you put a series of operators on a 
job, and you say, 'Right, what level of performance will I 
expect for that job?' And you say, 'Right, I'll expect a 90 
performance -
that's what we load the sub-assemblies at, about 
a 90 performance ... You're going to get some low 
operatives, and you're going to get some high 
operatives. But on balance, with the effort they're 
putting in, its going to give us an average of 
a 90 performance. So you can say, 'Right, I want 
10 operators there at a 90 performance and give it 
to me'. Knowing that on average you're going to 
get that - albeit with absenteeism and everything 
else that you meet with. Now, if you put measured 
day work in, you've got to drive those operators 
all the time - to get that level of output. Because, 
you've got to have some motivation for them. Now, 
it isn't a question of the output you're looking for, 
it's the balance within the factory. Because if you 
have one section prepared to work without any ... er, 
direct drive, its only their own self-motivation - 
then you're going to have a much more level ... static 
level of production. And you DO if you have a set of 
operators who've got to get a level and reach it 
before they go and have their dinner. In other words, 
you are using ... you tend to use piece work as a 
method to control the quantities passing through the 
factory." (So you need different quantities in 
different areas, so you need flexibility ...)
"A tremendous amount of control, to get what you want 
at the right time."
"Under M.D.W. you stipulate an output, then you have 
to get it. Under piecework: we put the number of 
operators on a section at the certain level of performance, 
knowing that - under reasonable piecework conditions - 
they will supply what we want. I mean, after all 
B.L's efforts at getting day-work in... And only last 
year they were considering going back to piece work - 
simply because it gives you a tremendous amount of 
control. Not tyrannical control. Don't think I'm 
one of the old stagers that says, 'You want to get the 
whip out, and whip them up! ' It isn't a question of 
that. It gives you the motivation to get the 
operatives working. And it can KEEP them working, 
and they've got a direct return for the effort they're 
putting in."
Barry White (Factory Manager). (2)
The rhetoric usually associated with payment by results, of 
positive incentive and self motivation, are found here. But it 
will soon be clear that, in the context of BSR's production policy, 
the piecework system worked rather differently, and the payment 
system as a whole offered management rather more than this.
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The new piecework "incentive" scheme based on performance levels
was put in to cover most production and assembly workers in 1971-72:
"And then, of course, you really had to sweat tears.
To begin with it was lovely. Nobody worried about 
us and the work was turned out far better than what it 
is now.
October-November 1972 it was changed - the union hadn't 
long been in - but some parts of the factory were 
already covered by performance levels. I was on 
packing the TD8's - used to be four in a box.
They wanted 2,000 per day with a line of 20. This 
was 6-800 more than what we were doing before - 
to get the basic day-work rate! X can remember 
that very clearly. (Did the people object?)
Well they did ! I can remember them leaving left 
right and centre". .
Pip (Sub-Assembly).
Previous to this, payment had largely been by hourly rate with 
basic piecework in some areas. The new system, as is clear, allowed 
systematic speed-up through the setting of 'minimum' performance 
levels throughout the factory. The incentive element, 
seeming to offer some recompense for this, presumably eased the 
introduction of the new system and encouraged some initial high 
counts.
In this chapter we look at some of the problems arising from 
management attempting to get the workers, not only to attain high 
levels of output demanded, but also to sustain these. In the first 
two sections, we can see that management did not rely on the system 
of payment to achieve either.
The final section looks at the payment system in the broader 
context of management's production strategy relating to the minimisation 
of costs. It can be seen that these not only derive from labour 
but also the use of materials and machinery. Moreover, management 
itself must also be viewed as a cost. We are proposing that the
organisation of the labour process at BSR was potentially expensive 
in managerial terms, because of the high degree of external control 
and organisation it required. We look at how the payment system 
facilitated these and other costs being deferred by the employer 
to be borne by the workforce instead, i.e. to be (re)distributed 
downwards.
While, in this chapter, we are able to point to many ways 
in which the payment system could be used to facilitate management's 
aims, we cannot, again, assume that it was necessarily effective 
or successful in practice. As we have noted in relation to 
management's production policy as a whole, the degree to which it 
might be effectively applied would be bound to vary. It is 
important, however,to identify such aspects of managerial strategy 
and practice because of the implications from the point of view of 
the workforce. These practices structure the workers'
experience of the labour process and production relationships, and 
to a great extent specify both the nature and degree of the problems 
that arise. Thus to the extent that managerial practices differ 
in relation to different groups in the workforce, so also are the 
problems and interests of these groups differentiated. Here, we 
continue to focus on the position of the women workers, and note 
again, that as a consequence of the sexual division of labour, their 
experiences differed in many respects from those of the men.
Finally, since most of the problems and implications arising 
for the women workers are covered in more detail elsewhere, this 
chapter is not structured in two parts.
Earnings and Effort
One of the most striking features of the piecework bonus 
system was its complexity. Nora's husband, who did not work for
BSR, was an experienced and active trade unionist. He had been 
forced to agree:
"You see - although I'd always had me counts, I'd 
never been sort of interested before I was a 
shop steward. I just had me wages and just looked 
at my slip - that was it. But when I came to be 
a shop steward, I was looking at it, and my husband 
says - 'well, how do they pay you'. I said, 'I 
haven't the foggiest idea ..' He says ' What ! 
you've been working there nearly nine years and you 
don't know however they've paid you?' I said,
'No. No, as long as I've had me wages, I've been 
quite contented'. He says ' well', he says,
'serves you right if they've done you'. He says,
'Explain some of the things to me and I'll see if I 
can find out how they work it'. Well I explained 
and he says, 'There's no sense to it! I can't 
find out how they pay you at all'"
Nora (Final Assembly).(4)
The system was based on performance levels derived from 
standard minute job values, and a bonus of 124 pence per point per 
40 hours was paid for performances above the day work rate (minimum 
earnings level). The difference between a 66 performance (the 
minimum) and lOO performance (rarely exceeded) over 40 hours was 
worth E4.25. ^  Two thirds of all hourly paid workers were
paid under this "incentive" scheme. But since self-motivation, 
other things being equal, would require a sense of how output 
related to pay, this was clearly not a design feature of the system 
rather the opposite in fact. This relationship was so obscure 
that many of the workers did not consider it piecework at all.
"Everybody is confused actually. We don't know how 
we are paid, but it isn't piecework, I can assure 
you, because if it was piecework, they'd think they 
were on a banana boat! Piecework is so much a gross, 
and when that gross is done you can think - well I've 
earned my money, go home and do what you want. But
when its performance rate - you've got to do so 
many more, for the day rate."
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (6)
Even though workers were given a slip to sign midweek, showing
their wages due at the end of the week (based on calculations from
their job cards of the previous week) for most workers - especially
those in teams whose "performance" depended on the number of women
in the group - the system remained largely impenetrable:
(Do you have queries over the count very often?)
"Yes, a lot of the girls you know, they say ’Oh I ’m not 
working this fast for this sort of money, or this 
performance’. And they want me to find out about 
it all. ... But, when it’s explained to you, the count 
is right - you've just had an extra girl come to 
work that day and you've got to pay her for doing 
that - extra to pay her, you know. And a pass out, 
if someone goes, well you've got to pay them up till 
they've gone and when they've gone your performance 
can go up - for doing the same sort of thing, 
because she'd gone out -but I don't know how they 
work that bit! They all come into consideration, 
pass outs and everything, you know".
(How often do you get a query like that?)
"I've got an awkward girl on my line, she'd
send me up every week". Barbara (Final Assembly). ' '
In this case, the system was incomprehensible without such 
information as the output for a given number of operators at each 
performance level. For the majority of workers it would seem 
that the piecework payment system remained "unworkable" because 
it was impossible to establish how the job value related to the 
performance level and how the performance level related to the 
count or output required. Nor did management readily provide the 
information:
"We went to them about our performances and the 
only reply we could get, every time I asked him a 
question, was 'you're just not doing enough and 
that's it*. "
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(What were you trying to find out?)
"Our performance rates. What percentage of units we 
had to do to get a performance like. I asked him for 
the count, to show the women. I went to ask how many 
they would have to do to get lOO performance - I 
know you've got to allow for absenteeism and things 
like that, but he kept saying 'you're not doing enough, 
you're not doing enough'. And he wouldn't - he 
showed me the count for what they had done (an 87) 
but he wouldn't give me the count to show the women". 
Barbara (Final Assembly) (8)
But it was not surprising that the links between job values
output, and performance levels, remained obscure to the workers
since they had been manipulated by management, not only in the interests
of cheapness, but also according to a notion of "equability". As
the factory manager of Stourbridge explained:
"Stourbridge performances tend to be much lower 
than the scales in the other factories".
(Why is that?) "We just keep them down there.
By nature of the fact that we ... You see, you've 
got to keep the performance levels equable throughout 
the factory. Because if you get one section earning 
very high performances and the other section 
earning very low performances, you get friction. So, 
if you keep the performances running about the same 
throughout the factory, then you've got much more 
equable labour conditions. This is again, you come 
back to (the question)...
Why is Stourbridge so much better organised than the 
other factories - why don't we have so many problems?
Because we spend so much time .. I'm not blowing my 
own trumpet or the trumpet for the management, - 
this is the way we work, this is the way we work as 
a team. If somebody's got a high performance on 
one section, he knows, - for his own salvation - 
you see, each manager is in charge of a fairly large 
area, therefore, he is likely to have high and low 
performances within that same area - therefore, its 
in his interest to say, knock the high performances 
down and bring the low ones up - because (otherwise) 
he is going to have problems in his own area. So not 
so much relating between area and area, as between 
section and section, if you know what I mean. Its 
in his own vested interest to make sure that he keeps 
the performances to an equable level".
(So, overall at Stourbridge ...?) "We tend to keep the 
performances down. Not deliberately to curtail wages - 
but it keeps the balance".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (9)
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One of the most important consequences of obscuring the
relation between job value, performance and output, was the increased
"flexibility" it gave management regarding speed-up.
"BSR's abusing the operators, raising the count.
They require the same count for the new unit as 
the standard one - they did 240 an hour for H O  
performance for the day. The new unit has a 
higher value but they're still expecting 240 - 
and the operators are only getting a 96 performance.
All the lines are the same now. They’ve gradually 
put the counts up, even if its the same value unit.
You do the same count, but get a lower performance ... 
and you'll find, if only the girls would look round, 
each time they have a rise - the count creeps up"
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly) (10)
However, setting levels of output is one thing, attaining it 
may be quite another. BSR's management could not, and did not, 
rely on "carrot" principles of motivation alone. Quite a large 
number of jobs carried no "incentive" element at all. Either 
because they were paid at a fixed performance (e.g. 85 performance 
on moulding machines), or they were so called "no value" jobs, 
which only carried a (low) standard day-rate. On all such "non­
incentive" jobs the women had to produce a stipulated count within 
the time allowed and they were disciplined when they failed to do 
so. However, bonus workers were also disciplined if they failed 
to meet the minimum performance level required to earn the standard 
day-rate. And in practice, they were disciplined too, for failing 
to reach the expected (albeit bonus-carryingJlevels of performance 
as well .
(Low performances?)
"This is a bit of a problem. This is where we 
set a level of performance which we consider to 
be reasonable - and they don't meet this performance, 
and they're taken through procedure. It's a very 
very long time since we sacked anybody for it - but 
we get them right close, and usually they decide that ...
you know, to ... be a little bit wiser and do a 
little bit more work, and eventually, they don't 
get sacked." Barry White (Factory Manager) (11)
Incentive and Disincentive
The need to take disciplinary action with regard to performance 
levels — as often as not, against bonus workers - suggests some 
basic limitations of this "incentive" scheme. The required levels 
of output may have been set too high, and/or the incentive pay, too 
low to call forth the extra effort. On the other hand, the women 
workers may have been particularly unresponsive to monetary incentives. 
Although difficult to disentangle, something of all of those would 
seem to have been pertinent here.
Looking at the first aspect; it is clear that management demanded 
very high levels of output throughout the factory. And some areas 
were particularly notorious in this respect. On the leads section 
for example, where the work involved the manipulation of fine wires - 
even the fastest workers could barely reach the minimum earnings 
level (the consultants were drawn to comment here that the time- 
values seemed "counter productive because there is a temptation to 
stop trying". (12)).
With regard to the second point, the low level of incentive
pay, it was certainly true that basic pay had been allowed to rise 
at a much faster rate (partly under the impact of “equal pay" 
rises) and that the incentive element, therefore, formed a small 
and relatively declining portion of the wage. The fact that bonus 
pay, at the rate of 12*jp per point per 40 hours had remained 
unchanged since it was first introduced at half-a-crown, says even 
more, perhaps about the low level of importance, in terms of
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management's production strategy, of "positive incentive" or 
"motivation". Indeed "lack of incentive" was not identified 
as a possible reason for the persistently flat or falling 
performance levels, until 1977-8, when the bonus pay rate was 
increased to 1 3 ^  per point - for performances over lOO. 
(Unattainable in most areas).
The area where "sticky" performance levels were most often
identified at this time was in final assembly - on the main lines.
And it is difficult to separate out a number of possible reasons
for this. In the first place the incentive element may, indeed,
have been perceived as insufficient, thus by dropping the rate of
output, (as they did, deliberately in "go-slows" e.g. 1977-8), the
women realised they lost very little money and "chose" a slower
pace. Secondly, workers on the main lines were possibly subjected
to greater fluctuations - periods of intense pace, for example,
broken by waiting-time due to shortage of parts - than workers on
other sections. And, so, their response in terms of levelling
their effort, may have been more marked. Finally, the lines
were womanned by younger workers who, it was widely believed, were
less responsive to the incentive payments altogether. Management
frequently voiced this opinion:
"I can remember many years ago, when the main lines 
were running 95, lOO performances, because tHey 
were all married women, who came solely for one 
purpose, only, to earn money. And they earned money!
And now you tend to have the younger girls on the 
lines ...
... Now, the younger girls today, don't seem to have 
the desire, their wages are higher anyway, therefore 
a lot of them just don't know .. the youngsters, the 
teenagers - certainly - just don't know what to do 
with their money ... They're just not interested - 
money's of no importance whatsoever to them".
Barry White (Factory Manager) (13).
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Overall, given the high basic levels of output demanded, it 
would seem that, in terms of controlling this, the most useful 
"motivational" features of the piecework system revolved less 
around its positive incentives as its negative ones. Clearly, scope for 
the former would always be strictly limited in any case. The 
degree of management control over production was such that they 
could not permit workers themselves to either set a level of output 
or vary it much - down or u p .  Piecework payment, varying with 
output, provided a "negative incentive" because "bonus" workers 
would find that, in addition to being disciplined for not "making 
the count", they lost money as well (with the lower output).
For management then, the "bonus" system in fact, added a very 
important "negative incentive" or sanction to back up direct driving, 
because neither the latter, nor "positive incentives" could be relied 
on to maintain required levels of output, even if workers 
could be incited or driven to reach them. For this reason
if no other, the concept of "motivation" in respect of payment 
systems needs examination.
Deferring costs
So far, discussion of the payment system has focussed on the 
implications for workers' activity or application to production, in 
a direct sense. Of course, whatever impact a payment system has 
on output, is intimately related to the question of costs. But 
overall cost control requires a much wider sphere of vigilance on the 
part of management, and calls on other attributes of a payment system 
which should not be ignored. Broadly speaking, these enable production 
costs to be deferred onto labour, and in this respect three areas are 
of particular relevance, namely: labour costs, materials costs and
management control costs. The payment system contained 
arrangements, for example: regarding operators' training and job 
allocation, waiting time, bad parts and rejects, which enabled 
management to "defer" a large part of these three cost areas onto 
the workforce.
LABOUR COSTS
When new workers first arrived they were put on a month's trial.
Shown the job by supervision, they learnt it sitting "next-to-Nellie" 
whose own output on any team job, could be significantly affected, 
as would that of the group as a whole. For this reason the company 
had agreed "to pay new starters'wages" rather than have them "paid out 
of the group's earnings". This meant that the newcomer was ignored 
in calculating the group's performance (and therefore, pay) level - 
which would otherwise take both output and the total number involved 
into account. While this system might not be entirely satisfactory 
as far as the group was concerned, it was better than nothing. Once 
the month's trial was over, however, the operative was considered 
fully trained but in practice this was far from the case. "Training" 
was all about picking up speed and at BSR "no job was yours", so a 
"fully-trained" operative would have to be "inter-changeable" to the 
fullest extent required. Training had, therefore, to be resumed 
with every new task an operator was allocated, and these costs were 
entirely borne by the group, (or, on an individual job, by the individual 
operator). After many years' struggle the women had finally got an 
agreement that they could be paid their average earnings (for a 
maximum of 4 weeks) if they were permanently moved onto another job.
But this proved difficult to enforce and afforded little effective 
protection against their losing money through allocation to lower-paying
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jobs or lower pay in "training" periods. Management's free­
hand regarding job allocation in conjunction with the group "bonus" 
scheme meant that operators could also be "made to pay" the costs 
of "under-utilised" labour. Labour in general was very intensively 
used - the main expedient being to run with a constant shortage.
On occasion a section might be temporarily dispensible to management, 
but it was useful to have these workers "on ice" (or perhaps, to 
force them to leave). Either way, if they were not reguired the 
company did not want to pay for them.
"A few weeks ago they brought women from upstairs 
and put them on our line over here. They came and 
said we've got some more women coming on your line - 
and we had about 4. Well, these women have got to 
be paid out of the money off that line. And that 
did pull our wages down. And they did get a little 
bit aggressive about that".
Jenny (Final Assembly) (16)
In order to maintain the same performance and therefore, pay 
level, the whole line would have had to produce another three units per 
hour for each extra person put on. By no means an automatic result 
from having them there.
"They put extra bodies on - therefore a little 
job had to be found for them to do. So some of 
them were doing little or nothing, and some of 
them were really working hard - and that is where 
the aggression comes in”.
Jenny (Final Assembly) (17).
Unless they can achieve this extra (and for all - faster,) output, 
the whole line is made to pay, with their lower wages, the cost of 
the "under-utilised" labour - which otherwise the company would
directly bear
-292-
THE COSTS OF MANAGEMENT AND MATERIALS
An operator's output could be seriously affected if there was 
a shortage of parts or materials, or if those they had to work 
with were "bad". Apart from increasing the pressure and stress 
of the work generally, those on bonus would, of course also lose 
money as a result of both. This was because rejects were not 
included in the workers' count at all, and waiting time was only paid 
on those occasions agreed to by management and then, at the minimum 
day-rate. This situation meant that the workforce was highly 
dependent on "good management" in the sense of a well co-ordinated 
flow of components uninterrupted and of consistent standard.
As we have already noted, to the extent that such methods of
organising the labour process, which entail a high degree of
fragmentation, do suceed in reducing the workers' use of discretion
regarding their own activities, they may increase the scope of
management's control. But it is also true that such methods,
multiplying the number of interdependent elements to be organised
and co-ordinated "from above" also increase, perhaps to an even 
(18)larger degree, the need for management control over the labour
process.
At the Stourbridge factory this was especially true because
(19)a much greater variety of models was produced there, 
more
"We have a/complex production pattern than other 
factories and therefore have to be more organised.
1 can give you an example: Old Hill run a maximum
2 main plates - Stourbridge run 6 ...
.... whichever aspect you look at, because of the 
variety of the end product, there's variety right 
through the factory ... Old Hill makes 3 or 4 
varieties of sub-plates, we make 15."
I
"Now, you can't run a factory like that unless it is 
well organised, because it would just be complete and 
utter chaos. So, it is force of circumstances which 
force us to be organised. This is the strength of 
Stourbridge - it's very, very well organised”.
Barry White (Factory Manager)(2).
But there are, as might be expected, two sides to the story:
"They say, oh blimey, we've got too many of them, 
we shall have to take the girl» off them, anu put 
them on something else! This has happened continually 
on the hinge section for a start. They've had that 
many of the different hinges to the pick-up arms - 
they've never had enough pick-up arms though. I'v e 
known it when they've had to hide them ! Because 
they've had too much stock. Yes, well the superintendent 
dared not let Smith know - that's how the place is run". 
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (21).
With pressure on space "one of the best disciplines you've got" 
(Barry White - Factory Manager) - not more than a day's stock was 
kept of most components, so that output had to be closely controlled 
and co-ordinated to ensure that every piece was available for assembly 
in the right quantity.
"We depend on everybody else in the factory. Now 
we're not getting the parts - we could be waiting 
an hour. Well we waited 42 minutes today for parts.
And I mean, when you're waiting for parts and things 
like this you know,it drops your performance down".
(So you don't get much money?) "You get a waiting 
time, but its not much. I mean if you’ve been slogging 
your heart out all morning, and then for the last 
hour been stopped for parts - well, what's the point?
You've just killed yourself off, and yet you've got no 
money! You see, this often happens ... that is very 
frustrating, I think this is where a lot of arguments 
flare up". Edna (Final Assembly) (22)
Loss of earnings due to waiting-time was one of the most 
common complaints - in particular from the women on final assembly.
But the operators should not simply be viewed as "paying" for
have
management's failures - that is, bearing what would otherwise/been the 
higher costs for management of organising a minutely sub-divided labour 
process. And, certainly, the management side was run with minimal
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personnel and equipment. The women did, however, also lose money 
as a result of management's deliberate policy to use all labour 
and machinery intensively. Operators queued for main-plates 
because there was only one press on the type required, instead 
of two. It was not just the flow of parts and materials which 
was important to the workers - their quality was an equally 
significant problem.
"Like - cups on the rivetting. The cups are 
covered with scrap so you have to keep clearing 
the (press) table off. I've tried to see if 
they could send cleaner parts, but they say no! ..
It takes longer - so you lose (money)".
Sarah (Press shop) (23).
On the main lines, bad parts were a particularly strong cause 
for complaint:
"It's one of the worst problems on the lines at the 
moment. The lines suffer, your performance goes 
down and if you're compensated, its not enough - 
and you still have to do repairs".
Ethel (Final Assembly) (24).
Under the payment system whereby only good parts could be counted, 
neither work produced from poor raw materials or basic components 
nor that assembled incorporating bad parts, would be paid for.
On the final assembly lines, only the units which were packed were
WGI*Gincluded in the count. Occasionally, if there a very large 
number of rejects, a form of compensation may be agreed:
(How sure you compensated?)
"We had one really bad day - they're all bad but 
this one was worse. He paid us an average of the 
previous four days and cancelled that day's count.
It didn't work out to very much because the other 
four weren't brilliant either - I couldn't tell you 
how they are supposed to compensate you .. .
(Do they have a system?) "I think it's just how they 
feel". Ethel (Final Assembly) (25)
"If you'ye got 60 - 70 on the floor, you fetch 
the superintendent and he will allow them to 
be paid on the previous days performance. But 
if they go down to test and they're going 
backwards and forwards from the test, and you 
haven't got them on the floor and the girls don't 
come down and tell you till the next day - then 
you don't get paid, because you've got nothing 
to complain with. you have to show them the 
bad components. There's two sides of test - 
if parts need replacing, they're sent to breakdown 
and repair, then back to test again - sometimes 
test can have them 7 or 8 times. But until the 
unit is passed - you get no payment.'*
Eunice (Final Assembly) (26).
The system of payment plus the arbitrary nature of compensation
combined to ensure that operators could be made to bear the cost
of management's strategy to cut labour and materials' costs.
Bad parts might be due to the shortage of setters and/or inspectors,
particular for example on automatic machinery, such as the presses,
turning out components at a rate of anything from sixty to a
couple of hundred per minute. They only needed to be a fraction
out, to cause innumerable problems in assembly. Bad parts might
also result from deliberate efforts to allay the cost of materials:
(What are the main bad parts that you get?)
"Sub-plates. I've had bad jockeys this week".
(What was the reason for the bad jockeys?)
"Well, if you have a bad part you break it down - well 
from the state I've had some this morning, and I 
should imagine they're using some of the breakdown 
parts to make good ones back up. I don't know why 
they do it, because they don't get through - they 
only get thrown back out. I don't know why they 
do it, it just keeps repeating itself you know, just 
keeps going back as a breakdown and coming back.
And if it doesn't get packed, they don't get paid".
Barbara (Final Assembly) (27).
As the organisation of work and the payment system was set up,
the workers would absorb the costs in terms of stress and finance
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of both management's intended policy - "to run a tight ship", 
along with its unintended, but increasingly likely — consequences 
of breakdown. Deferment of such costs was much facilitated 
by the discretionary nature of all "non-production" payments.
There was another respect in which the workforce might be 
considered to pay management costs which has already been taken up 
in relation to work intensification. v ' This concerned the 
use of bad parts - which management put into assembly in periods 
of low demand, as a means of reducing output, cutting wages, allaying 
the costs of materials and, most importantly, maintaining the 
same pace of work. It was considered vital that even when demand was 
slack, the pace should never be allowed to drop - because, it was 
judged, it could never be picked up again. This practice was, of 
course, facilitated by the same features of the payment system«mentioned 
above.
Conclusions
In this section the payment system has been scrutinised in order 
to identify those features which tended to facilitate management 
needs - in particular, control over workers' output and minimisation 
of production costs. On the face of it, the company operated on 
the basis of a piecework bonus system, but the advantages management 
derived from this lay somewhat less with the commonly attributed 
features of piecework schemes. This seems to indicate the need 
to view any payment system in the context of management's broader 
production strategy, and also to take into consideration other 
important contingency areas which (apart from workers' activity 
alone), nevertheless, touch on costs, output and earnings in a 
significant way.
Ultimately, since certain of the aspects which have been 
outlined might have helped to further management's aims, they 
could not, of themselves, guarantee these results. The utility 
of the payment system, from management's point of view, 
depended finally, on their control over the labour process and 
over information (particularly regarding the relationship between 
pay and output). It also depended on the control exercised 
directly, over the workers themselves. The importance of this
has already been made apparent. Despite the rhetoric of self- 
motivation, it is clear that the role of incentive in the payment 
system was minimal, with low levels of bonus pay and scarcely 
attainable levels of output. The piecework scheme thus appears to 
have been more significant from the point of view of its "negative 
incentives" than its positive ones. However, it is clear that the 
payment system as a whole could not be relied upon to sustain the 
consistently high levels of output required, and that these were 
underpinned by more direct negative sanctions applied to the workforce 
by management. While we have noted that this was a labour process 
which demanded a high degree of control by management for its 
effectivity, we now see that it demanded also, a high degree of 
direct control over the workers themselves. In the following chapter 
we go on to examine some of the ways this was applied and with what
effect
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CHAPTER 7 PAYMENT SYSTEM
FOOTNOTES :
(1) See , for example, Purcell (1979) and Cliff (1970)
(2) Ref 15/S1 : 531-580
(3) Ref 4/S1 : 248-312
(4) Ref 15/S2 : 296-358
(5) lOO--66 = 34 x 12*3P = £4.25
(6) Ref 4/SI : 248-312
(7) Ref 14/S1 : 814-852
(8) Ref 8/51: 420-470
(9) Ref 14/S1 : 470-518
(IO) Ref 5/S1 : 393-457. 31.10.1978
(11) Ref lO/Sl : 291-298
(12) Inbucon (1977) p.XI-3
(13) Ref 14/S1 : 480-518
(14) There is little "incentive" to produce more if it is impossible,
(15) This aspect of 'negative incentive' was further reinforced 
by the fact that some jobs were 'allowed' to pay better than 
others and the workers on these strove not to be moved off them
(16) Ref 28/S2 : 576-610
(17) Ref 28/S2 : 576-610
(18) Since workers discretion is often (perhaps i 
used to sustain production continuity etc.
more often than not?] 
see Nichols (1973)
(19) The October 1977 output of 280,714 units from Stourbridge 
comprised 25 different types; the Old Hill total of 276,294 
units consisted of 4 models and 2 different types were made at 
Waterfall Lane (output 33,810).
(20) Ref 12/S1 : 373-410 5.12.1978.
(21) Ref 36/S3: 950-971 5.12.1978
(22) Ref 6/Sl: 328-
(23) Ref 15/S2: 61-73
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(24) Ref Ollll/T2sl : 250-300
(25) Ref OH11/T2S1: 300-31o
(26) Ref OH23/T3S1: 220-240
(27) Ref lO-ll/Sl: 505-611
(28) See above pp. ■)7o - m
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CHAPTER b______ MALE WORKERS: THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE WOMEN
WORKERS AND THEIR PROBLEMS.
Having set out in the previous chapters, the position of the 
women workers in the system of production, we now look at how the 
men at BSR stood in relation to the women, and how they viewed 
the women workers' problems and experiences. As we noted in 
Chapter 1, the mainstream industrial relations literature is a 
little hazy on the importance of sex-based differences. Here we 
are going to consider how important and relevant these differences 
are.
In a general sense we aim to show that the male workers' views 
of the women workers and their problems tended to be of a particular 
kind and had a number of common themes. These derived from the 
fundamental relationship of inequality prevailing between the sexes 
and were shaped by the ideology which is both its expression and 
practice. We would argue that a number of serious distortions 
are produced as a result of this relationship and that these have 
a "mystificatory effect": one tendency being to render many important 
features of capitalist exploitation "invisible" when they are viewed 
in relation to women. The significance of what we conclude, is 
that these perspectives inform both the understanding and responses 
of male workers, at an individual and collective level,to women 
workers'position and problems in employment. Both these responses 
and the understanding must therefore be viewed as problematic.
As the discussion in this chapter proceeds, points are made and 
examples illustrated by reference to individual opinions expressed 
by the male workers interviewed at BSR. The intention is not to 
suggest any blanket generalisations about "how all the men thought":
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Tlie aim is, rather, to identify some distinctive aspects of those 
perspectives underlying their (individual) views, together with 
some distinctive points of contrast in their position and experience - 
as a means of specifying more closely the nature and shape of those 
sex-based differences of interest we are dealing with. Indeed, 
such sex-based differences can be located within every social 
institution and at any level, but we are focussing on just one point 
of production and section of the working class.
Even so, it is not possible to confine such a discussion of 
the implications and consequences of the sexual division of labour 
to the level of the workplace alone. Differences between men and
women in terms of occupational experience and working relation­
ships clearly do give rise to distinctive sets of interests within 
employment. But the shape of any resolution of these in terms of 
working class organisation and practice is patterned significantly 
by relationships prevailing between the sexes beyond the factory 
gates. We therefore need to see how the perspectives of the 
male workers at BSR on their own and the women's job interests were 
informed by the sexual division of labour both within the labour process 
and outside it.
The sexual division of labour assumes both general and specific 
forms within the two major spheres with which we are concerned - the 
private, and usually family-based household and social production 
(mediated by the labour market). A notable characteristic of ict' 
spheres is the tendency for men and women to live separate, or 
rather segregated lives. In quite crucial respects they can be said 
to occupy different worlds, engendering significantly different
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experiences, problems and consciousness. This assertion of 
distinctiveness is here perhaps the more heavily stressed 
because it is being made against a dominant tendency to consider 
"the family" as an undifferentiated unit and "the wage worker" 
homogeneously male. Such a proclivity serves to hide both the 
existence and also surprising extent of sexual segregation, 
separation and differentiation of experience and interests 
within social institutions and classes - some of the implications 
of which we are concerned to draw out.
In order to do this, the concept "sexual division of labour" 
has, in this analysis, been broken down and two major axes of 
differentiation identified. The first of these is a differentiation 
by function or type of social activity engaging men and women, and 
the second is by an (unequal) distribution of power between them.
Both dimensions entail a separation of interests and, though found 
in conjunction, these lines of separation are of a different order
and need to be distinguished, if proper implications of their effects
„  , .  ( 1 ) are to be drawn.
Why is it important to examine the sources and implications of
interest differentiation arising from the sexual division of labour?
If we are concerned with the matter of interest representation in trade
union structures, these issues could be crucial. Gordon was able
to make such a point plainly - from a male point of view.
(Are there any ways a women shop steward could be 
better than a man or vice versa?)
"Well. Where are we with women's lib? I would 
basically believe that a good male shop steward could 
be better than a woman, because a male shop steward 
could probably understand, deal with a woman's
problem as well as his own men. But I wouldn't say 
the same - that a woman could deal with a male problem."
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(Why is that?)
"Well, the male preserve is still something that a 
woman doesn't finally understand, isn't it 
really? I mean, I think I've got more chance 
of understanding a woman's problem than she would, 
or her women, I would say, than many of them mine. 
Because we haven't had lib. in that ... we haven't 
had unisex, in that long to be completely, shall we 
say, integrated with each other's problems.
So I'd say on balance, that I would have more
chance of understanding her problems. Men have always
dealt with women. And here, although through
the numbers you've got more say 'for' women, than 'for'
men, I would still say on the whole, that a good male
shop steward possibly ...
(What aspects of what you call 'the male preserve' do 
you think it is hardest for a woman to understand?)
"Well let's face it, there are toolrooms and maintenance 
departments here".
(What is it about them which makes them difficult?)
"Well, women have never been, shall we say ... 
women have never been involved in those departments 
have they to that extent? ... Alright you could say, 
adversely - but even the sheer technicality of these 
departments, its possibly - a man could go on the 
line and pick their problems up quicker than a woman 
off the line could go in and pick theirs up, because 
of the technical problems involved ..."
Gordon (Storeman) (2). My emphasis.
It would not be incorrect to say that this chapter is a 
sustained argument against Gordon's assumption that he might have 
a greater chance of understanding a woman's problem in employment 
than she would, either his or her own. Although we are more 
especially concerned with exploring the nature of his, and other 
men's understanding, as this has had, and continues to have, 
significant implications for the representation of women workers' 
interests in male-dominated trade unions.
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first we
examine the position of men in relation to women in the home.
We have already established the significance of domestic 
relationships for women's position in employment; what are the
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implications for male workers? We find that dimensions of
sexual inequality in the domestic/family sphere, for example
greater freedom in terms of control over the disposition of personal
time and scope for independent social activity plus a markedly
different conception of women's relationship to the wage (in
comparison with their own as 1 read-winners and property controllers),
are all aspects which are likely to carry over to the workplace and
have an impact - both attitudinal and material— on relationships between
the sexes there. Moreover we can identify already a distinctively
patterned "double standard" in the men's view of women as the
sex fit for "degrading" wor)^ which reflects the unequal power relationships
within the household - and also outside it. This double standard
also has the effect of "dehumanising" women and blocking generalisation
from men's own experience by the utilisation of alternative criteria.
In the second part of this chapter we go on to look at some of 
the implications of sexual divisions in the labour market. We 
concentrate here on some distinctive aspects of job socialisation, 
and the nature of employment opportunities and experience, as these 
might influence male workers' material position in relation to women 
in the workplace itself. We would argue that sex-segregation, 
although associated with "women's jobs" is, in its practice, more 
thoroughgoing in male dominated occupations. And where men and 
women are employed together, they are likely to be divided along 
lines of authority and/or control. Such differences, together with 
contrasting experience of trade unionism, are likely to have an 
impact on the problems faced by male workers and also their 
responses to them. This differential experience can, of course, be 
expected to shape the men's perspectives on the position of the 
women workers. However, we also find their views are likely to be
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strongly coloured by assumptions - such as the "fitness of women for 
drudgery", which will have a significant effect on the male workers' 
assessments. It would appear that many features of the kind of jobs 
women workers are employed to do, which are considered in themselves 
problematic, lose this status when women are the job-holders. So 
again we note how the utilisation of differential criteria might 
seriously distort awareness of important aspects of capitalist 
exploitation in general and the problems faced by women workers in 
particular.
The way that the men related to the women working at BSR is 
examined in the third part of this chapter. We have already pointed 
out that as a consequence of the sexual division of labour, men and 
women's position in and, therefore, experience of the labour process 
here, was different in a number of important respects: such as the way 
their labour was utilised, their jobs and authority relationships.
And some of the implications of this separation and differentiation
for the way the men evaluated the women's position are further explored here.
Similar lines of differentiation could, of course, be found in 
the ranks of the male workers. But taken overall, the contrasts with 
the women were significant in a number of respects. First, the 
extent that problems experienced by the women workers were not shared 
by the men; secondly, and related to this, the extent to which the 
male workers occupied less inhospitable ground for the maintenance/ 
development of job controls - whatever their rank. Aqain, we might expect 
this differential experience to shape the men's perspectives on the position 
and problems of the women. However, when we examine their approach 
to two major problems which the women at BSR experienced, we find, again, 
that the men's perspectives were structured in ways which were quite
distinct ivo.
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And their patterning; the utilisation of "double standards"; 
the view of women workers as the problem;and the biological 
reductionism, cannot be seen as necessarily or wholly deriving 
from the male workers' experience in the labour process.
We therefore return to examine more closely the nature of 
the relationships between men and women at the workplace.
Subsumed in common, within the relations of employment, we 
consider the impact of other sets of relationships between men 
and women, which mediate and are mediated by the first. We 
find that the lines of power inequality between the sexes structure 
all of these relationships systematically, and thus the differentiation 
of interest between the men and the women. In terms of the male 
workers' perceptions the mediations are complex, but the 
consequences are plain. Since the overall effect is to deny the 
basis of the women workers' problems in the relations of production
and exploitation.
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PART I : MEN AND WOMEN IN THE HOME
"I haven't got any home worries. I've got 
a very efficient wife".
Bob (Serviceman, moulding shop,/"two teenaqe 
children J (3)
We have already seen how the position of the women workers 
at BSR, their needs, problems and perspectives, cannot be 
understood without reference to their position in the home, 
because this shapes their employment experience to such a large 
degree. But what about male workers? It is clearly inadequate 
to assign such significance to the domestic sphere in relation to 
the female workforce alone, so in this section we look at some 
of the implications for the men.
Despite the spread of more "modern" attitudes and apparent 
proliferation of house-husbands, it is still true to say that 
the most important difference structuring the employment experience 
of both men and women springs from the sexual division of labour
( 4 )in the house, and the structures of power in family relationships.
The impact of unpaid domestic labour, child-care responsibilities and 
nurture of kin and spouse are of a very different order in the lives 
of men and women. The nature of this impingement and its 
consequences for women's behaviour and organisation at work is now 
more readily recognised;^^ and occasionally the implications of men's 
freedom from domestic ties is noted too.
But still the main focus of these d iscussions, i . e. the aspect 
which is problematised, is the impact of domestic responsibilities on 
the worker's relationship to his/her employer. We, on the other 
hand, are concerned to explore dimensions of workers' relationships 
with each other. And we are especially interested in the way that
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the men at BSR related to and perceived the women - their 
position, their work and their problems. How were these 
relationships and perceptions shaped?
If the sexual division of labour in the household can be 
so readily identified as having important consequences for 
women's experience of employment, what then is its relevance 
for men? What are the implications of men's freedom from 
certain aspects of domestic life, their authority over women 
in the household, and their relatively greater social power 
outside it, for their position and relationships at the workplace? 
These questions are explored in the following section, where we 
attempt to draw out some implications for the way male workers' 
perceptions and interests were structured by their experience.
Looking at the accounts of the male workers interviewed, 
it is not difficult to discern a number of areas where their life 
circumstances differed materially from those of the women. The 
most striking contrast, as we might exnect» can be found in the 
men's experience of domesticity. Not only are the differences - 
in terms of activity and functions - notable here, but also the 
separateness of many aspects of men and women's domestic life. 
Linked to this, and perhaps more crucially, we can see that this 
sexual division of labour is characterised by power inequality, with 
women subordinated to men.
Numerous consequences arise from the prevailing structure of 
domestic relationships which have implications extending well beyond 
the household. We identify three in particular: first there is
the greater degree of control for men over their own personal time
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which is consequent upon their relative freedom from domestic 
work responsibilities and personal caring; secondly, there is 
the extent of male control over family property; and thirdly 
the markedly greater scope ind extent of men's independent social 
activity. Clearly, significant contrasts in all these areas must 
give rise to sets of probleis and interests of a different order, 
not only between husbands and wives, but also between men and 
women as wage workers.
Domestic Relations: housework and personal caring
(Who does most of the housework at home. Is it 
your wife?)
"Well, I suppose she does most of it ... it just 
depends what kind of mood I'm in whether I do 
it or not - we share".
Terry (Maintenance Charqehand with four school-age 
children) (6)
"Oh well, my women see to all that (domestic 
arrangements) while I'm away. I've even trained 
them to cut the lawns."
Gordon (Storeman with one adult daughter) (7)
The way the sexual division of labour in the household is 
organised will show infinite variations of detail in practice.
But it still remains possible to identify some general features, 
which have implications for men and women outside this sphere. 
First there is the point that an unequal distribution of domestic 
work and responsibilities will provide differing experiences of 
domestic life for husband and wife. And as a consequence, 
significant aspects of domesticity are not only diminished for the 
man, but frequently remain outside of their experience almost 
entirely. The clear lines of demarcation in Gordon's household, 
for instance, provide .a basis for asserting the significance of
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the separateness, as well as the difference in the experiences 
of men and women.
(When she was a b lby were you involved in looking 
after your daughter - changing nappies and bathing 
her, things like that?)
"No - not really." (Did you want to?) "No, I'm 
not domesticated to that extent. No I've got a 
capable wife. If I go out to work - she looks after 
the ... the decision used to be clearer than it is 
now - since unisex and liberation coming in".
(Can you tell me about the household arrangements 
during the week, like - when you do the shopping and 
the washing etc?)
"My dear,I don't know a thing about what she does, 
what they do at home - that's their department and 
what I do at work is my department, and we never 
seem to ... there are three of us at home, we have 
an excellent arrangement. My daughter does all the 
wallpapering, inside. My wife does all the painting 
inside, and I do all the painting outside. Organisation, 
me) I mean if I get anyone in to do a job, carpenter, 
electrician - they ask me a question. I say 'look 
friend, I don't expect you to tell me how to do my 
job, and I've paid you to do a good job for me and so 
don't expect me to tell you how to do yours'. On 
that basis we agreed to run each other like that".
(Your daughter helps in house?) "Oh yes"
(What does she do?) "Oh yes, she cuts my lawns for 
me. She's an excellent cook. Cboks my evening meal 
sometimes."
(Does she do any housework on a regular basis?)
"Oh I don't think they've got it organised. One person 
organising in the household is enough - I want to organise 
everything that ...."
(Do you do any of the domestic jobs?) "No"
(None) "No".
Gordon (Storeman) (0)
Clearly, the unequal distribution of household labour underpins 
familiar and distinctive patterns of employment for men and women 
workers. And this is itself a consequence for each of the relative 
freedom from, or responsibility for, housework and personal caring. 
But as soon as we ask what determines this distributional pattern,
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or what its further consequences may be, it is clear that this 
sexual division of labour in the household cannot be considered 
in its functional aspects alone. Nor can the domestic relationship 
as a whole be isolated from the broader context of unequal power 
relations between men and women in society generally.
The male breadwinner still largely expects to be serviced by 
the female in the home, and to wield personal authority over 
the household:
(What do you think about the fact that most 
domestic work is done by women?)
"Well, my own particular feeling is that the 
wife's place is to ... I married my wife to look 
after me, my children and my home. If I wanted 
a housekeeper, I would hire one. So, in return 
for her doing my cooking, my ironing, my washing,
I provide her with sufficient money to run my home 
and have sufficient capital for environmental 
pleasure - the motor car etc. to be able to go out 
and enjoy life as much as possible on our particular 
income. I've no regrets about the way things have 
worked out. I'm very, very proud of the places 
I've seen and the friends we've made. Very proud 
indeed".
Michael (Carpenter) (9)
(Do you feel that boys should do things like ironing?)
"It is definitely very very useful indeed. There may 
come a time where ... he might be a batchelor that 
does his own ironing, unless he is fortunate enough 
to have his ladyfriend to live with him".
Michael (Carpenter) (lO)
"Well, my eldest daughter’s fifteen now, so I've 
made her take over the ironing".
Tony (Maintenance Chargehand) (11)
"Before my daughter came to stay - it was nothing for 
me to do all the washing up, prepare my own dinner, 
prepare my own snap for coming out ...."
Bob (Serviceman Moulding Shop) (12)
These comments do not just indicate the unequal division of 
domestic work. They show how the men considered that they had
choices ("If I wanted a housekeeper, I would hire one"), and
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exercised control over who did domestic work ("I've made her 
take over the ironing"). Such control is also implicit in the 
expectations that it is exceptional for men to do domestic work 
("he might be a batchelor that does his own ironing") which can 
be resolved by women taking up their "natural" servicing role, 
thus relieving the men from this unusual position ("before my 
daughter came to stay").
Some of the implications of this aspect of power in the domestic
relationship can be pursued by examining Ernie's account, as he
was particularly prepared to discuss such matters. He was
clearly proud of his wife and two young daughters. Kitty worked
at BSR in the moulding department from lO a.m. - 2 p.m., fitting
in housework and family care around these hours which extended
well into the evening. In his frank assessment Ernie could see
how he gained from the "traditional" division of labour.
(Do you think the fact that most domestic work 
is done by women is a 'good thing','bad thing',
'just natural' or what?)
"Well, I feel like saying custom and practice. I mean 
you just take it for granted that women do the 
domestic chores and all that. Is it a good thing 
or not? I'd say it was natural,whether its a good 
thing or not I don't know. It's possibly a good 
thing from my point of view - because the domestic 
work, they're menial tasks which I wouldn't like 
to become involved with you know. Well that's it - 
there can't be any interest in them can there, you 
know what I mean?".
Ernie (Maintenance Fitter - Deputy Covenor)(13)
Implicit in the view expressed is the notion that work which 
is considered (by men) to be menial and degrading is the"natural" 
province of women. Degradation of women by men is a consistent 
and in fact quite explicit aspect of our culture, even if it is 
not always clearly recognised. That it pervades close personal
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relationships is not surprising, nor that it should have wider 
consequences in terras of the collective organisation of men and 
women. If women cannot be considered "human" in the same way 
as men - if they are "de-humanised" — then their situation in 
the home, in the workplace or anywhere else cannot be judged by 
the same standards or understood by men by criteria they might 
use in relation to themselves.
We would argue that this "double standard", as well as 
the separation and differentiation of lived experience, are all 
manifestations of unequal power relationships. We have to 
note already, therefore, that this must have an impact on men's 
perceptions of women's position, problems and priorities in any 
other context.
Property Relations: male ownership, possession and control
One of the inumerable ways that the discrepancy in social 
power between the sexes is made manifest in the husband/wife 
relationship, is therefore, the pattern of sexually divided 
responsibilities in the household - where men have the power to 
command the personal services of women. This, we have suggested, 
has wider implications for the way men relate to women and for 
the way they perceive women's position. We are particularly 
interested to explore how these and other aspects of sexual inequality 
are relevant in the workplace. And in this respect there are 
two more features, also strongly apparent in the domestic relationship, 
which can be identified. These concern male/female differences 
in relation to control over the disposition of property, on the one 
hand, and over personal time, on the other.
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Taking the question of property first, we can approach 
this by examining the way that the men and women workers at 
BSR expressed the purpose of their wages and also their 
relationship to family possessions. There were some interesting 
similarities and differences here.
For instance, there was a marked discrepancy in the way the 
wage-earning men and women interviewed referred to the disposition 
of their wages within their own households. All the workers at 
BSR were paid in cash at this time, but still the tendency was 
for males to refer to the use of their money for "capital"items 
like the house and car and paying the bills, while the females said 
their wage went on "current" expenditures like the weekly groceries, 
things for the children and "extras we would not have otherwise".
In addition, when the males were asked about the disposition of 
their wives' wages (all except one had regular paid employment) 
they described a similar pattern.
However, such a coincidence of views on the different 
functions of men and women's wages was not repeated in terms of family 
possessions. While the men reinforced their view of themselves 
as the purchasers of the main household items by reference to 
themselves as house and property owners - viz "my house", "m^ car", 
etc - the women tended to refer to joint or family ownership - viz 
"our house", "our car" - unless specifically, and much more rarely, 
having their own.
Car use and "ownership" is a very interesting aspect of 
control over property in the family. Terry's case is probably 
quite common.
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(If your wife didn’t work, what sort of things 
would you have to do without?)
"The car would have to go straight away. Put 
it this way. Her money subsidises the car, 
quite honestly. It's the only luxury we have, 
in any respect like that”
Terry (Maintenance Chargehand) (15)
But it was by no means her err.
Terry's wife could not drive and, in fact, experienced 
considerable transport difficulties herself as a nurse on nights, 
who had to walk l1! miles home after working an 11 hour shift.
On the other hand, Ernie's wife did use the car and "she pays 
half towards it". But their internal monetary arrangements ensured 
it remained his financial responsibility, and therefore under his 
"ownership". He gave her housekeeping money which she added to 
her own wage (£26) and spent on groceries. When they purchased the 
car and then the automatic washing machine, he took her contribution 
towards these out of the housekeeping he gave her. "You know, I 
only end up giving her about £3 per week now, like out of ...."
(some ElOO). Thus it was "his" money which was actually spent on 
the "capital" items.
In such ways is the authority of status of the breadwinner 
maintained in terms of ownership and control over property and, 
thereby also, a demarcation maintained between men and women's 
relationship to the wage. Such distinctions, reflected in the 
sometimes highly complex financial arrangements between husband and 
wife,can be seen generalised in such persistent ideological notions 
as women's wages being "less important", the secondary wage or 
"pin-money" . But the arrangements themselves indicate a reality
of women's subordination through continued economic dependence which
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it is not necessarily in men's interests to reverse.
Jenny,for example, took home £32 per week. Her husband
paid all the bills and gave her £12 housekeeping money.
"I don't have a wage, but I have £12 off him 
for food ... and I don't get any more than that 
at all. Because he believes ... he said that 
a woman shouldn't go out to work to keep a man.
So to give him his bit of independence, he gives 
me £12.
Then I put that with my money and the boys' money 
of course, and I sort of ... If we need a new carpet, 
I save. And I buy the carpet - save him that 
expense. I buy ray own clothes - apart from gifts, 
he very rarely buys us anything."
Jenny (Final Assembly) (16)
Personal Relations: Possession and control
The third aspect of the relationship between men and women 
in domestic life which seems to throw up marked discrepancies 
in experience, concerns the scope of independent activity and 
the degree of control exercised over their own free time. In 
terms of the amount of free time available, there were quite definite 
differences. From the discussion of the women's domestic 
commitments, it was fairly clear that none of the married women 
seemed to have any free time whatever. Moreover, when discussing 
their social life, hobbies and interests, only two women, one 
showing dogs and the other closely supporting her daughter's 
involvement in show-jumping, could discuss activities not directly 
related to their homes. And neither of these took place outside 
of family relations. Most hobbies then, comprised an extension 
of domestic tasks, particularly sewing and knitting - with attendance 
at the union branch meeting being the only occasion most of the women
ever went out of the home "on their own".
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In contrast to this, the men could produce an impressive 
list of hobbies and interests, and a social life which regularly took 
them outside of home and family (e.g. pub and sport).
When, however, these male workers were asked about their wives' 
activities, they were generally hard pressed for answers - and quickly 
returned to themselves:
(Does your wife have any hobbies or interests?)
"Family. Yes. Well I'm starting with a new interest 
for me, I used to hate gardening, but I like to grow my 
own vegetables and stuff and I've told a friend of 
mine who's in an allotment association to keep his 
eye out - because I've found a bit of fun in growing 
my own vegetables actually".
Terry (Maintenance Chargehand) (17)
"No, to be quite truthful I've never known my wife 
have a definite hobby, you know that? Funny you 
asked that question. Really my hobby was life, 
involvement, you know".
(When you were doing all your voluntary work what did 
your wife do?)
"Well, she was at home with the kids and that is 
another reason I packed the whole lot in - it 
affected my family".
Bob (Serviceman Moulding Shop)(18)
(How did you arrange it when the children were young?)
"We always arranged to have one person in to look after 
the children". /He went to Scouts twice a week - she 
stayed in_7
(Did she go out?)
"We got baby-sitters to go out together"
(Did she ever go out on her own?)
"I believe she did once go on an evening institute 
course to the swimming baths to learn to swim ..."
Michael (Carpenter )(19).
Why was there such a difference between the men and women?
Had the latter ever had an Independent social life - at least, before
having children? When both were asked about hobbies or interests
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which had now been given up, the women interviewed could find 
answers (usually sports or dancing), as easily as the men - but 
their reasons for giving up were markedly different.
"I used to do ice-skating but I gave it up when 
I met my husband - because he couldn't skate and 
then he got fed ip when I was having my lesson, 
and he was having to sit and watch. He just 
stopped coming with me, and that meant I was having 
to go on the bus - and then he'd moan because I 
wasn't ready when he was coming for me .... 
so I gave it up.
I used to go with friends every Sunday. And then 
we decided we'd have a lesson, you know. I 
didn't get very far ..."
(Would you have liked to have carried that on?)
"Yes, I would actually. I enjoyed doing that.
But he didn't like it, because he couldn't do it.
He kept falling over".
Barbara (Final Assembly) (20)
It appeared that the women most frequently abandoned all types 
of independent activity when they formed their marriage relationships, 
in particular their outdoor hobbies and their employment.
Although this was hardly at all true of themselves, when the men 
were asked similar questions about their wives, they revealed much 
the same picture, and it is interesting to see their view of this 
and the way they recognised that marriage had seen the end of whatever 
independent activities their wives had been involved in.
(Was your wife working before you got married?)
"Yes, tailoress - she gave it up after the war.
(Was there any reason why she stopped?)
"No". (Did you want her to stop?). "Oh yes, I
didn't want her to go to work.
(Did whe want to stop?) "I think so, yes....
I may be old fashioned, but there we are".
(Did she have hobbies she's given up now?)
"I believe she used to be a good tennis player.
(When did she give that up?)
"Oh many years ago, when she met me".
Gordon (Storeman) (21)
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(Did your wife work before she had children?)
"Yes, she was an invoice clerk in a personnel office".
(Did she mind giving up work at all?)
"No, no, no. Family first - a case of family first.
I influenced her in no way - family started and that 
was it".
(Did she have hobbies in the past which she's given up?)
"Yes, athletics. She was good at running and jumping".
(When did she stop?)
"Oh gosh. X think the day we were married".
(Why was that?) "I don't know. I don't know at all.
There was no apparent reason for it. She keeps pretty 
fit at the moment".
(Did she used to compete?). "Oh yes. She competed. We 
have proud prizes to prove it, on our dressing table".
(Did you try to get her to carry on?) "Oh, I'm always 
on about it. In fact, it seems to me that the more I 
carry on to her about what she's missed by not 
continuing it, she fights against me by determining not 
to continue with these things. She's happy, she's 
quite happy".
Michael (Carpenter) (22).
The limited nature of girls' activities compared with boys' 
and the further rapid decline in the independent activity of women - 
however voluntary - which is associated with men's possessive relation­
ships and attempts to gain control, has long been expressed by 
women themselves. It is interesting to note Ernie's account of this 
process perpetrated against his wife. In the course of it, he refers 
to an occasion when they had taken up jogging together for one evening 
in the week. When the evenings grew light, his wife refused to continue 
as she felt too embarrassed. It is clear that women are inhibited
in their activities by strong social as well as personal controls. (23)
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(Does your wife have any hobbies?)
"Actually, I might be at fault here. I would 
probably resent her having a hobby because you know 
I'd think of it as taking her away from me like.
Once again, I'm being perfectly honest, like I 
have been all the way through with you - I think 
she would possibly like a hobby on her own, even 
if it was a matter of going to keep-fit evening 
class or something like that. And I probably wouldn't 
help her. I wouldn't say - oh yes, that'd be a great 
idea, you know. I'd probably be ... what's it - by 
my silence about it like. You know what I mean?
I'd possibly like her to have hobbies, but I'd like to 
be involved with her. I s'pose jealousy comes into 
it, or something. I probably would resent her 
having something on her own that would take her away 
from me, you know".
(Did she used to have her own interests?)
"Well, she loves dancing. She loves dancing even 
now like. We go to dances. I possibly don't like 
dancing as much as she does... And she used to enjoy 
jogging except when the embarrassment thing came in - 
when the light nights came in ..."
(Does she go out in the evening during the week?)
"Not as a regular pattern. If there's some particular 
women's thing organised - a trip or night out ... 
well whenl say I let her go, don't get the wrong 
impression, she goes and I don't mind her going like,
I trust her. But there isn't any actual function 
where she goes out on her own."
Ernie (Maintenance Fitter and Deputy Covenor)(24).
If a wife's independent social activity can be seen as a 
possible cause of "unnecessary aggravation" for the husband, this 
effect may also result from her employment - even when this is 
essential and arranged so as to "fit in" with her domestic 
responsibilities. Soon after having her second child Ernie's wife 
took an evening job. They had just moved house and were 
experiencing financial difficulties. So she went out to the factory 
after a strenuous day with two small children. But he was 
immediately aware of his own loss of freedom.
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"She went out to work... which was giving up her 
freedom. But as I saw it, it was also giving 
up some of my freedom, because I was spending 
evenings when I might possibly be out, even 
when I say out, I don't necessarily mean 'on my 
own' - out, just out - even with my wife, you 
know. She was at work, and I wasn't really having 
the choice, I'd got to stay in & look after the 
kids. Unless I got a baby sitter, but there again, 
the one counteracted the other, because if you get 
a baby sitter, you'd got to pay her like'.":.
Ernie (Maintenance Fitter) (25)
Clearly, it was more than just the loss of free time 
which exercised Ernie here. More essentially he had suffered a 
restriction on his freedom to dispose - not only of his own 
"free time", but also his wife's time. Whatever the extent 
to which it might be circumscribed in practice, we would maintain 
that men's expectations generally,in this respect, stand in stark 
contrast to those of most married women who have little "free time" 
anyway, if only because it is disposed by others who expect to 
be able to do so.
Conclusions
Since most of the generalisations concerning the sexual division 
of labour in the household have already been argued elsewhere, our 
purpose has been to use the experiences and perspectives of the 
male workers interviewed illustratively, and as a means of drawing 
out some further propositions. Thus, what these few examples show 
about the different positions of men and women in domestic relationships, 
is nothing new. Men, to a greater extent than women, can concentrate 
their activities in the sphere of the social rather than the private 
world, and manage to retain a more direct relationship to property.
As a result they clearly have, in comparison, greater access as a
whole to social power resources. Can we assume that the
processes by which this inequality is maintained, whether within 
the family or outside it, are without further consequences?
As we have attempted to she»’, they effect a differentiation of 
function and discrepancy of power which must qive rise, subsequently, 
to distinctive interests and problems on the part of men and women 
at the workplace, and significantly pattern the relationship between 
them as well.
We have noted that men have greater freedom to dispose their 
own personal time and that this is to an important extent dependent 
upon their share of domestic work and personal caring being 
devolved onto women - from whom there is an expectation of personal 
(and sexual) service as well. This underlines the extent to which 
men also (expect to) maintain control over women's activities 
and use of their time, especially (but not necessarily exclusively) 
within the domestic relationship. This is seen further reflected 
in the marked differences between the two parties in terms of their 
independent social activity.
To the extent also that women's subordination is based upon 
their economic dependence we can expect to find this inequality 
expressed in their relationship both to family property - with 
ownership and control vested in the men - and the wage. The wages 
of men and women may not be equal in amount, but they are not 
conceptualised in similar terms or assigned equal significance 
either. Moreover the relationship of the wage earner to the 
wage appears to differ (" his money" and "our money"), with the degree 
of independent control exercised over its disposition , and the 
extent to which it is invested in tangible property (car, washing
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machine) rather than the more intangible (groceries, petrol) 
yet necessary goods.
What broader implications flow from these aspects of the 
domestic relationship for men's relations with women at the 
workplace? What kind of view, for example, can male workers 
have of women workers, if they do not conceptualise their wages 
on similar or equal terms, if they understand domestic work as 
menial and boring - yet perfectly fit for women; and if they 
seek to exert control over women's independent activities, in short 
to manage them?
Taken together, it is clear that while these have been 
highlighted as aspects of on-going inter-personal relationships 
in the domestic sphere, they have implications which extend beyond 
this. Indeed each one indicates the existence of strong 
and widely operative perspectives underlying men's relationships 
with women, which are continuously being put into effect in the 
course of their daily lives. What is the nature of these "widely 
operative perspectives?" And why are they significant?
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SEXISM
Sexism,as an ideology of inequality, refers to any conscious 
or unconscious practice - attitudes, language, behaviour - which 
asserts male domination and/or superiority, and women's subordination 
and/or inferiority. Thus we can point to the presumption that men 
expect to wield authority and control over women generally. And 
the expectation of personal service in the home is a particular 
manifestation of this, as is the restriction of women's independent 
activity outside of it. Both can be seen as material aspects 
of a society-wide male domination, which has in fact to be 
continuously re-established in every sphere.
If one consequence of this social process, constantly 
reproduced through pervasive sexist practices, is an active denial 
of female equality accompanied by a negative view of women (i.e. 
the assessment of women by male criteria, in terms of what they are 
not) it is important to examine the other side too, which is 
much less explicit. For a perspective is also being expressed 
through sexism, as to what (men see) women are ! essentially, not 
only subordinate but, by male criteria, sub-human. And when this 
is examined it becomes clear that sexism is, essentially, an ideology 
of degradation;and this, as a widely operative practice, must certainly 
have significant implications for men's view of and response to 
women's problems and experience-in the workplace, or anywhere 
else for that matter.
The social and especially the domestic contexts are, therefore, 
important if we are considering the differences between men and 
women workers outlook and 'life' experiences. And also, of course, 
their approach to relationships with each other. We are concentrating
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here on aspects of men's experience which might be expected to give 
them a particular view of the position of women in employment.
And we would argue that what makes these views distinctive is the 
fact that they incorporate a special range of underlying 
assumptions which do not opsrate in the same way when men look at 
male workers or generalise about themselves.
A number of crucial implications can be seen to arise from this.
On the one hand, male workers may fail to generalise from their 
own experience, as a means of understanding the position of women 
workers, or by operating a "double standard" fail to utilise 
the same criteria for assessment. The "gap" is filled with 
stereotypical and "unrealistic" views instead, which serve to 
block out or actively close down alternative means of evaluation.
On the other hand, male workers may proceed to make generalisations 
and assessments which are, in fact, more valid for the men than 
the women. Their understanding is skewed through a failure to 
recognise or accord proper significance to the most crucial differences 
in their situations.
In the third part of this chapter we can see that these processes 
had a number of consequences in terms of the male workers' perception 
of and relationship to the women workers at BSR. But before 
turning to discuss the relationships prevailing between men and 
women on the shop floor, it is first necessary to indicate further 
(and prior) bases of differentiation, deriving from the labour market.
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PART 2 :  MEN AND WOMEN IN THE LABOUR MARKET
"Women are more suited to the type of job they're 
doing here aren't they? (Are they?) "X think so.
I mean because ... women do the tedious jobs don't 
they?” Gordon (Storeman) (26)
The labour market is the sphere wherein all wage workers are 
initially related to each other, and yet also differentiated.
Linking family/household and employment relations, these market 
structures and processes are complex in their mediation. They 
ultimately find expression however in the characteristic and quite 
distinctive job histories of male and female workers. We are 
particularly interested to explore the way such differences are 
reflected in the nature of men and women’s employment experience.
And in the context of BSR, using the individual job histories of those 
interviewed, to examine more closely the implications which follow 
for male workers' relationships and responses to the position of women 
in the workplace.
Such prominent industrial and occupational segregation of the 
sexes as exists in the labour market and employment generally, may be 
seen to constitute at least three important dimensions differentiating 
male and female workers' experience with significant effects. First, 
in terms of job choice, where patterns of demand for labour allied 
to opportunities training and the acquisition (and use) of skills 
and experience differ markedly between the coxes. Being far more 
restricted for women than men, the latter's strong position is 
reflected in their greater security and confidence in the workplace 
and corresponding lack of appreciation of the women workers' position.
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The second aspect we look at, job socialisation, draws out 
further the implications for male workers of their distinctive 
relationships with women in employment. We identify two features 
in particular which might t ;nd to shape their perspectives: 
the extent of segregation ard separation characteristic of male 
dominated work areas, occupations and industries, and the sexual 
divisions along lines of authority and control which prevail where 
men and women are employed together. A further distinctive aspect 
of men and women's job socialisation is their differential 
experience of trade union organisation. This was quite marked 
among the men and women interviewed, and although it probably 
varies regionally it is clearly linked also to the structure of 
the labour market.
In the final section we explore some aspects of the way male 
workers relate to "women's work", before going on in Part III 
of this chapter to examine in more detail their perceptions of 
the women's needs and interests in the labour process at BSR.
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Job Choice
Job choice for women in general is far smaller than that for 
men; and even this narrow range is considerably reduced when 
there is a need to find employment under terms and conditions 
which fit in with domestic responsibilities and women's relative 
physical immobility. These restrictions are clearly reflected 
in overall statistics, and unsurprisingly they were replicated 
in the individual job histories of the men and women interviewed.
We have already noted some major implications of this 
confinement to the poorer sector of employment from the women's 
point of view; one concerned the increased dependence on 
particular employers which may tend to inhibit confidence and 
freedom of action in the workplace. It is clear that the question 
of employment security cannot be restricted to the job which is 
currently held. It also extends to include the possibility of 
replacing it with another which is as good or better. Hence the 
direct relevance of the labour market; and the importance of 
historical and regional variations and trends within it, which 
structure the job choice of different groups of workers, and underpin 
their scope for organisation in any one industry or workplace.
Male workers' understanding of this in relation to their own 
situation is clear. Terry, for example, was a skilled maintenance 
fitter. He and his like have been generally considered more 
secure than most manual worker, in 1 hail "bility to hold their 
position in the labour market. Yet even in relation to his own 
"cohort" there were differences. And Terry was aware of how 
his wider experience benefitted him. He had been able to utilise 
and build upon his employment opportunities, in order to broaden
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the basis of his skills, thus strengthening his position in the 
labour market relative to others - even in this relatively 
privileged group.
" I know lads now, who I served my apprenticeship 
with. They're still there, they've never 
moved. They couldn't work anywhere else I 
don't think - to bi quite honest. They 
probably wouldn't have the confidence to work 
anywhere else. They know that job and they know 
everything that goes on there, but if it came 
to going somewhere else - say you've got lO weeks 
to suit another job. I don't think some of them 
could do this."
Terry (Maintenance Chargehand) (27)
Bob was employed as an unskilled labourery and therefore
somewhat closer to the position of the women workers. But once
he had worked in the electrical trade; and again his position in
the labour market can be seen reflected explicitly in terms of
confidence at the workplace.
"I'm in a luxury position here, alright. I'm 
a shop steward, and I speak my mind just because 
I am a shop steward; but over and above that,
I can speak my mind if I like - I've got two trades 
(And) If I want to, I can say sod it ..."
Bob (Serviceman, Moulding Shop) (28)
The question of skills and employer dependency is therefore 
a further point of differentiation, reflecting the (varying) 
extent to which male, as compared to female workers, may 
generally be better placed to avoid the inherent tendency for 
employers to render their skills both easily replicated and 
company or job specific - since this reduces their market strength 
and "transferability". Allied to this is the fact that the 
specific skills women workers do possess, such as sewing or 
typing, tend to be widely generalised within this group which is, 
at the same time, strongly "ghettoised" In the labour market and
thus subject to strong competitive pressures.
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Job socialisation
It is clear that the highly distinctive patterns of employers' 
demand for (and use of) female labour mean that most male workers 
neither share their experience in the labour market nor their experience 
in employment. Placing two BSR workers' job histories side by side, 
that of a woman or a man could never be mistaken the one for the 
other. This suggests that "job-socialisation" is likely to be of 
a very different order for male and female workers - particularly 
when they are employed in sex-segregated occupations. Are there 
any distinctive features of male workers' job socialisation which 
might shape their perceptions of, and relationship to, women workers?
JOB SEGREGATION AND SEPARATION
In the first place, men are far more likely to be found in an 
exclusively single sex labour force than women. Since women's 
work is invariably controlled by men employed alongside them in a 
technical and/or managerial capacity it is men who work in entirely 
sex segregated industries and workforces. We look first at some of 
the consequences of this "functional" separation.
Given that we are interested in the men’s perception of the 
women workers' problems, what are the implications of a sex-segregated 
employment experience?
Jim, for example, had worked as a labourer in a number of 
(unhealthy) metal treatment plants typical of the Black Country. 
Galvanising or stripping and plating are "dirty" trades employing
few women
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(When you first came to BSR what was the hardest 
thing you found to get used to?)
"The hardest thing I found to do was to walk into 
the shop. Because you see, where I was working, it 
was away from the main department. I was in the 
stripping shop, and at that time I'd never worked 
with women and I used to get very ... I must have been 
very shy or something, I wouldn't go in. It 
gradually came about (and) I didn't trouble after."
(How long did it take you to get used to it?)
"About six months. I'll bet. It did, yes. It 
was just when I came. And if I'd got to walk 
through the shop, oh my God! I could have sunk 
through the floor! I could yes. Because I'd never 
worked with women before, you see, they'd always 
been men. And then you walk through a shop with 
about 2 or 300 women there, all looking at you - 
especially when you was fresh, you know, fresh face, 
and they all look at you. I could feel the colour 
coming up, all over, I could ! So I'd always used to 
go all the way round the outside. I had —  around 
by the gates - I had! (laughs). But the one woman 
worked up there . . .
Well, I knew her dad you see on account of - I used to 
keep pigeons and race, you know, I was a pigeon fancier - 
and her dad was one, and we were in the same club.
And if he came and asked me, or I came and asked him, 
we used to go down there. And of course, gradually 
she'd come to me, and I'd have to go and tell her 
something, and gradually I got used to it you see."
Jim (Serviceman, Moulding Shop). (29)
Jim eventually became a shop steward in the Moulding Shop where
he worked as a serviceman. His constituents were all women, with
whom, he now considered, he got on very well.
"I'm not really the shy type now, as I used to be.
I talk to 'em, well - they swear at me and I swear 
at 'em back ... In the same way as they speak to me,
I speak to them back".
Jim (Serviceman, M^uldinn Shop )(JG).
Yet, it seems, the two worlds still remained somewhat separated by 
a "communications" gap.
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(Are there any ways a woman shop steward can be better 
than a man or vice versa?)
"Yes. I think that a woman is better than a man here”.
(Why ?)
"Because one woman can talk to another can't her?
But a man can't really argue with a woman, can he?
Not really. He can't really express himself, to her"
Jim (Serviceman, Moulding Shop)(31)
Simply looking at the question of job segregation and 
socialisation from the point of view of the physical separation 
of the sexes, we can see how this has implications for the way 
women's position at work may be experienced and/or perceived by men 
whose contact with them may be minimal.
But there is a further dimension of this sex-segregated work 
experience to be considered. And we look now at the implications 
of the separation along authority lines. Jim's history can be taken 
as a case in point. An "untrained", "unskilled" worker with 
nevertheless a working knowledge of his trade, he was originally 
made a chargehand responsible for running BSR's metal treatment plant 
and put in authority over male and female workers. And it is surely 
very commonly the case, that where men do work alongside women, 
they are either in positions of authority over them, or in positions 
allowing them greater control over the women's work than the women 
can exert over theirs. Or it may be that both of these positions 
apply at the same time.
Where, for example, skilled craftsmen supervise unskilled 
women workers, the combination of technical and managerial control is
unmistakeable.
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Michael was a fully trained carpenter whose first experience
of working with women was in a factory where he was made a chargehand.
It was also his first taste of factory work which he experienced as
a problem in relation to both his previous experience and also his
sense of himself as a craftworker.
teaching girls to use wood tools - we made 
schools articles - chalk boxes, blackboard rubbers, 
T-squares".
(This was the first time you'd ever worked with women?)
"Yes, I got on very well indeed with them. But what I 
didn't like, I was forced by the management and 
circumstances to tighten up on the time the women 
spent at the toilets, the time they powder-puffed 
themselves, and that I resented. But that was part 
of my job ... It was ... the system, at the time".
(That was more of a factory job - did you find that 
difficult to get used to?)
"Yes I did really. It was sort of military to what 
I was used to - up at the bell, breakdown at the 
bell, break-whereas on a building site you don't even 
clock in, but you have to be more or less there at 
eight - but you're not tied to seconds, you know.
Vast difference that was".
Michael (Carpenter) (32)
Nowhere in his discussion of his time at this factory did Michael
consider that those things he found irksome might also have been
a problem for the women. The women did not have problems, they
constituted, more significantly, his problem.
(At Helix - in your opinion, what was the main 
problem that the women working there had?)
"The main problem was trying to get the young ladies 
interested in the job. They came to pick a packet up 
and go home. We had to make things that were on 
display, in schools, that was the hardest thing I 
found: 'Oh, never mind that, we've only got so much
time to make this - we've got to make it - it's up to 
you to make our jobs easier, so that we can earn that 
money'".
Michael (Carpenter) (33).
Michael returned to the building trade and did not join a "mixed” 
labour force again until employed at BSR, and here he worked in 
the carpenters' shop which was separated from where the women worked.
We return to his views on their position in this labour process 
in a later section.
There is a third dimension to job socialisation which also 
to some extent derives from differences in labour market position 
between men and women - to be considered - and this concerns 
their uneven experience of trade union organisation. This has 
particular relevance for our study, and again the individual job 
histories can be used to illustrate some general points.
TRADE UNION EXPERIENCE
Of the fourteen women stewards interviewed who had been 
employed before coming to BSR, ten had worked in places where 
no trade union had any known presence. Their first contact with 
a trade union, and experience of working with unionised workers 
therefore, began when they joined the company. And it came when 
they reached the age - on average - of 40.
None of the men interviewed had been in this position. Only 
one had not been a member before and he had been employed in more 
managerial positions. Even though most of the men had not maintained 
a consistent or active membership themselves, nor had they always 
worked in unionised workplaces, it is clear that in contrast to the 
women a trade union and trade unionists constituted a presence in 
their work experience rather than absence. And this, of course, is 
to illustrate a general point: that the structure of employment 
bears a significant relationship to union organisation; and sexual 
divisions in the labour market see, in effect, the better unionised
(34)sectors skewed away from the women.
CONCLUSIONS
In this section we have looked at individual job histories as 
a way of exploring several aspects differentiating men and women at 
the workplace which spring from and relate back to their positions 
in the labour market. While thesr are individual examples, there are 
important features of Jim's and Michael's job histories springing from 
sex structured differentiations in the labour market which can be 
considered quite widely applicable if we are, for instance, 
considering the nature of sex differences in "job socialisation". 
Because a generalised situation whereby male workers are either
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employed more or less separately from women or, if not, in situations 
where they are in a position to exercise control over women and/or 
the women's work, must be significant when we come to consider the 
kind of appreciation male workers may have of women workers' problems, 
whether these are of a different, or even a quite similar nature to 
their own. And certainly a stronger labour market position in 
general, combined with their different traditions of working with trade 
unionists or in unionised workplaces, is also likely to have an 
impact on the kinds of problems the men themselves might face, and 
also the kinds of responses they might consider appropriate and open 
to them. Both of these again are likely to inform their perspectives 
on the women workers' position.
Men's work and women's work
Before leaving this section on labour market relations, there is 
another important aspect which our approach in terms of differential 
job socialistation and experience has missed. But any discussion of 
the male workers' position in relation to that of women workers and their 
problems must also consider thr men's position in relation to 
"women's work".
Of all the characteristics identified and itemised as peculiar 
to "women's jobs" perhaps the roost obvious (and often the least 
mentioned) is the fact that men are frequently highly resistant to 
doing them. While stressful, subservient, monotonous drudgery is 
disliked by people generally, in an unequal society men are better 
able to refuse or avoid it - and when they can they do. This fact 
and the reasons behind it are more rarely examined than, say, 
barriers to women taking up"men's" work.
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But scattered references to male "cross employment" exist, 
which point to a more stubborn basis for job segregation than 
straightforward employer discrimination or "wages and poor conditions" 
arguments altogether sustain. Thus, an experiment in Sweden to 
"cross-employ" men and women in telecommunications, by external 
recruitment and internal transfer, could find only 25 male 
participants to do the work normally performed by women and a mere 
3 of these were applications from within the employing organisation 
itself. 81 women took part. Over the first two years, only 4 of 
the 81 women had dropped out of the programme and the majority were 
reported as enthusiastic about their new jobs. But only 8 of the 
hard-won men said they enjoyed their work. The rest - criticising 
the monotony, limited scope for advancement, lack of responsibility
and low pay—  stated they would only stay on for as long as it took
(35)them to find another job. Closer to home, when a mixed intake
of school leavers learnt wiring on a job experience scheme sponsored
by Coventry Corporation, the boys apparently learnt more quickly
than the girls (despite the latters' much-famed nimble fingers).
But the boys, in the end, went off and found other jobs and the girls,
for whom there was little alternative, were the only ones left trying
C 36)to find work with their major employer - GEC.
Perhaps it may be difficult to disentangle how far such examples 
reflect the technical characteristics of the work and their subservience, 
and how far their specific identification as "women's work" (with the 
typically associated pay levels, status , promotion opportunities, etc). 
Nevertheless, we would argue that the nature of job content and work 
relations (in the light of possible alternatives), are certainly 
significant in respect of men and women's occupational "choices".
This includes, of course, their "refusals" - which they are not 
equally placed to do. This aspect of resistance can be further 
highlighted by the reported experience of male workers in a 
biscuit factory. A number of the foremen and also male Pakistanis 
sweeping up (the only other men there) had tried, at one time or 
another, doing the "women's"job - which was packing different shaped 
biscuits into different shaped boxes as they came past on a conveyor 
belt. Apparently, none of the men found themselves able to do this
work. As they told their startled interviewer, this was because
. (37)after twenty minutes they all got dizzy and fell over.
These examples of the way men avoid "women's work^ ' and indeed 
are able to do so, reflect the view they have of it. How then do men
see those workers who are less well placed to refuse or resist?
In our examination of the women's problems in employment at
BSR, it was found that these were not simply related to the general
issues of poor pay and conditions, but crucially to the nature of
the task - its repetition and monotony - and work relationships -
the domination and driving - within which their jobs were situated.
Their struggle was one against "dehumanisation and stress". How
did the men perceive this? This was Gordon's view:
(What do you think of management's attitude to women 
and girls?)
"They have certain jobs to do and they have to achieve 
it. I couldn't see there'd be any basic difference.
Women are more suited to the type of job they're doing 
here aren't they?" (Are they?) "I think so, I mean 
because women do the tedious jobs don't they? I couldn't 
go and sit there on the line and do the same job hour 
after hour, day after day, week after week like that.
I mean the job is tedious isn't it, but those types of 
jobs ... They're more suited to women, surely, aren't 
they?"
(Do you think women like doing those sort of jobs?)
"No X don't think they like doing them. No-one 
really - there aren't many people that you could 
really say, enjoy their work. The largest percentage 
of people down at the bottom - that's why they fill 
in the pools coupon every week - they hope to ruddy well 
retire ... I mean they'd sooner be doing something 
else. I think over the years and more so in the 
production of the factory - you're not likely to enjoy 
your job so much. Because you see, you can't see the 
end product ...
'•But sursly women are used to those types of jobs, 
aren't they, on the line more so than men ?
Well I think they are, yes - It's their make-up isn't 
it really. I mean you can sit and knit quite steadily 
but a man couldn't could he? ... I mean, the more 
manual jobs - whereas I wouldn't admit it, being a male, 
women have got more patience on the whole - I must 
admit, you know, they've got more patience on the 
job - on that job anywayT 
Gordon (Storeman) (38).
Gordon's comments are particularly relevant here. In the first 
place we have identified a number of "undesirable" features 
characteristically found in "women's jobs" which workers in general 
might wish to avoid (although men are better placed in the labour 
market than women to actually do so). It might still be expected, 
however, that these job features would retain their status as being 
problematic. But in Gordon's account, when women are the job-holders, 
it is quite apparent that they do not. What lies behind this significant 
shift? And what are the implications of this reversal? The second 
question is easier to answer, for it is clear we are seeing a complete 
denial of the problems of the women workers which derive from the 
nature of the job at BSR.
As to the nature of the "conceptual break" which we have noted, 
perhaps two points can be made. In the first place, there recurs a 
similar theme and pattern in Gordon's perception of the women workers'
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position, to that which we have already identified in relation to
(39)Ernie and his views about degrading household drudgery.
Namely, that it is no longer degrading drudgery when this work is 
performed by a woman - a perspective which stems, ultimately, from 
a "degraded" view of women in toto. And one which moreover 
switches easily into the proposition that woman (instead) is 
problematic - which we have also come across with Michael.
Following from this we would suggest, therefore, that 
alongside all the other material differences distinguishing the 
position of male workers which we might identify as giving rise to 
their distinctive views, the impact of sexism - the pervasive ideology 
of female degradation - is an absolutely crucial aspect of male workers 
perspective of women workers position. Expressing what is, after 
all, a problematic relationship between the sexes - named plainly by 
early feminists "the sex war" - sexism apparently conjures into 
operation a double standard which seriously distorts awareness of 
the facts and features of capitalist exploitation.
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PART 3 :  MEN AND WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE
" "Oh we've got some women spare, they're coming 
down from the press shop' he says, 'find them 
a job'. The chargehand said, 'I don't know what to 
put them on'. 'Course, big mouth, I interrupted 
because I knew ... 'you can give me as many women 
as you want - I will find them a job'."
Bob (Serviceman, Moulding Shop)(41)
We are now going on to look at some of the implications of
the sexual division of labour in the workplace for the male workers
at BSR. We are again looking for distinctive aspects of the
men's position in the labour process and we are particularly concerned
to examine the nature of their relationships with the women workers.
Throughout we are identifying the bases for, and aspects of interest
differentiation which can be seen to arise as a consequence
both
of, the sexual division of labour/within the workplace and as we 
have seen outside it.
In the first section, we identify several features of the male 
workers' situation which contrasted with that of the women. Finding 
that the men did not necessarily experience the same kind of 
problems, in the same kind of way, we see that in a number of 
respects they were better placed to deal with those that did arise.
What are the implications of the various aspects of interest 
differentiation we have identified so far in this chapter? In 
the second section we look at male workers' views on two problems 
which we have already identified as having crucial significance 
for the position of the women workers : movement of labour and 
(the disciplinary control of) attendance. We find first that 
there are, again, some common themes shaping the men's perspectives 
and informing the individual views expressed. And secondly, that
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these do not necessarily or wholly derive from male workers' 
separate experience of the labour process. We therefore return to 
a consideration of the way that men and women relate to each other 
in the work place.
These relationships are patterned along a number of different 
lines, and we look at the impact of three: domestic relations, 
authority/control relations in production and general social 
relations. Not surprisingly, we find that the overall inequality 
between the sexes is sustained in the way these sets of relations 
are mediated through the relationship of employment, which they, in 
turn, help to shape. And we go on to explore further some of the 
implications of this.
Male workers in the labour process at BSR
We have already noted that men and women occupied different 
positions in BSR's labour process and they were separated along a 
variety of lines. Few men were engaged in production jobs, and 
those who were tended to operate within boundaried locations or 
separate buildings (e.g. machine shop and EPS plants). At the 
Stourbridge factory, practically the only males who worked with 
women and who were also of equivalent (semi-skilled) status were 
the labourers who serviced the female production workers. Thus two 
immediate consequences of the sexual division of labour in terms of 
job segregation and differentiation of interests between men and 
women on the shop floor) can be identified: first, the men who had 
little contact with the women production workers had little direct 
knowledge of their situation or problems either; and secondly, 
even though some men (such as servicemen) did have contact with the
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female production workers in any immediate respect. They were 
not on piecework or "measured" work, but paid standard time-rates 
graded by "skill" differentials; neither were they under the 
same authority structure, answering to the nearest male chargehand, 
foreman or departmental manager. As a result of such physical 
and structural separations there was, as one might expect, both 
ignorance and lack of appreciation of the problems experienced by 
the women production workers on the part of the men at BSR who did 
not share them.
The intention here is to identify some of the general features
of the men's work situation which appear to stand in direct contrast
(42 )to that of the women. In particular, we want to look at those
aspects characterising the position of male workers in the 
labour process which, while especially valid for the skilled groups, 
were also in varying degrees applicable to non-craft males as 
well. Such aspects can be seen to comprise: first, the men's 
relatively greater physical mobility; second, their job "ownership" 
or entitlement, and their relative freedom from disciplinary-based 
driving, plus their greater scope for discretion in work performance; 
and third, features of their work environment which facilitated 
association on some basis other than one which was purely task- 
related. Such aspects are not coincidental. Taken together, these 
are key aspects of job control and collective organisation. 
Furthermore, they are not simply reduceable to a question of male 
workers' "attitudes" or "orientations", which is the usual basis of 
comparison and explanation when women's "shopfloor power" is 
contrasted unfavourably with that of men.
women they did not share the same problems as the
One of the first things which strike an observer on the shop 
floor is the difference in physical mobility between the men and 
women. Men circulate around the shop floor in their capacity 
as labourers, manager/supervisors, inspectors, work study or 
maintenance engineers. The women workers sit or stand at their 
work stations unless specifically released to go to the toilet or 
sent to fetch something. While the general accuracy of this 
situation is easily observable, not all the men enjoyed the full 
run of the plant or as much freedom from supervision and control 
as, say, the maintenance engineers. This category, in particular, 
also comprised the most strongly organised group of workers, so a 
more sustained look at their position is instructive.
Although the number of fitters and electricians had increased 
rapidly in the early 1970's, the amount of plant they maintained 
had grown faster so they had been subject to work intensification 
to some extent, and, more noticeably, to an increasing amount of 
overtime. After the union was recognised, a more orderly system 
of ensuring maintenance cover was introduced with the two shift 
system, but the men still put in long hours with regular overtime 
and systematic week-end work (both Saturday and Sunday mornings). 
Also, some "mobility and flexibility" in the deployment of these 
workers was practised, although this was nothing like the mobility 
arrangements affecting the women production workers. The skilled 
men employed had been trained in specific areas such as woodwork 
or pipe-fitting but tended to continuously broaden their areas of 
work (and competence) under the pressure of keeping up general 
plant maintenance with an insufficient number of "specialists".
Even so, no male workers in contrast to the women were explicitly 
employed without any specific job entitlement. And the men.
whatever their level of skill, had some kind of job designation. 
And we have already suggested that the presence of this kind of 
boundary within the employment contract is an important aspect 
of workers' ability to control the amount of effort extracted from 
them, i.e. the extent of their labour power's utilisation.
Hence the issue of job demarcation is surely as immediately 
relevant to the question of job control, as the related and more 
widely recognised aim to preserve overall employment opportunities.
"In our department, we have to do a whole variety 
of work. Sometimes it means metal work ...
With modern unions today, woodworkers only touch 
wood, metalworkers only metal, and 
paintworkers only paint. With our job we have to 
do the lot. And we're constantly being politely 
reminded'that is not your job'. We've got a 
problem now of a painter in another factory being 
asked to do something which isn't within his trade 
and he has refused to do it. ... but if there's no 
alternative way out, then he will have to do it". 
Michael (Carpenter) (43).
Job demarcation specifies and limits within boundaries the 
kind of work demands which can be made by employers. It also ensures 
that these demands are kept within the range of job practices 
already subject to the workers’ effort controls. These controls 
have, of course, been incorporated into established job practices 
already, and acquired by the worker in conjunction with his technical 
competence. Otherwise (and in any case), they are developed by 
workers as part of their job knowledge and experience. Since the 
employer continuously attempts to demolish such inhibitions on his 
utilisation of labour, the maintenance of job demarcation is not 
unproblematic. The point being made here however is that, in 
contrast to the women, these workers had jobs they could demarcate.
And their "job control" problems, in relation to the women's, 
were therefore of a different order entirely. No male worker, 
skilled or otherwise, was subject to movement of labour as it was 
practised on the women production operatives.
Again on the theme of job control, the maintenance workers were 
relatively remarkably free of managerial supervision, driving or 
discipline. Although required to apply themselves to breakdowns 
and emergencies they could exercise a great deal of discretion over 
the jobs they did and the way they did them, and over the use of 
their time.
"You see I'm a maintenance fitter and maintenance 
fitters can walk about and'sklve'a bit, I mean, when 
the pressure's on and there's a lot of breakdowns 
you're all brought together and do them, but you know - 
it's the same everywhere I've worked, you can'skive' 
to a certain degree like".
Ernie (Maintenance Fitter - Deputy Convenor)(44)
"The fitters had been used to taking their own 
decisions. They went from job to job as people 
asked them to look at things. Then when they 
got a chargehand he could never find the fitters 
because they rarely went into the shop to be given 
new jobs".
Terry (Maintenance Chargehand) (45)
"You complete a job, wash up and smoke. Have 
times with nothing to do. You may walk round and 
spot something. Every so often you walk down to 
the shop and if you're wanted you're sent off to repair 
something, but if no-one says anything to you, you 
just wander round and find little jobs to do. You 
keep going to the shop occasionally - you soon hear 
about it if there's a major breakdown and then you 
all get going on it".
Ernie (Maintenance Fitter - Deputy Conveyor)(46).
This contrast with the work situation of the women was so 
marked that it had once been the cause of seme trouble. One of 
the maintenance men habitually took himself off to the upstairs 
assembly section, well away from the main shop, and passed his
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days chatting-up the women and making comments about their work. 
While the women were being driven —  "It is sweated labour, you 
haven't started to work until you feel it trickling down your back" 
- he was being paid twice as much as they were for apparently doing 
nothing at all. Following a wage settlement which saw the men 
better rewarded "for their skill",the women's agitation became 
plain, whereupon he was moved away from the area and told off 
for"stirring them up".
As it happens this story also serves to illustrate a further
point of difference, since it was originally offered as an example
of disciplinary action being taken against a male worker and came
after the following observation on this particular subject:
"When we go in for warnings it's a bit of a 
formality. I don't really have to put up any 
fight. The superintendents don't like everybody 
in shop - it depends on who it is, but I don't have 
to get involved or argue and fight for them as such .... 
because when it comes to the stage of a warning, 
they don't usually get one unless they deserve it so 
they accept i t anyway."
Ernie (Maintenance - Deputy Convenor)(47).
It was clear from their responses to the same questions as 
the women that the male stewards were rarely called in on disciplinary 
matters, even in respect of the non-craft male workers. Was this 
because the men perpetrated fewer "offences"? On a question such 
as absenteeism, this might have been expected to be the case; the 
wife of one of Ernie's mates had gone in to hospital for a hysterectomy. 
He found no problem getting the davs off ht needed:
"She only came out on Saturday. He's got a small 
daughter lO years old - they've both been married 
before-and have a grown-up daughter in her 20's, 
whcfs come over to stay with him to look after the 
kid and fetch her from school and things like that, 
you know. Since his wife has come out,he has lost 
no time, so either his wife is managing or his daugher 
is still staying".
Ernie (Maintenance Deputy- Convenor)(48).
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But in addition to the men's more fortunate position, it 
is also quite clear that management instituted disciplinary action 
far less readily where the men were concerned. There is no 
evidence of a disciplining offensive such as that we have identified 
in relation to the women, which had such debilitating consequences 
for their employment security and job controls.
(Bad timekeeping?)
"Yes, we've got one or two of those! Well there 
are about four culprits in the shop. There are 
some people that just can't get up. It's just a 
fact of life - you know, you could put a bomb under 
them.
There's one guy in there, they've suffered him for 
about 7 or 8 years now. He's an electrician's mate 
and if I told you, you just wouldn't believe it.
And I've been in with him - warnings and keep sticking 
up for him and that, you know - but I'm getting to ...
He's a mate as well like, you know, I have a drink 
with him and that - it's getting to the embarrassing 
stage now, because he just ... if he can have 2 days 
a week off without a warning, he'll have 2 days off 
every week. And if he can be late 2 days a week 
without a warning, he'll be late the other 2 days.
And even with a warning, right up until the last stage 
when he's going to be suspended or summat - he'll 
just keep on, and then he'll just about scrape in for 
a week, till his period's over like ... well he's a 
single chap, he can probably manage on 3 days money a 
week, you know what I mean, and that's what he does.
This particular guy - I think they're pretty lenient 
with him, you know. Although he's me mate, I think 
they're pretty lenient with him, 'cos he is an embarrassment 
to the rest of the shop. Our gaffer, being a decent sort 
of bloke, if it comes to the crunch, like, where he 
might get sacked or anything - he might sit on a warning 
like and have a quiet word with me and say 'look Alan's 
going to drop us all in the shit! And I'll have a quiet 
word with Alan and he'll be a good boy for about a 
week, you know. But they've suffered him that long now, I 
can't imagine them doing anything about it".
Ernie (Maintenance - Deputy Convenor) (49).
The final point of contrast which might be made concerning the 
position of male and female workers in the labour process is that in 
relation to the social organisation of the work groups« the men's
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working environment itself, outside the direct line of management
discipline and driving for low cost, high volume production,
was markedly less stressful.
(In what ways does your job affect your life 
outside work?)
"It benefits it. This job benefits my life 
outside work ... I leave here at night with a 
relaxed mind".
Michael (Carpenter) (50).
(Have you had a member in trouble because of 
difficulties doing the job?)
"No. Not really. If anyone's stuck they all 
muck in and help".
Ernie (Maintenance - Deputy Convenor) (51)
Also, in comparison with the women, the men’s working groups were
(52)small and apart from the peripatetic servicemen, they were
compact; being located in specific, bounded areas of the factory 
or in workshops,within which these workers enjoyed a freedom of 
movement and association denied to women tied to machines or hemmed 
in at specific work stations in full view of all on the open factory 
floor. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the men were 
in a much better position to hold meetings amongst themselves or 
indeed that they did so:
"Whenever I come back from any negotiations or I've 
got anything relevant to tell them concerning 
pay, or action being taken or anything at all,
I go and ask Brian ... the only time I can get them 
all together is 2 o'clock , the one shift finishes 
at 2 and the other one comes on at 2 and you've 
already got the day workers there, you see."
Ernie (Maintenance, Deputy Convenor)(53) .
And management were able (and prepared) to turn a blind eye.
"Really, he's doing that off his own bat, you know.
If we went and asked John, John'd probably say no 
and then we'd have to force him by going and clocking 
out and standing on the car park - but he gives me 
quarter of an hour ..."
Ernie (Maintenance, Deputy Convenor)(54).
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In this section we have noted a number of features characterising 
the position of male workers in the labour process at BSR, which 
although not shared by them all to the same degree, presented, 
nevertheless, a significant contrast to the women. What implications 
can be drawn from these differences as they were patterned by the 
sexual division of labour?
First, we have suggested the male workers' appreciation of 
many major problems experienced by the women production workers would 
be coloured by the fact that they did not themselves share them. 
Secondly, since we have shown that the main points of contrast 
between the men and the women's position comprised also key elements 
of job control, we may conclude that the male workers were better 
placed to deal with problems arising from managerial strategies to 
undermine their employment security and to increase their effort 
and productivity. At the same time they would be less likely also 
to be posed with the same kinds of problems as the women in this 
respect - or not to the same degree. As indirect workers they were 
less subject to the production drive, and as men they were less 
subject to the disciplinary offensive (assisted by having women in 
the home).
Male workers' perspectives on the women workers' problems
In this section we look at the men's views of the women workers 
position and their problems. Again, these discussions are an 
expression of individual opinions and no claim is being made here 
that "all the men held the same viewpoint". Our interest in what 
are, at one level,idiosyncratic considerations, lies in the fact 
that they also incorporate some general perspectives worth noting; 
and it is the nature of these that we wish to explore.
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We have already suggested how structural separations might give 
rise to significant differentiation of interests between male and 
female workers, and lead to a "lack of appreciation" of the women's 
problems on the part of the men. But it would appear rather more 
them a "lack" of knowledge is involved. Questioned about the 
women's problems, the male workers interviewed clearly had views of 
a particular kind.
In this section, we look at two particular problems the women 
faced - movement of labour and attendance - through the eyes of the 
men. We find that there are major themes marking the men's 
perspective (some of which we have already identified in our analysis 
of domestic and labour market relations) and these were: the 
utilisation of "double standards"; a view of women workers as the problem 
and a concentration on how they could be controlled; and biological
explanations for their problems.
MOVEMENT OF LABOUR
This was one of the biggest problems the women workers faced.
And this was Terry's comment.
(Movement of labour at the factory only affects 
the women - what do you think about that?)
"Let them try it on the skilled men, that's 
all I've got to say about that”
(Do you think the women should do something about it?)
"No. Because in a factory of this type you've got to 
have movement of labour. You've got to be able to 
have the labour where its needed, whether they like it 
or not - whether they like the agreement or not.
You see the trouble is - well as far as I know, the 
firm's s'posed to tell them of this movement of 
labour agreement, and when we put you on a job you're 
not on that job - that isn't your particular job.
They should just have them all classed as semi skilled 
operators and that's it".
Terry (Maintenance carpenter) (55)
What was the nature of the criteria being used here which resulted 
in this "double standard"? And where had Gordon been all these 
years when the women had been saying "it doesn't work like that" ?
"I believe the movement of labour can be a safeguard.
THEIR first reaction is, you know, that it is 
detrimental, but ..."
(You don't get moved around like the women do?)
"No. There isn't this element in stores and goods 
inwards. Obviously where you've got thousands of 
people on lines, it's got to ... logically come 
into it - more then, or whole departments where a 
job ceases to exist. It's wiser to accept a 
movement of labour situation than have them made 
redundant ...
Movement of labour can also - where the first thought 
would creep into their mind that - inis is going to 
penalise us - it can also work in their favour can't it?
It can safeguard them. And probably I would say, the 
movement of labour here has safeguarded more people 
than it has penalised". His emphasis upper case underlined. 
My emphasis lower case underlined.
Gordon (Storeman) (56).
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It is rather easier to suggest the implications of such 
perspectives than their sources; if issues crucial to women workers 
are denied any status or existence as problems by men, they are 
unlikely to engage much support. Take, for example, the wide 
issue of management's control and production policy, which 
incorporated a particular kind of disciplinary offensive maintained 
in three main areas - factory conduct, job performance and attendance. 
It was in relation to the last of these that the women's struggle 
was perhaps posed in its most acute form, if only because it was 
the basis on which they were most commonly disciplined (and also 
disciplined"in common").
DISCIPLINING ABSENTEEISM
Gordon, who was a representative for some thirty male labourers
and servicemer^ expressed this view:
"I don't see that it's really so great an issue 
because there are not many of them get penalised on 
the final count anyway. It's may be a little 
spell they're having - if it came that I'd got 
a lot getting penalised such as suspensions and that, 
then probably you'd fight a little harder for it, 
but it hasn't got to that stage".
Gordon (Storeman)(57) .
But Jim, a serviceman himself, was also shop steward for 150-200
women in the moulding department. He shows clearly how his views
informed the kind of action he might take on their behalf.
(Do you have to go in for warnings?)
"Yes. Just after the holidays I had about eight in.
Some had been on their holidays. One woman made the 
excuse, that her husband was on the staff and he 
was entitled to a week's holiday, so she thought 
she was entitled to one as well. But she'd already 
had her week. She didn't think she'd ought to have 
had a warning because she had a week off with her 
husband. But she'd brought no notes, nothing so 
she'd got to have a warning.
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"But the others, they were all the same, they'd had it - 
their husbands had had their holidays at a different 
time and they had theirs with them. I believe you 
couldn't blame them for that".
(So do you think they should get warnings for that?)
"X think in a way, unless they advise the management 
before"
(But they get one even if they tell the management?)
"Yes, but it's only a verbal warning then you see. It 
doesn't really count as a serious warning, it's only 
what they call a verbal warning. If they just take it, 
well they get a written warning".
(You can refuse to accept a warning can't you?)
"Oh yes. If there's a reason for it. I mean if I 
thought one of the women was in the right, I'd refuse 
to let him give her a warning".
(Have you ever done that?)
"Only once. There was - well, I will admit that the 
woman should have had a warning, but the chargehand what 
did it went the wrong way about it, you see. He just 
walks up the shop with a form in his hand and he says, 
'sign this'. She called me and I went up - she says, 
'He's given me a warning', and I say, 'What for'. He 
says 'absence'. I says, 'Well you're quite out of 
order. I says, 'You get back into that office' I 
says, 'and next time you have me in that office and you 
have her as well'... 'Oh' he says, ' well come on then'. 
And I said, 'Oh no, you're too late, you've by-passed 
that now, you went the wrong way about it', I says,
'You should have done that in the first place'.
And it all died off".
(What is the main reason the women give when they 
go in the office?)
"Well, they try to make excuses, you know- the child 
was bad - or nobody to mind it - her husband was going 
to a darts match or something. You know that it's 
not the truth but .. they still get the warning.
They still get the time off anyway".
(Have you had to do warnings for bad timekeeping?)
"They go into the office and I'll be fair, he does 
ask them the reason - what was the reason - have you 
got a reason? And they give all kinds of reasons 
you see. But you can't believe them - but you can't 
argue with them because they're not ... it's just 
this opinion. You can't get and say “you're telling 
bloody lies, you wasn't .. (laughs)".
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(What reasons do they give?)
"Well, they're either - they've had to take 
the child to the hospital or down to the doctors, 
you know, or they've had to'phone the doctor 
to their child - the bus breaks down things like 
that".
(Do you think they are always untrue?)
"None of them are hardly true" (None of them?) 
"No, I don't think so". (Why don't you think so?) 
"You can tell by their faces, can't you?"
Jim (Serviceman, Moulding Shop) (58)
These examples have not necessarily shown that the men have 
entirely failed to perceive that the women workers had problems.
But there is a certain consistency in the way the matter appears 
to resolve itself each time into an appreciation of the women 
workers as the problem. There appear to be at least two identifiable 
components to this perspective. First, the view that the women 
need to be controlled, with the men adopting a profoundly managerial 
approach to what needs to be done. Secondly, there is an interesting 
reduction of the definition of woman-as-problem to the biological and 
sexual; with menstruation being posed as both an explanation for 
the problems the women faced as well as an explanation of why the 
women themselves constituted a problem (in the first place).
Ernie's discussion illustrates the first aspect. He actually
takes the women's problems as a starting point, but then shifts
sharply into an exposition of managerial control, problems and
strategies - as soon as the question is raised as to how the women's
problems might be resolved.
(Now that you've got more contact with the problems 
that the women have, what do you think is the main 
difference between the problems of the men and the 
problems of the women?) (59) .
"The women - the management say there's a problem with 
absenteeism you see. And the women don't like having
warnings - and have a lot of warnings. And I 
think a problem I find with the girls - in some 
areas they find difficulty in getting pass-outs....
Now speaking from my own shop, which is all I can 
speak for, we don't have any problems like that 
and yet the girls do.
There is a bit of absenteeism, but there a^in,a woman 
like, you know, there's lots of reasons why a woman can 
be absent aren't there? Especially if she's married 
and got a home to run and kids as well, and she hasn't 
got to be ill - it just can't be avoided can it, that 
she's got to be away.
This firm lately don't seem to recognise that, you know, 
they're just treating them as workers and you know, if 
you're absent - bonk, you have your warnings etc. Well - 
they're trying to like. Lately they seem to have 
tightened up more, seem to be having a bit of a purge on 
the absentee thing and the pass-out thing. I may not 
have been aware of it otherwise-it's just as a shop 
steward I know".
(Should the women be allowed more than 2 days off in 
3 weeks?)
"It's a difficult one to answer because I can understand 
the management have got to maintain - like we work 
very hand to mouth here, that's probably one of our 
strengths, you know, why we're so profitable - we don't
keep large stores of things. So they have got a problem
trying to maintain a flow of work from upstairs -
downstairs - down to here for the lines etc. So what do they
do? Do they put on more labour to cover it or what?
I think they're ought to be a personnel officer just
for this sort of problem, more involved like - who can sort
the wheat from the chaff.
Because obviously, you've got some who are just ...
I mean, you've got people who'll just keep on and on 
because they want to get the sack, you know, and they'll 
just .. and there's others they don't want to get the
sack, hut they're 'skivers' like, you know, and then you get the 
genuine ones who've got the kid in hospital, or the mother's 
ill at hone, or the husband, or they're separated, and they've 
got genuine problems. But they are, you know, abusing the 
system. So when you say do you think they ought to have - I 
think we should adhere to the system we've got".
Ernie (Maintenance s Deputy Convenor) (60).
This view of the women themselves as basically constituting 
the problem crops up again and again. What are the implications 
of this perspective? Ernie's response was typical of the male 
workers. When faced with the issue of how the women's problems
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might be resolved, there was a tendency to slide readily into 
strategies to control the women instead. But another important 
aspect was the tendency to divorce knowledge of the fact that the 
women did experience problems, from an appreciation of the sources 
of the problems in the policy of the firm. Thus the causes were 
seen to lie, not within the employment relationship at all, but 
within the women themselves.
If there is nothing problematic about the way (men and) 
women are employed, i.e. if there is nothing significantly to 
blame in the women's work situation, then the "difference" in terms 
of the problems they face must lie with the women workers. In 
which case it can only be due to one thing, because one thing 
especially distinguishes them as "not-men": the menstrual cycle. 
Thus we have Michael's view of the driving of the women. He had 
observed the dolorous consequences of this ("I've seen many women 
in tears here"), but these were solely seen to derive from the 
women's own "weakness". The nature and experience of their 
employment relationships had no independent reality or meaning for 
him at all. The cause of the women's problems was the "women's 
problem", and this was also the cause of them being a problem as 
well.
(What would you say about the manner of management 
towards the women and girls?)
"Personally I think it's quite good. I think it's 
quite good. The management is looking to the women 
for their bread and butter, so they've got to drive 
the women to such an extent - so that they can get their 
bread and butter. It's as simple as that"
(Do you think they drive them too hard?)
"I don't think so. I don't honestly think so.
Work that we had to do years ago - it's a piece of 
cake today. It is, it's a piece of cake".
(If they were all men, do you think management could 
treat them in the same way as the women?)
"Definitely no. Oh, some women - little things . . .
I've seen many women in tears here. I'm talking 
personally now. The regular ladies’ monthly, some 
of the men - that's of no concern - 'you should be 
doing that job'. She might be suffering agony.
They don't know, she knows. Her performance is 
affected, so she's victimised ... you know. This is 
why it's difficult - ladies have more problems than 
men in many ways, but the men don't see this at all.
And it leads to quite nasty problems, I've seen many 
women in tears here”.
(You think the management should be more sympathetic?)
"Oh I think so. But everything's geared to piecework and 
production output, so ... it's very difficult to - you 
know, you're dealing with lots and lots of women.
If they all decide to be poorly one day then obviously 
the production's going to go down. It's inevitable.
But I'm certain the management make allowances for these
things in the timing of the jobs......  the humanitarian
approach. Oh gosh, yes".
Michael (Carpenter) (61)
What we are finding is that the men's appreciation of the women 
workers' position does not simply reflect the structural separations 
of the sexually divided labour process; nor the differentiation of 
interests which this might engender. The men's perspectives are 
marked by major themes, which have their sources elsewhere; but 
which certainly have implications for the way they approach and relate 
to the problems of the women workers on the shop floor.
What were the consequences of those kinds of views? Before 
taking up this discussion, we need to examine one other important 
aspect of the sexual division of labour. What was the nature of the 
relationship between the men and women workers in the labour process?
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Workplace relationships
It would seem that men's perception of the position of women 
in employment may be strongly coloured in such a way as to bar 
useful generalisation from their own experience as workers within 
capitalist employment relations. One aspect of this - their 
close alignment with the managerial policy regarding women's jobs 
(and women's problems in them), may arise from the fact that married 
men in particular are already strongly instrumental themselves 
in the disposition of their wives' (and daughters') labour and 
labour power. This is already viewed as conditional upon their own 
and the family's needs. In the workplace, utilisation of the female 
becomes conditional upon the (male) employers needs. Thus may 
perception of women's employment relations and conditions in general 
be mediated by other relationships in such a way as to establish quite 
particular modes of understanding of these on the part of male 
workers.
In this section, therefore, we attempt to locate some of these 
modes of understanding of the women workers problems, and their mode 
of expression in terms of themes (some of which we have already 
identified), within the major sets of relationships patterning the mixed 
labour force at BSR. We look at three in particular: the domestic 
relationship; relations of production; and generalised male/female 
relationships. They are in no sense discrete. All express 
different aspects of male control over women, mediated by and also 
mediating the labour process and the position of women workers within
it.
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First, we look at Michael's discussion of the women workers' 
position in employment, which is especially interesting for its 
rather remarkable "double standards". But the main point is the 
way his perspective on the women workers' position at BSR is so 
strongly mediated by his own position as husband, father and head of 
the household. While objectively he is solely associated with 
BSR women by the one relationship which alone they hold in common - 
all being workers selling their labour power to the same employer - 
this is so overlaid by his own sense and practice of relating to 
women outside the employment relationships that their common situation 
within it sinks out of sight. What remains is a strong sense of 
difference, pervaded by inequality, which results in a "double 
vision of unusual clarity.
(Have you had members in trouble for absenteeism?)(62)
"Absenteeism in this factory is colossal - but it's 
very, very negligible amongst my members"
(What is the main reason for it?)
"Extremely urgent business, bereavements, dental 
appointments ...."
(What would be the main reason for the women?)
"Well they face severe problems don't they - with 
children ill, during the school holidays for instance, 
who looks after them? It's a very tricky problem, 
actually. Quite honestly, it wouldn't have happened 
in my house, it just wouldn't happen. My wife 
stays at home and looks after the children and 1^ 
earn the wages."
(The firm here allows the women 2 days off in 3 weeks 
before they get a warning. Do you think they should 
allow them more than that?)
"Oh gosh no! That's quite adequate in my opinion 
quite adequate"
(Have any of your members been in trouble for bad 
timekeeping?)
"I have a deplorable timekeeping record myself ...
Why am I late? I am not a military person. I am not
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woken up by false means in the morning, i.e. 
alarm clocks, I wake naturally, so when they 
change the clocks - how the blazes can I wake up 
today the same time as I did yesterday? Oh 
honestly! You've got me on a point now, timekeeping"
(Do they ha/e you up about it often?)
"Fortunately, not now. Things seem to have settled 
down. But I am not a machine. I am not woken up by 
false means every day - it's not something that ...
I'll be quite honest, I'm not proud of it. What 
on earth I can do about it I don't know. Half the 
people on the ground are bad timekeepers, and I know for 
a fact that people in top jobs have got worse timekeeping 
records than I've got"
(What do you think is the main reason for women's 
bad timekeeping?)
"Generally speaking, the old problem of working 
women with children - that is quite simply the 
right answer".
(Do you think management have the right attitude 
towards that?)
"Certainly. The management have to meet a production 
level. If Mrs so & so’s little boy is poorly and 
she's got to stay behind to get him off to school, 
how the blazes can the management reach their target 
for the month?"
(How do you think these women can cope then?)
"I quite honestly do not know how they cope. My wife 
would be totally incapable of doing a full time job 
and bringing 2 children up and looking after hubby".
(Do you think the management should be more sympathetic?)
"No. Oh no, I think they're quite sympathetic with what 
they're allowing now, quite honestly."
(Have any of your members had problems at work due to 
injury or illness affecting a member of their family?)
"My wife has been to the doctor and in bed for a day or two". 
(Did you have time off?) "Oh gosh yes! Then up come 
the old time study (sic) people - lateness! And pounce on 
me like a ton of bricks. 1 I'll come at 8 o'clock - you 
come and look after my children and get them off to school!' 
That's my answer to them! It does create problems of 
course it does - it's got to, when you get illnesses...
I've attended funerals which I've no need to, but I feel 
it's my duty, to pay my last respects. That goes down with 
a black mark with management too".
Michael (Carpenter)(63).
A second crucial dimension structuring sexual divisions in 
the labour force at BSR concerns the distinctive pattern of power 
and authority relationships within the labour process itself which 
also forms a significant basis for interest differentiation.
Indeed, it is true to say that the majority of male workers who 
were in contact with women had authority over them in some respect. 
They controlled women directly in a supervisory capacity or they 
were in a position of direct control over the women's work 
performance; for example as tool makers, setters, plant operators, 
quality control/inspectors or maintenance workers. Again, it is 
to the latter, a particularly important group at BSR, that we pay 
special attention here.
What features distinguish the respective positions of maintenance 
and production workers in general within the labour process? What 
difference does a sexual differentiation make in terms of these 
relationships?
With regard to the first question, two points might be made, 
one at a general and one at a more specific level. First of all 
we can look at the function of producing (surplus) value and the use 
of machinery at the point of production. The only new value added 
to the product comes from the labour which is, apparently, "set to 
work by"the machinery. In fact, the machine operator both
produces new and reproduces "old" value at the same time. Values 
incorporated in the machinery can only be realised when it is put 
into motion. This machinery, like other forms of capital, is 
useless to the capitalist, unless put to work by labour which both 
produces a surplus and unlocks values already in existence in the form 
of "dead labour". Just as it seems as if it is the machinery
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which puts the operator to work, so also does it often appear 
that it is the maintenance engineer who provides work or employment 
for the operator. There is, therefore, a tension within these 
sets of social relationships.
It is the function of the maintenance engineer to maintain 
"dead labour" in a form in which it can be consumed - that is, in 
its "original" state. The cost of the engineer is thus, more 
properly incorporated into the cost of the machine itself, these 
values being released into the product once the latter is set to 
work. In contrast to the operator, therefore, he is not in the 
business of transforming value as such, nor of directly adding to 
it. And he,along with the machinery, is useless to the capitalist 
unless the latter is put to work by value-producing labour. In 
a similar sense, objectively, the maintenance engineer is also 
dependent upon the production workers performing their proper 
function for his own existence, and he may be conscious of this 
"alignment" with the employer's interest.
This was how Michael, a carpenter (in building maintenance),
saw his position in relation to production workers.
(Do you have any dealings with work study at all?)
"We work very closely with work study. Work study 
people, their job is to make a woman or a man turn 
out more products per minute and if it can make a 
jig that can help do that job, we make it”.
Michael (Carpenter)(65).
If the position (and interests) of direct and indirect workers 
in relation to capital and the production process can be differentiated 
at this general level, so can they also be in a more concrete sense. 
The job of the maintenance workers was to maintain production and 
keep the women working and effectively they were in a position of
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control over the machinery. It was in a real sense that they 
set the women to work, and could exercise some control over when, 
where and how they performed. In the following example it can 
be seen how the lines of sexual division running parallel with 
this separation overlay and apparently shifted those tensions 
we have seen as arising within the production relationship onto 
different ground entirely. Because the production workers were 
women, the assumption of a managerial relationship appears "natural" 
and is quite explicit. The somewhat apocryphal character of 
this story (related by a male maintenance fitter) serves, if anything, 
to highlight the main points:
The experiment
"As an experiment - we used to have an electrician 
here - ever such a good chap. I've never had such 
a laugh in my life as when I worked with him...
And he was really up on moulding machines, and he 
reckoned he could double the factory's production 
and half the workforce - he was an electrician 
but he'd done his training on moulding machines and 
that, and he knew his job. He proved to me, he 
said 'watch this' - and so for a fortnight he kept 
turning the speed up on one machine. They kept saying 
they couldn't turn out proper motor spindles on this 
certain machine above a certain speed. He said 
'That tool, Terry,'he says, 'I can speed it up regularly 
for you'. You know, the women kept complaining for a 
fortnight, but in the end they were turning out double 
the amount of spindles, and the women were working to 
that figure without realising that we'd turned up... 
well a setter discovered it in the finish and turned 
it back. But the women they complained amongst 
themselves but they didn't complain to anybody else.
(What would have happened if they had?) "I don't know ... 
it was just an experiment, he was showing me that it 
could happen, it could be done. And since then the firms 
caught on to the fact. Over the last 3 years, they've 
more than trebled, in my estimation, the speed of those 
machines, and the quota they want out of them".
Terry (Maintenance Chargehand) (66). My emphasis.
But the pattern of power and authority relationships 
structuring the sexual division of labour and interests at the 
workplace cannot be viewed simply in terms of the labour process 
alone. In this society men seek to exercise control over 
women in general and in particular contexts such as marriage and 
the household this takes distinctive, institutionalised forms.
These social relationships structured by sexual inequality are 
hardly cast off at the factory gate. As Bob's story shows, the 
boundaries wherein men "manage'Vor control women in the workplace 
have a potential so elastic as to include, at times, even himself - 
an unskilled labourer. If such boundaries can cut across employment 
hierarchy and relationships like this it is because they are, in fact, 
male-society wide. Bob was a servicemen and also a union representative 
for 150-200 women in the moulding shop. Critical of management, he
was keen to show how he could do better. However over-drawn his 
example might be, his expectations and assumptions are perfectly 
clear.
"I was in office and there was a chargehand from
the opposite shift there. R--  (Superintendent)
turned round and said, 'Oh - we've got some women 
spare, they're coming down from the press shop, 'he 
says, 'find them a job'. The chargehand said,' I 
don't know what to put them on'. '-ourse big 
mouth, I interrupted because I knew'you can give me 
as many women as you want - I will find them a job'.
He says, 'What do you mean?'. I says, 'well this shop's 
been a bloody disgrace for long enough - and I’ve told 
you about it before. Now you give them to me. I'll 
find them work. I'll get this place cleaned up tonight'.
So eventually - I only got 2, but they gave it a damn 
good clean up. Now, I didn't just put those women on 
cleaning up, I gave them other work to do as well - 
I let those women - I told them what I wanted done, I 
helped them along a bit, I knocked 'em off, I brought them 
a cup of coffee, I treated them - alright. But I got 
the job done as I wanted it, see you see what I mean"
Bob (Serviceman, Moulding Shop)(67).
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Conclusions: Class relations
A particular outcome of the job segregation which we noted was 
that many male workers were likely to remain ignorant of the 
women workers' problems, or else carry an awareness which was tempered 
by the fact that they were not, themselves, subjected to the same 
conditions. On the other hand, no male worker expressed ignorance 
as such. Indeed they had views which contained a number of common 
strands - despite the fact that the men speaking stood in a different 
relation to each other in production and to the women workers also.
We are forced, therefore, to look more closely at the matter of 
relationships as well as the lines of spatial and "functional" 
separation in the labour process.
Hence it can be seen that, on a number of different levels, 
inequalities in power and authority plus access to control resources 
ran in favour of the male workers, and away from the women. To the 
extent that the men exercised direct controls over the women or the 
women's work, the presence of a differentiation of interest structured 
into the power hierarchy is clear. But we have also noted the impact 
of control relationships and interests which do not either directly 
or solely derive from the authority structure of the workplace; 
while the way these mediate and are mediated by the employment 
relationship is complex, we have been especially concerned to draw out 
some of the consequences. And here we find further reinforcement 
for the overall effect of sexual inequality and sexist ideoloqy which 
is: fundamentally to deny the basis of the women workers' problems
in the relations of production and exploitation.
We end this chapter by noting that this process is further 
reinforced by another very important feature of the male and female 
workers' relationship in employment at BSR‘. that of "co-exploitation".
As we shall see, the male workers in general and specific 
groups of them in particular, were consistently able to gain the 
larger share of the rewards accruing to labour from the company's 
(growing) profitability-in large part dependent upon the increasing 
productivity of the women workers. In the "craftsman's" dispute, 
for example, the struggle of the maintenance workers was publicly 
aired, with this group displaying an increased ability and willingness 
to exercise bargaining power derived from their stronger position 
in the labour market and labour process in order to gain the largest 
share of the annual wage award. But this open conflict was, in 
many respects, an explicit expression of a long prevailing circumstance 
whereby their greater ability to retain control over the labour 
process compared with the women production workers had helped gain 
them, as it had for all of the male workers, a relatively greater 
share of the product.
The male workers certainly perceived that their employment 
prospects depended upon the firm's continued viability and that this, 
in turn, was founded upon the cheapness of the product. To the extent 
that this was seen to be based on the low wage and high work-rate of 
the mass - the women production workers- they had little interest 
in seeing the women's conditions altered - if anything, their interests 
ran in the opposite direction.
It is probably true to say that such relationships of co­
exploitation are to be found in every labour process and thus structured 
into every labour force ( also between them )and so reproduced within 
the working class as a whole. But what is the significance of these 
relations for working class organisation when they run systematically 
along sex-divided lines? We suggested earlier that it is important
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to identify distinctive sets of interests which arise within the 
labour-process and prevail among different groups of workers whatever 
their sex. But we are also proposing that the shape of any 
resolution of these in class terms is patterned, in practice, by 
relationships prevailing beyond the factory gates.
Looking at the household/family and the labour market, we have 
attempted to show that socio-political and economic relationships and 
divisions of interest between the sexes are an exceedingly crucial 
dimension; so that lines of "co-exploitation" in employment which 
parallel sexual divisions in the class take on a peculiar significance. 
One reason is because male workers' vested interests in the economic 
sphere meet, and tend to be supported by, their vested interests 
in the social and particularly the domestic spheres. 1 ' ' The
limitations derived from the latter which are placed on women who 
seek employment ensure their systematic recruitment in the super- 
exploitative sectors. This circle can only effectively be broken 
by the women themselves pushing forward their particular interests - 
which is why their'sis often seen as the most significant area 
of the general class struggle.
But still it might be argued that interest differentiation along 
the lines we have explored, such as separation and hierarchy in the 
labour process for example, is totally characteristic of almost 
any labour force; are all workers, then, irrevocably divided or 
fragmented as a result? And in relation to the household and family 
structure, depending on whether they are younger or older, married 
or single, workers clearly stand in positions significantly 
differentiated from each other. Are we proposing that there is no 
possibility of them, finding common ground?
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While it is true that we have been especially concerned to 
point out the basis of division between groups of workers both 
within production and outside of it, it is not suggested that 
these differences cannot be resolved at any other level. Perhaps 
it is important to say in the first place, though, that they 
exist to be resolved. And our particular focus has been on the 
division between men and women because there does seem to be a 
number of very important problems associated with the resolution of 
differences here.
Throughout this chapter, wherever we have identified objective 
differences in the position of men and women which might give rise 
to sets of interests peculiar to either sex in specific marriage/ 
domestic and production/labour process relations for example, we 
have also had to note an accompanying and quite distinctive aspect 
of the males' perspective. We have suggested that this is derived 
from power inequality which structures male/female relationships in 
every sphere. It finds expression in a number of common themes 
which shape the male workers' perceptions, such as: the double 
standard or use of de-graded criteria in relation to women; the 
determination of women as problematic (and requiring male control); 
and the reduction of women's humanity to biology i.e. the de­
humanisation of the female.
What are the effects of this distinctive slant in the male 
perspective? We have suggested that this can be seen rather in 
the same way as a geological "rift" or "fault" by which there is a 
structured break in underlying objective continuity - in this case, 
in male workers' perception of the common basis of their position, 
with women, in capitalist employment relationships. The consequences
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can be assessed at two levels. In the first place, a generalised 
understanding for men of their mutual situation as wage workers 
with women is blocked through the operation of differential criteria. 
In the second place, the general tilt of this understanding is 
reversed through a displacement of subject in the problematic (here, 
the relations of capitalist exploitation being displaced by the 
women workers). The effect of both of these is to render significant 
features of capitalist exploitation"invisible" when they are viewed 
in relation to women.
This tendency has to be seen in conjunction with the differential 
structure of interests which pushes male workers, as co-beneficiaries, 
controllers and utilisers of female labour, to adopt perspectives 
closer to management and the employer himself.
Thus wherever these perspectives and differential interests 
in relation to women shape the understanding of male workers, we 
would propose that their responses, at both an individual and 
collective level,to the position and problems of the female workforce
will be problematic. (70) .
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Footnotes
MEN AND WOMEN
(1) The nature of the links between them - for clearly, the 
distribution of functions will reflect the nature of power 
relations between the sexes - is not examined here as it lies 
beyond the scope of this study. It remains, moreover, an 
area where much work needs still to be done.
(2) Ref GH 21/S3: 748-810
(3) Ref BM 11/S2: 240
(4) See Hunt (1980) for a useful discussion on this issue
(5) See, for example, Cavendish (1982), Pollert (1981), Perkins (1983), 
and Beale (1982)
(6) Ref TM 1/S1: 28
(7) Ref GH 15/S3: 46-50
(8) Ref GH 25/s@: 180-206
(9) Ref MC 31/S4: 88-105
(10) Ref MC 29/S3: 780-790
(11) Ref TM 25/S3: 720
(12) Ref BM 38/S4: 654-660
(13) Ref EC 50/S6: 239-250
(14) Ernie, for example, found that his relationship to his wife was 
quite different at work compared with when they were both at home, 
but he could not understand her or her depression, even by a 
simple projection of his own feelings about domestic drudgery!
In the following account, his assumptions, expectations and 
assessments, both implicit and explicit, come over quite clearly:
(Does she like doing housework?)
"No she detests it. She would prefer to work full-time and pay 
someone to ... she has said this often, she wouldn't mind working 
full-time and paying someone to do the ... well I s'pose they're 
menial tasks aren't they? The hoovering and washing and ironing 
and things like that.
(What do you do?)
"Drying up. You know, the ordinary day to day things I probably 
wouldn't get involved. I mean if I've been doing some decorating 
or something or other I will hoover up and things like that. But I 
mean, I wouldn't, possibly, hoover up as a job like; unless I'd 
made the mess. If she's ill or anything - obviously I do things 
then, but ... possibly help her to cook a meal occasionally or 
actually do the washing up and drying up like, you know. But as
regards making the beds, hoovering washing the clothes, cleaning 
the brass or anything - I don't get really involved, you know".
(Are there any jobs that you refuse to do?)
"I refuse to take stuff down to the washateria (that probably 
doesn't follow now because we've got an automatic washing machine) 
but I just don't. It is a thing against my ego to see a guy 
in a washateria. It's just, you know, a personal thing with me.
And yet, I do remember when we had a lot of rain once, I took 
some stuff down to dry like ... Probably we'd had a row or summat 
and I was trying to get in her good books I don't know. But I 
really don't agree with blokes going down washaterias, it's just 
... I don't agree with it, I just ... don't like it at all".
(Do your children help in the house at all?)
"Not really they would like to ... I think my wife should give 
them more opportunity. If they do, they're going to make 
mistakes - but I think she should give them ... Occasionally 
she'll give them some pastry and that to play with - they would 
love to help out - but I think Kitty wants her jobs out of the way.
So rather than have the trouble ... although the kids have got 
to get, shall we say - trained and have got to learn how to do 
things to look after themselves or the house - she prefers to get 
the work done and get it out of the way, rather than spend time 
showing the children. So they can help her - I mean considering 
we've got two girls, they should help really, you know. But 
I think that's her own downfall that they don't."
(Do you help with looking after the children?)
"Yes - I do. I mean when she was working I had no qualms 
about changing nappies ... bathed them and put them to bed - 
when Kitty started working the hours she does now, you know - 
it stopped because she was there to do it like".
(Did you used to help your mother?)
"You'd be surprised. Yes I did, - polishing and everything when 
I ... I distinctly remember doing all the menial tasks when I 
was a young kid. (When did you stop - can you remember?) When I 
started fancying girls probably! Possibly right up till I was about 
lO you know, and then I went to the secondary school and started 
getting involved with football and things like that you know. I 
hadn't got time for anything, only myself, probably".
(Do you ever get tired or depressed?)
"Yes - I do get depressed. I s 'pose really its mainly about 
money. Especially before we had a rise like, you just wonder 
where it all goes to, and how you're going to cope. And, you know, 
I've got a nice young attractive wife, I want to take her out and 
I want her to enjoy herself or show her off or whatever you like.
I want us to have fun together - I don't see why we should be 
restricted from enjoying ourselves because I can't afford it
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(Does your wife ever get tired or depressed?)
"She amazes me, she works here and everyone passes comment
how well and nice ... I mean she's attractive like, but apart
from that she'll always smile and speak to someone and be
friendly and that you know. And the same with me like - I go
up and talk, you wouldn't think we were married. I mean I spend
a lot of time up there talking to her like. People think its
my girlfriend they don't think its my wife. And yet I go home and she'll
be completely different, you know what I mean - she'll be in a
depressed ..■ I think possibly when the kids get home - the
younger one is very taxing and runs her down a little bit - she does
get depressed - you know, not really bad, but she does get depressed
a little bit. But I get a little bit depressed as well".
Ref EC 45 - 47/S5: 771-918
(15) Ref TM 8/S2: 246-250
(16) Ref JG 7/S1: 369-380
(17) Ref TM 24/S3: 677-691
(18) Ref BM 39/S4: 770-800
(19) Ref MC 31/S4: 77-88
(20) Ref BB 32/S3: 50-114
(21) Ref GH 26/S4: 140-150 x 26/S4
(22) Ref MC 33/S4: 301 -
(23) In fact a whole gamut of social and personal controls exist
by which women's movements are directed and constrained by men.
One of the strongest is of course, the fear of rape and humiliation 
in general. Most male control mechanisms relate to their 
attempts to retain power over women's sexuality. Note, in this 
respect, Ernie's "I trust her".
(24) Ref EC 49-50/S6: 165-220
(25) Ref EC 48/S6 : 109 x 49/S6:
(26) Ref GH 6/S1: 855-885
(27) Ref TM 5/S1: 890-949
(28) Ref BM 18/S2 : 840-856
(29) Ref JM 16/S2 : 68-88
(30) Ref JM 28/S2 s 866-887
(31) Ref JM 28/S2 s 866-872
(32) Ref MC 4/S1 241-270
(33) Ref MC 5/S1 : 337-346
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(34) It is, certainly, not particularly useful to suggest that
a difference of this kind 'explains* 'less militancy' on the 
part of 'unschooled' women workers. Since it is just as 
likely to be related to the opposite. See for instance 
Drake (1920) Part III Ch. II.
Thus no specific or general conclusions can be drawn about 
men and women's experience in employment simply from looking 
at their position in the labour market. It is necessary
to examine this experience in practice, and to draw out the 
implications empirically.
(35) See TUC (1980) - Equal opportunities: Positive Action Discussion 
Document.
(36) See Chesterman (1978) p.151
(37) See Mitchell (1971) p. 128
(38) Ref GH 6-7/S1: 855-945
(39) See above p. 3»Z,
(40) See above p.
(41) Ref BM 10/S2: 150
(42) Perhaps it should be said at the outset, that while the men 
did enjoy many advantages denied to the women workers, this 
should not be taken to suggest they had no problems of their 
own!
(43) Ref MC 17/S2: 520-547
(44) Ref EC 14/S3: 75-84
(45) Ref TM 7/S2: 91-101
(46) Ref EC 14/S3:
(47) Ref EC 25/S4: 140-150
(48) Ref EC 22/S3: 687-707
(49) Ref EC 21-2/S3:
(50) Ref MC 9/S1: 661-670
(51) Ref EC 24/S4: 80
(52) Carpenters, toolroom and maintenance fitters were each around 
30 strong.
(53) Ref EC 20/S3: 427-440
(54) Ref EC 20/S3: 440-480.
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(55) Ref TM 27/S3 : 925-950
(56) Ref GH 17/S3 : 235-256
(57) Ref GH 16/S3 : 170-199
(58) Ref JM 22-23/S2: 440-534
(59) He had only recently been made deputy convenor
(60) Ref EC 28-29/S4: 350-457.
(61) Ref MC 8/81: 608-660
(What is the main reason for people leaving?)
"Better money elsewhere.
(How often do people leave?) "Very few in my department - 
they've been there for years. Quite content. But they come and 
go in the factory like wildfire.
(Why do you think that is?)
"General desire to earn as much money as quickly as possible 
(Even for the women?). Yes, and the men. (But do you think the 
women can get better paid jobs elsewhere?) Quite honestly,
I wouldn't have thought so. (Do you think it is the main reason 
women leave here?). It isn't the main reason, its one reason.
The other reason would be, I think, discipline. There's quite a 
lot of discipline here - which there has to be if you're on a 
piecework fast - production line, which has to meet an output 
at the end of the week. It's inevitable that is.
(In what ways might you see a woman leaving because of the discipline?)
Well like I said earlier to you - the monthly problem that ladies 
have. That woman can be 50% below physical and mental 
capabilities for that time, so her production will be down. She 
is then jeopardising the pool in her group - which are paid out 
a monthly bonus, so obviously she's being victimised. To such 
an extent that tears and almost fighting matches - these 
fortunately, are isolated incidents but they do take place."
Ref MC 13/S2: 152-198.
(62) Michael was shop steward for thirty three members, most of whom 
were carpenters and all male, in the building maintenance section.
(63) Ref MC 14-15/S2: 198-297
(64) See Marx (1976)
(65) Ref MC 17/S2: 475-485
(66) Ref TM 29/S4: 35-60
(67) Ref BM 10/S2: 150-174.
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(68) These links are certainly not unproblematic or without 
contradiction - for example, where men/families are dependent 
on women's wages.
(69) This is not the same thing as saying that the male workers 
were in the same position as capitalist exploiters of female 
labour power - quite clearly they were not. What is being 
identified here, are some of the generally prevailing pressures 
which seem to underlie an apparent common tendency or distinctive 
slant in male workers’ perspectives of women workers. A slant 
which persistently saw themselves as (needing to) exercise control 
over women as the source of the problem, rather than the conditions 
and features of their employment and exploitation.
(70) A further note on sexism: "Assumptions of a particular kind"
This conclusion, which addresses some important implications of 
sexism for working class organisation and politics is stated 
at rather a broad level because more detailed work on the parameters 
and components of this ideology has yet to be done. As a brief 
contribution to this, we can examine two discussions by men on 
women's work and women workers which contain manifestations of 
several "assumptions of a particular kind".
We can see, in the first instance, that these 'assumptions' are 
in fact more than that - they are'operational definitions'.
That is to say, they are also a practice whereby men may seek to 
define and also to control the sphere of women. In this discussion 
of the sexual division of labour, the 'argument' is constituted by 
the assertion of male interest:
"Don't ask me what - but there are some jobs that women can't do 
you know. If you say what? then I'll say breaking coal up, and 
you'll say there's nothing to stop a woman doing that ... But 
there are just some jobs that a woman can’t do and equally so, 
there are some jobs that blokes can't do aren't there? That's 
a fact of life, I should say.
(What sort of jobs do you think men can't do?)
"Well, I mean you've got men midwives now haven’t you? Well,
I mean I would have thought that was an area that a man couldn't 
have got into, but they have. Everything I say I'll probably 
be proved wrong, you know - working with handicapped children and 
things like that - a woman tends to do those type of things, and 
looking after - I s'pose you just naturally expect a woman to 
look after kids don't you like? You see. I think a woman is 
more suited to that type of work than a man obviously".
Ernie (Maintenance - Deputy Convenor) Ref EC 38/S5: 136-161.
When we move in more closely we can find a few more 'definitions'. 
This time they are being martialled by a male serviceman with 
a bad back who feels his job threatened.
"Well there are some jobs that women can do a damn sight better 
than men."
(What sort of jobs?)
"Well intricate jobs, small, component parts etc. But I do not
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agree with employing women on manual jobs or doing a man out
of a job, which they're doing in the moulding shop at the moment.
They've got service women, but these service women don't do
the job. Let's put it this way, they don't do the job as
good as I do it. They do it as good as some of the service
men do it. (Because some of the service men, I wouldn't
pay them in bloody washers, I tell you quite frankly)."
(How do they do it differently?)
"Well there's heavy stuff to lift, so therefore a man will go 
and lift it. Whereas a woman she'll take a few spindles out of 
a box and take them to her machine and then, alright, she's got 
to go back and get some more, and so forth. That's a waste of time. 
That is not production.”
(And a man would take the whole box?)
"He'd take the whole bloody box!” (And do his back in?)
He'd do his back in - you crafty devil, you! No, but 
you see what I'm getting at? Now, forget whether they are doing 
a job as good as a man or not. Just forget all that. Do you 
believe that a four-hourly woman who maybe has a husband working, 
should do a man out of a job on an 8 hour shift?"
Bob (Serviceman Moulding Shop) Ref BM6-7/S1: 800-850.
In this discussion Bob makes various appeals - first to his own 
superior - and women's inferior job performance - and next, 
more strongly, their lesser entitlement to employment. We can 
see that, as one argument falls another can be called into 
service, but all are well rehearsed assertions of inferiority and 
therefore inequality as far as women are concerned. On another 
occasion, talking about the women workers' problems the discussion 
took off on another familiar route: women are a problem and 
they are also defined as inferior social beings as well.
"Well you cannot expect a woman - I wouldn't expect you to lift 
a towpan of spindles that can weigh anything up to 2 cwt.
But you see, they've got women on these jobs ...
Again you will find women (and if you're playing this back to 
women, they can cock their ears up again) you will find that women 
can be very bitchy to each other. Whereas a man, he'll have a 
downright ... he'll have a downer and most likely go up to the 
Barlow Mow and say - 'Oh, wasn't that a bloody row we had in 
there....'
But the women can be very bitchy to one another, and I have found
that I've got 170 odd of them tonight to deal with and they
do tell tales...." Bob (Serviceman Moulding Shop) Ref BM30-31/S4:1-77.
Putting these points together we have a view now which sees 
women defined: into certain social roles and out of others; 
as economically dependent appurtenances of a man; as inadequate 
people and as inferior workers. In truth they are allowed no 
independent existence, certainly not one which is independent of 
a man; 'operative definitions' - as this unfortunate woman found:
"I had a case where a girl had been on the same machine for 
blasted years and she ruined 2 tools in 2 nights and she got a
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suspension for 2 days and I upheld it".
(Why did it happen?) "Because she was just damned careless, 
and her husband works upstairs, he's one of the bosses upstairs".
(Did she get a warning?)
"If its negligence - this woman was warned, and then the next 
night she turned round and did the same damn thing all over 
again. So I upheld the 2-day suspension".
Bob (Serviceman Moulding Shop) Ref BM24/S3: 309-327.
What has her husband got to do with it?
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PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH UNIONS - MEN AND WOMEN SHOPSTEWARDS
Women: Total 17 (3 straight to BSR from school not counted, so only 
14 used)
Contact with union 
in previous jobs
Previous union Age 
membership
first
Barbara No 42
Carol No 26
Jenny No 45
Jill No 35
Janet No 37
Lorna No 47
Madge Yes AEUW Engineering 
Shop
17
Nora No 48
Pip No 41
Pearl Yes CPSA Civil Service 18
Pru Yes 40
Sarah Yes GMWU Press shop 32
Sally Yes TGWU Buses 19
Tracy No 37
Average Age first contact 40
Men: Total 6
Bob Yes AUEW 25
Ernie Yes NUSMW, TGWU, GMWU 20
Gordon (Yes) (none, self-emnloved) (43)
Jim Yes Bakers Union, wire- 
workers' union
35
Michael Yes ASK 21
Terry Yes BISTAKTA AUEW 23
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS, PROBLEMS flND RESPONSES
In the first chapter of this Part, introducing the firm and 
its workforce, we noted that married women workers have long taken 
their place in the "active" labour force, and we asked what particular 
problems they might find within the employment relationship at 
workplace level. If they are recognisably engaged as "married 
women with domestic commitments", are the difficulties experienced 
in the labour market, which are associated with this special status, 
left behind at the factory gate - particularly one that is apparently 
especially designed to admit them?
We find that they are not. Moreover, distinctive needs and 
interests in employment, differing fundamentally from those of men, 
arise as a result of women's notable position as both waged and domestic 
workers. Their experience of this and the particular problems 
encountered, shape demands which challenge the nature of the employment 
relationship and the organisation of work itself. How might these 
demands be achieved, and what problems are associated with instigating 
the necessary changes?
Looking at the position of the female workforce within the 
employment relationship at workplace level, we see that this is also 
distinctive and peculiarly problematic as well. In the case of BSR, 
the women workers bore the main costs of management's production policy 
in practically every aspect of its requirements. We have noted how, 
especially in terms of "stability" and "flexibility”, these requirements 
stood diametrically opposed to the workers' needs. Thus we have found 
that stability in the labour process was achieved by flexible utilisation 
of labour - at the cost, from the workers point of view, of extreme 
instability and insecurity in employment. On the other hand,
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flexibility required by the workers met with severe rigidities on 
the part of the employer - to preserve stability in the labour process; 
and stability required by employees was similarly countered because
of the way it translated into costs for the employer— this time in terms 
of inflexibilities where flexibility was required. Because of the 
particular position of the female workforce in the labour market and 
also in the workplace, the employer was better able to pass on the 
"costs of stability" to be borne by them; with, from the women workers' 
point of view, highly stressful consequences.
We are interested in pursuing some of the further consequences 
of this process, whereby the female workforce bore the costs of market 
competitition and instability. What impact did it have on the 
women workers'* ability to take up their demands and to change their 
situation, not only in terms of the double burden, but also their 
position in the system of production itself?
Looking at the women workers' responses to their position in the 
labour process, we can identify a number of strategies at an individual 
and collective level, for coping with, resisting and regulating, the 
impact and application of management's production and control policies. 
Job control practices were a central concern of both managerial policies 
and the women workers' responses, since protection and advancement of 
these (from the workers' point of view) provided the basis,in terms of a 
stronger bargaining position, from which changes might be made at 
workplace level.
The main organisational focus of change for workers at this level 
is, of course, the trade union; under the auspices of which the workers 
engage in bargaining via representatives, with the employer. In order 
to examine the extent to which the women workers were able to defend
-382-
and advance their interests (both in terms of the labour process 
and outside it) by these institutional means, we need, of course, to 
look at their position within the trade union itself. The substance of 
this analysis lies in Part Three of this thesis. Here, however, we 
note that the question of job controls which is being raised in relation 
to the women workers' non-institutional responses on the shop floor, 
at both an individual and collective level, remains highly relevant.
This is because, we would argue, that these comprise an essential 
bargaining resource for workers engaged in negotiating their interests 
inside (or outside) an institutional context, in relation to the employer, 
other groups of workers, and their own representatives.
We conclude this part of the thesis, therefore, turning first 
to look at the way the problems the women experienced in combining work 
at BSR with domestic responsibilities, shaped their demands regarding 
their employment. Lending urgency to the need for change, is a view 
of some of the personal costs involved for women - which cannot simply 
be seen as a consequence of the double-burden alone. Indeed, the 
latter's importance should not detract from those problems associated 
with each of the two spheres in which these workers are engaged, 
considered separately. The domestic role assigned to women, their 
isolation in the home, immuration in the family and social subordination 
in general, is a crucial source of stress, needs and demands.
Likewise, employment, with its dehumanised and dehumanising work and 
power structures, is a source of oppression in its own right: a 
wellspring of resistance and focus of demands for change.
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"it's a womans factory isn't it?"
The women workers at BSR soon discovered that despite 
appearances, the labour process was not organised with a recognition 
of their needs. They could not alter the hours they worked or 
change shifts - job transfers were not allowed. They could not 
take time off without the risk of punishment through disciplining 
or loss of the job altogether. They could not even be certain of 
getting permission to leave the factory (a pass-out), without which 
the instant they left, they would be deemed to have 'sacked themselves'.
As we have seen, management ' s policies and activities were 
governed by the needs of production, or, more specifically, prioritized 
stability in the organisation of the labour process, and flexibility 
in the use of labour. This militated against the married women 
workers' needs for flexible terms of employment. And we again note 
that there was no tidy match between the 'supply-side' characteristics 
of the women workers and the 'demand-side' aspects of their utilisation 
by the employer. Rather, the opposite was the case - because the 
two forms of flexibility stood in contradiction to each other.
For instance, it was the generally rigid application of the 'no
transfers' rule, that lent both force to, and underpinned the
movement of labour principle. No-one could get out of,or refuse to
do,the job they were put on - other than by leaving the company
( 2 )altogether.
Application of the 'no job transfer' rule also extended to workers 
wishing to alter their hours, even if it was to do the same job.
"If they do leave it's because ... they started 
when their children wereverv young and father 
could look after them in the evenings. When the 
children get about 7 or 8 and at school, the 
mother wants to be with them in the evening, which 
is only natural, so therefore they want to change
their shift. And ... I fought it out with 
John Smith ... I told him straight, it stank - 
I said, 'you've had these women 7,8, & 9 bloody
years, and you're treating t h e m .... *
(But) they can't change their shift."
Bob (Serviceman - Moulding Shop) (3)
Thus flexibility for the employer was predicated on inflexibility 
for the employee. The ability of the women to impose some kind of 
priority on the organisation of production in relation to their 
needs is a major subject of our enquiry. Their demands, with which we 
must begin, arose from their position as waged and domestic workers, 
and the problems they experienced. But these demands were given a 
sharper edge as a result of some of the consequences of their situation 
and those are outlined below. We then move on to look at the 
substance of the demands themselves.
Inflexibility on the question of time-off, was certainly one of 
the women workers' biggest problems. For the married women workers with 
domestic responsibilities, taking time-off was the crucial means of 
reconciling conflicting demands, even though it entailed temporarily 
foregoing their wage. But it was never permitted for other than 
medical reasons, although, of course, occasions for it could arise 
from myriad circumstances. Here, problems arising from this general 
prohibition are illustrated in relation to just one of the many possible 
instances - holidays with the husband.
"Talking about problems, right - women, working in 
industry, with a set date for holidays, such as 
the industrial fortnight. A lot of women, their 
husbands don't get that holiday My husband doesn't 
he's a busman - so he gets his holidays when they 
say so, see? So the women have their holidays with 
their men - which is an obvious thing to do, isn't 
it? Unless you're lucky and you can get on your own! 
But...they have the ladies in to the office, and 
you know - ask them why they've had time off - why 
they've gone to Majorca for a fortnight, and...the 
girls tell 'em: holidays with their husbands.
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Well, they've always accepted this, and I feel that 
they should accept it, because - its a woman's 
factory, isn't it? And, this year they've accepted 
it - but over the past few weeks, they've kind of ... 
started to crack the whip giving warnings a nd they've 
threatened that next year they will bring in 
suspension for women that take holidays out of their 
.... you know. Because it slows production up.
So I said, 'Well, if this slows production up - and 
next year if ... the first one of my members that is 
suspended - production will stop!"
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (4)
"The women object to signing warnings if they've 
been on holiday with their husbands. They get 
a written warning, even if the women say beforehand ... 
One woman had a week off with her husband and she'd 
worked the BSR .... holiday week but she still had 
a warning!" Madge (Moulding Shop)(5)
The women were subjected to systematic disciplining for taking 
time off as if they were free as individuals to dispose of their labour 
power and in this disposition had total choice or control over their 
work attendance. The reality - that they had not - underpinned their 
'stability' in terms of the type of work and meant, ultimately, that 
they were being penalised for not being male workers: for being women 
or rather, wives and mothers. This predicament, that so many had in 
common, made the issue a crucial one.
They did not take time off for themselves, but for others, nor had 
they control over the circumstances.
"I mean you don't order these things they just happen, 
and they all come for the money - the people that come 
here, they come for the money. The older ones come, 
even when they're ill. You'll get some people, they'll 
come even when they're on their last .. you know, they 
can hardly drag themselves here! and they'll moan about 
it all day, but they'll still come".
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (6)
Punishment was inflicted on these women who took time off (and 
lost money) for the sake of others, just at those very times when
demands upon them were heaviest.
"Another had her husband ill. She was had up in 
the office for absenteeism 3 times".
(Eventually he went to hospital where he died).
"She didn't have doctors notes but she did have 
proof that her husband was in hospital - which she 
had to attend to see him in any case. But she 
was reprimanded on several occasions".
Pip (Sub-Assembly )(7).
The fact that the women were being recruited and penalised on 
the same basis - their family responsibilities - created a vicious 
circle which was a source of great stress:
"It's absenteeism which, of course, as I've said 
to you before, it's unavoidable in a woman's 
factory. I can't see in a factory like this, 
where you've got children who are sometimes taken 
ill, or school holidays ... And then you've got 
the various shifts - they've nearly all got children, 
that's why they work these odd shifts ... and I can’t 
see how you can avoid the absenteeism really, with 
all the warnings under the sun. It will only 
frighten the person to a nervous disorder - more than 
stop her taking time off, because if she's got to 
take time off .... " Pearl (Convenor)(8)
The kind of pressure which is indicated here, was, of course, 
exacerbated by management's inflexibility regarding both transfers 
and pass-outs:
"Pass-outs - terrible! We 'ave a lot of pass-outs, 
because they're married women with children. And 
its either dentist, clinic, or school day, which ...
A long time ago - I'm going back about 4 years —
BSR used to understand those problems with married 
women ... Well, this week, they're on a kick.
By all accounts, the superintendents, they were signing 
a terrible lot of pass-outs. So Mr Smith sent a 
memo round to 'is superintendents - 'You're signing 
far too many pass-outs -*I want you now to double-check 
and triple-check, that they've got a card or a note 
to say where they're going to. In other words, 
they're callin' us liars ... well, the girls, I 
should say". Jill (Supervisor- Final Assembly)(9)
As the women frequently pointed out, it was not possible to 
produce a card to cover every circumstance - even from places that 
usually gave them. The women were faced with the unpalatable
choice of losing their jobs: instantly-in the case of pass-outs - if
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\without one; or eventually - if they incurred too 
absence (because they couldn’t get pass-outs or for 
reason):
"He has refused several requests for pass-outs.
And it makes it very difficult - the women are 
forced to take a day off. Well, when they’ve 
been in the office (for disciplining), I've 
said, 'Why on earth didn't you.come in - when I told 
you to come in - and get a pass-out?'. They say,
'Pip, if we've got to have this trouble to get a 
pass-out, we'd rather take a day off'. So - where 
do you go from there? They're forced ... and I 
get it every week". Pip (Sub-Assembly) (11)
The only cause for absence acceptable to management was personal
incapacitation of the worker herself, 'proved' by a doctor's note:
"This week its school holidays, so there's many 
away. They'll get warnings, unless management 
eases off. Some are getting wise to 'em now, they 
bring in doctors' notes.." Nora (Final Assembly) (12)
The effect of this was not only to deny legitimacy to any other
reason, but actually to deny the existence of other reasons:
"You have to give a medical reason even when it's not. And a lot of
people say, why should they have to tell a lie?". Janet (Sub-Assembly) (13) .
Moreover, the doctors took a dim view of this procedure. ''They do,
every person that goes to the doctors, they only mention BSR, and they
go 'Oh, that bloody place again'". Nora (Final Assembly) (14)
"(And) doctors won’t always give them - that's the 
problem - they won't. As a matter of fact the doctors 
turn round and say, 'we don't like giving our patients 
doctor's notes - costing 80p. just to please BSR*- that's 
their answer.
Then some children have the usual infectious illnesses - 
and there again the doctors won't come in just to please 
BSR". Pip (Sub-Assembly) (15)
From the women's point of view, not only did they feel that the 
legitimacy of their responsibilities should stand by itself rather 
than be denied by having to be presented in false terms, but they felt 
the process itself was irresponsible. Even when it was a matter of
they left 
many days 
any other
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their own health, there was the question 6f anti-social behaviour:
"Some people, if they're ill - like say, diarrhea 
and sickness, or the 'flu - they don't feel like 
they should go to the doctors and worry the doctor.
So they don't want a doctor's note. So they say, 
if they've got the 'flu and they can cure it themselves, 
which I know myself. I could cure the 'flu myself 
without going to the doctors, by staying in bed. But 
yet my work wants a doctor's note, to say I've been 
ill, but I haven't even informed the doctor. So how 
do you go from there." Edna (Final Assembly) (16).
The women workers'needs and demands
How could the vicious circle whereby the women were both 
recruited and penalised on the same basis - their family responsibilities 
be broken? The women put forward a twofold demand: the punitive 
system had to be abolished, and production organised positively in 
such a way as to accommodate their requirements. Both of these aspects, 
the first to defend and the second to advance the women's position, are 
clear in Edna's account which springs, quite clearly from her personal 
appreciation of the circumstan oes.
"Well, to me I would abolish anything like that.
There again, sitting on the working side - I'd abolish 
it. I can understand the management have got a big 
problem here, but - like I said, when they take on 
a lot of women, they've got to put themselves into a 
situation - when they do start us - that we're going to 
have the time off. So there shouldn't be any need 
for all this.
I know there is a few youngsters thinking, 'Oh, it's 
good money' - they haven’t got much responsibility, and 
they have time off for nothing - but they're still going 
to have it off, whether the/re taken in the office or 
not. But it's the people that have got a responsibility 
to the home, who need the money - that gets all the 
worry and the trouble over this absenteeism.
They think, 'well if I have time off - they might 
sack me, and I need my money, and I can't have this 
off - and it's a big thing, it's a big worry. I 
mean, you're afraid to have time off. That's how 
they make you, they're making you afraid. Not me 
personally, if I wanted time off, I'd have it off.
But I know there's some not so strong minded as me, - 
they're very weak - and afraid! And I've known 
them come to work, and they've really been ill! And 
I say - 'you shouldn't be at work'. 'Oh, I can't have
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this off, oh. I'll have to go in the office, oh ....
I say, ’well send a doctor's note in'. 'Oh, I don't 
like ....'. You see, they're saying 'Oh I can't go 
to the doctors with the 'flu. It's too much 
trouble for my doctor, it's only the 'flu. Which I 
can understand, because they've got a big responsible 
job. There may be somebody's life in danger, while 
you're taking up the time with the 'flu. But - where 
do you go from there? The firm has you in the office 
and burns you up - and you'll be suspended or sent up 
the road, I mean, it's a big problem".
Edna (Final Assembly)(17).
The women made demands which required a positive orientation 
of the work organisation towards their needs - in both a subjective 
and objective sense. In general, they needed to be able to make 
those responsible decisions which affected the family's income and/or 
welfare such as:
"Now if she's got to 'ave time off with 'er 'usband 
which doesn't 'ave the same 'oliday as BSR - 
that man's gonna lose more money than she is, so its 
best for the wife to 'ave the holiday with the man ...
6,000 women work here - and you can't tell me that 
all 'usbands are gonna 'ave the same 'oliday as BSR."
Jill (Final Assembly - Supervisor) (18).
More than this - management had also to embody their appreciation
of the women's position and responsibilities towards others, in a
definite system which would enable them to fulfill these; for instance
"A woman was fetched off the line because her 
daughter had been taken ill at school, and it was 
15 minutes before she could get a pass-out, to go out.
This problem's come up several times at the shop 
steward's meeting. Management say, if it falls in 
a break, then the women have to wait till work starts 
again. But we feel there should be a system - being 
as this is a woman's factory here, there should be a 
system here - that in an emergency, like that, the 
woman should be able to go out". Nora (Final Assembly) (19).
Not only this - the women had material requirements as well.
"Because the women have often said that to me, 'why 
don't they have some room where the women can bring 
the children?'. I mean when you look at it, there's 
a lot of women as have to have time off now for 
children, sort of - got nowhere to leave them. If 
they had got a place, the women could bring them, and 
then they could come to work and then collect thorn
after ... And it would cut the absenteeism wouldn’t 
it, in a woman's factory?" Nora (Final Assembly) (20).
Predictably too, the women wanted greater choice and flexibility
over the hours that they worked. And their preferences showed clearly
how these could be related in a variety of ways - and also change -
according to domestic and personal circumstances. Of the 16 women
interviewed, for example, 12 were full-time workers, and seven of
( 21)these wanted to work different hours. 4 of 16 women were
working part-time shifts and 2 of these now wanted to alter their hours.
The other two were happy to remain on their shorter hours "I hope
( 22 )they never phase it out, this shift suits me fine".
While the women voiced demands which would materially assist
them in combining waged and domestic work (plus, if they were lucky,
a small modicum of time to themselves), their most immediate
requirements certainly involved the removal of those means of punishment
with which they were so seriously abused. This need lay closer to
the category of collective defence than advancement and indeed, it can
be argued that the former was a necessary precondition for the latter.
Both aspects ,the need for 'disarmament' on the one hand,and positive
orientation on the other, were simultaneously entwined within the
telling phrase - so often repeated:
"As I've said before - it is a woman's factory, and 
most - the biggest majority are married and 
have responsibilities at home". Pip (Sub-Assembly) (23) 
Emphasis in original.
"We want these rules abolished ... it's not going to 
stop absenteeism - because of the problems that 
come up! It isn't fair for them. It's unfair for 
the mother because you've got such a lot of things 
to do and let's face it, they're doing two jobs.
Because it's not just a job where you finish here.
You don't. You go back and you start again. And some 
days, I s'pose there's a lot of people - they have 
it on their mind all day - with children at school, 
wondering if they've got the housekey, if they've 
got all their stuff for sport. I think there's 
some women - keep on till 9 at night when they get back".
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (24).
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The sense of injustice, and also the specific nature of their 
problem,was sharpened when the women considered the men's position. 
For one thing, they didn't have to deal with the same problems and 
responsibilities arising from the domestic relationship:
"I say its wrong, in a woman's factory. I mean 
you wouldn't find many men having days off, would 
you? I mean, you wouldn't find the men having 
many days off to look after the kids - even when 
they've got children Pip (Sub-Assembly) (25)
Neither did men apparently, have to suffer the same kind of 
treatment within the employment relationship.
"I don't think there's any more absenteeism here 
than in any other woman's factory. You see, we 
say - here, they don't get so much understanding.
X know my son, I mean he'll go down to personnel and 
explain something to them. If he's got his wife 
ill and he's got notes from the doctors - well, 
they'll tell him to have time off. But here, you 
know, its just ... they don't even ask them why 
they've been away. When you go into work, all they 
see of you is to give you a warning! To me, I 
think they should ask them why they've been away, 
and I think they should think about the reason".
Janet (Sub-Assembly) (26). Emphasis in original.
Pip, who has the last word here - gave immaculate expression to 
the painful irony of the women's position as domestic and wage workers.
"I reckon if the women ... they shouldn't ... if
the women don't come to work, they shouldn't abuse
them like they do, they shouldn't have them in the
office. If they don't want to work, they don't
pay them. But you know the management's view on that
is, we don't employ them to ... we employ them to
make money out of them, not to be absent! But they
don't pay them to be absent.' So I don't know what they're
grumbling for! They'd soon make you absent if they
didn't want the work, and they'd got their stocks up.
They wouldn't want you then!". Pip (Sub Assembly) (27).
The Costs of Stability
A lot of people try to get off the main 
lines but don't succeed, on health-lines. But 
there again - I think everybody has their off-days, 
don't they, you know. If you're really working 
hard, then its bound to make you ill isn't it?
People, well, most of them take valium tablets.
But I s*pose, like myself, when you've got a full­
time job and then you have to go back home and 
start again, I s'pose it's not long before it brings 
you down is it?". (How many people do you know who 
are on valium?). "3 so far, on my line. But - quite
a few don't speak about it. I mean, those are just 
people that I know personally. There's probably 
quite a few that I don't know, because not everybody 
speaks about their health or anything do they? "
Edna (Final Assembly) (28).
It is clear from the previous discussions of the women 
workers' position in the labour process, that they were subjected 
to a high degree of stress from practically every aspect of it. 
Stress was engendered by the nature of the work and its performance 
under constant pressure and rigorous disciplinary controls. It 
was increased by movement of labour, constant speed-up and the 
intensification of work. And it was sustained by pervasive 
insecurity and high levels of intimidation generally.
Confirmation (if more is needed) that management's intensive
utilisation of female labour was problematic from the workers' point
of view might be seen in the occurrence, on at least two occasions,
(29)of mass hysteria in the factories. (One of these taking place
during the course of the study).
The toll on the women workers in terms of stress was well known.
"A lot of them suffer with nerves - the biggest 
majority of the factory ... you've only got to go to 
the hospital and they'll tell you - they've got 
reports of people suffering with their nerves. You've 
only got to walk into Corbett Hospital - they say 
'You work at BSR?'. First thing they ask. It's got 
a black name". Pip (Sub-Assembly) (30).
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And it was the pace of the work which formed the most
readily identifiable source of this:
"The local doctors will say - the first thing 
they will say is, 'do you work at BSR?'. As a 
matter of fact, we had five doctors go round the 
factory about 2 - 3  years ago. And my doctor 
happened to be one of them. It was to see the 
environment in which we work ... he said it was the 
pace, the pace at which they were working."
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (31)
While the women interviewed certainly conceded the particularly 
stressful nature of their work, they were less inclined than the 
doctors to consider this the sole source of their ill-health and 
disease. "Nerves - quite a number. But you always have it - it's 
not just this place, I don't think". Pru (Sub-Assembly) (32)
Every person interviewed produced examples, from among those 
they knew, of women put under particular pressure as a result of their 
home circumstances, quite apart from 'every-day' problems like sickness 
and ill-health in the family and simply having too much to do.
"She's 59 - her daughter's 20, and her son's 17 - 
her 'usband works daily but ... 'e spends 'is money 
on booze. She's never got any money for bills - I mean, 
she should be retiring, but there's no way she can 
retire, no way! 'E spends 'is money on booze and 
gambling - and she's never got 2 ^pennies to rub 
together on Monday - at all. And when the bills come
in - she just 'as a fit! ....  an' 'opes that
something turns up. At the moment, it 'asn't affected 
'er ... well, when I say it 'asn’t affected 'er - I'm 
a-lyin'. She smokes from 9.30 until 3.30 - non-stop, 
never takes a cigarette out of 'er mouth at all! And 
she's got one speed which-I don't know whether she's 
on tranquilisers or not - but she's really slow. But 
it doesn't jeopardise me line so - I don't interfere".
Jill (Supervisor - Final Assembly)(33).
Half of those interviewed related occasions when they had 
been seriously stressed and/or depressed and had been given 'nerve 
pills'. (Although this question was not specifically asked
of them and more may have taken tranquilisers at some point in their lives).
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That both employment and household relationships, as well as
the manner in which they were combined, must constitute focal
points of women's struggle to change their circumstances is
perfectly clear from the toll of stress and fatigue exacted.
This finds no parallel with the men.
"There's 4,000 women 'ere - 3,999 hye nervous 
disability ... all over the factory ... you'll 
find the majority of people are on pills here - 
tranquilisers, black and green capsules, the pinky 
ones ... they're all on.
I've got 3 on my line now - there's J_______ , P_____
and D________ . The one - 'er 'airs failin' out.
And it is, it's the pace and the tension here - 
you know, it's one big rat-race here".
Jill (Final Assembly - Supervisor) (35).
(Do you know women with bad nerves?)
"Oh yes, quite a bit of that around". (How many 
do you know?) "Numerous people, numerous. It's 
the pace of life today - pace of life .. you hear 
these ladies that have been - because they go to 
the doctors and they give them valium, librium - 
doesn't seem to hurt them. Because I know for a 
fact, one young girl, oh, a woman we'll call her 
now, whose been on valium for well over 10 years.
So whether valium ever affects them over a period of 
years, I don't know...." Pearl (Sub-Assembly-Convenor) (36).
"Oh a lot of them on the line, they've all got bad 
nerves - if you heari them, they've got tablets 
for their nerves ... (Other illnesses?) "Nerves 
mostly nerves. You know when they go to the doctors - 
nerves, or they're exhausted or something".
Nora (Final Assembly) (37).
"As a matter of fact, I've got one girl up there, 
and she's done nothing else - and it only happened 
since she's been at BSR - and she's disabled. She's 
in the disabled team now, through it".
Pip (Sub-Assembly) (38).
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The women workers' responses
The women workers were not rendered totally passive victim^ 
in relation to their problems as a result of managerial strategies.
The latter encountered continuous opposition from the workforce 
and the women's resistance took a variety of forms.
There were numerous work stoppages. Most frequent were
"downers" - individual teams or sections downing tools for a short
while, but remaining at their stations - for example:
"It was stupid really - our head of department 
snatched a flag, that a woman had put up, you know - 
how pathetic can you get? It was Jubilee day, and 
everybody had decked up you know, but our particular 
superintendent didn't like it. And he snatched it 
down - but he jolly well put it back up again - he 
was man enough to go and put it back up again! Because 
everybody stopped work! (laughs). They just stopped 
work ... so silly ! You know, i'nt it really? But 
that was a male action wasn't it? It wasn't the 
women! I was just too disgusted to speak!"
Sally (Sub-Assembly) (39).
There were also, on occasions, mass walkouts:
"A couple of summers ago, it was very very hot.
And there's only about 2 or 3 windows in the room 
where I work ... and it was about - it was 98 degrees.
So, every afternoon, we got up and walked out. Put 
our coats on, and went home. And they couldn't 
understand why, you know. So, we told them that it 
was inadequate ventilation - now their attitude to me 
wasn't very good, but - we did get same more ventilation 
in, the following year. It was ... we had lots more 
fans, and extractor fans all over the place - and 
we haven't had a summer like it since! So, whether 
they'd be effective, I don’t know. But we walked out, 
several times." (Did they penalise you for that?)
"No. Well, there was too many of us. If it had been 
just me, you know, I s'pose they would've ... although 
they couldn't 'ave done really, because my women 
would've ... you know, they would've stuck with me.
Well, they did do. They just saw me getting my bags 
ready and ... off I went, and they trailed out after 
me - there was no way that I was going to work in 98 
degrees! Half of our room went, and the other half 
stayed . And some of the main lines downstairs walked 
out as well". Sally (Sub-Assembly) (40).
It was not always the case however that withdrawal of labour 
on a mass scale was as orderly as this. Quite frequently, "wild-cat"
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strikes occurred which developed close to riots. The Branch 
Secretary remembers the occasion when the women workers at Old 
Hill discovered that the men had received a bonus which had not 
been extended to them, in a wage deal, which was supposed to 
establish equal pay. The women's action was successful but:
"It was terrifying! They got a chap by the legs, 
and they were dangling him over the staircase.
The afternoon shift came on, and they were told 
there was no strike and to work normally. But 
these kids went around, whipping the chairs out from 
under them as they sat to work on the lines. We met 
the company, they wanted to see what would happen.
I told them they should get the police, someone was going 
to get killed". Mary West (Branch Secretary) (41).
At a less dramatic level altogether, the women workers at BSR 
looked to a variety of other strategies to resist and regulate the 
worst effects of management's exercise of power. We go on to 
examine some of these.
INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES
Albeit, at an individual level, but on a mass scale, the
women workers took pills, time-off or quit.
"Well, I think, in time, with the mass production 
and that and the atmosphere gets tighter, working 
all the time here, it sort of gets on top of people.
I know there are a lot of people working on my own 
line, they're on nerve tablets, valium tablets, and 
things like that you know. It's a big strain really 
you know ... It gets them down that much that they 
have to pack in,in the end. Yes."
Edna (Final Assembly)((42).
Taking time off as a response to the pressure of work was commonly 
recognised and understood, but it was most often associated with <-iie 
younger girls rather than older married women -probably because the 
latter were more likely to have resort to specify domestic 
circumstances as the main reason for their absence.
(Is pressure of work a reason for absenteeism?)
"I should say it is, it's very tiring - I mean, 
today myself I could have done with an extra day 
in bed, you know. It i^ very tiring you know.
It is a push really, to come out some days, you 
know, you get very tired. It gets worse towards 
the end of the week - I was exhausted this morning." 
Edna (Final Assembly) (43).
"Really. Everybody - when work gets on top of you ... 
to me, when work gets on top of anybody, they have 
a day off. They come back to work the next day and 
they're fresh as a daisy. But of course, they don't - 
management don't think like that."
Nora (Final Assembly) (44).
(Reason for absenteeism?) "They're fed up - fancy 
day off. Some feel bad. Quite a few just fancy a 
day off. They're more open today, they will admit 
they fancy a day off for themselves - more so than 
they would a few years ago". Ethel (Final Assembly) (45).
But time off could entail pressures of a different kind:
"Bad nerves is common - I know about 6 on pills.
It sometimes involves them having time off. They don't 
go to the doctor's every time, so they get hauled 
into the office ..." Sally (Sub-Assembly) (46).
Apart from being seen as a coping strategy, taking time off 
(or quitting) employment as a response by workers to their working 
conditions, is also, of course viewed as a form of resistence to these. 
In this example, the two aspects are clearly combined:
(Reasons for absenteeism?)
"Well, I don't know. Sometimes its because of their 
home life, and other times its because they're fed up 
of the job or something like that. ... One of the 
ladies' presses was moved. It used to be turntables
and now its on forming mainplates. Well when her 
press was moved you see, her job was finished. Well 
she hasn't followed her press and gone onto main plates 
she's like - all over the shop. And last week she 
had 2 days off, and I said to her hudsand - 'what's 
the matter with Leah?'. And he says, 'Her's fed up!
Fed up with the set-up here! And I said, 'really?' 
and he says, 'Yes - because she's moved around'C.
Sarah (Press Shop) (47).
As a form of resistance, individual workers 'spontaneous' actions 
in terms of time-off or quitting tend not to be seen as a means of
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regulating or modifying the conditions they are a response to.
Such assessments of effect do, however, need to be made in the
(48)context to which the actions apply. Certainly, the threat
of(individual) absence on a large scale as a response to management 
•breaking the line' for example, was aimed at preventing this from 
being carried out; and might well be effective, (depending on other 
circumstances) as the women well recognised, because of the disruption 
it caused: "If people think the line will be broken that day they
won't come in". Ethel (Final Assembly) (49).
The connections between 'resistance', 'coping' and 'regulation'
strategies can be explored more fully perhaps, in relation to two
forms, so commonly used they appear to have been part of the general
shop-floor culture: the system of cooperation or 'mutual aid' and
'compartmentalisation'. The first points towards the collective
identification and social support which the women workers continuously
developed as an integral aspect of their work-group relations. This
was in addition to, while at the same time it extended beyond, the
collective mutual regulation (also continuously developed) within
the technical job context. The second was an 'individual' strategy
which, nevertheless, required - as much as it also pointed towards -
the need for, workers to control their jobs in order to maintain their
health and their capacity to labour.
"I've never got time to be ill... I haven’t got 
time to be ill - at all. Even when I am ill you 
know - I still carry on. But there again, there's 
•undereds of women exactly the same. They 'ave GOT 
to, they can't afford not to." Jill (Supervisor - 
Final Assembly) (50).
"They all, all of them, if they come in, and one of them's 
got a cold or an off-day - I've got to be fair to them,
I mean, I can '>t be any otherwise - they're very good in 
that way. They say, 'take it easy, we'll do half of that' - 
they help. You feel below par, and they don't let you 
do everything".
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1... M>____'s husband, he's never given her a wage ..
She’s never had a wage off him. She's always lived 
on what she's got from here. She's found it very hard ... 
But the girls all share find :help each other.
Like, you hear 'I've got to go and buy a little tin of 
paint and all I need is enough to do so and so'.
•Don't buy any, I've got some!' And the next morning 
you've got it, they bring it. Or they say, 'I'm going 
out on Saturday night and I could do with buying myself 
another dress, but I can't afford one - I could do with 
something for a change. 'Well, I've got so and so you 
can borrow it if you want it!' And its there the next 
morning!' And they'll always offer lifts around if they 
hear you're going somewhere .... "
Jenny (Final Assembly) (51) (emphasis in original).
It would appear from the interviews, that at a personal level,
the women commonly used compartmentalisation as a coping strategy.
Keeping separate the two spheres of their lives in order to contain
the pressures of each and to prevent 'spill-over', which might otherwise
threaten an uncontrollable build-up of stress. The following two
conversations make this procedure quite explicit.
(1) (Tracy, do you think about BSR when you're not at work?)
"No! No I don't. I'm sorry I don't. I clock in at 
8 o'clock and I finish at a quarter to five, apart 
from attending branch meetings - when I finish at 
quarter to 5, I finish! And I don't talk about it 
... I never discuss anything at home".
(You don't take worries home with you?)
"No, no, no, you have to ... You can't, because as 
I said, you've got everyday pressures of your own at 
home anyway, and so you've got to shut off haven't you? 
Otherwise, you'd got the two mixed up, and then you 
would be landing up with having a nervous breakdown, 
so - the only thing is, you shut off. You've got to 
shut off... So that's what I do".
(Do you shut off your home-life when you're at work?)
"I shut out a certain amount when I come out the house 
in the morning. I shut out a certain amount, for the 
simple reason, they know where I am if they need me.
I mean before now, my daughter's come up here, you know.
I shut off, because I know I can't combine the two.
As I said before.. Oh well, let's face it, when you're 
working in the daytime you know, you think about a few 
things, things do crop up and you do think about it.
But you have to shut off a certain amount.”
Tracy (Final Assembly) (52).
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\(2) (Edna, do you worry about your job?)
"No. When I go home X cut it off altogether. I 
think you've got to make your self have some sort 
of relaxation. There's a few - well one night in 
a month - we go to the shop stewards meeting at 
St. Michael's Hall, and that's the only time out of 
working hours that I have anything to do with the 
work. Otherwise I shut it off completely. Well, 
you don't seem to be home very long anyway, before 
you're back here!"
(How does your home-life affect you at work?)
"Well, when I'm at work - there again, I try not to 
think about home. Because - I think if I thought 
about home I'd be thinking, 'oh. I've still to go back 
and do it now', you know. I think it would depress 
me if I had to stop and think about home. So there 
again, where I cut off work when I get home, I cut off 
from home when I get to work. I get stuck into me job 
or talk about anything - so you don't really think about 
it". Edna (Final Assembly) (33).
But it was only possible to compartmentalise effectively, if 
the pressures in either sphere were not too great, because the 
process required a level of detachment which was difficult to attain 
and easily broken down. Carol, for example, was worried about her 
job on mats for a time:
"Yes, yes I did all the time yes. Worried at the time, 
worried thinking have I done it right? Well I knew 
I couldn't do the mats, and they kept me on for a bit and 
that worried me, knowing that it was rubbish I was doing."
(That worried you at home even?)
"It did when I knew I couldn't do me job right, you 
know. But when I was put on the deflashing that I'm doing 
now - I don't worry over that because I know that, in 
my mind, I'm doing me best and I know that.
... that's why I like the job that I'm doing, because 
I can forget it, you know. I mean, I enjoy what I'm 
doing, that's why I said, I'm not bothered about being in 
any other department". Carol (Moulding Shop) (54).
In the workplace, as we have seen, many aspects of management's 
policy would have the effect of destroying an attitude of detachment 
towards the job - for instance doubling*up and movement of labour.
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Tied, as the operators were, to the rapid repetition of detail 
tasks, these changes destroyed the only respite which could possibly 
be found in such work - the hard-won 'reward' of habituation in their 
jobs, i.e. the achievment of a level at which work at the requisite 
speed was accompanied by a sufficient degree of relaxation to render 
it relatively less stressful. While both of these systems - 
mutual aid and compartmentalisation - can be viewed, essentially as 
strategies for coping with the impact of working conditions rather 
than altering them, they both, nevertheless depended on the ability 
of the workers concerned to establish and maintain job controls.
Not only, as we have suggested, to reduce personal stress, but also 
in order to redistribute the workload, so that the workers could help 
each other.
We go on now to look at those of the women workers' responses 
which were aimed . explicitly at regulating crucial aspects of their 
working conditions - not only in terms of their impact but also their 
application. Again, we note that the effectiveness of these means 
of regulation largely depended on whatever level or degree of control 
over the job the workers could sustain. On the other hand, these 
regulatory strategies themselves were aimed both at enabling the 
further development of controls over the job, and defending those 
already in existence. Since the main drift of management's production 
and labour policy was, precisely, to undermine their position to do 
either, we find that the main efforts of the women workers addressed 
this policy centrally. We look at their attempts to regulate the 
pace of work and to resist speed-ujx Snce this required the regulation 
of disciplinary offensives and also movement of labour, we go on to 
examine some of the women workers' responses in respect of these.
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"YOU'VE GOT TO PACE YOURSELF"
Tremendous pressure was put on the women to work at the 
fastest possible rate and was not reduced in the periods of slack 
demand. This was because first, unit costs remained crucial when 
production was for stock (prices might have to be lowered in order 
to clear it); secondly, management feared they would be unable 
to increase the pace again once it was allowed to drop. This 
strategy, however, did not meet with total success.
On individual piece-work jobs, for example, workers such as 
Janet resisted the pressure exerted through the incentive payment 
system, in a manner similar to that documented in accounts of 
piecework payment systems elsewhere.
"I used to worry about it, you know. Worry 
about working - mainly keeping up the count.
You get into a routine of doing the same count.
Now, I don't ... if I don't get the count out 
I don't worry about it. As long as I'm doing 
the job right, I'm not bothered about the count 
now. I think I've got to the stage where, you 
know, you can only earn.like so much. And its 
better to stay on one lot of money and then you 
know what you're going to do with it. You've got 
the same amount coming in every week-end and it 
doesn't worry me now".
Janet (Final Assembly) (55)
This example of an individual piceworkers' decision to opt for a 
certain level of earnings - and (therefore) output - cannot be 
generalised too far because large numbers of workers were on fixed 
counts/performances, or 'no value jobs', or else they operated in 
closely coordinated teams. Here, we look at attempts to regulate 
the pace of work on the final assembly lines which involved more
than 60 people
It is clear that all workers regulate their output to some 
degree. Nora's line of part-time workers was more co-operative 
to management than most, but this didn't mean the latter had it 
all their own way:
"They (the workers) thought that the value wasn't 
enough for the money and I don't know, I think it 
was something that they talked about amongst 
themselves. And they said as they'd only send 200 
an hour up, it wasn't worth sending any more. And 
then I think there was a bit of a showdown. They 
(the management) wanted 220 an hour. And then ... 
we compromised and said we'd do 210."
Nora (Final Assembly) (56)
Making the decision between effort and earnings within the limits 
set by any given payment system is a much more complex process where 
teams of workers are involved. Edna describes the difficulty of 
achieving a concensus.
"I mean, you get so many girls saying, 'Oh, its not 
fairj but they don't stand up to it you know. It is 
stupid really, its not worth the money how they dash - 
its better to take your time, there isn't really that 
much difference in the money."
(But here, they just keep going fast?) "Yes, they 
do,they just don't ... They moan about the money, but 
they won't back it up. You know, they wont sort of ...they 
want you to tell them - but if you go round and tell 
them, then they want you to pay their difference on 
Friday, you know what I mean? It's really complicated. 
That's how I think of ... they know what they want, 
they've moaned about it, but they don't do anything 
about it. I mean, if you're gonna do anything - how 
long are youJ-67 people. Now, you depend on each other 
that is every one - they're a team. Now if you get a 
quarter of a team that wanted to stop rushing and to do 
a "normal" week, you know just to their own speed - then 
you'd get the other part, where they say they're gonna 
get the piecework out - then you get another part where
they say, 'Oh well we don't care!' So ....  If you're
gonna do anything like that, well you've got to stick 
together as a team, and you don't always get this."
Edna(Final Assembly) (57).
The difference between establishing a pace of "normal working" 
and a "go-slow" is largely a question of degree since the process of 
regulation is the same. Restricting output is often used as a means
of achieving some other specific and commonly agreed aim, which as
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Barbara indicates may make it easier to'sustain.
(Have your line ever decided its not worth 
getting the count and gone slow?)
"Yes. They've done it quite a few times".
Say they were doing 130 - 140 an hour, they've 
dropped down to about lOO. But then, like, all 
the girls won't stick together. The front ones 
are going like mad and the back test have slowed 
down, then there's just a great big block of work 
waiting to go through. But then they get fed up 
of going slow because they've got no work, and so 
they start to do it again".
Barbara (Final Assembly) (58).
The only time they succeeded in keeping up a 'go slow' for any
length of time was 'when the whole factory's on the go...'. In
a dispute the previous year (1977) line workers in all the factories
had kept up this action for several weeks.
"Yes we did too. I think that was on the wages - 
they did it for about a fortnight, I think, but then 
the threats came out, of redundancies and short time, 
you know, and closure of the factory. They couldn't 
afford to lose their jobs".
Barbara (Final Assembly) (59).
This dispute provides a good example of these workers' use of 
output restriction as a means of resisting management's attempts to 
intensify work, in the first instance, and then as a means of applying 
a higher degree of regulation over the 'normal pace' thereafter.
The centre of this action was the Old Hill factory, which appeared 
to be the main focus of management's efforts to cut production while 
maintaining the pace of work and avoiding the payment of waiting time.
In all factories recruitment had stopped and movement of labour was 
being used to a greater extent, together with work intensification, 
in order to carry out production with a smaller workforce. But in 
particular on the main lines a continuous supply of bad parts - which 
cut out waiting time payments, had made the work more difficult, and 
resulted in a higher number of rejects. This had led to a considerable 
drop in performances and, therefore, the women's wages, especially at
Old Hill
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"The lines really got their tails up, and then 
they had a go slow. The girls on the lines thought 
they were being unfairly treated. No matter how 
much work they did their wages never seemed to get 
any higher, so they decided to take things into their 
own hands. And they found out that by working steady 
they weren't that much worse off in their wages".
Ethel (Final Assembly) (60).
Despite a short stoppage, the situation did not improve. And 
following this adoption of a 'go-slow' specifically as a protest, 'normal' 
working was never really resumed in this factory. The women continued 
'working steady', that is, they established a new and lower level of 
'normal working'. Faced with what appeared to be a 'spontaneous'^61  ^
yet concerted drop in the count which lasted well over a year, 
management were finally forced to consider re-vitalising the incentive 
element in their pay system (which they did in the wage deal of 1978) .
(How much did count drop?)
"Well we're capable of 2,000 per day on average.
Now we're doing about 1,800. But over the last 
12 months, 2 years, the counts really have gone down 
a terrific amount. Well I've seen a time when out of 
those 7 full-time lines, at least 5 of them would be 
doing over 2,000. It isn't happening how".
Ethel (Final Assembly) (62).
Whatever the specific conditions, it is clear that the process 
of regulating the pace of work on a collective basis was much more 
complex than for one worker alone. On the other hand, as we have 
seen, the successful operation of management's production policy required 
a high degree of cohesion, mutual coordination, and regulation by 
the work groups. And where the pressures of inter-dependency - whereby 
workers tended to drive each other - required, on the part of teams 
(as it did of all to some degree) collective efforts to ameliorate this 
impact on each individual, these controls derived from the same sources 
of mutual regulation and coordination.
Apart from these sources of regulation deriving from workers' 
relationships with each other, there are also those which derive 
from the workers' relationship to the job itself. Information 
and knowledge, together with skills picked up while doing the job 
are essential elements of control over work-effort, thus we have 
noted overall that workers develop and utilise job controls to both 
facilitate the execution and flow of work, and also to regulate the 
expenditure of effort entailed. In this labour process the need 
for the former was heightened by the degree of fragmentation and 
interdependence designed to increase managerial control; while the 
significance of the latter was heightened by a labour intensive 
system which restricted the extent of machine-pacing.
Management utilised two kinds of control strategies which 
continuously confronted the female workforce in their attempts to 
regulate the pace and control their work effort. Movement of labour 
and disciplinary offensives undermined employment security and 
underpinned driving. Labour mobility in particular, by destroying 
job continuity and expertise, made speed-up and intensification harder 
to resist. And by disrupting the co-ordination and mutual regulation 
necessary in a collective process, it undermined protective strategies 
developed both on an individual and a collective basis. Domination 
and the use of disciplining was an important means of driving those 
on non-incentive, fixed performance jobs. And made the kinds of 
decisions, such as that made by the individual pieceworker In the 
first example, particularV difficult, because as has already been 
pointed out, the "incentive scheme" comprised much more of stick than 
carrot: the level of pace being crucially related to the level of
intimidation management could sustain.
In looking at the regulation of pace and effort it is 
therefore, relevant also to look at the question of regulating the 
level of intimidation and movement of labour both of which 
underpinned it.
RESISTANCE TO DISCIPLINE AND DOMINATION
There were interesting differences, between the older and 
younger workers in their resistance as individuals to managerial 
domination.
"When they're younger, somehow they've got a sort 
of 'couldn't care less attitude towards the job that 
they're doing. They don't seem to be able to respond 
to the type of discipline that's necessary -to being 
told anything”.
Pearl (Sub-Assembly - Convenor) (63).
According to Jill, the supervisor, the younger girls did, 
indeed, tend to display rather distinctive responses - at least towards 
immediate supervision.
"Well I went past a line one day, and this little 
girl - couldn't have been above 17 , did turn at me 
and flout! An' I said to her, 'If I was your 
mother, I should smack your bottom!* And she says to me, 
'And if you were my mum, I should put one on the end of 
your nose'. You know, well they do talk to the 
supervision like that sometimes, I mean, sometimes we're 
abused terrible! You know - some of 'em take 'em 
through procedure, but me - I just give 'em as much 
as they give me! Well, not swearing, because I've got 
2 daughters, and I 'ope they would never turn out 
language like this - it's terrible isn't it! (laughs)”
Jill (Final Assembly - Supervisor) (64)
And the younger girls' greater daring and militancy is illustrated
in Jenny's account of how her line of mainly older women were brought
out on strike
(Have you ever been involved in industrial action?)
"When they've come out on strike then, naturally 
we've had to go with them. I mean - we asked if 
we could work, and they said, if we did that - they'd 
come and stop us forcibly! So we didn't take that 
risk."
(When was that?)
"It was last year, when there were one or two strikes - 
one over pay I think it was, something to do with the 
pay. And they'd said, 'we'll strike on different 
weeks - and my row said; 'CAN we work if we want to?' 
and they'd said we could: 'If you want to work you 
can'. And we found that it was the young kids really 
that were causing the trouble • THEY said 'if you work, 
we shall chop your hands off!' You know,'we shall 
come round ....' so we ... well, to save any trouble - 
we'll go with the others, and that was the reason.
Because there were a lot of people wouldn't have gone home." 
My emphasis lower case underlined, original emphasis 
upper case underlined.
Jenny (Final Assembly) (65).
The basis for this difference in response and resistance was
identified as lying outside the workplace. Janet commented on the
difference in the generations:
"Although women are frightened more easily than men,
I say the next generation of people coming into the
factory - they aren't". (You think the younger
ones are less...?) " Yes, I think they're not so frightened
as what we were. And, I don't say I'm frightened or
I shouldn't be shop steward, but I think some people are
scared. I think they're not the people to turn round
and tell anybody off."
(Do you think its only in recent years?) "Yes, 
definitely, you can see the change in people. They don't 
work so hard, and it doesn't worry them if somebody comes 
and tells them to get on with it. You know, they 
don't ... they carry on. Which I think is a good thing.
The older women don't answer back, they just sit there 
and take it". Janet (Sub-Assembly) (66)
Although within the generations there are differences too. Most
notably, with regard to the financial commitments entailed in the home
and family: this discussion concerned absenteeism. But similar
points can be (and were) made about the difference in response to
discipline generally
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"Well you don't get it with the men do you really, 
because they've got to come to work, you see. And 
a lot of the young ones - this is our biggest problem 
where the wages are concerned - they go home, they 
only give their mum £5 or ElO. Let's face it, 
they've got £30 or £35 worth of pocket money. They 
think well, we're going to have 2 days off - and they 
have 2 days off. So of course .. I mean this is 
what's causing our headaches. More than anything.
I ain't going to tell the management that they've got 
too much money. But that is what's doing it. But 
then again,if they paid their own whack at home, or 
if they had their own home, they'd have to come to 
work. You see that's why we get more cooperation off 
the young ones that are married and buying their own 
home, they've got to come into work because otherwise 
if they didn't come to work, they wouldn't be able to 
afford the commitments that they've got, would they - 
like if they were buying their own home? We have 
more problems between the age of 16 & 21 a lot more”.
Eunice (Final Assembly) (67).
The impact of marriage and children on a woman's position in the 
labour market has been noted already. The strength of this position 
clearly made a difference to the women workers' response in terms 
of their option to quit or to risk standing out against management. 
(What about labour turnover?)
"In our shop its mostly the same people there as 
last year. As I've said, it's mostly older women.
I mean, they can't just go out and get another job 
like a youngster can".
Elizabeth (Machine Shop) (68).
"I think the older women tend to accept things a lot 
more than the younger women. I don't know if its 
because they've got a decent little job (they want 
to hang on to). The younger ones are that little bit 
more prepared to stand up for themselves, you know".
Madge (Moulding Shop)(69).
The**e wore also occasions when the women stood up for each other.
"A girl who was friends with the supervisor had a week
off and returned straight back to her job. A week later
another was off and when she returned she was had in
the office and told she'd be moved off her job. The
girls were up in arms and threatened to have a downer unless
she was put back on her own job again".
Nora (Final Assembly) (70).
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The response of the workforce to management taking 
disciplinary action varied according to the degree the women could 
insist on 'fair' treatment, and stand out against petty tyranny, 
as in the incident of the flag above. But there is a lack in 
examples of groups taking action on behalf of individual members 
who were disciplined, which seems to suggest that protective 
strategies were difficult to establish and sustain in this area. One 
reason may have been because of the interest workers themselves had 
in maintaining the flow of work and the difficulties they experienced, 
as a result of disruption. e.g. the worker doubled-up felt 'penalised' 
by the absentee. But the main reason was, probably, that the level 
at which disciplinary policy could be effectively controlled, lay 
beyond the power of individual sections or work groups. This was 
certainly the case with regard to particular aspects of management's 
offensive, such as the timing and scope of purges, and attempts to 
shorten the disciplinary threshold. Effective regulation of 
management's disciplinary strategy, therefore, required a wider 
basis of organisation, and we need to look at that which was provided 
by the trade union.
Regulating Movement of Labour
The effects of movement of labour unilaterally and selectively 
imposed by management, on the workers' job controls - developed both 
individually and on a collective basis - have already been described. 
The main strategy used by the women to control its impact was to 
establish a rota:
"There's a section where mainplates go to have bits 
put on before going to the lines - it's known as Sam's 
section. One woman complained because she was always 
the one that was being sent over. So now they take 
it in turns". Kath (Paint Shop) (71)
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Several, similar instances were cited. The rota was 
important because it removed the power of selection (and therefore, 
victimisation) from management and removed the use of movement of 
labour as a disciplinary tool. It thus helped to protect 
individuals, and to promote employment security. From the point 
of view of the group and the preservation of job controls, a rota 
helped to maintain stability in the social relationships underpinning 
these by ensuring equal treatment. As with other control strategies 
which were developed, the establishment of a rota in the first place, 
and subsequently the continual insistence on its use, required a 
certain degree of strength in the group. In this sense it was thus 
an outcome as well as a means of job control. But the position was 
contradictory. And the rota as a strategy of resistance was limited 
because it also facilitated movement of labour for management. So 
to some extent, the preservation of the group's cohesion was at the 
expense of other aspects of job control. Again we note, that as 
with the regulation of management's use of disciplinary power, while 
the establishment of a rota lay within the ambit of the workgroup, 
control over the policy itself lay beyond this level. We therefore 
require a view of the wider collectivity which is examined more fully 
b«.|ow. We can refer to the impact of trade union organisation 
on the regulation of this practice, and also several shop floor-wide 
strike incidents which, from the women workers' point of view, had 
control over labour mobility at their heart. On the subject of 
maintaining the rota, however, it is interesting here, to look at an 
instance where the group relied upon their shop steward to do this.
It was as a result of speaking up on behalf of a few people on 
her section who were constantly being moved, that Janet became a
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shop steward in the first place. A rota was formed at the time 
but it was difficult for the workers themselves to maintain it, 
because the section was large with many individuals and separate 
jobs. Janet as the gropp's representative was clearly seen as the 
guardian of the rota. When called upon as a shop steward to support 
two women who objected to being moved off their jobs, she refused to 
represent them. "They'd never been moved before, so they'd got to 
go, like the rest". Janet (Sub-Assembly) (72).
This raises the issue of course, as to why the union representative
could not be used to prevent the movement of labour in the first
place, and why she might have chosen to facilitate management's
requirements - by operating the rota - rather than to oppose them.
While these questions are addressed in the following chapters, here, we
are interested to enquire why the choice this steward made - between
fulfilling her "proper function" of taking up members grievances
against management and preserving the control practice established
by the group - was, itself, significant? We would argue that in
prioritising the latter, Janet illustrates the continuing relevance
of that function of the shop steward as a representative directly
engaged in the regulation of relationships between workers - as a means
of their (indirectly) regulating their collective relationship with
(73)management/employers. This, according to Hugh Clegg precedes
historically the function of the shop steward as a representative 
directly engaged in regulating the relationship between workers and 
employers/management through collective bargaining. But the conception 
is not rounded out in his work, in the sense that no view is offered 
of what impact direct bargaining relationship«might have,in turn, on 
relationships between the workers (and between the workers and their
representative)
-413-
In industrial relations literature, little attention at all 
is paid to the way relationships between workers are regulated. In the 
first place, this is because of the predominant focus on bargaining 
between agents of the union and the employer. Secondly, there is 
an assumption that the establishment of job controls involving 
workers' mutual regulation of activity and mode of relating was the 
prerogative of craftsmen alone. Craftsmen engaged, moreover, in 
the "outmoded" (though they never seem quite to disappear) practices 
of unilateral control - in which Industrial Relations practitioners 
have little interest beyond the specific problem area of "restrictive 
practices".
Where non-craft workers are concerned the literature is not 
helpful in providing us with a view of the elected representative 
engaged in both functions. And still less in the relationship between 
the two. How are the processes of unilateral regulation based on job 
control^and joint regulation based on collective bargaining related?
What consequences does each have for the other? Some of these 
questions are explored in Part Three above.
Some of the questions which have been raised
We began this Chapter by outlining the women’s position as 
workers combining employment with domestic responsibilities and 
specifying some of the problems they faced. As a consequence of 
this dual role, we have shown how distinctive experiences of these 
workers shaped a set of demands which imply some fundamental cha igp. 
in the employment relationship, both at workplace level and beyond.
We have also set out some further consequences arising from the workers' 
position in terms of the mode of utilisation of their labour in 
production. This was highly intensive and debilitating: it engendered
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a further set of demands - for fulfilling work and humanitarian 
treatment. How are changes in both of these areas of workplace 
experience to be achieved? And what problems might be encountered 
by the women workers in their attempts to achieve them?
We are suggesting that, being positioned so as to absorb the 
costs of product market competition and instability (the deferment of 
which we have noted, most aspects of this labour process is designed 
to facilitate), had important consequences for the women workers' 
ability to progress their demands in either of the above respects.
In what ways might this be so?
Clearly, the continuous pursuit by management of production 
policies in relation to female workers which aimed to defer costs 
onto this labour force which would otherwise remain to be absorbed 
and/or reflected in the price of the product, resulted in a highly 
insecure and unstable position in employment for the women. And
as we have seen, the most significant impact of one aspect after another 
- the payment system, the use of discipline (selectively and in 
general) the use of labour mobility - was to undermine the development 
or maintenance of controls by which the workers might regulate job 
performance and the expenditure of effort. We are arguing that these 
controls were a necessary means of resisting speed-up and intensification 
of work. They served to strengthen the position of individuals 
or groups in the labour process and were the means by which their position 
in employment could be rendered more secure. Ultimately, therefore, 
these job controls constituted vital bargaining resources underpinning 
workers' attempts to both defend their situation and also, promote 
their demands for change.
In the last section, some individual and collective strategies 
and responses to the problems posed by management have been described.
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In these examples, the workers' main resource in opposing or 
attempting to modify demands imposed on them, lay in their own 
strength. This might vary according to their position as 
individuals in the labour market and, in the labour process, 
according to the extent of individual and collective controls 
over the job and the degree of cohesion in the group. Indeed, 
these responses had, centrally, to be concerned with preserving 
the main elements of job control themselves: i.e. the individual 
workers’ knowledge of the job, their special facility in performing 
it, and the cooperative and social relations developed between and 
within groups.
There was, however, another resource available to the workforce - 
that provided by the trade union organisation inside and outside the 
plant. Through this the workers had access to a wider collectivity 
and also the means of promoting their demands through the established 
channels of collective bargaining. We need, therefore, to examine 
how useful these institutional resources were, in relation to the 
problems experienced by the women workers on the shop floor.
Two important questions have already been posed for this 
analysis. The first concerns the impact of the sexual division 
of labour, by power and function, on the relationship between men 
and women workers. In respect of both areas we have identified as 
problematic for the women - the dual role or double burden, and their 
position/relationships in the labour process - we have noted how the 
structure of interests between men and women is différer."riated 
along lines which may be significant for collective bargaining.
What implications does this differentiated structure of interests 
therefore, have for our analysis of how far the problems of the women 
workers are addressed in organisational terms?
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The second question which remains to be examined concerns 
the impact of managerial policy - regarding the utilisation of female 
labour and the absorption of costs by this workforce - on the 
women workers' bargaining resources. What are the implications 
of the women workers' position in the labour process for their ability 
to progress their interests and demands by institutional means?
This, of course, is to repose the question: what is the relationship 
between (the processes of) unilateral regulation based on job 
controls, and joint regulation, based on collective bargaining?
A further question links both of these. Given that job 
controls comprise an essential bargaining resource for workers 
engaged in negotiating support for their interests, not only from 
the employer but also other groups of workers and their own 
organisational representatives as well, what are the implications 
of one group, whose interests may be cross-cutting, having more (or 
less) bargaining resources than another? If the male workers were, 
on the whole, differently placed in terms of being made to bear the 
impact of the employers' costs of production and also better placed 
to defer these themselves than the women, what implications follow 
for our analysis of how far the interests of either group are prioritised 
and pursued within collective bargaining institutions - or even outside 
them?
These are some of the questions which have been raised so far
and we now turn to consider them.
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Footnotes
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Writers such as Friedman (1977) and Ruberv (1978) have noted 
how the costs of (in)stability may be shifted from one 
sector of the labour market to another as a means of 
maintaining stable employment relationships (by employers and 
workers) in the 'primary sector'.
(2) Not even if they were physically incapable of doing it:
"This woman has very shaky hands. She is now expected to hold 
very fine leads - like threads, and have good eyes - she's 
about 50. She has asked to be transferred. She's always 
asking to be transferred - and they turn round and say there 
isn't another job for her. And then you see a young one will 
come - onto a simple job. Well, why couldn't they put that 
woman onto that simple job?
This lady has a lot of time off - because she can't see to do 
her job, and she's being forced - she says: 'I shall have to 
leave'." Pip (Sub-Assembly) Ref 20/S2: 780-794.
(3) Ref 15/S2: 626-650
(4) Ref 26/S3: 173-203
(5) Ref 34/S4: 30 - 40
(6) Ref 7/S1 : 816-858
(7) Ref 24//S3 : 89-114
(8) Ref 26/S4: 580-606
(9) Ref 24/S3: 271-321
(lO) "I had a woman raging mad with toothache. She made a dentist's 
appointment by 'phone and had no card. The superintendent
wouldn't give her a pass-out, so she came to see me. I went 
into the office and I went mad at him. I says, 'Look here Bob - 
that girl - she's in agony with her tooth - she had a day off 
yesterday'. I said,' You've only got to go by and you can smell 
it'. Which you could actually. And he says, 'well she should 
bring me a proof'. I says, 'Alright then you let her have that 
pass out - and she can bring you the bloody bill tomorrow'.
I was that angry I told her to do it, and she did.
He gave it her, but he made that woman worry all day, whether 
she was going to get out or not". Pip (Sub-Assembly) Ref 21/S2 
850-880.
(11) Ref 21/S2: 820-850
(12) Ref 12/S2: 1-12
(13) Ref 5
(14) Ref 12
(15) Ref 24/S3: 100-120
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(16) Ref 18/S2 : 810-820
(17) Ref 17-18/S2: 749-833
(18) Ref 13/S2 : 342-350
(19) Ref 8/SI : 626-654
(20) Ref 25/S3 : 365-380.
(21) Two had young children at home and wanted to work a part-time
shift, 
she could 
children 
the full-
Edna (26) quoted 
see more of her 
8 yrs and 10 yrs 
time workers who
above specified 8 ■ 
6 year old. Carol 
preferred the 9.30 
had no children at
- 12. 
(31) 
- 3. 
home
30 so that 
with two 
30 day. Of 
five more wanted
to work shorter hours. The four (Barbara, (21) Janet (43) ,
fit in housework preferably around either a 9.30 - 3.30 
or a morning shift. The single girl, Kathy (20) wanted to work 
6 - 2 in the summer, so that she could have more of the day to 
herself.
Five of the 12 full-timers were satisfied with their hours.
These were: Pru (58), husband and no children at home. Pearl (55) 
widowed and self-supporting, Pip (47) husband, but required 
to be self-supporting, Tracy (44) who had a husband and 2 children 
over 15 at home, but who chose for herself, financial independence 
as a priority and Sarah (39) who had a similar household, 
together with a very helpful husband.
(22) On the 1 0 - 2  shift Madge (35) divorced with 2 young children 
at home, needed the earnings from full-time work. Jenny (54) 
with husband, and 3 children all now over 15, would have preferred 
the morning 8 - 12.30 shift instead of the previously handy
9.30 - 3.30, because this would give her time to fit in her hobby 
between leaving the factory and making the tea. The two part- 
timers who did not want to alter their hours were: Jill (42) 
with two children over 15 at home, and Nora (57) with husband but 
no children now at home.
(23) Ref 24/S3: lOO
(24) Ref 12/S2: 565-630
(25) Ref 19/S2: 718-725
(26) Ref 9/178- 199
(27) Ref 45-46/S4: 430-441
(28) Ref 13/S2: 44- 90-
(29) In January 1977 there was an outbreak of mass hysteria at the
new Garratts Lane factory. Approximately 40 women were rushed 
to hospital and another 150 were sent home after sudden illness - 
stomach pains, headaches, fainting and vomiting - struck women 
workers in the vacuum cleaner plant. The source was said to be
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fumes exuded by the plastic moulding machines, but 
subsequent tests discounted this as a possible cause. It 
appeared that a woman had collapsed in the toilets with stomach 
pains - she was later found to have suffered a miscarriage.
As the news spread round the factory, suddenly, masses of workers 
fell ill. (Coincidentally, time-study testing was being carried 
out in the factory's main production areas).
Management recalled a similar occurrence which had taken place 
three years earlier at the Waterfall Lane factory. It had 
started on the 'twilight' shift on the record-changer plant 
and spread to the motor accessory factory ('Eversure' a BSR 
subsidiary) next door. Women workers complained of sickness 
and headaches which were attributed to 'fumes' or 'gas', 
possibly escaping from the old mineshafts on top of which the 
industrial complex had been built. Outbreaks of illness lasted 
for a week, but no trace of toxic fume was found. In both cases 
rumours spread about the factories being haunted - by the spirits 
of dead miners and children buried in the mineshafts below. And 
in neither case were male workers involved.
Such outbreaks are recognised as being relatively common in the 
far East, where women work under similarly highly stressed 
conditions. Referring to this as a 'subconscious wild cat strike', 
Rachel Grossman (1979) noted that:
"Mass possessions in the factories usually occur during times of 
high production pressures, changes in the production process or 
other generally recognised tension. Incidents commonly begin 
with one worker seeing a spirit in her microscope, often that of 
her mother. The vision sweeps through the factory floor and 
suddenly several hundred women are hysterically weeping and 
writhing (...) Workers and management alike, offer many explanations 
for the epidemics, usually revolving around unhappy spirits or 
ghosts". But she states there is open acknowledgement of the 
connection with working conditions .
It appears that very little work has been done on the hysterical 
illness of workers in industrial settings. But contributions have 
been made by Phoon (1976) in Malaysia and Colligan (1979) in the 
USA. In this country there is an article by Maguire (1978) 
referring to an outbreak in Lancashire. Most studies refer to 
women workers (but see Delasnerle (1972-73) which covers male 
workers in France).
(30) Ref 26/S3 & 20/S2: 760-780
(31) Ref 26/S3
(32) Ref 9/S2: 65
(33) Ref 28/S3: 629-665
(34) Two had suffered a broken marriage. Two had suffered the death 
of a husband. One had suffered the death of a child. Two had 
suffered from serious depression after being left alone at home 
with a young child.
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(35) Ref 27 \
(36) Ref 37/S6: 23-47
(37) Ref 12/S2: 63-70
(38) Ref 7-8/SI: 624-631
(39) Ref 26/S3: 153-173
(40) Ref 1 1 / S 1 : 950-1000
(41) Ref MW 19
(42) Ref 13/S2: 44-90
(43) Ref 13/S2: 56-
(44) Ref 12/S2: 864-893
(45) Ref OH 14/T2S1: 558-693
(46) Ref 19/S1: 542-558
(47) Ref 13/S1: 901-931
(48) See Edwards and Scullion (1982) for similar arguments
(49) Ref OH 14/T2 SI: 600
(50) Ref JA 53
(51) Ref 20/S2: 110-128 and 23/S2: 265-290
Jill., the supervisor, had herself, been a direct beneficiary
of this kind of support. Her story recalls the best traditions 
of mutuality as well as the social and humanitarian roots of 
trade unionism lying deep in the history of working class 
organisation.
"I'm going back about 4 years ago. I couldn't tell you why I 
worried, but I used to bring it to work and get terribly upset - 
and I ... I'd cry sometimes. And then I was ... I was taken 
ill, I 'ad cancer of the womb - which was caused by worry and 
fretting. I 'ad my womb removed, and I vowed then that 
I would never ever ... well, I don't worry about anything 
now - at all. You know, I think, if its gonna do that to me, 
why worry, just accept things as they come.
When I first started worrying, and I started losing weight - but 
I just thought it was through fretting and worrying ... you know, 
I'd go 'ome, I think - and then, I'm talkin' about £25 I was 
taking' 'ome then - (now I'm more than that remember ...) 
and I couldn't make ends meet, no matter 'ow I tried. I 'ad 
a rent rebate, quite good one really, because ... I used to only 
'ave to pay £2 rent. But then I'd got gas and electric, food, 
and I couldn't buy the kiddies clothes, couldn't do this and ... 
they were going without terribly - and I fretted and worried.
And as I say, I would never ask for charity, I would never go to
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social services, I mean ... I don't know why - they would 'av 
'elped, probably - but I just couldn't. And then ... I was 
poorly here on the Monday, went to the doctors on the Tuesday, 
sent me to the 'ospital on the Tuesday afternoon; Wednesday, I 
'ad to report in, Thursday, I was operated on for cancer of 
the womb.
... If I stay at 'ome, I'm worse. And I was back at work 
within 6 weeks, which ... being a supervisor, it was ideal 
because - I haven't got to do any 'eavy work, so - you know, 
after 6 weeks - took it easy, and ... I'd got good friends 
here, very good friends. Supervisision - all the supervision - 
I was 'aving hampers every week ... they used to collect every 
week. I used to 'ave a hamper and money, and the girls on the 
line, they were fantastic - everybody was marvellous, you know.
... there again, this is BSR girls. I've got a lot to thank 
BSR supervision and operators, because ... they've been ...
I ... I think that's why I never applied to social services. It 
was better for me to accept if off these girls, because I knew 
it was coming to me in friendship, them going - begging, you 
know. (And they kept you going for 6 weeks?) ... Oh they did, 
they were ... they were gold, and a couple of neighbours you know. 
Never 'ad a penny of my ex-husband - not a penny! But there 
again, we 'avn't gotta thank 'im, sort of thing.
But even now, I ... 8 years - I've never bought anything new -
The girls at work ... But all the money I do get, see, I buy
the kiddies theirs. They've 'ad more now - in the last couple
'a years - than they've ever 'ad. But we're 3 together, we've always
worked together, the 2 daughters and myself - and they've been
very good, you know - they've accepted the situation, they've
bever begrudged me at all, they've never thrown at me - "Oh so
and so's 'ad this and so and so's 'ad that, ' we're close knit
really, the 3 of us.
.... the doctor said - the cancer was brought on by the fret ...
Not lettin' people know - the situation I was in, money-wise - 
financial difficulties and worrying that I was letting the children 
down. That was my main worry - I was lettin' them down, sort of 
thing. But 'e said, if I'd 'ave asked for 'elp, or gone in 
to somebody and ••• got it off my chest, I would never 'ave been
ill - at all'". Ref 13-14 (S3: 367-444
(52) Ref 8/S1: 825-860 and 9-lO/Sl: 946-967
(53) Ref 11/S1 : 643-751
(54) Ref 12/S1 ; 680-720
(55) Ref 18/S3 : 232-250
(56) Ref 7/S1: 565-589
(57) Ref 6/S1: 296-328
(58) Ref 14/S1 : 852-870
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(59) Ref 14/SI: 870-880
(60) Ref OH8/T2S1: 90-96
(61) Yet not 'spontaneous' in the sense of meaning unorganised.
As has been explained above, the process of output regulation 
requires a high degree of organisation. At Old Hill, where 
a smaller range of cheaper units was produced at high volumes, 
problems posed by management cutting production were felt both 
more acutely and also more generally across all the assembly 
lines. The "common response” was, therefore, to a commonly felt 
experience, and it was less difficult to achieve a concensus.
(62) Ref OH 16,17/T2S2: 310-330
(63) Ref 32/S5: 394-405
(64) Ref 11/S2: 207-220
(65) Ref 28-29/S2: 620-640
(66) Ref 12/S2: 630-650
(67) Ref OH 21/T 3SI: 900-
(68) Ref OH 3/Tl : 332-340
(69) Ref 32/S3: 694-709
(70) Ref 17/S2: 529-590
(71) Ref 29/S2: 419-425
(72) Ref 10/S1: 740 and S2 102
(73) Clegg (1980) p. 20. See also chapter 1 above.
(74) Consequently, there is more to be found in the labour history 
literature, although here discussion is almost totally concentrated 
on the activities of craftsmen - a very small group e.g.
Montgomery (1979).

CHAPTER 10 UNIONISATION
In 1 9 7 0  following a ten year period of increasingly rapid 
growth in the numbers of women in the workforce, a third of w h o m 
were now unionised, the proportion of female union members to 
male stood at 25% over all. The pro p o r t i o n  of wom e n  in the 
GMWU was m u c h  in line with this, although here the rate of 
increase u p  to 1970 had been faster than the average. It 
was not as fast, however, as that of this union's major rivals 
in two important spheres of recruitment: in particular, NUPE 
in the p u b l i c  services sector and the TGWU, in manufacturing 
and p r i v a t e  sector services.
Clearly, it was to women workers the unions now had to 
look, in order to gain ground in the membership league table.
In 1970 m e m b e r s h i p  of the GMWU topped 800,000 for the first 
time. B y  1975 it stood at 873,351, over 1969's 793,853; and 
women acc o u n t e d  for 66,000 (83%) of this 79,498 increase.
David Basnett, the General Secretary, was looking for one million 
members by 1977. No union could stand still on recruitment and 
hope to r e t a i n  its status and influence in relation to others 
b a r g a i n i n g  in the same sphere - wh e r e  the number of seats at 
the n e g o t i a t i n g  table depended so m u c h  on the size of its 
membership.
A m o n g  the ten regions wh i c h  constituted the GMWU nationally, 
much the same kind of considerations regarding their size and 
relative influence (both inside and outside the union's structure) 
could be said to apply. B i r m i n g h a m  and the West Midlands with
100,000 m e m bers ranked third largest overall. But w i t h  a heavy
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concentration in the stagnating e n gineering sector, they seemed 
in the early 1970's to be s t a n d i n g  still in comparison with, 
for example, up - a n d - c o m i n g  L i v e r p o o l  where significant m e m b e r s h i p  
gains had been m a d e  in the local authorities. In B i r m i n g h a m  
there still remained, moreover, o n e  or two large and u n u n i o n i s e d  
engineering firms - B S R  and JCB n u m b e r e d  amongst them.
W i t h  8,000+ employees, BSR w a s  an attraction no u n i o n  in 
the area could ignore, but w h i l e  Dr. MacDonald was in char g e  
none could succeed in gaining recognition. Despite his v i r u l e n t  
opposition, union m e m bers did e x i s t  in the plants, however. 
Skilled m e n  continued to hold u n i o n  cards e v e n  though they had 
no nego t i a t i n g  rights, and p o c k e t s  of unionised workers spr a n g  up 
occasionally on the shop floor.
"Two unions started r e c r u i t i n g  outside the gate.
They gave out l e a f l e t s . . . (fewer people worked h e r e  
then). W e  decided to join the G & M. We filled 
in slips and we had a col l e c t o r  - used to do it 
secretly. Then after about a year, management 
recognised the union".
Lorna (Final A s s e m b l y ) (1)
"They paid union dues - if anything had gone w r o n g  
the u n i o n  couldn't h a v e  come in then and fought 
for them, because the r e  was no agreement".
(How m a n y  joined pr i o r  to recognition?)
"80 wo u l d  be too many. Certainly not more... they 
were dotted here and there, about 20 at the start - 
in sub-assembly m a i n l y . . .  Two w o m e n  in the f a c tory 
started asking their f r i e n d s  if they wanted to join 
a union. One was a G e r m a n  lady... who worked on 
the motorline. The o t h e r  was on sub-assembly.
Just a few members, p a y i n g  to these two, who w e r e 
c o llecting stewards".
(Were there any p r o b l e m s  with management?)
"No they didn't know, it was under cloak and dagger" 
(When it was secret, w h a t  did the other wom e n  think 
of it?)
"It w a s n ' t  discussed. Those that wanted to j o i n 
paid their subs... the un i o n  came and canvassed o u t s i d e  
the gate".
Pearl (Convenor - S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (2)
T h e  TGWU also had a toe in the door, particularly in the
transport section. As a result of dealing with unionised 
h a u l a g e  contractors used by BSR, some of the Company's 'C' 
licence drivers had joined up. The regional trade group 
secretary was w e l l - k n o w n  in the area:
"It was Alan Law. Well, the Company wouldn't 
look at h i m !" (3)
In August 1969 dramatic events at BSR's Scottish factory 
in East Kilbride presaged the end of the Company's erstwhile 
industrial relations policy. A  fifteen-week strike entailing 
violent scenes on the picket lines, a 2 hour sympathy stoppage 
involving 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 engineering workers throughout the west of 
Scotland and a mass demonstration at the factory gates, was 
ended w i t h  the intervention of the CIR and the Company's agreement 
to recognise the AEF. The fact of the settlement had immediate 
consequences for workers in the West Midlands factories. The 
terms of the settlement also had enduring repercussions. It 
is to the former that we first turn.
The recognition dispute at East Kilbride and union organisation 
in the West Midlands
"Whilst the bulk of the workforce may have been ac q u i ­
escent and cooperative, it had certainly not been
universally content". CIR(1970)p.l2
T h e  factory at East Kilbr i d e  reflected in its rapid d e v e l o p ­
ment f r o m  the mid-60's onward the speedy growth of the Company 
overall. The workforce there had expanded from some 50 people in 
1964 to over a thousand in two years. By 1969 it had doubled 
again and stood at 2 ,2 0 0, and in the same year a large new
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extension had been ad d e d  to the factory. Of the hou r l y  paid workers, 
1,800 were fem a l e  and 300 were male. Women, therefore, constituted 
8 6 % of this labour f o r c e  and a third of them w o r k e d  p a r t - t i m e  hours.
It was a c o n sistent aspect of the Company's recr u i t m e n t 
policy to avoid hiring w o r k e r s  from organised w o r k p l a c e s  or 
industries, or those w i t h  any previous e x perience of industrial 
action. This policy, mai n t a i n e d  to the pres e n t  day, is c a r efully 
explained by the S t o u r b r i d g e  factory manager. A s  he poin t s  out, 
however, it had beco m e  m o r e  difficult to sustain during the late 
1960's ex p a n s i o n  - e s p e c i a l l y  in respect of the m a l e  w o r k e r s  at 
East Kilbride.
" A  lot of our labour is g r e e n . .. g r e e n f i e l d ' l a b o u r .
In ot h e r  words, people who've never h a d  jobs b e f o r e  
c o m i n g  to this - never had industrial e x p e r i e n c e  
before, I s h o u l d  say - and coming to this factory; 
and, therefore, they hadn't got the b a c k g r o u n d  to 
i n d u s t r i a l . . .er, sorry! They hadn't got the 
back g r o u n d  to i n d u s t r i a l . . .urn,.. .er, i n d ustry 
generally. A n d  then - East Kilbride, they 
re c r u i t e d  a lot of their labour from the local 
factories... partic u l a r l y  males - and they b r o u g h t  
in a degree of unionism".
Ba r r y  Whi t e  (factory m a n a g e r ) (4)
The d i s p u t e  whi c h  sparked off the strike at East K i l b r i d e  
began in the tool room, w h e r e  there was already a h i s t o r y  of poor 
labour relations. W h e n  the factory was first set up in 1964 
the Company's policy w a s  to develop this dep a r t m e n t  in order to 
manufacture, r e b u i l d  and m a i n t a i n  tools and m a c h i n e r y  for the 
wh o l e  group. Accord i n g l y ,  25 toolmakers were e"T>lov»H her*-, at 
the end of 1965 and 32 by the end of 1967. The g r o wing confidence 
and bargaining strength of this group of key w o r k e r s  soon prompted 
a change of c o m p a n y  p o l i c y  however, and in May 1968, as a result 
of this, eleven t o o lmakers were sacked at ten minutes' n o t i c e  for
being 'trouble-makers'. (5) Letters were written, subsequently, 
by the AEF's divisional organiser, to which the Company failed to 
reply. W h e reupon no further union action was taken.
Industrial relations did not improve during the next twelve 
months, and on June 21st, 1969, the Company suspended one of the 
remaining 20 toolmakers for 3 days for bad workmanship. All 
the rest (bar one) walked o u t  in protest. W h e n  they returned, on 
23rd June, they were all sacked and only the one retained in 
employment. Ag a i n  the Company ignored the union officials but 
n o w  the district committee decided to launch a major recruiting 
campaign amongst BSR's workers - at last it was realised they 
had to have the w o m e n  workers in the union.
W i t h i n  six weeks of the campaign 900 of BSR's Scottish 
workers had joined the AEF. Then, returning from the summer 
holiday on August 4th, the w o m e n  found that the Company were 
instituting changes to the payment system, which included tying 
the m i n i m u m  earnings level to a higher performance rate (i.e. bonus 
could now only be earned at a performance of 74 and above, instead 
of 6 6 ). Part-time workers were not paid on bonus at all, at this 
point. They simply earned an hourly rate based on the full-time 
workers' m i n i m u m  earnings level. This basic rate had been 
increased - although by under £1 - as part of the annual wage 
round; and so had the bonus increments, on a rising scale according 
to performance rating. So, although the proposed changes were 
incorporated with wage increases of some kind, the low level of 
these, plus the complex nat u r e  of the payment system and build-up 
of grievances, ensured that general c o n fusion as to the likely
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impact o n  e a r n i n g s  and effort was r a p idly transformed into 
acute d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  20 wom e n  on o n e  of the final assembly 
lines w a l k e d  out on the m o r n i n g  of 13th August, and the District 
Secretary o f  the union, w h i c h  had only j u s t  started recruiting, 
was now put un d e r  strong pressure to s u p p o r t  them. The strike 
spread r a p i d l y  - p a r ticularly as it a p p e a r e d  the 20 had been 
dismissed - and soon w e l l  over 1 ,0 0 0  had joined the stoppage, 
many j o i n i n g  the union at the same time. (6 )
The s t r i k e  was approved by the AEF D i s t r i c t  C o m mittee and 
the N a t i o n a l  Executive Council and was m a d e  official. Man a g e m e n t 
took pains t o  explain the w a g e  deal m o r e  fully and decided to 
include p a r t - t i m e r s  in the bonus scheme. They still refused to 
meet the offi c i a l s ,  however, and the fo c u s  of the dispute quickly 
became one of trade un i o n  recognition. By the end of October, 
over 900 w e r e  still on strike and the C o m p a n y  was still attempting 
to c o n t i n u e  prod u c t i o n  w i t h  only half o f  its w o r k f o r c e  - including 
some 200 r e c r u i t e d  after the strike began. O u t side the factory 
hundreds of supporters helped swell the p i c ket-lines and there were 
numerous v i o l e n t  clashes w i t h  the police. The case was referred to 
the C I R  o n  O c t o b e r  21st.
T h e  coiraniss ioners interviewed em p l o y e e s  inside and outside the 
factory g a t e s .  They found a great b o d y  of grievances expressed by 
the latter and even among those still working, a desire to join 
the union, should it be recognised. Significantly, they noted:
" T h e  most comm o n  reasons g i v e n  why, despite their 
grievancies, strikers had not p r e viously left the 
fir m ' s  exployment, w e r e  that t h e  hours w e r e  convenient, 
t h e y  liked their work-mates, a n d  they doubted whether 
they could get another s u i t a b l e  job".
C I R ( 1 9 7 0 ) p , 11
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Xhe Commissioners recommended that the Company should 
recognise the union and during 12th and 13th November, d e t a i l e d  
negotiations, lasting some 12 hours, took place on the terms 
of the recognition agreement and of their return to work. A t  
last, it seemed, the ill-tempered dispute had ended with a 
vict o r y  for the strikers - they had finally broken through a n d  
gained trade-union recognition at BSR. But not f r o m  Dr.
Macdonald! He had already made his exit f r o m  the bo a r d r o o m  
and had b e e n  replaced b y  John Ferguson, a m a n a g i n g  director w h o  
was prepared to work w i t h  the trade unions w h e n  he had to.
Indeed, even befo r e  the Scottish a g r eement had been signed, 
this preparedness was already being put into effect back in 
England. And as we go on to consider the process of u n i o n i z a t i o n  
south of the border, the contrast is qu i t e  remarkable. In the 
course of half a year, it could almost, at first sight, a p p e a r  
that industrial relations practices in this one company s t r a d d l e d  
two centuries. In the aftermath of struggle and violence in the 
north, what major factors and c o nsiderations can be iden t i f i e d  - 
at this early stage - r e g arding the subsequent d i r ection and 
pattern of industrial relations at BSR in the West Midlands?
ORGANI S A T I O N  IN THE W E S T  MIDLANDS : W H I C H  UNION?
Undoubtedly, the Regional S e c retary of the GMWU in B i r m i n g h a m  
had counted his union as a likely b e n eficiary quite early in the 
Scottish workers' struggle. A n d  once the C I R  had been b r o u g h t  in, 
passing Dr. Macdonald o n  his w a y  out, the possibility of a 
recommendation for recognition seemed certain. So while his
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r e c r u i t m e n t  officers at the f a c t o r y  gate handed out leaflets to 
a somew h a t  indifferent West M i d l a n d s  workforce, J i m  M a s o n  found 
w i t hin, management far f r o m  indifferent: now they w e r e  w i l l i n g 
to talk.
"They were in favour of this u n i o n  - for some rea s o n  
or other. I don't k n o w  why, but I thi n k  it was 
because they'd m o r e  or less got to c o m e  to it some 
time or other you kno w .  So they f a v o u r e d  this one".
J i m  M a s o n  (Regional S e c r e t a r y ) (7)
BSR's top management had obviously c o n sidered c a r efully 
the terms un d e r  wh i c h  they m i g h t  best be able to o p e rate in 
c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  a trade union. Apart from their indigenous 
e x p e r i e n c e  of industrial r e l a t i o n s  in Britain a n d  awa r e n e s s  of 
t h e  contrasts found in their m a i n  market, the USA; their 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w e r e  also u n d oubtedly, well i n f ormed as a result of 
s e v eral years' close o b s e r v a t i o n  of their major comp e t i t o r s  on 
the p r o d u c t i o n  side, based in Japan. Here, a rath e r  different 
s y s t e m  of 'benevolent paternalism' could commo n l y  be found: one 
w h i c h  included, rather than e x c luded, union o r ganisation. At 
a n  individual level, moreover, John F e r guson h a d  himself wor k e d  in 
m a n a g e m e n t  in the Far East (Sri Lanka) before j o i n i n g  BSR. If 
s u c h  experiences, together w i t h  the years of M a c d o n a l d ' s  anti-union 
autocracy, had failed to e q u i p  management p e r s o n a l l y  in terms of 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  recogni s e d ' i n d u s t r i a l  relations skills" - this 
c a n n o t  be taken to imply an a b s e n c e  of ideas r e g a r d i n g  the system 
t h e y  w e r e  n o w  being required to institute.
"Well, the m a n a g e m e n t  presumably, at that time, 
decided that it w o u l d  be much more c o n v e n i e n t  to 
h a v e  a one union f a c t o r y  - have a pl a n t  u n i o n  rather 
than individual u n i o n s  - and so they w e n t  into n e g otia­
tions with the M u n i c i p a l  W o r kers to h a v e  100Z; or at 
least, any members i n  this factory w o u l d  be m e m b e r s  of
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the G & M, So, therefore, if we were go i n g  to 
have a union, w e  had the best set of circumstances. 
We had a plant u n i o n  rather than a craft u n i o n  - and 
that's h o w  it turned out."
(So they m o r e  or less, chose the G & M  - in a sense?) 
"No, the G 4 M  def i n i t e l y  approached the Company.
They decided that times had changed, and if... 
ob v i o u s l y  the resu l t  of the Commission w o u l d  lend 
itself to unionisation, it would come h e r e  anyway.
So, w e  m i g h t  as well accept the inevitable, accept 
the change, and... have the union".
Barry W h i t e  (Factory M a n a g e r ) (8)
Once they w e r e  for c e d  to accept a trade union there w e r e  a 
number of reasons w h y  the Company should have f a v oured the 
GMWU quite apart f r o m  its repu t a t i o n  as a m o d e r a t e  u n i o n  w i t h  a 
cooperative approach.
In the fi r s t  place, B 5 R  management c l e a r l y  desired to 
deal with a single o r ganisation wh i c h  might cater for all grades 
of worker. A d h e r i n g  to a c o mpany-union model encomp a s s i n g  all 
employees, they w i s h e d  to avoid those problems w h i c h  were 
frequently identified at the time w i t h  the patterns of m u l t i ­
unionism, conanonly found in B r i t i s h  plants. Like, for example, 
the complex b a r g a i n i n g  structures, inter-union (especially 
demarcation) d i s putes and heightened rank and file mi l i t a n c y 
generated by compe t i t i v e  p a c e - s e t t i n g  and 'catching-up' engendered 
among groups w h i c h  w e r e  s e parately unionised.
In this d e s i r e  for a single negotiating body the Company had 
found ready support from the CIR, an institution b o r n  of a movement 
long dedicated to the rati o n a l i s a t i o n  of Britain's 'chaotic' 
industrial r e l ations structures. At that time though, the 
prospect of being able to cover all employees nea t l y  by one 
organisation was less via b l e  than it is today. T h e  large general 
and 'mixed' unions had not yet developed their staff or white- 
collar sections, and the tendency was to allow supervisory grades 
for example, to be organised separately ( eg. by ASTMS) rather
-*♦31-
the G & H. So, therefore, if we were going to 
have a unio n ,  we had the best set of circumstances.
We had a p l a n t  u n i o n  rather than a craft un i o n  - and 
that's h o w  it turned out."
(So they m o r e  or less, chose the G & M  - in a sense?) 
"No, the G  & M  d e f i n i t e l y  a p proached the Company.
They d e c i d e d  that times had changed, and if... 
o b v iously the res u l t  of the C o m m i s s i o n  would lend 
itself to unionis a t i o n ,  it w o u l d  come h e r e  anyway.
So, we m i g h t  as w e l l  accept the inevitable, accept 
the change, and... h a v e  the union".
Barry W h i t e  (Factory M a n a g e r ) (8 )
O n c e  they w e r e  f o r c e d  to a c c e p t  a trade u n i o n  there w e r e  a 
number of reasons w h y  the C o m p a n y  should have favoured the 
GMWU quite apart f r o m  its r e p u t a t i o n  as a moderate u n i o n  w i t h  a 
cooperative approach.
In the f i r s t  place, BSR m a n a g e m e n t  clearly desired to 
deal w i t h  a single o r g a n i s a t i o n  which m i g h t  cater for all grades 
of worker. A d h e r i n g  to a c o m p a n y - u n i o n  model encomp a s s i n g  all 
employees, they w i s h e d  to avoid those problems w h i c h  were 
frequently i d e n t i f i e d  at the time with the patterns of m u l t i ­
unionism, commonly f o u n d  in B r i t i s h  plants. Like, for e ..if. 
the complex b a r g a i n i n g  structures, i n t e r - u n i o n  (especial!, 
demarcation) d i s p u t e s  and h e i ghtened rank and file militai 
generated by c o m p e t i t i v e  p a c e - s e t t i n g  and 'catching-'; u.g m  
among groups which w e r e  separately unionised.
In this desire for a single negotiating bo , , m  .i „ i rr nt 
found ready support from the CIR, an iust tula < >- t w  - reivireu
long dedicated to t h e  rationalisation of !.. . i . Mis' 
industrial relations structures. At a..«.., -t ^
prospect of being a b l e  to cover .. an tv '-mr ive . i * -e,
organi s a t i o n  was l e e s ^ g j ^ e  U W S l g f f  m «  «»no —  ..
and 'mixed' l^^ehe direction of ineorpm «tine si, • 
)lAthiry|É(p»r«l union which lacked craft ttaon «.on­
to be with d e m a r c a t i o n  and sis q
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the G & M. So, therefore, if w e  were going to 
have a union, we had the best set of circumstances. 
W e  had a plant union rather than a craft u n i o n  - and 
that's how it turned out."
(So they m o r e  or less, chose the G & M  - in a sense?) 
"No, the G & M  definitely a p p roached the Company. 
T h e y  decided that times had changed, and if... 
obviously the result of the C o m m i s s i o n  would lend 
itself to unionisation, it wo u l d  come here anyway.
So, we might as well accept the inevitable, accept 
the change, and... have the union".
Ba r r y  White (Factory M a n a g e r ) (8)
O n c e  they w e r e  forced to accept a trade u n i o n  there w e r e  a 
number of reasons why the Company should h a v e  favoured the 
GMWU quite apart from its reputation as a m o d erate uni o n  with a 
cooperative approach.
In the first place, B S R  m a n a g e m e n t  clearly desired to 
deal w i t h  a single organi s a t i o n  w h i c h  mi g h t  cater for all grades 
of worker. A d h ering to a company-union mo d e l  encompassing all 
employees, they wished to avoid those p r o b l e m s  which were 
frequently identified at the time w i t h  the patterns of mul t i ­
unionism, commonly found in Brit i s h  plants. Like, for example, 
the complex bargaining structures, inte r - u n i o n  (especially 
demarcation) disputes a n d  heightened rank and file militancy 
generated by c o m petitive p a c e-setting and 'catching-up' engendered 
among groups wh i c h  w e r e  separately unionised.
In this desire for a single n e g o t i a t i n g  body the Company had 
found ready support f r o m  the CIR, an institution born of a movement 
long d e d icated to the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  of Britain's 'chaotic' 
industrial relations structures. At that time though, the 
prospect of being able to cover all e m p loyees neatly by one 
o r ganisation was less v i a b l e  than it is today. T h e  large general 
and 'mixed' unions had n o t  yet developed th e i r  staff or white- 
collar sections, and the tendency w a s  to a l l o w  supervisory grades 
for example, to be o r g anised separately ( eg. by ASTMS) rather
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than r e c r u i t  t h e m  along w i t h  shop floor workers. This prob l e m  
of i n c lusion o r  exclusion of certain groups in r e l a t i o n  to the 
system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  b e i n g  set u p - h e r e  in terms of wh e r e 
to draw the line re g a r d i n g  supervisors - was a q u e s t i o n  identified 
by the C o m m i s s i o n e r s  as still re m a i n i n g  to be resol v e d  w h e n  the 
A E F  was d e s i g n a t e d  sole n e g o t i a t i n g  b o d y  for all shop floor 
workers at E a s t  Kilbride.
T h e r e  were, in addition, two other areas of anomoly, or 
possible contention, as to the "represent a t i v e n e s s "  or appro p r i ­
ateness of the u n i o n  chosen, vi s - a - v i s  the c o n s t i t u e n c y  it was 
supposed to cover. First, there w e r e  the craft groups not 
normally c o v e r e d  b y  the AEF; and secondly, those groups of 
a n c i l l i a r y  staff, such as c a n t e e n  a n d  transport workers, more 
properly the p r o v i n c e  of a general u n i o n  such as the TGWU. T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  had rather m o r e  sympathy w i t h  the first gro u p  of 
workers than the second. Of course, there was to be no i n t erference 
with the craft s m a n ' s  right to b e l o n g  to the u n i o n  of his choice!
But the A E F  w o u l d  ne g o t i a t e  his c o n ditions of employment.
P e r h a p s  i t  might be suggested here, that if the CIR showed 
little i n t e r e s t  as to the type of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a f f o r d e d  to 
m e m b e r s — o n l y  a desire to see them t i d i l y  unionised - the C o m pany 
was, possibly, m o r e  co n c e r n e d  - albe i t  from a p a r t i c u l a r  point of 
view. It m u s t  certainly h a v e  been the case that they pr e f e r r e d  
it to b e  the skil l e d  engineers who were, in effect, 'dis'- or 
' m i s ' - enfranchised in terms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  - if any w e r e  to b e  -• 
through their inc o r p o r a t i o n  into an a l t e r n a t i v e  un i o n  organisation.
To this extent, therefore, m a n a g e m e n t ' s  preferences must always 
have l a i n  in the d i r e c t i o n  of in c o r p o r a t i n g  all the skilled m e n  
with i n  a general union w h i c h  lacked craft traditions - resonant 
as th e s e  have tended to b e  w i t h  d e m a r c a t i o n  and status quo principles.
In the West Midlands, however, management could take ad v a n t a g e 
of their greater r o o m  to m a n o e u v r e  and they opened n e gotiations 
with the GMWU. Perhaps, in these discussions they also took 
cognisance of some further comments which had been made by t h e  
CIR in respect of the A E F  at East K i l bride - this time, in terms 
of the k i n d  of servicing a u n i o n  m i g h t  provide. For example, 
the commissioners felt that an e f f e c t i v e  union service to the 
Company would require a s y s t e m  of factory-based branches together 
with m u c h  use of, and ready access to, the full-time o f ficials. (9) 
Neither of these could be said to b e  features particularly 
characteristic of A E F  organisation. Moreover, with d i f f e r e n t  
historical traditions, large staff and resources devoted to 
administration, the GMWU could o f f e r  an array of personnel services 
(the r e g i o n  ran its own sick pay scheme, for example) i m p ressive  
to the Company w i t h  its pol i c y  of m i n i m a l i s m  w i t h  regard to 
personnel functions. (10)
BUILDING THE MEMBERSHIP
By February 1970, the r e c o g n i t i o n  agreement which d e s i g n a t e d 
the G M W U  as the sole nego t i a t i n g  body in respect of employees at 
the BSR's West M i d lands factories, had been signed. Now w h a t  
they nee d e d  was members. E v e n  b e f o r e  this, efforts had had to 
be made at recruitment among the w o m e n  in order to sustain a 
case for the GMWU, as averse to the other unions who had also 
recruited (or as in the case of the AEF retained) members. Tie 
GMWU recruitment campaign had, accordingly, been joined by 
man a g e m e n t  - whose powers o f  p e r suasion could usefully be b a c k e d  
up by their powers of deployment:
(Did you join?) "Reluctantly, we joined. And I've 
got to b e  v e r y  honest about that - we w e r e  asked to 
j o i n  the union. And —  don't a s k  me the reason why,
I could n ' t  give you one - but the m a j o r i t y  of people 
on the shop floor, they w e r e  in the same frame of mind, 
they d i d n ' t  w a n t  to join a union. I mean, what I 
k n o w  n o w  and w h a t  I k n e w  then's two d i f ferent things 
but... w e  w e r e  a c t ually b l a ckmailed into going into 
the union.
W e  w e r e  sat o n  a job, and w e  w e r e  told, if w e  
didn't j o i n  the u n i o n  - if a girl came to work here, 
and she'd joi n e d  the union, she would b e  offered the 
job first - even though I was sat on it! So, let's 
face it, w e  were all frightened to death! - of 
losing our jobs -  so w e  all JOI N E D  the union.
(Who was it who organised it like that? Was it the 
other workers?) Well, the people who told us actua l l y  - 
I mean, w h o  approached us - they w e r e  to do with staff, 
if I r e m e m b e r  rightly. T h e y  w e r e  the foreman - the 
formen at the time. Whet h e r  they'd b e e n  told by the 
m a n a g e m e n t  or this part i c u l a r  union, I don't know.
But... I ' m  glad I've joi n e d  now, but I still c o u ldn't 
g i v e  y o u  the r e a s o n  w h y  I didn't w a n t  to join".
(So the m a n a g e m e n t  did n ' t  object...?)
"Oh no! Beca u s e  it was the foremen w h o  asked us to 
join the union, oh yes! And it was the foremen w h o  
w e r e  b l a c k m a i l i n g  us, so I should imagine the m a n a g e ­
m e n t  w a s  all for the u n i o n  really".
Jill (Final A s s e m b l y  S u p e r v i s o r ) (11) emphasis in original.
This picture, c o n t r a s t i n g  so starkly w i t h  the union i s a t i o n  of East 
Kilbride, w a s  c o n f i r m e d  by management:
(Were the w o r k f o r c e  v e r y  union-minded?)
"No. No, w e  had to enc o u r a g e  them to join. Th e r e  
w a s  very, v e r y  little interest in unions down here. 
O b v iously, the c r a f t s m e n  - the m a j o r i t y  w e r e  in 
unions - so they had no interest in join i n g  a u n i o n  
other t h a n  the one they w e r e  already in. So, m o s t  
of the males, you could say, p o s s i b l y  70Z or 80Z of 
the males, w e r e  a l r eady in unions anyway - by nature 
of their craft. So, they had no particular need to 
go in the union, they w e r e  already in one - there just 
w a s n ' t  a n y  pr o c e d u r e  to w o r k  to at that stage. But, 
the women, parti c u l a r l y  - they didn't want... in fact, 
we had to pract i c a l l y  go and say, 'Look! Have you 
filled y o u r  f o r m  in?' you know! And, 'Will you fill 
your f o r m  i n ! '..• And w e  had to encourage them to go 
- b e c a u s e  it was no good havi n g  part of the factory in, 
and not t h e  other". B a r r y  Wh i t e  (Factory M a n a g e r ) (12)
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On the union's side, undoubtedly the most ef f e c t i v e  action, 
f r o m  the point of v i e w  of winning members, o c c u r r e d  w h e n  the 
officials took up the c a s e  of a woman w h o  had h a d  an accident 
o n  one of the presses. The value of fighting o n  just such an 
issue, in r e c ruitment terms, is, of course, fu l l y  realised. It 
is, in fact, a co n s c i o u s  policy, put into effect w h e never the 
u n i o n  requires to e s t a b l i s h  its credibility and circumstances 
allow.
"Anyway Paul Silver came down. As it happened I 
was in the p l a t i n g  shop at the time, a n d  he comes over 
to m e  - about the union. And I says 'yes' I says,
'It isn't w o r t h  getting going in it'. Just like that!
I says, 'It isn't w o r t h  it.' I says, 'That union!'
And he says, 'Why?' and I couldn't a n s w e r  h i m  b e c ause 
I didn't know. It was only just sort of... I was 
m o r e  or less only having a joke - but I don't think 
Paul Silver s a w  it at the time! But anyway I joined. 
A b o u t  a f o r t n i g h t  before, a wo m a n  had had her fingers 
off in the presses. And I said to P a u l  Silver,
I says, 'What about that w o m a n  that's had her fingers 
off in the presses?', I said, 'are y o u  going to fight 
her case?' W e l l  of course he'd got to know, he'd 
found out m o r e  about it, and he come to me and he 
says, 'Yes' h e  says, 'we're fighting the case'.
W e l l  after that, I think that's what g o t  the union 
go i n g  properly. They fought - I d o n ' t  know what 
she got or a n y t h i n g  like that. I k n o w  they got her 
something". J i m  (Serviceman, m o u l d i n g  s h o p ) (13)
As recruitment prog r e s s e d  and the firm e x p a n d e d  in size, the 
membership quickly o u t g r e w  the local branch into which it had 
b e e n  initially, enrolled. Indeed, the p r e s i d i n g  lay officials 
had been exceedingly stretched to service the sudden influx of 
n e w  members together w i t h  their inexperienced s h o p  stewards.
A n d  in addition, BSR's man a g e m e n t  m u c h  preferred its employees 
to be accomodated w i t h i n  an environment solely d e v oted to the 
concerns of the work e r s  of that one company alone. Once it
beca m e  v i a b l e  Co set up a s e p a r a t e  branch for the three factories, 
n o m inations w e r e  taken for a full-time administrative officer,
Mary West, f r o m  the c a r t r i d g e  section (sub-assembly) of the 
Stour b r i d g e  factory, was selected after interviews b e f o r e  the 
Regional Committee, and a p p ointed in 1972. She, herself, had
no p r e v i o u s  u n i o n  experience, but she was c o nsiderably aided in 
her w o r k  by the f u l l - t i m e  official, who also presided over all 
m e e t i n g s  of the branch. (These w e r e  held - irregularly - every
three mont h s  un t i l  J u l y  1973 and bi- m o n t h l y  thereafter).
By J u n e  1974, 6,500 of the 8,800 shop floor w o r kers employed 
in the three W e s t  M i d l a n d s  factories, had b e e n  organised into the 
union: GMWU m e m b e r s h i p  thus comprised some 73% of the Company's 
hourly paid employees. (14) The union's officials were, 
na t u r a l l y  enough, c o n c e r n e d  to e s t ablish 100% organisation, and 
this was for historical, as well as the m o r e  obvious reasons.
In the S p r i n g  of 1970, four months after the B S R  agreement 
had b e e n  signed, the G M W U  had b e e n  involved in a disp u t e  at 
Pilki n g t o n s  in St. Helens. This entailed mass d i s affection 
and the f o r m a t i o n  of a b r e a k a w a y - u n i o n  after workers' efforts to 
b r i n g  in the TGWU instead, had foundered on Bridlington. For 
the GMWU, rev e r b e r a t i o n s  f r o m  this famous strike, w e r e  lasting.
One o u t c o m e  of internal s o u l - s e a r c h i n g  w i t h i n  the bureaucracy was 
the s e t t i n g  up of an O r g a n i s a t i o n  Department at national level 
w i t h  the brief of, a m o n g s t  other things, trying to e n s u r e  that 
w o r k - p l a c e s  r e a l l y  w e r e  100% u n i onised by the ¿MWU w n e n  they were 
s u p posed to be. A l t h o u g h  support for the breakaway u n i o n  (which 
was w i d e s p r e a d  and e x t e n d e d  well beyond St. Helens), had largely
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been fuelled by GMWU members, n o n - m e m b e r s  were seen to p o s e  a 
threat to the union's hold over plants they ostensibly organised. 
Moves to o u s t  the GMWU from its p o s i t i o n  as sole barg a i n i n g  agent 
were, p r e s u m a b l y  strengthened by non- m e m b e r s  who felt free to 
join a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  union. (15)
T h e  P i l k i n g t o n  workers were all m e m b e r s  of a single GMWU 
branch, over 7,500 strong, wh i c h  was, before reor g a n i s a t i o n  one 
of the l a r gest in the country. BSR, w i t h  its potential 8,000+ 
employees in 1974, bade fair as a rival, and the union's officials 
hoped it w o u l d  not turn out by e m u l a t i n g  its forerunner too 
closely. T h e y  remained concerned, therefore, about the level of 
n o n - m e m b e r s .
E n t h u s i a s m  for union recruitment seems to have diminished 
early on the part of B S R  management. M o r e  importantly perhaps, 
the Co m p a n y ' s  expansion, together w i t h  its (normal) 'abnormally' high 
labour turnover, constantly produced a large flow of new starters, 
many of w h o m  remained outside the u n i o n .  The latter was, therefore, 
potentially the faster growing constituency. There still remained, 
moreover, c o n s i d e r a b l e  numbers of e m p l o y e e s  who w e r e  m e m bers of a 
different u n i o n  (the A U E W  4 TGWU in particular): a circumstance 
which added to the danger of a p o s s i b l e  movement to break the 
CMWU's sole b a r g a i n i n g /organisation rig h t s  - especially gi v e n  the 
number of non- m e m b e r s  as yet in the ranks.
Efforts to resolve this q u e s t i o n  w e r e  finally rewarded in 
1974 w h e n  t h e  Company wanted to d i s c u s s  the q u e stion of redundancies. 
The results o f  these discussions w e r e  finally embodied in an 
agreement of December 4th. In r e t u r n  for union cooperation, the 
Company c o n c e d e d  a post-entry closed s h o p  and thus, new starters 
would, in future, have to become u n i o n  members with i n  the first 
four weeks o f  their employment. T h e  redundancy agreement also
stated that all non-uni o n i s t s  w o u l d  be given a m o n t h  (until 
Janu a r y  8th) to j o i n  the un i o n  a n d  any n o n -union members r e m a i n i n g  
would be the first to leave at the end of January. (16)
"What h a p pened - 1 w o u l d  say 80% of all the employees 
of the f a c t o r y  w e r e  in the un i o n  b e f o r e  the redundancy. 
A n d  all it did was - part of the r e dundancy agreement 
preserved the 100% membership... and it was merely 
just one o f  the bar g a i n i n g  counters in the redundancy 
agreement". Bary W h i t e  (factory m a n a g e r ) (17)
A t  the same time, n e g otiations began, r e g a r d i n g  the org a n i ­
sation of staff into M A T S A  the w h i t e  collar s e c tion of the GMWU.
The C o m p a n y  was allo w e d  to make extensive rati o n a l i s a t i o n  of its 
staff s e c tions first though, and, proportionally, m o r e  extensive 
r e d u n d a n c i e s  o c c u r r e d  here than among the manual workers. After 
this, the 100% un i o n  m e m bership agreement c o v ering the staff was 
signed.
TERMS F O R  O R GANISATION.
W e  n o w  turn to e x a m i n e  the terms of the Co m p a n y ' s  r e c o g n i t i o n  
of the union, and the basis of their subsequent, bargaining 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  the G M W U  in the W e s t  Midlands. These were 
embodied in the 'blue-book' agreement w h i c h  r e m ained operable, in 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  una l t e r e d  form, at the time of the study. (18)
T h e  contrasts w h i c h  have b e e n  indicated b e t w e e n  the two 
'modes' of u n i o n i s a t i o n  of BSR's factories in E n g l a n d  and in 
Scotland should not, of course, be over drawn; since the struggle 
at East K i l b r i d e  was the basis of recognition in the West M i d lands. 
But, g i v e n  that there w e r e  also significant diffe r e n c e s  in the 
ci r c u m s t a n c e s  under w h i c h  union recog n i t i o n  was negotiated, should
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we n o t  expect the terms of the settlements - in eith e r  case - 
to reflect this in some way? In the first instance, the Company 
(and the union) was appa r e n t l y  bargaining un d e r  substantial 
pressure; in the second instance, less so. If such a n  expecta­
tion seems feasible, it is not, in fact, borne out - a t  least, 
not in terms of the writ t e n  agreements. In the n e gotiations 
prec e e d i n g  the return to w o r k  at East Kilbride, the C o m p a n y  set 
out its terms to the union - for recognition, and sole negotiating 
rights and 100Z membership. T h e  results of these negotiations, 
a s s isted by the CIR Commissioners, were embodied in the agreement 
e n t i t l e d  'General conditions n e c e s s a r y  for a return to work' wh i c h  
was signed by the AEF. (19) T h e  'Blue book' a g r e e m e n t  signed by 
the G M W U  a few months later d i d  not differ sub s t a n t i a l l y  from 
this- apart from being more fully explicated. At the heart of 
both agreements lay the clau s e s  w h i c h  protected manage m e n t ' s  
p r i nciple of full mobility; intercha n g e a b i l i t y  and flexibility 
in the use of labour. And a cla u s e  explicitly a g r e e i n g  to this 
p r a c t i c e  on the part of the u n i o n  was included. T h e r e  w e r e  no 
status quo clauses in either agreement: the C o m pany exp l i c i t l y  
r e t aining full freedom to c h a n g e  production set-ups a n d  introduce 
new meth o d s  w h e n  required.
T h e  agreements also p r o v i d e d  for a procedure for resolving 
disputes, and this was spelt o u t  in the 'blue book', as was the 
discip l i n a r y  procedure. Finally, provision was made for a 
s y s t e m  of shop steward r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and the setting u p  of a 
wo r k s  committee for joint c o n s u l t a t i o n  between company and union 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
Whate v e r  the respective w o r k - f o r c e s  thought about these 
agre e m e n t s  at the time they w e r e  negotiated is not recorded.
T h e r e  was, however, a short d i s p u t e  over the ret u r n  to w o r k  
ag r e e m e n t  at East K i l bride w h i c h  m a y  perhaps be taken to indicate 
so m e t h i n g  about the different interests and attitudes o f  the 
p a r t i e s  involved. It is apparent, for example, that the CIR's 
interest in the agreement lay in its procedural rather than its 
s u b s t a n t i v e  aspects, in contrast to both m a n a g e m e n t  and the 
m e m b e r s h i p  on str i k e  at the time.
A l t h o u g h  sig n e d  on November 14th, a hitch in the plans for 
a pha s e d  r e t u r n  beg i n n i n g  on N o v e m b e r  18th occurred, w h e n  a mass 
m e e t i n g  m a n d a t e d  A U E W  officials to refuse to proceed. Workers 
d e m a n d e d  that the crucial c l a u s e  relating to the jobs in which 
those re t u r n i n g  would b e  placed, should be i n terpreted to mean 
that all re t u r n i n g  employees should, without q u a l i f ications, be 
plac e d  in their previous p o s itions - w h e r e  these still existed.
T h e  C o m p a n y  had not considered they were at all bo u n d  to do this 
und e r  the terms of the agreement the un i o n  officials had signed:
"Th e r e  shall be a res u m p t i o n  of all w o r k e r s  on 
Tuesday, 18th November, 1969, the m a n a g e m e n t  
e n d e a v o u r i n g  to pl a c e  returning workers in their 
p r e v i o u s  positions. Due to r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n  of 
production, this may n o t  be possible in all cases; 
however, alternative w o r k  will be m a d e  available". 
C I R ( 1 9 7 0 ) p . 2 2  (20)
As a resu l t  of this d i s p u t e  the ret u r n  to w o r k  w a s  delayed 
b y  a week, r e s u m i n g  once the C o m p a n y  had again r e a c h e d  agreement 
w i t h  the u n i o n  officials. T h e  CIR commissioners w e r e  rather 
m i f f e d  by this unexpected hold-up. T h e y  recorded in their report, 
their a g r eement w i t h  the f i r m ’s (i.e. employer's) interpre t a t i o n  of
Che clause; along with their view that:
"(any) d i s p u t e d  cases could have been dealt with 
prope r l y  w i t h i n  t h e  framework of the r e t u r n  to 
work a r r a n g e d  by the Company. C I R ( 1 9 7 0 ) p . 13
That the workforce, by and large, had taken a different 
view might, however, suggest, not so m u c h  that they had an 
improper grasp of procedures, but that they had a keener a p p r e c i a ­
tion of the s u b s t a n t i v e  issues embodied in the b a r gain negotiated 
on their behalf. In the first place, p r o t e c t i o n  against 
v i ctimisation is a n  o b v i o u s  concern, of course, for strikers who 
return to work; i n  respect of this, m a n a g e m e n t ' s  freedom to 
deploy workers c l e a r l y  had to be circumscribed. Beyond this, 
however, BSR's em p l o y e e s  had experience, u n m atched by either CIR 
or A U E W  officials, of a company's production p o l i c y  based 
centrally (and e x p l i c i t l y  so) on the principles of labour 
f lexibility/mobility. T h e i r  stand, en masse, against the terms
of the return to w o r k  w a s  also, at the same time, one against 
management's c o n n o n  practice.
This brief incident is the only recorded r e s p o n s e  by members 
to the agr e e m e n t s  made b y  the Company w i t h  the unions concerned.
The impact and implic a t i o n s  of the terms under which recog n i t i o n  was 
achieved in the W e s t  M i d l a n d s  factories are explo r e d  more fully 
in the f o l lowing chapters.
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The Impact of U n i o n i s a t i o n  : "more soap and m o r e  towels"
What were the b e n e f i t s  of u n i o n i s a t i o n  for the workforce 
at BSR in the West Mi d l a n d s ?  M a k i n g  their assessment some 
seven years later, the shop stewards fre q u e n t l y  made reference to 
the 'bad old days' - about w h i c h  a w h o l e  body of stories existed. 
These c o nstituted qu i t e  a mythology.
(How would you feel about w o r k i n g  for BSR without 
a un i o n  here?)
"Oh no! O h  no way! I w a s n ' t  here in the days 
w h e n  there was no union, but I've heard lots of 
stories about... I couldn't p o s s i b l y  have worked 
under those conditions".
Sally ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (21)
In c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  the m e m o r y  of the 'old days' it was 
apparent that there had b e e n  m a n y  c h a n g e s  and improvements:
"Our e x - c o n v e n o r  worked h e r e  - she was one of the 
instigators of b r i nging the un i o n  in, you know.
And she said - it was terrible, they'd just come 
al o n g  and T E L L  you you'd got to work over-time, 
tell y o u  w h a t  they w e r e  g o i n g  to pay you, what you 
could do - y o u  couldn't M O V E  from your bench, kind 
of thing, y o u  k n o w  - Oh, no!"
Sally ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (22) empha s i s  in original.
(How w o u l d  y o u  feel about w o r k i n g  for BSR without 
a union here?)
"I don't th i n k  I'd like that. I didn't work here 
w h e n  there w a s n ' t  a union, but I've talked to 
people w h o  did, and they said to me - 'If your 
face did n ' t  fit, you w e r e  up the road'."
(What d i f f e r e n c e  has the u n i o n  made?)
"I T H I N K  they ca n ' t  just go and sack 'em now.
But I ca n ' t  think of any p a r t i c u l a r  changes due 
to u n i o n . ..
I o n c e  k n e w  a girl w h o  was Personnel Officer, 
bef o r e  the u n i o n  came. She left the job 'cos she 
couldn't keep up w i t h  them - they w e r e  sacking them
and s t o p p i n g  them and sacking them and stopping them - 
and it j u s t  got her down. S h e  couldn't keep up with 
them, and she just packed it in. And b e c ause that 
was w h a t  I'd heard - w h e n  I just started here, I 
didn't th i n k  I'd be h e r e  two minutes!"
Nora (Final A s s e m b l y ) (23)
C e r t a i n l y  n o - o n e  questioned that there was the need for a 
trade uni o n  at BSR!
would
"I thi n k  a lot of people / s t i l l  work h e r e  w i t hout a 
union and its been h e r e  for a few years now. I 
don't t h i n k  you a p p reciate just w h a t  the union 
has done. Perhaps that's the best w a y  to put it. 
If w e  w e r e  without it, I thi n k  then w e  mi g h t  
a p p r e c i a t e  it a little more".
(What w o u l d  be the difference?)
"I think that we w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  be go i n g  home 
a b s o l u t e l y  exhausted and on stretchers! I 
think t h e y  would certainly m a k e  you w o r k  a lot 
harder".
Ma d g e  (Moulding S h o p ) (24)
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the m y t h o l o g y  of the past, there was also 
the v i e w  that, if anything, the need for a trade un i o n  was even 
g r e a t e r  in some w a y s  today, than it had been before. And once 
the p e r s p e c t i v e  m o v e d  away f r o m  the needs of the past to those 
of t h e  present, n e w  (and sometimes unspoken) qu e s t i o n s  were also 
r a i s e d  about the impact of the union.
(How w o u l d  you feel about w o r k i n g  for BSR without a 
union here?)
"I d o n ' t  think it w o u l d  be v e r y  nice to w o r k  for 
them w i t h o u t  a uni o n  now. One time it used to be, 
b e c ause - although I said M a c d o n a l d  was a terror - 
w h e never anyone got a rise s u c h  as the engineers, 
you k n e w  damn well that M a c d o n a l d  wou l d  see that 
you got that rise as well. But I do n ' t  think it
would happ e n  now. I don't think it would. I 
think it would be one of the poorest paid factories 
in the Midlands if we hadn't got a union now. I 
don't think the m a n a g e m e n t  - speaking personally - 
I don't think the m a n a g e m e n t  have got any interest 
in the w o r k  people here. I don't think they have. 
They're only interested in the work they can get 
out. They've got no s y m pathy for anyone here.
Not this management.
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Because there's some w o m e n  - they're in that press 
shop, they're in the paint shop and they're in the 
p l a t i n g  too - they n e e d  the money. T h e y ' r e  practically 
dying o n  their feet. And do y o u  think the y ' d  give 
them a lighter job o n  this moulding, or a lighter job 
a n y where else? NO, No chance for them. They'd 
rather that e x p e r i e n c e d  person leave and set o n  another 
one, inexperienced, in their pl a c e  then t h e y ' d  give 
them a lighter job".
(Is it a p r o b l e m  g e t t i n g  transfers?)
"They can't get them. And yet I don't see why, 
if its a genuine case. I will admit that there's 
some of them who p u t  it on, yes. But if its a 
g e n uine case I d o n ’t see why they can't g i v e  her a 
lighter job".
(Do you know someone like that?)
"Oh yes. M y  own w i f e .  She suffers a lot w i t h  
fibrositis n o w  you know. And as I say, h e r  ankle 
swells up a lot. W e l l  I must admit that I haven't 
tried to get her a transfer y o u  see. But I have 
asked her to ask t h e  staff foreman to g i v e  h e r  a 
lighter job - like i n  the same department - but 
he won't. He w o n ' t  hear of it. T h e y ' r e  j u s t 
w a i t i n g  for her to leave".
J i m  (Serviceman, m o u l d i n g  s h o p ) (25)
(What difference h a s  having the union made?)
"Well they can't j u s t  sack you... Mac D o n a l d  used 
to - sacked a w h o l e  section just because t h e y  were 
h a v i n g  a laugh - h e  sacked the lot. He w a s  a 
tyrant, but he b e l i e v e d  in good workers. A s  long 
as you w e r e  a good w o r k e r  - they said - h e ' d  never 
sack you here. B u t  that w o u ldn't apply today.
That w o u l d n ' t  m a k e  a n y  difference now, oh n o ! "
Janet ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (26)
Clearly, a n  assessment o f  the union's impact has to be 
m a d e  against a background of present needs, as well as changes - 
some of w h i c h  were due to u n i o n i s a t i o n  itself. And in this 
r e s p e c t  again, comparisons w i t h  the past did not a l w a y s  result in 
v a l i d a t i o n  of cue present:
"Well I don't r e a l l y  know, because I've n e v e r  worked 
for B S R  without a union. But from w h a t  I ' v e  heard 
f r o m  the wo m e n  t h a t  have w o r k e d  here a l o n g  time -
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they said that B S R  WAS B E T T E R  W I T H O U T  A  U N I O N " .
(Why d o  they say that?)
"Well they say that - like, w h e n  we're going to have a 
rise —  they w o u l d  go straight in and tell management 
and t h e y ' d  discuss it and... W h e r e a s  now, today, 
y o u ' v e  got to go through UNION and all this lot, and 
if y o u  don't agree w i t h  it then they... just get you  
the sack..."
Ka t h y  (Paint S h o p ) (27) emphasis in original
A l t h o u g h  the p o i n t s  are not m a d e  alt o g e t h e r  clearly, what seems 
to be indicated here is a sense of reduced effectiveness in the 
workers' d e a l i n g s  with m a n a g e m e n t  wh i c h  is associated w i t h  the 
loss of a d i r e c t  approach, and the use of a r e presentative and 
procedural system. We need to e x p l o r e  m o r e  fully some of the 
features u n d e r l y i n g  this observation; b e c ause such systems are, 
of course, a c r u c i a l  feature of u n i o n i s a t i o n  and the establishment 
of collective b a r g a i n i n g  structures.
What w e r e  the more tangible benefits of unioni s a t i o n  from 
the workers' p o i n t  of view? T h e  males, certainly, could point to 
the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a shift s y s t e m  w h i c h  rationalised (but did 
not do away w i t h )  overtime working, and the introduction of 
recognised p r e m i u m  rates of pay for both; although this had never 
been extended to the women. ( " W e ’ve always said we w o u l d  never 
ask for the e x t r a  there".) (28)
On the w h o l e ,  it was, of course, difficult for workers to 
assess what t h e  position mi g h t  have been:
"I c a m e  to BSR for a w a g e  that was higher than any 
w o o d w o r k  job I had before. So that wasn't the doing 
of t h e  union in the first place. I now get slightly 
less than my equi v a l e n t  trade outside of BSR... So 
in f a c t  its slightly reduced - o n l y  because the vast 
a m o u n t  of incentives and bonus's, etc. w h i c h  have been
introduced into my trade outside of BSR.
But the union has brought in m a n y  improvements 
w h i c h  m i g h t  not otherwise have b e e n  here. A  little 
bit m o r e  forceful in getting cleaner toilets and 
more soap and more towels, better f i r e  exits - which 
make sense anyway".
M i c h a e l  ( C a r p e n t e r )(29)
"Well the man a g e m e n t  they muck you a b o u t  N O W  even 
w i t h  a union. So without one, you'd b e  pushed 
f r o m  p i l l a r  to post - and you'd get nowhere. We'd 
really h a v e  some trouble - there'd b e  some problems 
I should imagine.
(In the y e a r s  you've been here have y o u  n o t i c e d  any 
d i f f e r e n c e  the union's made?)
"The m o n e y ' s  getting better and the r i s e s  seem 
better - I don't k n o w  about the c o n d i t i o n s  - they're 
a bit b e t t e r  than they were. It d o e s n ' t  s e e m  to be 
so... y o u  c a n  walk up a gangway w i t h o u t  falling over 
something there, you know!"
Barbara (Final a s s e m b l y ) (30) emphasis in original.
Clearly, as the Company had grown, this h a d  brought changes 
over the years - for better and for worse - and it was difficult 
to weigh-up the impa c t  of the union. For instance, the syst e m  of 
p e rformance rating had been developed around t h e  time the un i o n 
was brought in, and, w h i l e  this might have b e e n  associated with 
some initial i m provements in the women's pay, i t  was a l s o  linked 
w i t h  speed-up and the establishment of a higher work-rate.
But the un i o n  h a d  introduced bargaining s t r u c t u r e s  of a 
kind w h i c h  had n e v e r  existed in the Company before. A  new 
system for r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and negotiation b e t w e e n  the wo r k f o r c e  
and m a n a g e m e n t  had b e e n  established — and, for the first time, 
the means for c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining on an in s t i t u t i o n a l  basis 
e x i sted - backed by m o r e  powerful org a n i s a t i o n a l  resources on 
the workers' side t h a n  the Company's employees o n  their own
could ever muster
Edna, in her assessment of the union's impact, tried to take 
account of these developments in the context of other, broader 
c h a n g e s ,
"Its a bit di f f i c u l t  to answer, because I have 
wor k e d  here w i t h o u t  a union - and it was great!
But, like I said, there w a s n ' t  any mass production, 
and I should say that is w h a t ' s  changed it.
But there again, most of the cases that we do 
take up and that - aren't solved anyway, most of them, 
so... Well, they don't call in the un i o n  most 
times out of ten, so, its like not hav i n g  a union 
really, isn't it?
I think, the o n l y  time that you really feel that 
there is a union, is w h e n  the wage negot i a t i o n  comes up - 
and they negotiate your wage. But there again, we 
w e r e  ENTITLED to the 102 by government! And all 
w e  got off the u n i o n  was just a productivity scheme, 
w h i c h  we can't get anything out of! So there's no 
chan g e  w h a tsoever really!
I think its the mass pro d u c t i o n  that's making it 
change. Well, its changed since the mass production. 
And, I don't know if the union's helped b y  making things 
so that you can't go in to talk to the m a n agement and 
get things sorted out. Beca u s e  at one time you could.
I can remember the time - w h e n  we've had a problem 
here and you felt that you could go to the management, 
e v e n  the personnel, and they'd say: 'Right, we'll sort 
this out for you, don ' t  you worry', you know. You 
couldn't do that now".
Edna (Final A s s e m b l y ) (31)
All the main aspects of c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining have been 
m e n tioned here - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and g r i evance handling, negotiation 
of claims and demands, and the procedural system - and in each 
case they have been vie w e d  as problematic from the workers' point 
of view.
These are the issues w h i c h  we are going to e x p lore in more 
detail below. Moreover, we intend to argue that these features 
of un i o n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and c o l l e c t i v e  b a rgaining were, o n  the whole 
m o r e  p r o b l e m a t i c  for the w o m e n  workers than the men. In
c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on the problems, it should be clear that there is no
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intention to de c r y  the need for trade u n i o n  o r g anisation in
general, and esp e c i a l l y  not the a c h ievements of trade u n i onists - 
rather, the o p p o s i t e  is the case. Nor, in concentrating on the 
problematic aspects for the wom e n  w o r kers, is it be i n g  suggested 
that there w e r e  no problems for the m e n .  Our p u r p o s e  is to 
specify, m o r e  precisely, the position o f  the w o m e n  workers in 
the u n i o n  and in do i n g  so, to offer s o m e  forms of approach and 
expla n a t i o n  a p p l i c a b l e  to all trade un i o n i s t s  engaged in 
c o l lective bargaining, whether male or female. Finally, there 
is no i n t e n t i o n  to suggest that the p r o b l e m s  examined here w e r e  
due to the w o r k e r s  being organised in o n e  particular union 
rat h e r  than another. It should be c l e a r  from the analysis that 
the re l a t i o n s h i p s  and processes e x a m i n e d  have a m u c h  broader 
relevance. T h e  Company was dealing w i t h  two trade unions: the 
A U E W  in East K i l b r i d e  and the GMWU in the West Midlands. It is 
m o r e  useful to e x a mine features of the firm and its w o r kforce 
than to s u g gest explanations wh i c h  e x t e n d  no further than the 
boundaries of the trade union o r g a n i s a t i o n  alone.
"This particular union - in another f a c tory down the 
road - is w o r king great, all the members are satisfied 
w i t h  it and everything. I say, 'You're the union, 
and I am the r epresentative... and w e ' r e  at fault.
W e  are the fault here - at B S R  anyway".
Jill (Supervisor - final a s s e m b l y ) (32)
Exc e p t  that we are not a t t r i b u t i n g  blame, but looking for
explanations which stay help to shift it
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CHAPTER 11 THE WOMEN WORKERS AND THEIR UNION
"The m a j o r i t y  of the women don't get on with 
the union. T h e y  say they're not strong enough
and they won't do anything for them". Barbara (Final A s s e m b l y ) (1) 
If the main benefits of u n i onisation derive f r o m  the 
development of col l e c t i v e  b a r gaining - the e s t a b l i s h i n g  of appro­
priate structures for represen t a t i o n  and negotiation, through which 
workers' interests might be effectively promoted - then it is 
clear that this was problematic from the women's point of view.
"Most of the time, I quite honestly think that a 
lot of them wouldn't be in the union if they didn't 
have to. They say they can't see w h a t  they pay their 
money for" M a d g e  (moulding Shop) (2)
"We get this all the time ... the union's no good 
and they're ripping up their cards - I mean, this 
is hap p e n i n g  all the time."
Edna (Final Assembly) (3)
"Oh, you'll find ... the m a j o r i t y  of the people in 
BSR are d i sillusioned w i t h  the union ... They don't 
think the union's doing enough for them".
Jill (Superviser - Final Assembly) (4)
Why was d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with the trade union so widespread
among the wom e n  workers on the shop floor? There was, clearly, a
feeling that the organ i s a t i o n  was ineffective on their behalf: it
was "not strong enough" and it was "not doi n g  enough" for them.
What was the reas o n  for this?
"When they've got a p r o b l e m  its: 'the Un i o n  - they 
don't c a r e  what ' s  going on'. But they haven't brought 
it, really, to the Union yet.
And say they're not getting their performances, or 
this Inbucon (productivity scheme) isn't working: 'Huh!
Trust the Union to get something that we can't get our 
money on'. 'Huh! they never get a n y t h i n g  for us, like'.
'Look at it now! H o w  are w e  goi n g  to get our money?'
But they haven't brought it up in the right manner, or 
said - what are w £  do i n g  about it?
All w e  get is a load of abuse. And if you do tell 
them w h a t  they're getting, and you want some of their 
backing - they don't back you".
Edna (Final Assembly) (5)
What were the problems underlying these members' complaints?
And how is this lack of e f fectiveness to be explained?
"NOT STRONG ENOU G H "
Perhaps it is b e c ause it is the w o m en's e x p e r i e n c e  of the 
problems which c o n s t a n t l y  provides the m a i n  focus o f  our discussion 
in this Chapter, that we find questions about their strength in 
relation to m a n a g e m e n t  in the workplace bei n g  continuously posed in 
terms of the k i n d  of institutional support and resources available: 
not only financial but also, importantly, o r ganisational (vis 
coordination, info r m a t i o n  and guidance).
Thus in the first Section, when we consider t h e  'strength' of 
the female membership, we find there are two main issues in the 
balance. On t h e  one hand, there is the question o f  what institu­
tional resources w e r e  av a i l a b l e  in relation to t h e s e  members' needs, 
since this will, obviously, have had an impact on their strength and 
effectiveness v i s  a vis management. O n  the o t h e r  hand, the
availability and extent of these institutional resources may themselves 
be partly de p e n d e n t  upon the m e mbership's ' b argaining strength' 
this time in r e l a t i o n  to their own organisation.
We are, therefore, required to take a step b a c k  from a view of 
their relatio n s h i p s  with m a nagement and to look at the effectivity 
of the women m e m b e r s  in relation to their o w n  i n s titution first.
We look at two levels of the union's domestic o r g a n i s a t i o n  - at the 
factory and at the branch, '.•'hat were the problems of the wom e n  
members in r e s p e c t  of b o t h  of these?
A brief v i e w  (because this is c o nsidered in m o r e  detail in the 
following Chapter) shows the shop stewards' o r g a n i s a t i o n  in the 
factory to be d o m inated by management to a s i gnificant degree. A 
longer view of the branch reveals both the d o m i n a n c e  of the male
membership and a strong role played by the union's full-time 
officers. H o w  responsive, therefore, was the union's organisation 
at this level to women's problems and interests? Our analysis of 
the records show that in the first place, these received little 
attention, to the extent that the m a l e  workers' problems dominated 
the agenda. A n d  in the second place, w h e n  issues of major concern 
to the female m e m bership were raised - this was to little effect.
Wh i l e  it m a y  be a tru i s m  to say that 'the strongest groups 
of workers will gain more' - from either management or their own 
institutions, we are s u g gesting here that the underlying processes 
w h e r e b y  some groups gain m o r e  than others are not only complex but 
they are inter-linked. Thus, in setting out, as we are in this 
chapter, the parameters of the women workers' position in the un i o n  
and in s p e c i f y i n g  the problems they faced, we have constantly to 
enquire: w h a t  are the sources of this membership's apparent 'weakness' 
W h a t  u n d e r l i e s  their seeming inability and unwillingness to both 
press their demands and claims and to use the institutional resources 
available?
"NOT DOING E N O UGH"
In the second section we go on to v i e w  the outcome, from the 
w o m en's poi n t  of view, of collective bargaining. W e  look at two 
agreements finalised between the union's negotiators and management 
and here again, we can identify problems wh i c h  appear to spring f r o m 
the women members' lack of bargaining strength on the one hand and 
the institution's lack of responsiveness to their interests on the 
other. In the first example we can see that the agreement reflected 
the needs of management to a greater extent than the needs of the
women workers. In the second case, the agreement reflected the 
d e m ands of the m a l e  work e r s  more strongly than those of the women.
W e  i d e n t i f y  a number of specific limitations in respect
of b o t h  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  system and the collective bargaining 
structures - estab l i s h e d  as a result of unioni s a t i o n  - which 
affected the female m e m bership especially. In particular, we 
find a number of q u e stions being raised conc e r n i n g  the degree of 
r e s p o n siveness of the institution as a whole, to the wo m e n  members' 
needs and demands. As a result, we are led to examine the patterns 
of interest r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  wit h i n  the organi s a t i o n  in more detail.
Not s u rprisingly, perhaps, we find that this is heavily weighted in 
favour of the male workers. But this does not get us very far.
For a l t h o u g h  we can surmise that this may, to some extent, explain 
the p r o b l e m  of r e sponsiveness in o r ganisational terms, further 
que s t i o n s  are also raised. H o w  is this p a t t e r n  of unequal represents 
tion itself to be explained?
In our c o n c l u d i n g  disc u s s i o n  w e  outline a n  approach to these 
q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  does provide a me a n s  of exp l a i n i n g  some of tlie 
probl e m s  w h i c h  have b e e n  raised. And these points are taken up in 
the fo l l o w i n g  Chapters.
W e  begin, however, by taking a cue from the women members w h o  
felt that the o r g a n i s a t i o n  was ...
"Not str o n g  enough"
(Do y o u  think trade unions do enough for women?)
"They, obviously, fight their battles. But w h e n  you 
say trade unions - the trade union is, surely, only 
as powerful as its membership... Because, as the 
u n i o n  reminds the mem b e r s h i p  - you are the trade union, 
not us. Therefore, if the m a j o r i t y  (of women) are 
apathetic about it (equality) or e v e n  don't want it 
changed - you see, THEY are not p r e ssing - because 
unions will do something when they are being pressed 
by the membership". Gor d o n  (Storeman) (6)
C o nventional w i s d o m  has it that 'the members are the union'. 
Ultimately, the strength and e f fectiveness of the workers' o r g a n i ­
sation is dependent u p o n  their ability and willingness to press 
their clai m s  against management and to take action on their own 
behalf. Is, therefore, the wome n ' s  appreciation of the u n i o n ' s  
lack of effectiveness, simply a reflection of the weakness, 'docility' 
or lack of experience of this group of workers in trade u n i o n  terms?
As Bob, a serviceman who represented 170 wo m e n  in the M o u l d i n g 
Shop observed:
"I've found m a n agement pretty dogmatic - to the exte n t 
that w h e n  they say something they don't want to hear 
anyone else's point of view".
(Do you think they w o u l d  be the same if they w e r e  dealing w i t h  men?)
"Oh no. T h e  men - if they take the men too far here, 
the men' l l  down it - see, same as they have done several 
times before". Bob (Serviceman M o u lding Shop) (7)
T h e r e  are, of course, numerous points of contrast in the 
r e s p e c t i v e  positions of the m e n  and women workers which u n d e r l i e  
this observation; such as the latters' (relative) lack of self- 
c o n f i d e n c e  in general, and lesser employment security. T h e s e  
aspects c a n  be taken to u n d e r l i e  the position of women w o r k e r s  
g e n e r a l l y  even though they w e r e  not specifically m e n tioned by Edna, 
when s h e  tried to p i n  down the p r o blem of her members' lack of 
p r e p a r e d n e s s  to act:
(Have y o u  ever asked them for backing?)
"Just that once, w i t h  that girl... but it wasn ' t  for 
long, it was only for about 15 minutes, and they moved 
her. But I've never actually asked for their b a c k i n g  - 
putting d o w n  tools o n  a fight that I'm having o n  the 
lines - because, y o u  see, the first question t h e y  ask:
'Who's pay i n g  the money? Who's going to pay our 
money o n  Friday?' And you're stuck - well, y o u  can't 
turn round and say w h o  _is^  going to pay their m o n e y  on
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Friday. And you go to your convenor, you say - well,
I want so and so to stop - 'Oh, you daren't do t h a t ! ’ 
you know,*they must stop on their own accord' - and 
people wont! People won't stop on their o w n  accord, 
you see, they look t o  you to tell them everything.
But - t h e y  also w a n t  their m o n e y  on Friday. Well, 
you go to them and you say - 'they're not going to 
be p r e p a r e d  to do so and so, its up to you which w a y  
it's g o i n g  to be.' Oh - they'll have a load of moans 
- 'the bloody union's hopeless here, it never brings 
you out on strike, it never tells you what to do.'
They'll tell you this. 'They're not bothered - w h o ' s e  
going to pay our money?'.and things like this, y o u  know. 
They w o n ' t  put d o w n  tools on their own bat.
If they moan about d o u bling - up. You say-go through 
the pro c e d u r e s  and I'll take it up in the office - and 
that. And they say, 'oh it's n o t  wo r t h  it. I'll only 
end u p  d o i n g  it in the end'."
(So they can't c o m p l a i n  about doubling-up?)
"Well, they could complain. B u t  they say, they h a v e  to 
go t h r o u g h  so m a n y  people, t h e y  just don't bother in the 
end. T h e y  say - 'Oh, I might as well do it' - y o u  know.
And t h e n  you go in the off i c e  and they (management) 
blame it on the absenteeism. So ... it is a p r o b l e m  
r e a l l y " .
Edna (Final Assembly) (8)
It would a p p e a r  that the women's preparedness to take action 
here is p r e d i c a t e d  on a number of points directly p e r t a i n i n g  to the 
organisation, and so we need to examine these.
F r o m  this account, w e  can see that first, if members' action 
is to take p r o c e d u r a l  forms, problems h a v e  to be expressed initially 
as grievances and then the grievances h a v e  to be processed through 
the system of representation. And for some reason, this w a s  not 
con s i d e r e d  w o r thwhile. At a different level, the d e c ision to take 
action directly, i.e. by stopping work, also required c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
of what might be gained - this time by loss of wages and disruption. 
And in the b a l a n c e  here, was the q u e s t i o n  of what kind of wider 
support strikers might expect. Both of these aspects apply, of 
course, to m e n  and women members. So if we are looking for their
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Friday. A n d  you go to your convenor, you say - well,
I want so and so to stop - 'Oh, you daren't d o  that!* 
you k n o w / t h e y  m u s t  stop on their own accord' - and 
people wont! P e o p l e  won't stop on their own accord, 
you see, t h e y  l o o k t o  you to tell them everything.
But - they a l s o  w a n t  their money on Friday. We l l ,  
you go to t h e m  a n d  you say - 'they're not g o i n g  to 
be prepared to do so and so, its up to you w h i c h  way 
it's going to be. ' Oh - they'll have a load of moans 
- 'the b l o o d y  u n i o n ' s  hopeless here, it never brings 
you out on strike, it never tells you what to do.'
They'll tell y o u  this. 'They're not bothered - who'se 
going to p a y  o u r  m o ney?'-and things like this, you know. 
They won't put d o w n  tools on their own bat.
If they m o a n  about doubling - up. You s a y - g o  through 
the proc e d u r e s  a n d  I'll take it up in the o f f i c e  - and 
that. And t h e y  say, 'oh it's not worth it. I'll only 
end up d o i n g  it in the end'."
(So they can't c o m p l a i n  ab o u t  doubling-up?)
"Well, they c o u l d  complain. But they say, t h e y  have to 
go through so m a n y  people, they just don't b o t h e r  in the 
end. They say - 'Oh, I might as well do it' - you know.
And then y o u  g o  in the office and they (management) 
blame it o n  the absenteeism. So ... it is a problem 
r e a l l y " .
Edna (Final As s e m b l y )  (8)
It w o u l d  appear that the women's preparedness to t a k e  action 
here is predicated o n  a n u m b e r  of points directly p e r t a i n i n g  to the 
organisation, and so w e  n e e d  to examine these.
F r o m  this account, w e  can see that first, if m e m b e r s '  action 
is to take p r o cedural forms, problems have to be e x p r e s s e d  initially 
as g r i evances and t h e n  the grievances have to be p r o c e s s e d  through 
the s y s t e m  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  And for some reason, t h i s  was not 
cons i d e r e d  w o rthwhile. A t  a different level, the d e c i s i o n  to take 
action directly, i.e. by stopping work, also required co n s i d e r a t i o n 
of what mig h t  be g a i n e d  - this time by loss of wages and disruption. 
And in the balance here, was the question of what k i n d  of wider 
support strikers m i g h t  expect. Both of these aspects apply, of 
course, to m e n  and w o m e n  members. So if we are l o o king for their
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special re l e v a n c e  in relation to the fem a l e  membership's (in)
effectiveness, w e  need to identify particular features of the
women's situation w h i c h  m i g h t  render these aspects m o r e  pertinent.
Was th e r e  any g r e a t e r  need for, and r e l i a n c e  upon, the grievance
p r o cedure and c o l l e c t i v e  or financial support, on the part of the
women c o m pared to the men? Or, were eit h e r  of these features of
trade u n i o n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  'less responsive' in respect of the female
membership? T h e s e  questions are taken up in more detail below. In
r e l ation to a third aspect mentioned b y  Edna, there w e r e  some clear
d i f ferences in terms of the men and w o m e n ' s ' n e e d s ' and, therefore,
reliance upon o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  resources. For in order to make
d e c isions and to proc e e d  to take any a c t i o n  at all - in whatever
form - the m e m b e r s  needed to w e i gh-up their situation, individually
and/or collect i v e l y .  And w e  have already noted first, that the
women workers' opp o r t u n i t i e s  for m e e t i n g  and d i s cussion w e r e  m u c h
more limited than the men's; and, secondly, their needs, in this
respect were that m u c h  greater:
"I find the m e n  stick together more. But the men are 
a small m i n o r i t y  - we ' r e  a large majority. It's 
easier for them to stick together".
Edna (Final Assembly) (9)
Overall, there appeared to be s t r o n g  limitations in respect
of ev e r y  point m a d e  by Edna w h i c h  did not either wholly, or necessarily
derive from the w o m e n  directly, but which, nevertheless, had an
impact on both their confidence and effectiveness.
"Because, let's face it, if the m a n agement offer 
some thing - if we hadn't got a union in... we'd 
have h a d  to have taken it. But where... if they offer 
it now, w e  can d i s agree w i t h  them - with the union's 
backing... Well, w h e n  I say union's b a c k i n g  - advice.
B e c ause you never get their backing. There's never
b e e n  a n  official strike here! Never! I only 
m e n t i o n e d  that yesterday. And the r e  has, I'm 
sure t h e r e ' s  been times that call for an official 
strike. But... I don't know w h e t h e r  it's a 
good t h i n g  or a bad thing. I do n ' t  believe in 
s t r i k e s ,  to be honest - but it w o u l d  be nice, 
o n c e  - if you've got a big issue - that you would 
d e f i n i t e l y  get the backin' of the union," (Give 
c o n f i d e n c e ? )  "Yes. Yes it w o u ld".
Jill ( F i n a l  A s s embly Superviser) (lO)
" T h e r e  h a v e  been times when I t h i n k  this union 
s h o u l d  h a v e  brought the people out on strike and it 
s h o u l d  h a v e  gone towards helping their week's money 
so t h a t  they could fight a big problem. But somehow 
it n e v e r  seems to be there for them..."
Edna (Fin a l  Assembly) (11)
There had, o f  course, been numerous stoppages, but where the 
mass of w o m e n  w o r k e r s  especially were concerned, there had never 
been any s u g g e s t i o n  these might find o f f icial support (12).
Indeed, the full time officers always refu s e d  to "negotiate under 
pressure", i.e. u n t i l  normal working had b e e n  resumed, which made 
it d i f f i c u l t  f o r  shop stewards to support stoppages by their own 
m e m bers (13).
Some of t h e  wo m e n  workers' strikes had ended with achievements. 
Many had been m a r k e d  by a high degree of m i l itancy. But this, as 
Madge pointed o u t ,  was not to be confused w i t h  'strength'. The 
e f fectiveness o f  the women's actions was v e r y  often dissipated in 
char a c t e r i s t i c  c o n f u s i o n  and disarray. Aga i n ,  we can note a number 
of points, this time in Madge's account, which place the sources 
of this w e a k n e s s  in terms of the o r g a n i s a t i o n  rather than the 
w o m e n  directly.
"The u n i o n  have done a very good job in a lot of 
a s p e c t s ,  but there again so m e t i m e s  I think it 
d o e s n ' t  always w o r k  for the best. Oh, I don't 
k n o w  it's with the disputes - w h e n  we get disputes, 
the u n i o n  doesn't seem to be strong, it doesn't 
s e e m  t o  help. W e  get a lot of incensed members 
and y o u  get a false impression a c t ually - you
\
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need a strong union, or a very well informed union."
(How could that be remedied? What wo u l d  you like 
to see?)
"Well, one that can explain to it's members, even 
w h e n  you get them as het up as w e ' v e  had them 
here - a w a y  you could explain to them, why a 
thing is w o r k i n g  that w a y  - and give them the full 
facts and N O T  keep things to yourselves. As 
stewards and that - to give them the full facts, 
the 'fors' and 'against', and then they can make 
up their o w n  mind.
This d o e sn't happen, w e  always get splits if 
we have a n y t h i n g  serious. We've got members 
that, you know, are going to stand and walk out, 
and then y o u ' v e  got the others that want to stop 
in - and it does cause an awful lot of trouble.
You need to be strong at a time like that and you 
need to be a b l e  to e x p lain to your members just 
what its all about - and we don't seem to get 
that". M a d g e  (Moulding Shop) (1A)
D i s o r g a n i s a t i o n  r e s ulting from the lack of information and
guidance o n  the un i o n  side was one of the m e mbership's strongest
complaints. But if no stoppage wo u l d  find official support, no
steward dared to suggest this course and was, indeed, forbidden
to do so. (15) Moreover, in the tightly integrated system of
production, it was difficult for stewards or groups individually
to cont r o l  the extent or scope of their action. So a high degree
of o r g a n i s a t i o n  would, actually, have been required, for the wo m e n
work e r s  to use sectional stoppages successfully.
"If we do get disputes, they like to k n o w  where they 
stand, not hivering and hovering. W h e n  they stopped 
us - when the wo m e n  on the lines were incensed - and 
stopped the M o u lding Shop working, t h e  management 
came down, and turned the machines off. Women were 
actually w o r k i n g  the machines and they turned them 
off. And they still didn't pay them. It was done 
again - the last dispute w e  had. They came down and 
turned the machines off, the m a n a g e m e n t  did, and 
people w e r e  still w o r k i n g  with them.
So... on two occasions, they sat there for two 
hours, thinking that if they didn't go home then 
they'd get paid. Now I couldn't tell them to go 
home - I w e n t  home myself ns m u c h  as to say - well
\
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I'm not going to sit here and not get paid, but 
they still kept sitting there and they didn't get 
paid. And so they h a d n ' t  really got a strong lead 
f r o m  the union, and this is where they tend to get 
their grievances you see".
Ma d g e  (Moulding Shop) (16). My emphasis.
Disorganisation and confusion were seen to result in the 
loss of an effectiveness on the workers' part, which might otherwise 
have sprung from collective organisation.
It is clear that these sources of weakness were institutional
rather than personal, and they w e r e  perceived specifically in the
union's lack of 'backing', w h i c h  encapsulated the notion of wi d e r
support - not necessarily or c h i e f l y  in the form of finance, but of
information and guidance.
"When they come out on strike and then they say,
'are union backing it?' - No. 'Oh well, the 
union's useless', you know, 'they're not backing 
us'." (Do you agree w i t h  that?) "Yes. I don't say 
every ons, because they'd say - oh well - go out o n  
strike for everything. But, like that Wednesday, when 
w e  weren't going to get paid - well, the union said 
w e  SHOULD have got paid. I thought well, to me, 
they could say - well O.K., if we ain't going to get 
paid then we WILL c o m e  out on strike - AND MAKE A 
D E C I S I O N ". Kathy (Paint Shop) (17) emphasis original.
"Oh, you'll find - not only supervision, but the 
m a j o r i t y  of the p e o p l e  in BSR - are disillusioned 
w i t h  the union... e v e n  staff. T h e y  don't think the 
union's doing enough. (What sort of things do they 
w a n t  the union to do?) They want the union to b a c k  
them - they say that they're there to advise the 
members - and there's not enough of that... advi c e  
coming over from the u n i o n  - whi c h  I have got to 
agree.
Because w h e n  we ' v e  had trouble w h e n  we've had 
w a g e  negotiations - I'd love to go back to my m e m b e r s 
and advise them. But w e ' m  told...all we're to say... 
'Give 'em the answer from management, and let 'em 
deci d e  themselves'. Now, to me, I'm a shop steward 
and I should be able to ADVISE my members - but w e  
are, actually f o r bidden to do that. Oh, yes, 
definitely". (Who forbids you?) "Oh, the u n i o n  - 
you know you've got y o u r  convenors, and people like 
that... 'You can't go and tell your member to do this
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I'm not going to sit here and not get paid, but 
they still kept sitting there and they didn't get 
paid. And so they hadn't really got a strong lead 
f r o m  the union, and this is wh e r e  they tend to get 
their grievances you see".
Ma d g e  (Moulding Shop) (16). My emphasis.
Disorganisation and c o n fusion were seen to result in the 
loss of an effectiveness o n  the workers' part, whi c h  might otherwise 
h a v e  sprung from collective organisation.
It is clear that these sources of weakness were institutional
rath e r  than personal, and they w e r e  perceived specifically in the
union's lack of 'backing', w h i c h  encapsulated the not i o n  of wider
support - not necessarily or chiefly in the form of finance, but of
information and guidance.
"When they come out o n  strike and then they say,
'are union backing it?' - No. 'Oh well, the 
union's useless', you know, 'they're not b a c king 
us'." (Do you agree w i t h  that?) "Yes. I don't say 
every one,b e c a u s e  they'd say - oh well - go out on 
strike for everything. But, like that Wednesday, when 
w e  weren't going to get paid - well, the un i o n  said 
w e  SHOULD have got paid. I thought well, to me, 
they could say - well O.K., if w e  ain't going to get 
paid then we WILL come out on strike - AND MAKE A 
D E C I S I O N " . Kathy (Paint Shop) (17) emphasis original.
"Oh, you'll find - not only supervision, but the 
m a j o r i t y  of the people in B S R  - are disillusioned 
w i t h  the union... even staff. T h e y  don't think the 
union's doing enough. (What sort of things do they 
w a n t  the union to do?) They want the union to back 
them - they say that they're there to advise the 
members - and there's not enough of that... advice 
coming over from the uni o n  - w h i c h  I have got to 
agree.
Because when we've had trouble when we ' v e  had 
w a g e  negotiations - I'd love to go back to my members 
and advise them. But w e ' m  told...all we ' r e  to say... 
'Give 'em the answer from management, and let 'em 
decide themselves', Now, to m e » I'» a shop steward 
and I should be able to ADVISE m y  members - but we 
are, actually f o r bidden to do that. Oh, yea, 
definitely". (Who forbids you?) "Oh, the union - 
you know you've got your convenors, and people like 
that... 'You can't go and tell your member to do this
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and do that'. And I said, - I could give 'er the 
situation, and then if she asks for my advice, I'd 
give 'er m y  o w n  personal opinion... and then it 
would be up to them. I said - I'll always agree 
that they... y o u  know, you can tell your member 
what's goin' on and ask for their opinion - but,
9 times out of 10, they'll turn round to me and say,
'Well, w h a t  do you think?' And I'm told to s a y ,
'It isn't w h a t  I think, its what you think'. - But 
its wrong, it is wrong".
•Till (Final A s s e m b l y  ( S u p e r v i s e r ) (18) emphasis in original.
Jill saw this as an abd i c a t i o n  of r e sponsibility on the part 
of the union, wh i c h  the mem b e r s h i p  also recognised and 'paid 
for' by their reduced e f fectiveness and lack of s t r ength in the 
workplace. But how far was it also a result of this? The lack of 
information helpful to the mem b e r s h i p  was, in m a n y  respects, 
constructed. And J i l l  saw that this was linked to another dominant 
aspect of union o r g a n i s a t i o n  at BSR - the lack of democratic control.
She recalled a n  instance when, during the annual wage negotia­
tions, the n e g o t i a t i n g  c o m mittee reported m a n a g e m e n t ' s  reply back to the 
shop steward body as a whole. The rest of the shop stewards took 
notes, but •••
" . . .then after that, there'd be a d i s c u s s i o n  on what 
w e  were g o i n g  to tell our members - and what we 
wasn't goin' to tell our members... Wh i c h  to me is 
all wrong". (What w e r e n ' t  you going to tell them?)
"Well, lit t l e  tit-bits you know, which, to me were... 
they w e r e  r e l evant to their decision. If they'd gotta 
make a decision, it w o u ld've helped them to make it.
There's a lot of things like that".
"They w o u l d n ' t  come back to the shop floor and 
ask their o p i nion — of what they WAWT to do. You've 
got a d o z e n  people t h i nking for 4,000 - which is 
wrong".
"And that's h o w  the last convenor got out.
Because she used to m a k e  those decisions for the 
people on the shop floor, and it was wrong. And 
that's w h y  she was voted out - and she w a s  a good 
convenor actually... But you know... I mean, 
probably in her love for union, and it was love, 'cos 
she lived and breathed union - she thought she was 
helping the m e m bers by trying to get 'em more - she 
would accept things what... the wom e n  on the shopfloor 
would not 'vc accepted, or reject it... whichever the 
case may be. Jill (Final A s s embly Supervisor) (19)
My e m p h a s i s  lower case underlined 
Original emphasis up p e r  case underlined
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This leads us, therefore, to consider another side to the 
question of the w o m e n  workers' 'strength' namely, that in relation 
to their own organisation, as G o r d o n  has pointed out, "Unions will 
do something w h e n  pressed by the membership". But h o w  much 
pressure is required? W h i l e  it m a y  well be the case that because 
of their position in the labour process the women workers placed 
greater reliance u p o n  and had greater needs in relation to, institu­
tional resources. We need some v i e w  also, of the degree to which 
the union's representational and b a r gaining structures were 
responsive to their women members' problems and interests; if the 
question of "strength" is to be properly gauged.
It is immediately obvious that there were problems for the 
women members, in respect of both levels of the domestic or local 
union o r g a n i s ation-at the factory and in the branch.
FACTORY ORGANI S A T I O N
"Management are strict w i t h  the union. T h e y  want 
to k n o w  w h y  we want meetings and there has to be 
a reason for havi n g  them..."
Madge (Moulding Shop) (20)
"We don't k n o w  if we ' v e  got a meet i n g  till it 
comes. Because to get a meeting, it's like 
hav i n g  to go through a g a o l-gate here".
Nora (Final Assembly) (21)
The extent to which man a g e m e n t  attempted to dominate the
union o r g a n i s a t i o n  at factory level, was certainly seen as a
prob l e m  for the w o m e n  shop stewards in terms of their effectiveness
in d e a l i n g  with their members' problems. (Grievance handling is
examined in detail in the next Chapter.) They frequently felt
they were being m a d e  to do manage m e n t ' s  job:
"I don't think we ought to be involved in telling 
people what they've, got to do - I think that 
should be management's side, I think we're there 
to help them, not push them into doing things".
Janet ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (22)
\
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And collectively, the body of stewards w e r e  constrained in terms of 
their m e e t i n g s  and also the scope of their negotiations at factory 
l e v e l .
" W e  have a shop stewards' m e e t i n g  on the second 
W e d n e s d a y  each month, and we m e e t  Smith on the 
thi r d  W e d n e s d a y  - but only if e v e rything is 
r u n n i n g  smoothly. If there is any industrial 
a c t i o n  whatsoever, with i n  the group, then those 
m e e t i n g s  don't usually take place".
P e a r l  (Convenor - s u b - a s s e m b l y ) (23)
Moreover, there appeared to be a rule that questions concerning pay
were d i s a l l o w e d  from d i scussion or negotiation. This seems to have
arisen b e c a u s e  alterations to the paym e n t  system could not be made
at factory level. Topics were confined to 'welfare' type questions.
" Y o u  can go to those meetings and discuss the 
w e l fare, such as heating, e x t r a c t i o n  of air - 
s p e cial welfare, but you c a n n o t  discuss money".
(How do you raise questions a b o u t  performances 
a n d  counts then?)
"Through the Superintendent in domestic 
procedure, or else at branch - in the wage 
negotiation".
P e a r l  (Sub-assembly C o n v e n o r ) (24)
There c e r t a i n l y  seemed to be p r o blems with this 'rule'. And,
it would a p p ear, w i t h  changing it.
"So what we call performances - can't be 
discussed. Or it it is, it c a n ' t  be brought 
u p  - taken any further. I think this is wrong.
T h e  union must have agreed it - its something 
M a r y ' s  (branch secretary) do n e .  They tell you to 
b r i n g  it up domestically, but you haven't got a 
c h a n c e  at all... Its so m e t h i n g  I'd like to 
s e e  changed - it would have to be done through 
the branch - but its difficult if Mary 's agreed".
P i p  (Su b - a s s e m b l y ) (25)
THE BRANCH
"If its a big thing you take it to branch".
The f e m a l e  membership outnumbered the males by about 5:1 in 
the branch, w h i c h  in 1977 was around 8 , 5 0 0  strong. It is difficult 
to assess w h a t  proportions of men and w o m e n  attended the branch
m e e ting which, on occasion, could see a turn-out of hundreds - but 
it was usually around fifty or sixty. The shop stewards p r o vided 
the main core of those attending, and they numbered in total, o v e r  
80 roughly divided into a third male and two-thirds female. It is 
reasonable to assume, therefore, that w o m e n  would have o u t n u m b e r e d  
the m e n  at t e n d i n g  branch meetings.
The m a i n  part of the bi-monthly m e e t i n g  (running from 8 p.m. - 
9.15 p.m.) was taken up w i t h  items brought up under 'matters a r i s i n g  
from the previous minutes' with the full-time officials u s u a l l y  
responding or commenting on the o n - going issues; followed by reports 
given by e a c h  of the officers. Members who wished to raise p o i n t s  
for dis c u s s i o n  from the floor could do so by notifying the b r a n c h  
office in w r i t i n g  at least three days beforehand.
What issues were raised at the branch? And who did they 
concern? The insert (pp466-468) has been constructed b y  e x t r a c t i n g  ev e r y  
recorded instance of issues being raised, at any point, in 21 meetings, 
vhich affected specific groups rather than the whole workforce; and 
noting the sex composition of the group. The fact that only a third of 
such issues (32 out of 83) raised betw e e n  October 1972 and F e b r u a r y  
1977 related specifically to women, reveals the men's d o m i n a n c e  of 
the branch (26). Even so, it does rather understate this. First, 
because it does not take account of w h o  was making the r e f erence, 
or the reasons for it. Thus 6 of the 32 instances relating to wo m e n  
arose as a result of the officials ann o u n c i n g  changes in l e g i s l a t i o n 
which specifically affected them. Secondly, the analysis d o c s  not 
record the men's dominance in respect of all 'general' issues, such 
as branch wages policy in relation to the various stages of incomes
policy
In contrast to the issues raised by the men, few of those 
r e l a t i n g  to the women w e r e  d i r e c t  expressions of particular problems 
t h e y  were experiencing at the workplace. Within this 'group' of 
issues, however, it should be noted that those most commonly raised 
c o n c e r n e d  movement of labour (which accounted for 9 of the 23 
r e l e v a n t  instances).
Ex a m i n i n g  the issues s p ecifically concerning male workers in 
t h i s  period, it can be seen that only seven of the 51 instances 
r e f e r e d  to 'men in general'. Most questions were concerned with 
w o r k / p a y  problems of specific groups, and that most frequently 
r e -curring, was the autoshop. W i t h  a total of nine instances 
recorded, this section a c c o u n t e d  for 20% of the issues raised concerning 
p a r t i c u l a r  groups of m a l e  workers.
The m i n u t e s  of the b r a n c h  committee display this pattern even 
m o r e  strongly. Again, two- t h i r d s  of the specific issues (20 out of 
30) raised betw e e n  January 1974 and May 1977 concerned groups of male 
w o r k e r s  alone. But of the 10 specific instances counted here as 
r e l a t i n g  to women, 4 refer to the a b s enteeism agreement (and on one 
o c c a s i o n  at least, this issue was raised b e c ause the agreement, in 
fact, covered men as well). If this topic is not included in the 
a n a lysis, then over t h ree-quarters of the issues recorded as being 
r a i s e d  on the branch c o m m i t t e e  (12 meetings) which concerned specific 
g r o u p s  of workers, concerned men. Only six instances were recorded 
c o n c e r n i n g  women, and two of these were announcements arising as a 
r e s u l t  of government legislation.
The picture presented by this analysis of the minutes is
i mpressionistic. Nor, of course, can the latter be taken necessarily 
to reflect the whole b a l a n c e  or content of discussions. Yet despite
Questions on issues affecting specific groups raised at the branch meeting
(from branch minutes 1972-1977)
Meeting & Subiect Group S e x  composition
17.10.72.
staggered holidays toolroom males
pass-outs nightshift (OH) males
nomination forms nightshift (SB) males
guide to shopfloor procedure autoshop (OH) m a l e s  (some females)
6.3.73.
bonus for m a c h i n e  shop autoshop (OH) m a l e s  (some females)
job e v a luation 
31.5.73.
moulding shop females
extra duties Inspectors &
Chargehands (SB)
ma l e s
conditions moulding shop (SB) females
12.7.73.
holiday pay females females
conditions auto setters m a l e s
pay to attend branch pm shift reps. mal e s  (some females)
27.10.73
guaranteed w e e k  agreement part-time workers females
pay (lieu-bonus?) indirects: setters & 
lorry-drivers, etc.
ma l e s
pay charge-hands, setters 
and inspectors
males
over-time d i s tribution night shift males
condition of ma c h i n e r y press shop m o s t l y  females
job s a t isfaction plating & press shop males & females
productivity deal 
5.12.73.
night shift males
pay press shop males (OH) ma l e s
lieu bonus indirects males
12.2.1974
lieu bonus indirects males
4.4.74.
lieu bonus indirects ma l e s
over-cr o w d i n g autoshop ma l e s  (some females)
piecework system piece-workers mos t l y  women
holiday pay - av. earnings 
15.3.74.
overtime & shift workers males
work i n g  conditions autoshop (OH) m a l e s  (some females)
lieu bonus indirects males
holiday pay - av. earnings overtime 8 shift workers males
job grading moulding shop females
union m e m b e r s h i p old age pensioners males & females
holiday pay night shift males
M e e t i n g  & Subject
\Group Sex composition
31.11.74.
s h o p  stewards'course female reps females
m a l e  wage cl a i m males males
12.12.74.
m a l e  w a g e  cl a i m males ma les
r e d u n d a n c y pensioners females
p i e c e w o r k  system autoshop (OH) males (some females)
m o v e m e n t  of labour production w o r kers females
6.3.75.
p i e c e w o r k  system autoshop (OH) males (some females)
m a l e  w a g e  cl a i m males males
co n t i n u e d  short-time w o r k i n g females females
r e d u n d a n c y night shift malesII twilight shift females
m o v e m e n t  of labour production w o r k e r s females
p e n s i o n  rights wid o w s  & single parents females
e q u a l  pay
m e n  doing womens' jobs
females females
males & females
m o v e m e n t  of labour and 
represen t a t i o n
autoshop females
24.4.74.
s e p a r a t e  negotiations skilled men males
h o l i d a y  pay - av. earnings overtime & shift workers males
17.7.75.
h o u r s  of w o r k part-time work e r s females
p a y  (allowances) lorry drivers males
hours transport section males
eq u a l  pay n e gotiations - 
complaint
representation of males males
p a y senior chargehands males
m o v e m e n t  of labour sub-assembly (WL) f e m a les
o v e r t i m e males males
d i f f e r e n t i a l s top-grade setters & 
chargehands
males
9.9.75.
ho u r s  of w o r k  & redundancy part-time workers females
(re)employment press-shop setter (WL) male
h o u r s  of work night shift males
20.11.75.
amb u l a n c e  room auto shop (OH) males (some females)
E q u a l  Pay & Sex D i s c r i m i n a ­
tion Act
females f e m a les
29.1.76.
h o l i d a y  pay - av. earnings overtime S shift workers males
4.3.76.
u n i o n  contributions & E P A / S D A females females
c o n d i t i o n s moulding shop (SB) females
b r a n c h  m e e tings shift workers males
m o v e m e n t  of labour production workers females
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Meeting & Subiect
\
Group Sex composition
29.A . 76.
union c o ntributions A E P A / S D A females females
lieu bonus (£1.50) shift workers males
lieu bonus (£2.00) females females
sectional meetings males males
m o b i l i t y  of labour production w o r k e r s females
u p - grading progress chasers males
1.7.76.
lieu-bonus (£1.50) males males
piec e - w o r k  system pieceworkers males A females
holiday pay - av. earnings overtime A shift workers males
differentials females females
conditions Roband (W.L.) males
union rule-book request Roband (W.L.) males
16.9.76.
a b senteeism female workers females
convenorship (female replaced by male) 
W.L.
males A females
holiday pay - av. earnings overtime A shift workers males
movement of labour production w o r k e r s females
2A.2.1977.
pay (visit to Dept, of Employment) autoshop setters males
movement o f  labour production w o r k e r s females
twilight shift (+ m o v e m e n t  of 
labour)
evening shift (W.L.) females
overtime night shift (W.L.) males
Questions on issues affecting specific groups raised at branch committee
(from branch committee minutes 1974-1977)
M e e t i n g  & Subject Group Sex composition
24.1.74.
Gua r a n t e e d  w e e k  & short in relation to:-
time w o r king toolroom males
m a intenance males
semi-skilled males & males
female supervisors females
22.2.74.
Lieu bonus indirects males
M a i n t e n a n c e  agreement maintenance workers males
Cla u s e  26 maintenance workers males
O v e r t i m e night shift males
Sectional bra n c h  m e e t i n g males males
Wage n e g o t i a t i n g  team to include more males males
T r a nsport drivers males
15.10.74.
H o l iday pay - av. e a r nings overtime & shift workers males
G u a ranteed week - av. earnings males
Male w a g e  cl a i m males
26.3.75.
Equal opportu n i t i e s  l e g islation female workers females
12.3.76.
Union c o ntributions E P A / S D A female workers females
(9.7.76.
( A bsenteeism a g r eement female workers females
(13.8.76.
( A bsenteeism agreement female workers females
(17.7.76.
(Absenteeism agreement female workers females
(27.10.76.
(Absenteeism agreement female workers males & females
( objections male
Holi d a y  pay - av. earnings overt i m e  & shift workers males
Movement of labour production workers mostly female
C a l l>out payments maintenance males
11.1.77.
H o l i d a y  pay - nv. earnings overtime 4 shift workers males
Conven o r s h i p Fortcrsfield toolroom males
2.5.77.
Conven o r s h i p Portcrsfield toolroom males
M e e t i n g  & Subject Group Sex c o m p o s i t i o n
26.5.77.
Convenorship 
Wage claim 
Discip l i n a r y  charges
Movem e n t  of labour
Porter s f i e l d  t o o lroom males 
female work e r s  females 
t o o l r o o m  rep. vs. males 
a u t o s h o p  reps.
2 fema l e s  sacked for females 
r e f usal
these limitations, there do appear to be some strong indications here 
that the problems of the wo m e n  members at BSR had a low profile in the 
branch! W a s  this because these problems were not raised? Or 
b e c a u s e  they w e r e  raised, but not recorded? Probably both was the 
c a s e  - so h o w  can this be explained?
The usual explanations offered, for the first circumstance at 
least, c o n c e r n  women's general lack of confidence and deference 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in forums such as a large meeting.
"Like when we got the 10%, well that's not enough - 
we need more. But, you know, they - well they won't 
air their views really. They say things, but they 
won't go up to these meetings, and won't... They 
just sit there and listen if they do go - they 
don't get up and say how they think".
Barbara (Final A s s e m b l y ) (27)
It is beginning to be realised that this unwillingness to 
spe a k  (or attend) m a y  be strongly associated with other significant 
features of the environment, such as the person's perception of how 
their contri b u t i o n  is likely to be received and some measure of 
w h e t h e r  it is 'worthwhile'. (28) Moreover, assessment of the latter 
m a y  also colour, whether and to what extent, contributions are 
recorded as well. We need to examine more closely, therefore, what 
h a p pened to issues which had been brought to the branch - especially 
by the w o m e n  members.
"If its a big thing, you take it to branch - like 
if its going to affect all the factories - but then, 
you don't hear any more about it really. You know, 
everything seems to keep going quiet, every time 
you're fighting - you get tired sometimes, because 
things go quiet and you just don't seem to get a n y ­
wh e r e  - even though you're fighting very hard".
Edna (Final A s s e m b l y ) (29)
"Well, my own honest opinion, on a lot of stuff 
that's been brought up at branch and has gone 
through branch,its never been proceeded on as 
far as I can see. There's a lot of things 
which are brought up at branch that you know 
for a fact they'll never get through anywhere..."
(What sort of things can you think of?)
"Oh there's somebody brings up a motion on
something - I can't say specific things because it's 
been some t i m e  since I've been branch Chairman nov. 
But, you know, you can sort of... M e  bei n g  branch 
Chairman, k n o w i n g  how m u c h  has got through 
p r e viously y o u  know, I'm aware - it's alright them 
putting that, but that's a was t e  of time - sort of 
thing".
Terry ( M aintenance Chargeliand e x - b r a n c h  C h a i r m a n ) (30)
W i t h  a full-time b r a n c h  a d ministrative o f f i c e r  and a n e g otiating 
(regional) officer who gave the c o m p a n y  a major p a r t  of his attention, 
the branch was fully serviced. In fact,apart f r o m  the monthly 
shop stewards' m e e t i n g s  at the factory, no meetings were held w i t h o u t  
at least one, but u s u a l l y  both of the officers b e i n g  present. (31)
This included the branch, branch c o m mittee and jo i n t  shop stewards. 
B o t h  officials m a d e  sign i f i c a n t  contrib u t i o n s  to all of these 
bodies, and were, of course, in a p o s ition to e x e r c i s e  a high degree 
of control. (32) This kind of acc e s s i b i l i t y  does not, however, 
appear to have r e s u l t e d  in r e n dering the branch, (or any of the other 
bodies) any m o r e  r e s p o n s i v e  to the problems and interests of the 
female membership.
(Are there any problems w h i c h  your m e m b e r s  have, w h i c h  
don't s e e m  to get b r o ught up or fully discussed at 
branch?)
"Some times they do, and sometimes w e  haven't got 
time to b r i n g  them up, you know. And sometimes 
they're j u s t  shelved".
(What k i n d s  of things are 'shelved'?) "Various 
things - u s u a l l y  things that have g o n e  through w h a t  
we term p r ocedure, you k n o w  — absenteeism, I think's 
one.
And an occasion, just a few months ago, whereby...
Once again, I say - w e ' r e  equal - w e ' r e  termed as 
semi-s k i l l e d  people, right? Well, the s e m i-skilled 
male has £10 holiday pay more than the semi-skilled 
female. So, that has b e e n  brought up at branch, 
but, I t h i n k  it was at some embarra s s m e n t  of l’aul 
Silver a n d  Mary, and... Yes, there's lots of things, 
if I co u l d  just think - that we all get very upset 
over, b u t  nothing seems to come out of i t , you 
know.
Oh, y e s  - w o r k i n g  conditions. That's the m a i n  
thing y o u  k n o w  - w o r k i n g  conditions for wo m e n  on 
the m a i n  lines. In respect of the w a y  they have 
to work - the pace.
And, the various agreements that we ' v e  got, 
that are no good to us really. M o v e m e n t  of
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labour... Well, we ' v e  got a rule book here, and its
just... a lot of i t .......... There's a hell of a lot
in there, you know, and we've been trying to get 
this altered, for about 2 years. And there's two 
of us, me and a friend - we've put suggestions, 
you know, of the things that we would like altered - 
but, we've never heard anything from it! Gave it 
to Mary - haven't heard a thing about it (concerning 
the work study, you know). ...But, you might think I'm 
being unfair to M a r y  and Paul, but you know, I think 
that - our management, they just chose to ignore... 
things. And, that's it".
Sally (Sub-assembly)(33) my emphasis 1/c underlined.
M o r e  seriously than "things going quiet" and problems getting 
shelved, there was the question of what happened to decisions on 
w h i c h  the members had clearly voted that action was to be taken.
"Well, I'm disillusioned with the b r a n c h  really - 
because every time they make a Branch mandate - 
it gets broken".
Jill (Final A s s embly S u p e r v i s o r ) (34)
(What do you think about the branch meeting?)
"Not a lot. I've known of., where you stand up 
and you air your views and it gets passed - sort 
of thing. And it just gets thrown out - it 
doesn't go anywhere - that's the end of it then". 
Barbara (Final A s s e m b l y ) (35)
"Many things are passed but which never seem to 
get through - the vote against the Inbucon 
(productivity deal) it was a unanimous v o t e  that 
was and it still didn't get done. And if you can't 
go to branch and get things done, what chance have 
you got really, on the shopfloor?
I could be wrong, in that I don't know, fully 
now, how trade union i s m  works. And there could be 
some legitimate reasons why this doesn't happen.
But I'm like the members. I have no explanation 
why they don't happen. And a shop steward can 
only inform their members what's gone on if they've 
already been informed."
Madge (Moulding S h o p ) (36)
The greatest amount of inertia or lack of any apparent 
r e s ponse or effect through the branch seemed to fall in precisely 
those areas we have identified as most problematic from the women 
workers' point of view:
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, \(Branch m e e tings - any problems your members have 
w h i c h  are not raised?)
"Well - 'domestic' p r o blems can't be (i.e. p e rtaining 
to an individual factory).
(Anything you think should be raised?)
A b s e n t e e i s m  - we w a n t  these rules abolished. And 
m o v e m e n t  of labour - but its in the rule-book.
(Have these problems been discussed at branch?)
W e ' v e  raised it w i t h  Mary, but all they say is - 
'Well, its in the rule-book'".
Janet ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (37)
What h a p pened to these problems?
"The o f f icials always say... things should h a v e  been 
brought up domestically. Well we' v e  b r o u g h t  things 
up domest i c a l l y  and its g o n e  as far as that - and 
its not b e e n  solved and, therefore, it goes through 
to Stage 5, and it still can't be done — so its a 
thing that has to be passed at branch."
(What sort of issue?)
"Well such as m o v ement of labour - w h i c h  has g o t  to 
be done at branch anyway. Well we' v e  a l r e a d y  taken 
it to branch and still n o t h i n g  is d o n e  at b r a n c h  - 
so w h e r e  do we go o n  from there? Its the s a m e  
w i t h  absenteeism".
Pip ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (38)
It w o u l d  appear that problems w h i c h  could not be 'shelved' 
but would c o n t i n u o u s l y  recur, w e r e  kept at bay by being p u s h e d  back 
down into the lower levels of procedure, i.e. to be dea l t  w i t h  
'domestically' at the level of e a c h  individual factory. W e  can see 
this proc e s s  hap p e n i n g  quite clearly in relation to m o v e m e n t  of labour, 
which is r e c o r d e d  as being raised on seven occasions in b r a n c h  
minutes c o v e r i n g  five and a half years. No progress was m a d e  in 
these n e g o t i a t i o n s  at all d u r i n g  this period. (39)
The w o m e n  stewards were aware of the wider c o n s e q u e n c e s  of this 
'ineffectiveness' on one side and ‘It- -k ot responsiveness' on the 
other, in terms of their own members' involvement and com m i t m e n t  to 
fighting the issues. "If you can't go to branch and get it done - 
what chance have you got, really, on the shopfloor?"
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Discussions concerning movement of labour (M.O.L.) recorded in Branch 
minu t e s  during period Oct. 1972 - May 1 9 7 7 . (All questions raised 
un d e r  Any Other Business).
12.12.1974. Question about loss of earnings (lower performance) 
due to M.O.L.
Action: Referred back to f a c tory convenor (OH).
6 . 3.1974. A lengthy discussion reported. Main complaints: 
that it was not d o n e  fairly, representation not 
allowed to women in machine shop (OH) d u r i n g  M.O.L.
Action:
and piece-work performances badly affected.
A  meet i n g  with the convenors and the C o m pany 
to be arranged, to draw up an agreement o n  
payments, eg: flexibility, breakdown and 
rectification etc. to cover the three factories.
17. 7.1975. P r o b l e m  of M.O.L. and loss of earnings at 
Waterfall Lane due to section of sub-assembly
Action:
being phased out.
Referred back to factory procedure.
4. 3.1976.
Action:
Prob l e m  with M.O.L. and work contracted out. 
"Ought to be" taken up at S.5 meeting with 
Company. Branch "wa n t s  more consultation" 
with Company on b o t h  issues.
29. 4.1976. Quest i o n  on M.O.L. "This problem still be i n g  
dealt w i t h  at convenor level".
30.11.1976. Lengthy discussion reported. Full-time w o r k e r s  
getting a rough deal. Part-time workers not
Action:
taking their full share of M.O.L.
"As the question of M.O.L. was being d i s c u s s e d  
with Mr.Stuartand the convenors, it was agre e d  
to leave it with the convenors to get the best 
possible deal for all members. It was vi t a l  
that M.O.L. be a l l o w e d  to continue, oth e r w i s e  
w e  could be in a p o s i t i o n  like some industries - 
where no work was a v a ilable in some areas lay­
offs occur. It m u s t  be done, however, o n  a 
fair basis".
Convenors to ne g o t i a t e  with Company for a v e r a g e 
earnings or average for the job, whi c h e v e r  is 
the greater when M.O.L. takes place.
24. 2.1977. M.O.L.: "Once a g a i n  this problem was raised 
and a heated d i s c u s s i o n  took place. This 
matter was at C o n v e n o r  level."
"Peo p l e  w o u l d  c o m e  to bran c h  if they k n e w  that things 
w e r e  really go i n g  to be flushed out and ironed out - 
and acted upon". Madge (Moulding Shop)(AO)
"Management knows - if it really came to a pull - 
w i t h  the shopst e w a r d s  or man a g e m e n t  - the girls 
wo u l d  stick by m a n a g e m e n t  anyway. I think they 
k n o w  this, you know. B e c ause they're a f r a i d  of 
their jobs and t h e y're afraid of losing their 
m o n e y " .
"And I think o n e  of the reasons why things aren't 
fought through - I think they should be brought 
u p  (at branch), and w h e n  they are brought up,
K E P T . Not just for one d a y  or two days - ALL THE 
T I M E . " E d n a  (Final Assembly)(Al) empha s i s  in original.
There w a s  clearly so m e t h i n g  of a vicious circle here because 
in order to k e e p  the p r e s s u r e  o n  -
"The members'll o n l y  go to the m e e t i n g  if they think 
there's s o m e t h i n g  going for them - like a w a g e  claim. 
But (even if they don't go) - the next d a y  they 
always w a n t  to k n o w  - they're interested but just 
w o n ' t  put themselves out to come".
(Would it m a k e  a d i f f e r e n c e  if they did?)
"Yes. It w o u l d  give Paul Silver and t h e n  the 
idea as they w e r e  after s o m ething - and interested 
in what he was a-doing. I think it w o u l d  make him 
look d i f f e r e n t l y  - towards us, and help us more than ■ 
help the w o m e n  m o r e  than what he is doing".
Lo r n a  (Final Assembly)(A2)
"Not doing enough"
(Do you think trade unions g e n e r a l l y  do enough for women?)
"No. I think they've got the m a l e  m o r e  in mind when 
they m a k e  rules and things like that. I don't know. 
They seem to h a v e  the m a n  in mind all the while.
A n d  then this'no time off'- and things like that, 
you know. I s u p p o s e  there's lots of w a y s  they 
could help the w o m e n  but they don't..."
Barbara (Final A s s e m b l y ) (A3)
With the introduction of the trade union a barg a i n i n g  structure 
was established whereby workers*demands and claims upon the Company 
could be negotiated. A  number of agreements had b e e n  signed over 
the years, either f o r malising terms and conditions of employment, like 
the 'Guaranteed Week* and 'Procedure for Redundancy', or assigning 
benefits, such as the annual pay awards and the P e n s i o n  Scheme.
How did the wo m e n  workers fare in this c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining 
activity, as it was m a nifested in such agreements? Their main 
complaints w e r e  that on the one hand 'the uni o n  d i d  not do enough 
for them', and o n  the other, that 'the union did m o r e  for the men'.
Were these perceptions confirmed in terms of the a g r eements wh i c h  
were negotiated? We look at two which appear to illustrate some 
aspects of the problem: the absenteeism agreement and the productivity 
deal.
THE AGREEMENT ON ABSEN T E E I S M
In June 1976 an agreement was made between B S R  and the Union, 
to adhere to a new d i sciplinary procedure for d e a l i n g  with uncertified 
absenteeism (44). Prior to this, there had b e e n  an informal un d e r ­
standing that employees w h o  were absent on more t h a n  three days in 3 weeks 
or 4 weeks were liable to b e  disciplined. This w a s  not necessarily 
systematically applied; in some areas, and on s o m e  occasions, management 
adopted a more, or less, tight approach - as it suited them.
The new procedure rendered employees m o r e  liable to incur 
disciplinary action for "unjustifiable" absence - the threshold being 
reduced to two days in a three week period. It also enabled management 
to apply disciplinary acti o n  'progressively': i.e. a single day's 
absence in the two f o l lowing four week periods i n c urring increasingly 
harsh penalties.
Giv e n  the problems and interests of the o v e rwhelming majority 
of the female m e m b e r s h i p  in this area as o u t lined in PartTwo above - 
how can this a g r e e m e n t  be explained? E s p e c i a l l y  since opposition 
could be so vehement.
"It w a s  about this busin e s s  of h a v i n g  two days off, 
and someone had had to go into the office. And 
this w o m a n  thought they shouldn't have gone in - 
so of course, she just exploded. She just got a 
bee in her bonnet about t h e m  g o i n g  in for two days 
- and she just exploded - just exploded!"
Jenny, a new shop steward, had been a s k e d  by m a n a g e m e n t  to accompany 
the absen t e e  and to witness the warning. (45) When she did this, 
another wo m a n  o n  the line had responded angrily:
"I m e a n  she r e a l l y  went berserk! The who l e  of the 
w a r e h o u s e  could hear what she was saying.
(What was she saying?) She was bawling and 
s h o u t i n g  - 'they shouldn't go in', and - 'you're 
l o s i n g  us d o w n  if you take them in - you shouldn't 
do it!' And, y o u  know, e v e r y b o d y  - they turned 
round and in the end I f e l t  that it was me that 
was w r o n g  you know. I do n ' t  t h i n k  there was any 
need to fetch in all the e n t i r e  factory. And, of 
course, she d i d n ' t  let it rest after. She started 
again, going h o m e  on the bus. And she got the 
w h o l e  bus up in arms goi n g  home".
J e n n y  (Final Assembly) (46)
W h y  then, had this a g r eement b e e n  negotiated? And why did 
the u n i o n  officials insist that it shou l d  be a d h ered to? The 
m i n u t e s  of the S e p t e m b e r  1976 branch m e e t i n g  records thut:
"Mr. Silver reported on a m e e t i n g  with the Company 
w i t h  a view of setting up a sick pay scheme. He 
w i s h e d  it to b e  minuted that o w i n g  to the serious 
a b s e n t e e i s m  a m o n g s t  our female membership, w e  were 
n o t  givi n g  the Company a n y  e n couragement in 
i m plementing a Sick Pay Sch e m e  f o r  BSR workers.
It was possible that if w e  could encourage less 
absenteeism, the Company m a y  be prepared to 
in t r o d u c e  a Sick Fay Scheme".
The absenteeism agreement was a quid pro quo - conceded by tlie
negotiators - in return, not for a sick p a y  scheme as such, but the 
Company's agreement to open negotiations on this subject in the first 
instance.
It is fairly clear, from our p r e v i o u s  discussions, that it 
would be the wo m e n  workers who would b e a r  the m a i n  impact of this 
'cost' attached, thereby , to the 'bargain' wh i c h  had been struck 
between representatives of both the C o m p a n y  and the Union. But, 
what further implications might then f l o w  from this? In the first 
place, we would argue that the w o m e n  w o r kers' bargaining position 
would be undermined overall, as a c o n s e q u e n c e  of management's stronger 
position to m a i ntain and increase their d i s c i p l i n a r y  offensives - 
an immediate result. And, of course, their bargaining resources would 
be reduced as the women struggled to p r o t e c t  employment security and 
job controls in the face of the higher levels of intimidation maintained 
on the shopfloor. However, we would a l s o  propose a further set of 
implications - this time pertaining to the institutional structure of 
representation within the union itself. Because when we look at 
how the officials attempted to medi a t e  or impose management's terms on 
the membership, we can see straight a w a y  that this could o n l y  be 
achieved at the cost of diminishing the responsiveness of those 
structures of interest representation f r o m  the members' point of view.
THE SICK PAY SHEME
The question of a sick pay sch e m e  had first been raised with 
the Company by the union's full-time o f f i c e r  in 1972. This was in 
the context of the Conservative govern m e n t ' s  statutory incomes policy 
when trade unions generally had shifted a t t ention to improving 'fringe- 
benefits' - for which there was plenty of scope in the manual sector.
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L i t t l e  progress had been m a d e  in n e g o t i a t i o n s  over the next 
five years. While the Comp a n y  refused to c o n s i d e r  a scheme, giving 
as their reason, the w o m e n  workers' high level of absenteeism and 
the fear it would be 'abused', the full-time officer retained the 
i t e m  on his 'agenda', w h i c h  was increasingly constricted by pay 
pol i c y  and less reflective of his m e m b e r s h i p ' s  demands. By 1976, 
the of f i c i a l s  w e r e  be i n g  put under heavy p r e s s u r e  - f r o m  the male 
m e m b e r s h i p  e s p ecially - because of the u n i o n ' s  support for continued 
w a g e  restraint. The wage cl a i m  for that y e a r  was limited to £6 for 
all - w i t h  no p o ssibility (this time) of f i n d i n g  anything 'extra' for 
the men. W h i l e  the C o m p a n y  were also to b e  found more amenable to 
c o n s i d e r i n g  a l t ernative ways of staving off "p o s s i b l e  disruption", 
there w e r e  strong incentives for the un i o n  n e g o t i a t o r s  to "find 
w h a t e v e r  else was allowable", in order to a p p e a s e  their increasingly 
d i s a f f e c t e d  membership.
N o t  that the latter were d e m anding a sick pay scheme. On the 
contrary, there is no evidence that the m e m b e r s h i p  in general showed 
(or had e v e r  shown) interest in this at all.
"I'll read out the minutes of the last meeting and 
then ask for 'matters arising' - no response. They 
just sit there. So sometimes I insist - come on now, 
surely you want to talk about pensions and sick pay?
I think they O U G H T  to be a s k i n g  about important 
things like pensions and sickness - that we've been in 
and out for for woekr.. ''
Mary (Branch S e c r e t a r y ) (47)
In v i e w  of the employer's hostility, this lack of interest 
mi g h t  h a v e  had to have b e e n  partly const r u c t e d  - given the difficulties 
w h i c h  w o u l d  have arisen for the full-time o f f icers if demands for it's 
imp l e m e n t a t i o n  had been really pressed. A n d  it does not appear that 
the terms of any scheme had ever been p r o p o s e d  or set out for discussion
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by the membership.
C e r tainly the terms of the abse n t e e i s m  agreement were not.
As the bra n c h  secretary later described it, this had b e e n  negotia­
ted by the convenors, "under p r e ssure f r o m  the membership".
H o w  could this have been the case? Indeed^its rationale had not 
been initially presented in terms of the sick pay scheme n e g o t i a ­
tions at all - but movement of labour, w h i c h  was why the idea 
had picked up a degree of support from some of the w o m e n  members.
It will be recalled that a b s e n t e e i s m  increased the incidence of 
movement of labour and d o u b l i n g - u p  - the necessity for both of 
which was blamed entirely on female absentees: by management, in 
whose interest it was; by the union officials, who upheld the 
agreement; by the men, w h o  w e r e  not affected; and, not surprisingly, 
often by the women workers themselves. M u c h  heat generated in 
discussions about what should be done about movement of labour, 
could be, and very often was, therefore, channelled into the 
question of how to deal w i t h  the absentees.
The Company's new d i s c i p l i n a r y  p r o cedure dated 25th June,
1976 was, first presented, n o t  to the b r a n c h  meeting of July 1st, 
but the branch committee w h i c h  met a w e e k  later. Here it was 
agreed that acceptance, for a trial period of three months, be 
recommended to a m e e ting o f  the joint shop steward's committee 
planned to take place shortly afterwards.
This meeting of shop stewards from all factories as a 
'joint body', was the first to be held, and it was very nearly the
l a s t :
"It was a shambles. The shop stewards discussed 
movement of labour - it had already been decided 
that the answer was to tighten up on the a b s e n t e e ­
ism agreement and bri n g  in the sick pay scheme...
But at the joint shop stewards m e e ting the shop 
stewards threw out the a b s e n t e e i s m  agreement.
It was just daft - didn't m a k e  sense at all.
The convenors w a n t e d  n o t h i n g  more to do with the 
m e e t i n g  - what they'd d e c i d e d  was being over-ruled.
So no other m e e t i n g  has b e e n  held since".
Mary (Branch S e c r e t a r y ) (48)
The branch committee (mostly c o m p r i s i n g  the officials, 
convenors and their deputies) decided to ignore this and to stand 
by their former reco m m e n d a t i o n  for a c c e p t a n c e  of the n e w 
procedure. But this had still to be presented to the branch 
w h i c h  next met in September.
At this m e e t i n g  the full-time o f f i c e r  gave his report in 
the c o u r s e  of w h i c h  he recorded his statement, set out above, 
in the minutes. No vote was taken and no discussion is recorded 
as h a v i n g  taken place. The branch c o m mittee subsequently 
deemed that:
"As this matter was not q u e s t i o n e d  at Branch, 
it was decided that the ag r e e m e n t  should go 
through for a trial period of three months and 
will be raised again at a Bran c h  committee 
m e e t i n g  for a further discussion, after the 
trial period".
Branch Committee Minutes 17.9.76.
Held now by the declared policy of the union, it was the 
stewards who then had to m e d iate the 'costs of the bargain' to 
the m e m b e r s h i p  o n  the shop floor.
The focal point of o p p osition w h i c h  soon surfaced, came 
from a group of male workers at Wa t e r f a l l  Lane. Shop stewards 
from this factory, had, it seems, led the initial resistance to 
the agreement at the joint shop stewards meet i n g  - where they
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had found wider support. Now the 'Roband' men w e r e  refusing to 
be bound by it. T h e y  agreed w i t h  the reasoning w h i c h  had been 
offered for the n e c e s s i t y  of tightening the discip l i n a r y  rules 
in the first place - the 'troublesome' a b s e n t e e i s m  of the 
females - and so they did not see why the p r o cedure should be 
applied to them.
The branch s e c r e t a r y  records in her minutes of the October  
committee:
"Questions w e r e  rai s e d  by Waterfall L a n e  that certain 
members h a d  not accepted the A b s e n t e e i s m  Agreement.
It was explained, however, that the B r a n c h  had 
accepted the implementation of the agreement on a 
trial p e r i o d  of three months and that it was in the 
interest of all our members that this agreement be 
accepted, if we w e r e  to press the C o m p a n y  for the 
implementation of a sick pay scheme. It was 
proposed that the Company wo u l d  be informed before 
the end of the trial period that we w o u l d  expect 
the impl e m e n t a t i o n  of a Sick Pay Scheme.
It was reported by Paul Silver that Mr. Stuart was 
already l o o king into sick pay schemes at other 
factories".
Branch C o m m i t t e e  M i n utes - October 1976.
The 'trial period' was due to end in December, but no 
announcement had b e e n  made and no dates had been given to the 
shop stewards; so m a n a g e m e n t  continued to o p e rate the new 
procedure. Since little progress had been m a d e  in the sick 
pay negotiations the officials also preferred to allow the 
absenteeism a g r e e m e n t  to continue. No proper branch m e e ting 
was held in January because of bad weather, so the position 
still remained c o n f u s e d  in February, w h e n  a l o n g  motion was 
tabled for the b r a n c h  m e e ting by the Roband m e n  at Waterfall 
Lane. (49) As the disc u s s i o n  is recorded in t h e  minutes, the 
position was left e n t i r e l y  unclear: (50)
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"It was reported by Paul Silver that the Comp a n y  had 
not conceded to a sick pay scheme and the Branch 
requested that we should now be allowed to return 
to the Old A b s e n t e e i s m  A g r e e m e n t . It was felt 
that by not ac c e p t i n g  a tightening up on absen t e e i s m 
that w e  were not in a very strong position to get a 
sick p a y  scheme at B S R  Limited.
Branch minutes, F e b r u a r y  1977. (emphasis in original)
T h e  bra n c h  secretary was, however, quite clear about the 
p o s i t i o n  herself:
"Well, of course we k n e w  the agreement had come to 
an end - but we w a n t e d  to keep it going and to make 
the rest all ag r e e  - so that we could offer 
som e t h i n g  in r e t u r n  for sick pay..."
Mary (Branch S e c r e t a r y ) (51)
This policy was not likely to succeed at Waterfall Lane,
however, as b e c a m e  clear on one of her visits to this factory.
Dick (deputy convenor)
"What's frightened t h e m  off is the way it was 
d r o p p e d  on them. A l s o  Tony Stuart said he'd 
come b a c k  in a fortnight on the sick... and he 
hasn't".
M a r y  (branch secretary)
"Well, ignore the agr e e m e n t  then - go b a c k  to 
the o l d  one".
Ettie (new convenor)
"Would we be in our rights?"
Mary: "Well, he hasn't come back - and the n e w  agreement's
at a n  end".
Ettie: "So if we have a w a r n i n g  today, we can stop it back
to three days in a m o n t h ? "
Mary: "Don't tell the o t h e r s  - this is for W a t erfall Lane
at the moment. ...I'd have thought you'd have done 
that already.
Ettie: "No. We wanted c onfirmation..."
Field Notes. 23.2.1977.
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At the joint shop stewards' m e e t i n g  a week later a female 
shop steward asked for c l a rification on the position.
" R e v e r s i o n  to the old a b s e n t e e i s m  agreement - 
is that immediately?"
Mary (branch secretary)
"W h e n  you like. I don't k n o w  if the Company's 
b e e n  informed..."
Shop Steward:
"Would you clarify w h a t  the old agreement was?"
Mary: (vague) "...all I remember... three days in a month".
Field notes. 28.2.1977.
On t h e  shopfloor m a n agement continued to o p e rate the n e w  
procedures. They told the stewards, many of w h o m  remained 
confused as to their position, that they (the management) had not 
been i n f o r m e d  to do otherwise.
And t h e  Company continued to stall on the sick pay scheme 
until a ser i e s  of strikes in M a r c h  re-injected some ene r g y  into 
the negotiations. Again, this spur did not come directly from 
the m e m bers. The issues und e r l y i n g  the strikes were pay 
(restrained under the social contract) and for the women, most 
p r e ssingly - w o r king conditions. The official's announcement 
that they w e r e  'trying to achi e v e  a sick pay scheme for o u r 
members' w a s  actually greeted w i t h  groans at one of the strike 
m e e t i n g s .
But the terms of the scheme had still not been discussed 
with the membership, and when a group of male stewards presented 
the o f f i c i a l s  with some of their own proposals, chief a m o n g  which 
was sick p a y  from the Company at the level of average earnings, 
they w e r e  not welcomed. The o f f icials clearly feared the
-486-
c o nsequences of raising the members expectations, given the 
Company's recalcitrance. What then was being negotiated?
T h e  scheme, in its final form, emerged in the summer of 
1976 for a 'trial period' of one year. It was designed so 
as to benefit the women w o r k e r s  to the m i n i m u m  extent, "so as 
not to e n c ourage abuse". A sum of £2.50 (plus an extra £1 for 
male shift workers), p a y a b l e  for 15 days in a year, could, if 
not claimed, be 'saved' - as a bonus paid out twice yearly. (52) 
This sum was said to produce, for the average male worker w i t h  a 
m o r tgage and dep e n d e n t s  - close to average earnings, when t a k e n  
in conju n c t i o n  w i t h  his (state) sickness benefit and tax relief. 
But a large number of the married wo m e n  workers who did not p a y 
a full insurance stamp, w o u l d  not get this. There was a o n e  
year service q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and a 5 day 'waiting' period - " t o  
prevent abuse". "But still a woman can have four weeks off 
w i t h  the kids and get £37.50". (Union Official). The men 
blamed the women work e r s  for the fact that they had not b e e n  able 
to get a better scheme.
Meanwhile, eighteen months after the sick pay agreement had 
been signed, the w o m e n  workers and their representatives w e r e  
still trying to push b a c k  the d i sciplinary threshold in r e s p e c t  of 
absenteeism, w h i c h  m a n a g e m e n t  had successfully assaulted.
"Management a r e  still trying to enforce the 2 day s .
She sent a m e m o  off, Mary did - but she never 
received an answer... I don't think".
Sally ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (53)
"Well, the union, in 1975, we recognised 3 
days absent, b e f o r e  they were taken into the 
office for warning... two days, you were allowed 
off before s u p plying a doctor's note. Well, the
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BSR are trying to say n o w  - that oue day off, 
should be a d o c t o r ’s note, plus - going in for 
a warning. Now, fortunately, the m a j o r i t y  
of the shop stewards are not recognising that 
a n y w a y  - w h i c h  is a good thing. But that is 
a loop-hole B S R  try and get through... They're 
m a k i n g  rules up...
I went in to J o h n  Smith, not so long ago 
about absenteeism, and he said, 'I've sent a 
m e m o  round - two days I And I says, 'NO!' I 
said/the d o c u m e n t  1975'- and I produced it, 
because I keep all m y  papers - I says, 'it 
was b e t ween m a n a g e m e n t  and union. W h e n  you 
b r i n g  me another m e m o  with that - "between 
m a n a g e m e n t  and unio n "  - I will recognise it'.
I said, 'but not y o u r  personal memo! - Its 
g o t t a  be jointly b e t w e e n  union and management'.
Well, as I say... little things like that 
he's tryin' to get in - and the major i t y  of 
'em, he gets t h r o u g h . "
Jill (Supervisor - final a s s e m b l y ) (54)
My emphasis
T H E  PRODUCTIVITY DEAL:
In 1977, having an n o u n c e d  record profits for the previous 
year, the Company succumbed to pressure from the wo r k f o r c e  and 
agreed to skip Stage 2 (5%) and to follow the L a b o u r  government's 
Stage 3 pay guidelines instead. This permitted w a g e  increases 
up to 10% and the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of a productivity deal.
C o nsultants (Inbucon) had been hired and p r o duced an 'off 
the peg' scheme, w h i c h  m a n a g e m e n t  submitted to the shop stewards 
at the end of that year.
"...'Course they give the shop stewards the 54 
pages on Inbucon, and they were just frightened 
to de a t h  about it, you know - 'Stuff it! Throw 
it out!' And P a u l  Silver s a y i n ' : 'Look! - 
There's a couple of quid... if its only a couple 
of quid, there's a couple of quid there for you 
N O W  - at the m o m ent, you know - for doing 
nothing!
Ernie (deputy c o n v e n o r ) (55) emphasis in original.
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"I tell y o u  this - I didn't understand a p a g e  - 
not a page of it. And we did ask for a Mr...
Clive I think... w e  asked if the shop stewards 
could m e e t  him - and as he could go through it, 
and just tell us the pages that were r e l event for 
us. But that was asked for at the branch — 
it was promised, but we never... he never c a m e  round. 
And w h e n  w e  raised it again - he'd left! h e ' d  left 
Inbucon, you k n o w  - and I said, 'Where's h e  
working - blo o d y  B S R ? I '"
Jill (Supervisor - final a s s e m b l y ) (56)
The scheme was based on the principle of c o m p a r i n g  the 
output in standard w o r k  minutes, w i t h  minutes (already) 'paid 
for' in wages. (57) W i t h  greater productivity this d i f ferential  
would be increased, as a result of 'savings' in (mostly) labour 
c o s t s .
V/e are i n t erested in the p a t tern of distribution o f  this 
'gain' .
"It's split 50/50. A n d  the firm have 50% for 
r e i nvestment, and we have 50% to be distr i b u t e d 
amongst the workforce, you k n o w  - 50% of t h e  
saving"
Ernie ( M aintenance deputy c o n v e n o r ) (58)
The firm managed, from the start, to swing the b a l a n c e  more 
in its favour - by 'clawing back' payments due for the first year.
A c c o r d i n g  to the Industrial Relations director, the Department 
of E m ployment had b r o ught pressure to bear, as a c o n sequence of the 
previous year's 107 wage settlement, by threatening to 'blacklist' 
the C o m p a n y  and w i t h d r a w  government contracts. (59) Withholding 
the back-pay d u e  on the produc t i v i t y  deal, was j u s t i f i e d  on the 
grounds that the firm was, thereby, 'bringing itself back into line'.
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But still, as Ernie pointed out, in theory at least, 50% 
of the savings was, at some point, available to be distributed 
amongst the wor k f o r c e .  Was there any pattern to the 'balance' 
of distribution to b e  discerned here?
Despite the f a c t  that the firm had refused to guarantee 
this minimum, the m e m b e r s h i p  had been assured by their union 
officials that the scheme should never yield less than 4%: 
"They've got a s i m ilar thing in Scotland and it averages out 
at about 6% you see". And, indeed, notifi c a t i o n  of the first 
payment was, in l i n e  with this - a lump sum at 4%, going back 
for sixteen weeks.
"And t h e r e  was a big stink about that...
O n  the list, the craftsmen were shown as 
gett i n g  the most, and the w o m e n  got the least. 
S o m e t h i n g  like £70, £60, £50... In a lump 
sum.
A n d  the wo m e n  said: 'No! We'd rather not 
have it at all... Anyway, one way and another, 
it e n d e d  up g e t t i n g  paid out".
Ernie (Maintenance deputy c o n v e n o r ) (60)
"The b a c k  payment on the produc t i v i t y  deal gave 
m a i n t e n a n c e  men etc. about £70, and the women  
on the shop floor - the full-timers, £32.
A n d  that upset the women. Because we 
e x p e c t e d  that the Inbucon, the produc t i v i t y  
would b e  pound for pound - straight across 
the s h o p  floor. And this was what we wanted 
it to b e  - we expected it to be, and it wasn't". 
Madge (Moulding S h o p ) (61)
"The w o m e n  seem to be at the bottom of the 
ladder all the time and they work the hardest.
...The membership wanted flat-rate, across 
the board. The men wanted more - they work 
shifts and hours - and with the productivity, 
the m o r e  they earn, the more they get; which 
the w o m e n  on the shop floor didn't agree with 
at the time. T h e  women voted at b r a n c h  against 
it. They want e d  the same money as the men".
Lorna (Final A s s e m b l y ) (62)
"We had a hell of a branch meeting. All the 
m e m bers went and threw it out. We demanded 
pound for pound, straight across... But we 
didn't get it - they paid it o u t  on a 
percentage. It wasn't what t h e  members 
wanted".
M a d g e  (Moulding S h o p ) (63)
"It was supposed to have been t h r o w n  out.
The hall was a b s olutely packed, because there 
was a terrible feel i n g  about t h i s  productivity. 
They'd had a bit of paper s h o w i n g  the 4£ 
payment. And they knew, on t h e  lines that 
ot h e r  d e p artments - where they co u l d  get 120 
p e r f o r m a n c e  - were getting m o r e  than they 
ever could! So they all went to the 
meeting; and they all voted for it to be 
thrown out, but it wasn't.
They w o u ldn't have minded... if it had 
b e e n  paid on the 40 hours at 4%. But they 
did object to the fact that s o m e  take more 
of the bonus w i t h  overtime and shifts and 
p e r c e n t a g e  higher earnings.
You see here, I don't think they've got 
d o w n  to w o m e n  be i n g  equal w i t h  men..."
Nora (Final A s s e m b l y ) (64)
"What they thought, you see - they thought they 
were going to put the £90, £70 and £60 together... 
er, what's the average of that - say its £70, for 
instance... Well, obviously, it w o u l d n ’t work 
like that, because you're talkin' about 500 blokes 
and about 9,000 women! So, all them £ 9 0 ' s and 
£ 7 0 's go together, and we'd all have ended up 
w i t h  about £51 - you know w h a t  I mean?"
Er n i e  (Maintenance, deputy c o n v e n o r ) (65)
W h e n  arguments j u s t i f y i n g  the d i f f e r e n t i a l  in m e n  and 
wo m e n  workers' wages were posed in terms of 'skills' and 'training/ 
q u alifications', or even in terms of 'the breadwinner'; they were 
m o r e  strongly bolstered ideologically, a n d  thus, more difficult to
oppose. But w h e n  it came ^ ' p r o d u c t i v i t y * -  the w o m e n  workers
. * , / knew w h o  was doing the producing.
"There's a dispute about it not being a 'fair share 
across the board'. The percentage payment means - 
e v e n  those working Saturdays and Sundays BUT NOT 
PRODUCING still get the 4%. They feel that the 
ones who do produce aren't getting a fair share of 
the bonus".
Sa r a h  (Press S h o p ) (66) emphasis in original.
W h i chever w a y  it was viewed, the w o m e n  could not justify their 
contr i b u t i o n  to production being valued at an absolute sum 
equivalent to half of what the skilled men received. Nor, 
again, one wh i c h  came to less than that received by a (shift 
working) serviceman on the same grade as they were. And 
between the women workers themselves, it was felt, there could 
be no ju s t i f i c a t i o n  for the differentials produced by percentage 
p a y m e n t s .
"The productivity bonus is the biggest racket out! 
Even on the shop floor - take Pearl's section, 
sub-plates. They can get 120 p e r formance while 
on the lines, we can't reach 100. And so, they 
get more bonus. It causes ill feeling... on the 
lines".
Nora (Final A s s e m b l y ) (67)
So the women members went to the branch meeting and voted 
for a f l a t-rate d i stribution,to no avail because: "one way and 
another, it ended up getting paid out".
"Then at the next branch meeting - hardly anyone 
attended. It was asked why no one was there.
And a shop steward from Old Hill stood up and 
said - 'Well, when you have a thing thrown out at 
Branch, you don't expect it to be carried through!' 
And Paul Silver said it would have cost too much 
money to have had it done, and gone through again. 
And so...
The attitude of the girls is - well why should 
we work? See h o w  much the men're getting, eg. 
the maintenance - on weekend work... And the girls 
on the line say - 'look at us sweating for their 
m o n e y ! '
The girls didn't want it like that. The girls 
wanted say, £2 each person, in the packet, on its 
own at the end of the month".
Nora (Final A s s e m b l y ) (68)
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Patterns of representation and the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of interests 
betw e e n  m e n  and women
(Do you think the m e n  und e r s t a n d  the 
w o m en's problems?)
"Some, may do - you know, there are some. I 
m e a n  there have b e e n  some that have stu c k  up 
for the women and s a i d  -'they w o r k  d a m n  hard, 
they should have a b i t  m o r e  m o n e y  - they should 
have a bit more of the cake'. But there's 
some think - 'huhl' Y o u  k n o w  - they're out 
for themselves you see. And... you get the w o m e n  
saying - 'they're g e t t i n g  all the damn money - w e ' m  
getting nothing...'".
Edna (Final A s s e m b l y ) (69)
O n e  of the main benefits of u n i o n i s a t i o n  to the w o r k f o r c e  is 
the establi s h m e n t  of a system of rep r e s e n t a t i o n  together w i t h  
a p p r o p r i a t e  representational structures. These operated in two 
m a i n  directions, one in r e l a t i o n  to management, the other in 
r e l a t i o n  to the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  bodies of the trade un i o n  org a n i ­
sation itself. These are, of course, linked. And one of the 
m a i n  reasons put forward today, for w o m e n  in the wo r k p l a c e  not 
b e n e f i t t i n g  from trade union o r g a n i s a t i o n  and c o l lective barg a i n i n g  
to the extent that might be e x p e c t e d  - given their increased 
m e m b e r s h i p  - is their lack of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  in these i n s t i t u ­
tional structures. Because m e n  do n ' t  n e c e s s a r i l y  share them, 
it is n o w  realised that for f e m a l e  workers' interests, p r o blems 
and exper i e n c e s  to be p r o perly reflected and addressed in 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  terms, w o m e n  m u s t  have a presence in d e c i s i o n ­
m a k i n g  positions, for instance, as c o m mittee members, delegates 
and office-holders. Conversely, wh e r e  m e n  d o m i n a t e  these 
positions and structures, we m i g h t  e x p e c t  (although it is not 
always fashionable to suggest) policies are likely to m a t c h  their
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interests the m o r e  closely.
H o w  far can the question of women's (under) representation 
explain the problems we have just identified at w o r kplace and 
branch level? We are r e f erring to two aspects especially here.
One the one hand there is an apparent weakness in the women's 
ability to put forward or purs u e  demands, in relation to management 
or the union, on their own behalf. On the other, there is a 
seeming, low level of responsiveness - not necessarily deriving  
directly from the same source - in respect of the union's 
r e p r e s entational structures, to the w o m e n  worker's problems and 
interests. Both of these features have been shown to have 
implications for collective bar g a i n i n g  - which we have illustrated 
in respect of two a g r e e m e n t s . In order to examine how far 
these features can be explained by women's possible u n d e r - r e p r e ­
s e n tation despite their overwh e l m i n g  numerical dominance, we need 
now, to look at how the p a t tern of interest d i f f e r e ntiation 
b e t ween men and women at B S R  fits in w i t h  the structure of repre­
sentation at every level of the union's organisation locally.
D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N  OF INTERESTS
In Part TWo of this thesis, we have set out numerous lines of 
interest differentiation b e t ween m e n  and women both inside and 
o u t s i d e  the workplace, w h i c h  are structured by the sexual division 
of labour. In collective organisations, these interests are 
brought together and have, by some leans and to some extent, to be 
reconciled. Their status and priority is negotiated by the parties 
c o n cerned (or their representatives). And it is clear that in
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the outcome, where t h e y  are c r oss-cutting or m u t u a l l y  exclusive, 
all interests will n o t  be accomodated equally. The internal 
processes through w h i c h  this o u t come is reached are, therefore, 
important subjects for the parties to consider.
They certainly w e r e  f r o m  the point of v i e w  of the male 
workers. Because, b e i n g  so firmly in a minority, any process 
such as a straight v o t e  of the wh o l e  membership, would be c e r tain 
to m e a n  that they w o u l d  lose any decisions on w h i c h  they stood 
opposed. As a result, the m a l e  workers v e h e m e n t l y  disliked this 
system, a l t hough it w a s  rarely operated - only b e i n g  used o n  a 
regular basis to d e c i d e  the pattern of holidays and to signify 
(individual) a c c e p t a n c e  or r e j ection of the annual wage deal.
The men preferred o t h e r  forum for d e cision-making, where there 
was more room to m a n o e u v r e ,  such as those w h e r e  they could 
construct a m a j o r i t y  (eg. by 'flooding' the b r a n c h  meeting); or 
whe r e  they could o p e r a t e  through repr e s e n t a t i v e s  (discussed further 
b e l o w ) .
We can briefly i l l ustrate both this p r o c e s s  of interest 
diffe r e n t i o n  and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  with an e x a m p l e  taken f r o m  one of 
the few areas w h e r e  a straight vote across the wh o l e  of the 
m e m b e r s h i p  was used. This e x a mple is p a r t i c u l a r l y  interesting, 
because the lines o f  s e p aration dividing the m e n  and women in 
the w o r k p l a c e  can b e  seen to der i v e  from the d o m e s t i c  and power 
relations of the h o u s e h o l d  - and so does M i c h a e l ' s  choice!
At BSR the y e a r ' s  holidays were o r g anised well in advance.
The non-sta t u t o r y  d a y s  were arranged in v a r i o u s  combinations, 
around a basic p a t t e r n  wh i c h  provided for a series of short 
breaks throughout the year - w i t h  no "too long" periods in 
between (thought to be the cause of strikes and disruption). (70)
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Two or three d i f ferent options on the arrangement of days 
m o r e  (or fewer) before (or after) the Christmas day, for example, 
w e r e  offered for the w o r kers to vote on.
"Christmas holidays! A n  instant wh e r e  a vote is 
taken - what are the best days to have off for the 
Christmas holidays? So a vote comes round - which 
is a fair way of deciding something - by a vote.
But what chance have we got - US M E N , of our type 
of holiday? When 90% are the ladies - wh i c h  are 
solely respo n s i b l e  for what we get for Christmas... 
and shopping days, etc... So they heavily out-vote 
us, on matters like that.
The ladies, obviously, would prefer to have more 
days - some of the days - taken off the end of the 
Christmas h o l i d a y  and put onto the beginning, so 
they can get the shopping done in advance. It 
limits them g r e a t l y  doesn't it, having to w o r k  full­
time, shopping amongst the m i l ling crowds in the little 
bit of time left after work. And getting towards 
Christmas, S a t u r d a y  to Saturday is a very big jump. 
Wh e r e  you can shop in the week its better, but to 
shop all day - their minds are relaxed they know 
exactly what they want - Christmas period. Because 
the ladies - w e  don't have to do anything - the ladies, 
they look after all the Christmas presents, all our 
cooking, catering, everything. So obviously, to 
them, its better to have a few days before Christmas 
than after.
But the m e n ' s  point of view, its drink, drink!
Social d r i n k i n g  hours after the big event of Christ­
mas, you know. They look at it from an entirely 
different view-point.
The men, the m a j ority w a n t  the time after Christ­
mas rather than before; w h i c h  to me, isn't as important 
a v o t e  as the ladies w a n t i n g  the shopping days".
Michael ( C a r p e n t e r ) (71) emphasis in original.
One of the most crucial lines of interest, however, between 
the men's ranks and the wome n ' s  concerned pay. To the extent that 
the males, as indirect workers, perceived that the size of the cake 
to be shared depended u p o n  the rate of output of the women workers, 
we have identified a r e lationship of 'co-exploitation' whereby their 
interests did not concur w i t h  the wom e n  working at a slower pace.
T h e  productivity deal pic k e d  up on this relationship nicely, with
the men reaping a grea t e r  reward for the increase in e f f ort/
output - effectively all manual in the labour-intensive assembly areas.
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(Do you th i n k  the w o m e n  h a v e  to work at too fast 
a pace?)
"Well, the p r o b l e m  is, how a r e  you going to slow 
t h e m  down? You've got a p r o d u c t i v i t y  deal - on 
the figures that they've w o r k e d  to previously.
A n d  the o n l y  way w e ' r e  going to beat those 
f i g u r e s  and get m o r e  money is, they've got to 
w o r k  harder".
T e r r y  (Maintenance C h a r g e h a n d ) (72)
Apart f r o m  the size of the cake, there was the q u e s t i o n  of 
the size of the share. The m a l e  w o r k e r s  had to guard their 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  carefully.
" W o r k i n g  as a shop steward - I'm only dealing w i t h  
m y  o w n  m e n  you see. If y o u ' v e  got a mixture of 
m e n  and w o m e n  it could be d i f ficult in the e q u ality 
f i e l d . (How so?) They w o u l d  get to hear w h a t  
t h e  m e n  a r e  e a r ning - more so than if a man was 
sol e l y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  men, h e ' s  got no women listening 
to h i m  - w h e n  they start talking, *'
(Why do y o u  think that co u l d  cause a p r o blem here?) 
"Jealousy. Just plain jealousy."
(Do you think the w o m e n  h a v e  got grounds to be jealous 
of the m e n ' s  wage?) "T h e y  certainly have! A n d  
l i k e w i s e  the men have just rights to be jealous of 
some of the women".
(Why? W h a t  could the m e n  b e  jealous of the w o m e n  
for?)
"I'll g i v e  you some instances:
N o  d r a u g h t s  behind them w h i l e  they're working.
C l e a n e r  toilets; he a t - t e m p e r a t u r e s  at work. They 
look af t e r  the w o m e n  more s o  than the men. N o w  I 
w o u l d  say this is j u s t i f i e d  because there are 
three times more wo m e n  t h a n  there are men! A l s o 
the fact that they are not quite so hardy with 
draug h t s  and winds as the m e n  are. So..."
(How l o n g  have y o u  been asking?)
"Ab o u t  six months for one particular - heat, 
radiators".
(At the mom e n t  its too cold?)
"No, w e ' r e  not compl a i n i n g  its too cold. But 
there are, a c c ording to m o d e r n  factory regulations - 
ours isn't that temperature. But w e  aren't really 
c o m p l a i n i n g  much, we're s o r t  of used to it. But 
factory regulations are such... we aren't s h o u t i n g  
so loud as other people, so we won't get ours quite 
yet".
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(In what w a y s  do you think the women have got cause 
to be j e a lous of the men?)
"Oh money. The colossal earnings that the men have 
got here. But if the women would like to work here 
seven days a week, they can take home the same money - 
that's m y  answer to that!
Michael ( C a r p e n t e r ) (73)
Also, it seems, there was more to be lost than differentials:
(Do you think wo m e n  should be more militant about 
getting equality?)
"I think there are enough organisations looking 
after the technicalities of it, the legal 
positions - the watchdogs, they are there and 
they are w o r k i n g  towards it. But I wouldn't 
think it w o u l d  be good, on the whole, for women 
to be m o r e  militant - we've got enough divorces 
a l r e a d y . .."
Gor d o n  (St o r e m a n ) (74)
As we have a l r eady pointed out, the differentiation of 
interest between the men and wom e n  was structured by both their 
(unequal) r e lationship and also their (separate) experiences 
outside the w o r k p l a c e  and w i t h i n  it. The men's views on the 
women w o r k e r s ’ problems: for example, disciplining abse n t e e i s m 
and the 'absenteeism agreement', were coloured to the extent 
that they did not themselves, experience these; and also to the 
extent that they tended to adopt a managerial perspective - it 
was "troublesome" - together w i t h  the employer's perspective - 
it was "costly" (affecting the 'size of the cake'?) (75)
These d i fferences in interests and experience on the p a r t  of 
the m e n  were, of course, perceived by the women, as was t h e i r  basis 
in inequality.
(What do you think about the levels of pay here?)
"Good - for the men". (And for the women?)
"The w o m e n  should b e  paid more. Because they 
w o r k  harder. But for a woman, it is a good rate 
of pay, very good - but, I still say they 
deserve more, e s p ecially on the m a i n  lines - 
have you seen them?"
(What do you think of the differential b e t w e e n  what 
the m e n  e a r n  and w h a t  the w o m e n  earn here?)
" I ’m  not sure really, what the m e n  earn - I've got 
a v a g u e  idea... I supp o s e  y o u  could say it was for 
skill - but is t h e r e  equality?
T h e  skilled m e n  - well, they say they're skilled- 
I s'pose its w h a t  they call the 'BSR skilled', you 
know. I don't t h i n k  they're really wo r t h  their money.
I think the w o m e n  a r e  far greater... you know, I 
think they d e s e r v e  the money far more than the men - 
in a lot of instances, you know, the women, they 
real l y  work, t h e y ' r e  w o r k i n g  v e r y  hard. A n d  we're 
supposed to have e q u a l  pay and equal rights, but we 
aren't you know! No way, are we equal...
For instance, if a woman has a day off, or if a 
w o m a n  has two d a y s  off - she's dragged into the 
office, and she's g o t  to e x p l a i n  why she's had two 
days off, or they expect a doctor's c e r tificate from 
them. Now, I d o n ' t  suppose this happens to the 
men. It just g o e s  to prove that, a l t h o u g h  this is 
a woman's factory - they've got no idea of under­
s t a nding a woman* s problems h a v e  they?
Because, w o m e n  - you know, as I say, w e  are 
supposed to be equa l ,  but no w a y  - because, a 
w o m an's role in t h e  home is entirely di f f e r e n t  to 
a m a n ' s  isn't it? And, if one of the k i d s  are 
bad, you don't f i n d  daddy stopping at home, you 
find mummy has to stop at home. Well, they don't 
unde r s t a n d  here, y o u  see. They think that the 
w o m a n  should still come out to work and... its all 
wrong! There's lots of problems, lots of ways that 
w e  aren't equal. I don't think we ever w i l l  be myself. 
W h a t  do you t h i n k ? "
Sa l l y  ( S u b - a s s e m b l y ) (76)
Km>hasis in original
How w e r e  m e n  and w o m e n ' s  interests r e p resented in the union's 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  structure a t  the local level? W e  c a n  look first 
at who held offi c e  and sat o n  the committees.
OFFI C E  H O L D I N G
It is soon clear t h a t  male m e m bers d o m inated most of the major 
offices of the union at f a c t o r y  and b r a n c h  level. First, while 
w o m e n  outn u m b e r e d  m e n  in the w o r k f o r c e  and shop steward body at 
every factory, until the e n d  of 1976, all the convenors bar two
had been men. Even after this had changed, male stewards still 
held the p o s ition of Chairperson in the Shop Stewards' Committees 
at factory level. Secondly, wh i l e  the full-time b r a n c h  admi n i ­
strative o f f icer was a female, the union's chief n e g o t i a t i n g  
offi c e r  was a m a n  and the b r a n c h  had always been C h a i r e d  by a 
male, right from the beginning.
It is interesting to look at the careers of two men, both of 
w h o m  achieved positions in the union organisation at this local 
level: one as branch chairman, the other as convenor.
Terry was a chargehand in the maintenance d e p a r t m e n t  working 
in the m o u l d i n g  shop. Joining the firm in 1968, h e  had retained 
his mem b e r s h i p  of the AUEW for a couple of years a f t e r  the 
reco g n i t i o n  agreement had b e e n  signed w i t h  the GMWU, until he had 
found himself being disciplined w i t h  no-one to r e p r e s e n t  him.
He had taken over the p o s ition of shop steward for tool r o o m  and 
main t e n a n c e  work e r s  almost immediately; pursuing a gr i e v a n c e  they 
had about overtime. And w i t h i n  a few weeks he h a d  found himself 
a shop stewards' training course at the union's college. (77)
"We falsified the number of people I w a s  looking 
after, if I remember rightly, to get m e  in".
(Why did you have to do that?)
"Well, I was caus i n g  that much trouble, I think 
Paul wanted to get me under control a bit. So 
he said - I want you on a course - a shop 
stewards' course,to indoctrinate me into the 
GMWU! They just put o n  more people t h a n  I was 
looking after. Th e r e  w e r e  36-7 odd, in the tool­
room, and m a i ntenance - only about 18 - at that time.
So instead of saying 55 or something l i k e  that, they 
said I was looking after 150 I think!"
Terry (Maintenance c h a r g e h a n d ) (78)
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In June 1973, 8 months after joining the union, Terry was 
n o m inated by his convenor for the position of branch chair and 
took over from t h e  previous (male) incumbent, who had gone on 
to w o r k  for the u n i o n  as a full-time official.
(How did you become Chairman?)
" I ' m  still trying to w o r k  it out myself! I 
had n ' t  been in the un i o n  that long - I hadn't 
been a shop steward that long. Then, I s'pose 
I was the only o n e  causing trouble!"
Terry (maintenance c h a r g e h a n d ) (79)
Ter r y  held this p o s ition for three years b e f o r e  losing the vote 
to Trevor Bridges, deputy convenor at W a t erfall Lane, a factory 
w h e r e  m a l e  w o r k e r s  had recently b e e n  showing a lot of militancy.
(So its always b e e n  a m a n  - the b r a n c h  Chair?)
"Yes". (Do they have women's names put forward?)
"No. I can't remember ever havi n g  any".
Terry (Maintenance C h a r g e h a n d ) (80)
N o  longer a shop steward, and finding himself n o w  on the 
o u t side of an o r g a n i s a t i o n  whose inner-workings he had for years 
been pa r t y  to, T e r r y  set about finding h i m self another constitu­
ency. W h e n  t h e  January (1977) elections came up, he had got 
himself, first n o m inated and then elected as a shop steward to 
re p r e s e n t  (male) chargehands, setters and inspectors and quality 
control. A  s o m ewhat p o l y g l o t  'grouping' some 70 strong spread 
t h r o u g h o u t  the factory, they had never had "their own" shop 
steward before. In a mat t e r  of weeks, T e r r y  once again came to 
the forefront in a disp u t e  involving maint e n a n c e  workers in the 
m o u l d i n g  shop. When the position of conve n o r  fell vac a n t  in 
M a r c h  he was n o m inated for the position, but w i t h d r e w  when
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. \management stipulated he would have to work on days if he was 
elected.
Ernie was also a maintenance fitter. He had joined the 
union when he first came to work at BSR in 1971 b u t  had dropped 
out soon a f t e r w ards^leaving the C o m p a n y  in Janu a r y  1974. He 
rejoined the union on his return in J u n e  1975, because by that 
time the 100% membership agreement h a d  b e e n  signed. In January 
1978 a new shop steward had been e l e c t e d  to represent the 
maintenance fitters:
"I used to give h i m  a bit of stick - and pushed 
this, that and the other... And in the end he 
jacked it in you see".
Ernie (Maintenance - deputy c o n v e n o r ) (81)
Ernie stood and was elected in March. Shortly afterwards the
Chairman of the shop stewards' co m m i t t e e  at Stourbridge resigned
(he had represented the toolroom) and Ernie was voted in to
replace him. In July - some three m o n t h s  later - there was a
struggle over the convenorship. Both convenor, Pearl (sub-
assembly) and deputy, Cordon (storeman) had been elected into
position following the resignation of Ellen fifteen months
earlier. The deputy had then led a b i d  to replace Pearl as
convenor, and w h e n  he failed to get a vote of no confidence
passed against h e r  in the shop stewards' committee, he resigned.
Ernie, chairing the meeting, was n o m i n a t e d  and seconded for the
vacant position, along with another female shop steward.
"Then someone said that it h a d  been passed at branch, 
that if y o u  had a woman convenor, y o u  had to have a 
male deputy and if you had a male convenor - you 
have a wo m a n  deputy".
Ernie (Deputy convenor - M a i n t e n a n c e ) (82)
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W h e n  this had been pointed out, E r n i e ’s n o mination stood alone,
"and it was passed v i r tually unanimously".
"I don't k n o w  how I've mana g e d  it. I've only been 
a shop steward eight months and I've gone from 
Shop Steward to C h a i r m a n  to Deputy Convenor".
When Pea r l  resigned as Convenor in the following year, Ernie 
was elected to succeed her, narrowly defeating another female 
steward w h o  had also b e e n  nominated.
Unli k e  Terry, E r n i e  had little interest in the branch. He 
had never attended a bra n c h  meeting up to the time he was elected 
shop stew a r d  and had only been to three in the eight months 
following this. The first visit was as a consequence of the 
'craftsmen's dispute'. Early in 1977, maint e n a n c e  and toolroom 
w o r k e r s  in all four factories had be g u n  o r g a n i s i n g  in order to 
m a k e  a s e r ious bid to restore their pay differentials. On 
several oc c a s i o n s  they had switched off the power supplies - 
c l o s i n g  d o w n  all four factories - wh i l e  they h e l d  meetings (from 
w h i c h  o t h e r  workers, and at first even the convenors were excluded). 
Mea n w h i l e ,  the m a j o r i t y  of the other workers w e r e  laid off w i t hout 
P»y.
"We heard a rumour they were all going to go and 
pass something against us (at branch) - so we, as 
craftsmen from all factories, decided that we w e r e 
all going to go up like.
...I've only been to two branch meetings since - 
I went to one in between, you know, just to see h o w  
things w e r e  going. And then Pearl was away ill and 
I had to go because I was (acting) convenor...
Well, now I'm deputy convenor, I should think I'll 
have to go - its b e c ause I have to go, you know. I 
don't find them very helpful one way or another".
Ernie (Deputy convenor - m a i n t e n a n c e ) (83)
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Bo th m e n  had made very r a p i d  progress once they had come to 
the fore, without any apparent background of involvement in the 
U n i o n  or BSR previous to their taking office. They were both 
workers in the highest skill g r a d e  who had achieved prominence 
in the course of this group s h o w i n g  a certain degr e e  of militancy. 
And both enjoyed the support, and to some extent, 'sponsorship' 
of the union's full-time officials. This was the case b o t h 
directly - as with Terryfe p r o m p t  training and pro m o t i o n  to Branch 
C h a irman - and indirectly. E r n ie's nom i n a t i o n  for deputy 
convenor was left unopposed as a result of a 'rule' p r o mpted by 
the bra n c h  secretary some m o n t h s  earlier at a m e e t i n g  of shop 
stewards (not the b r a n c h ) .
Both the convenor and d e p u t y  w e r e  of course, elected by the 
body of shop stewards in e a c h  factory, the m a j o r i t y  of w h o m  were 
women. Prior to 1975, however, only one factory had ever had a 
female convenor. Ellen had held this p o s ition from the be g i n n i n g 
(February 1970) at the S t o u r b r i d g e  factory, w h e r e  there w e r e  m o r e  
w o m e n  in the workforce, and, at the time of her election, even 
fewer men. In fact, the d e p u t y  convenor was a wo m a n  too - 
Pearl bei n g  voted in at the same time — but Ellen, who built up 
strong personal controls, p r e f e r r e d  to operate on her o w n  and 
never involved her deputy at all. ( W h e n  she was finally forced 
out of office in 1977, Pea r l  succeeded her. This time, however, 
the deputy was male - a c c o r d i n g  to 'rule'.)
At Waterfall Lane, the m a l e  convenor who worked on nights w a s 
m a d e  redundant in 1975 w h e n  this shift was phased out. His female 
deputy succeeded h i m  - the fi r s t  wo m a n  to take over this office from 
a man - and the subconvenor w a s  a semi-skilled male (also relatively
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unusual). At the Old Hill factory on the other hand, both positions 
had b e e n  held by males until 1974 when a female steward was 
elected as sub-convenor on the death of the previous incumbent.
W h e n  the m a l e  convenor at Old Hill left the C o m pany in 
1976, to take up employment w i t h  the Union (like his (male) 
p r e decessor had d o n e  four years earlier), it was apparent that 
the female deputy was likely to b e  elected in his place. A n d  it 
was fears about the reactions of the male workers at their loss of 
represen t a t i o n  at this level on the part of the b r a n c h  secretary, 
which had led to her instigation of the n e w  'rule': a female 
c o n v e n o r  would always have to have a male deputy (and vice versa). 
There w e r e  grounds for this apprehension on the b r a n c h  secretary's 
part, because the female convenor at Waterfall Lane had been all 
but d r i v e n  out of office by the male workers there. W i t h i n  a 
year she had b e e n  replaced by another male, with a female as 
deputy. (84) But by 1977 again, the female deputies had finally 
all 'come through' for the first time, and for a short period, 
all the convenors w e r e  female. (85) A  further chan g e  from 1976 
onwards, also r e l evant to this question of the d i f f e r e n t  levels 
of representation, was that deputy convenors became increasingly 
involved in negoti a t i o n s  at factory level and ab o v e  - being 
o f f icially admitted to Stage 5 meetings around the same time that 
the n e w  'rule' was formulated.
Clearly, a l t hough outnumbered in every factory - overall, by 
5:1, at Stourbridge by 7:1, at W a t erfall Lane and Old Hill by 4:1 - 
m a l e  workers w e r e  over represented w h e n  it came to office— holding 
in the union's o r g a n i s a t i o n  at the local level. W h e n  we look at
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the committees u n d e r p i n n i n g  this structure, we can again see 
this was true.
ON COMMITTEES.
The main p o l i c y - m a k i n g  body (as ave r s e  to policy-makers) 
was the branch committee. This had been set up in the first 
place by the f u l l - t i m e  official in December 1973. It comprised 
a chair person and 10  members - three from each of the three 
main factories ( i n c l u d i n g  the convenors) and one from the 
Portersfield t o o l r o o m  (a separate unit). In practice, the deputy 
convenors were i n c l u d e d  in the three as well. The fu l l - t i m e  
officers both attended. A n d  in 1976, a representative from the 
new Garretts Lane f a c tories m a d e  their first appearance.
Over the ye a r s  the male/ f e m a l e  balance on this c o m mittee 
had stayed around 1:1. In 1976 w i t h  two female convenors, the 
ratio had moved s l i g h t l y  in the women's favour, but by 1977, with 
four women as c o n venors, there were also four m a l e  deputies who, 
with the chairman and the repr e s e n t a t i v e  from the Porter s f i e l d  
toolroom, r e d r e s s e d  the balance again. (All those men were, 
moreover, drawn f r o m  the skilled grades).
Rivalling the bran c h  committee, in many respects, as a 
policy-making b o d y  of the union's organi s a t i o n  at a local level, 
was the joint shop steward's committee. This, as we have  
already noted, w a s  a m o r e  recent innovation, set up as a result 
of a decision p a s s e d  at the branch in April 1976. And it's 
decision-making status in r e l ation to the branch committee was, 
to some extent, a l w a y s  ambivalent.
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The joint shop steward's committee was made up of stewards 
f r o m  all (record-changer) factories and, over time, numbered 
f r o m  70 to over 80 strong, (A body which, as we have already 
noted, made up the core of regular attenders at the branch 
m e e t i n g  as well). We c a n  see from Table 6 that the male 
workers at B S R  w e r e  r e presented over twice as well on this 
committee as the wo m e n  were.
Table 6 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of m a l e  workers at Stourbridge,
Old Hill, and Waterfall Lane Factories.
% of w o r k f o r c e  and
M
%
A L E S
of Shop Steward Body.
Stourbridge 12 27
Old Hill 20 29
Waterfall 20 63
Lane
TOTAL 16 37
Sources: Inbucon Report and Branch records.
Men, comp r i s i n g  some 16% of the wo r k f o r c e  of the three main 
factories in 1977-8, constituted well over a third (37%) of the 
body of shop stewards and at least 50% of the branch committee. 
Since it is already clear that the b a l ance of representation in 
the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  structures of the un i o n  locally, was signi­
ficantly shaped by rep r e s e n t a t i o n  at factory level, w e  need to 
consider this in m o r e  detail. Befo r e  doing so, it is worth
noting t h a t  it also, crucially, underpins the trade union's 
regional a n d  national po l i c y - m a k i n g  structures as well.
The b r a n c h  minutes record that the f o l lowing people w e r e  nomi­
nated and elected for the r e g ional council and national congress 
of the union.
T a b l e  7 N o m inations to Regional Council and National 
Congress of the QMWU from the BSR Branch.
Date M a l e/Female P o s ition Body
6 . 3. 1973. TM(m) Bran c h  C h a i r m a n  - elected R e g ional Council
5.12. 1973. NT(f)
CA(m)
AP(ra)
Conven o r - S t o u r b r i d g e 
Convenor - W a t e r f a l l  Lane 
C o nvenor-Old Hill-elected N a t i o n a l  Congress
12.12. 1974. AP (m) 
CA(m)
C o nvenor-Old Hill 
C o n v e n or-Waterfall Lane- 
elected N a t i o n a l  Congress
20.11. 1975 EH(f)
AP(m)
?
Convenor-Old Hill-elected N a t i o n a l  Congress
30.11. 1976 TB(m) Branch Chairman-elected 
(ex-deputy convenor-
Wa t e r f a l l  Lane)
N a t i o n a l  Congress
24. 2. 1977 SW(f)
IB(f)
?
Conven o r - O l d  Hill-elected R e g ional Council
To the extent that in m o s t  unions, shop stewards and convenors 
c o m m o n l y  comprise the core of un i o n  lay— activists and delegates, it 
must be the case m o r e  generally that represen t a t i o n  in the policy­
maki n g  structures of trade unions is fundamentally sha p e d  by the 
p a t t e r n  of representation at w o r k p l a c e  level. We therefore 
need to e x a m i n e  the structure of rep r e s e n t a t i o n  in the BSR factories 
more closely.
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REPRESENTATION IN THE FACTORY.
The overall picture reveals that there were over twice as 
many male shop stewards in every factory as might have been 
expected given the proportion of men in the workforce.
T a b l e  &  Representatives and Members in Stourbridge,
Old Hill, and Wa t e r f a l l  Lane "Factories 1977-75.
Factory FEMALE MALE TOTAL
R e p s . Members Ratio Reps. Members Ratio Reps. Members Ratio
S t o urbridge 19 3282 1:173 7 469 1:67 26 3751 1:144
Old Hill 22 2124 1:97 9 519 1:58 31 2643 1:85
Waterfall
L a n e
7 1057 1:151 12 276 1:23 19 1333 1:70
48 6463 1:135 28 1264 1:45 76 7727 1 : 1 0 2
Ratio M  : F in workforce Ratio M  : F of Shop Stewards
S t o urbridge 
Old Hill 
W a t erfall Lane
1:7 ) 
1:4 ) 
1:4 )
All 1:5
Stourbridge 
O l d  Hill 
Waterfall Lane
1:3 ) 
1 : 2  ) 
2 : 1  )
All 1 : 2
S o u r c e s ; Inbucon Report and b r a n c h  records.
Moreover, if it is assumed that the shop stewards m a i n l y  
repre s e n t e d  workers (or the interests of workers) of their own sex, 
then m a l e  work e r s  appear to have been three times b e t t e r  represented 
than the women overall - with one representative for 45 male members 
compared w i t h  o n e  for every 135 women. But we need to look at how 
constitu e n c i e s  w e r e  organised w i t h i n  the factories to see how far 
this p a t tern of representation was borne out in practice.
-509-
A l t h o u g h  at Stourbridge, wo m e n  outnumbered the m e n  rather 
more h e a v i l y  - b y  7 or 8 to 1, the pattern was little different 
from the other factories. The body of Shop Stewards here 
numbered some 26 - 19 w o m e n  and 7 men, a ratio of 3:1* There 
were, therefore, more than twice as m a n y  m a l e  shop stewards as 
might have been expected, given the structure of t h e  labour 
force. O n e  reason this was a relatively high proportion, was 
due to the fact that, at the time, two m e n  repr e s e n t e d  constitu­
encies of women. However, this does not alter the fact that 
the m a l e  workers, as such, were substantially over represented.
As w e  can see from the Table 9 , three quarters of the
male w o r k f o r c e  was o r g a n i s e d  in constituencies o n  average no 
greater than 50 members per Shop Steward; r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of the 
skilled groups was near e r  1:30. In a w o r k f o r c e  some 4,000 strong, 
the 'average' c o n s t i t u e n c y  size was approximately 160 members.
T h r e e  quarters of the female w o r k f o r c e  were in constituencies 
larger than this - the a v e rage for the wo m e n  be i n g  around 180. 
Skilled m a l e  workers w e r e  thus about four times b e t t e r  represented
than the wom e n
Table 9
Trade U n i o n  Representation of M e n  and Women w o r k e r s  
(Stourbridge factory 1978, figures approximate.)(a)
ss section constituents (approx)
female : male Total
Pip subassembly 296 4 300
Pearl I I 300 - 300
Sally I I 286 7 293
Pru I f 266 5 271
Janet I f 200 6 206
Edna final assembly 140 2 142
Lorna I f 140 2 142
Barbara I f 70 1 71
Tracy I f 2 10 3 213
Betty I f 140 2 142
Jenny " + 12 0 20 140
m a c h i n e  shop
Nora final assembly 70 1 71
B r i g e t t e I f 140 2 142
Madge m o u lding shop 170 170
Carol II 170 170
Bob (m) II 170 170
J im (m) II 170 170
Sarah press shop 72 8 80
Kathy paint/plating/ 
stripping/EPS
200 80 280
Jill supervision 125 125
20 3455 143 3598
Er n i e m a i ntenance 30 30
Gordon stores, warehouse 30 30
Terry chargehands, setters 70 70
quality control
M i c hael carpenters 33 33
John tool room - 30 30
5 193* 193
25 3455 336*(436) 3 7 9 1 * 0 6 9 1 )
*Does n o t  include a number of labourers and s e r v i c e m e n  unacc o u n t e d 
for (b)
Total shop stewards 25 (18 women, 7 men) (c)
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n :
- in areas wh e r e  men predominate 1:38 (or 1:50 i n c l u d i n g  100 labourers)
- In areas wh e r e  women predominate 1:180
Notes to the table
(a) T h e  figures are not the same as those given in Table 8 above 
b e c a u s e  they are derived from different sources (mainly 
interviews w i t h  shop stewards).
(b) At the time of the study, there was some dispute as to 
who repre s e n t e d  the semi-skilled labourers and servicemen 
not already included w i t h i n  recognised constituencies.
G o r d o n  (storeman) had previously claimed to do so, but did 
no longer. In order to m a i n t a i n  his constituency at a 
'viable' s i z e  (i.e. his own position as a shop steward)
he 'laid claim' to the semi-skilled w o m e n  w o r k i n g  in 
i n s p e c t i o n / q u a l i t y  control. Terry who had 'created' his 
c o n s t i t u e n c y  to include the skilled grades in inspection/ 
q u a lity control, also claimed to represent this group of 
women. N e i t h e r  men, in practice, appeared to have had 
a n y t h i n g  to do w i t h  them vis:
(How m a n y  w o m e n  are there in quality control?)
" I ' m  never sure... because I've never caught 
them all together yet". Terry 11/S2:546
(c) N o t  included is MP(f) who acted as the representative for 
w o r k e r s  on the even i n g  shift covering the press shop, paint, 
plating, stripping and EPS. No figures w e r e  a v a ilable for 
the size of this constituency.
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Conclusions
In this chapter we have identified a number of problems 
associated w i t h  the women workers and their trade union. There 
is the n o n - a p p e a r a n c e  of issues e s p e c i a l l y  relevant to the female 
mem b e r s h i p  in the union's domestic o r ganisation, and a lack of 
effect consequent u p o n  them being raised. T h e r e  is an apparent 
failure of women's needs to be p r o p e r l y  addressed in collective 
bar g a i n i n g  and an unequal benefit for w o m e n  in agreements. There 
is a shortage of w o m e n  in most d e c i s i o n / p o l i c y  m a k i n g  positions 
and the under- r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of all w o m e n  workers in the r e p r e s e n t a ­
tive system as a whole.
T h e s e  can, perhaps, be reduced to two m a i n  problems to be
explained. On the one hand, there is the women's seeming lack
of ability and w i l lingness to press th e i r  claims - their lack of 
barg a i n i n g  strength. And on the u n i o n ' s  side, there is an 
apparent lack of responsiveness to the wom e n  members' needs and 
interests. In w h a t  follows, we are m a i n l y  addressing the latter
question. And w e  look first at two features of the union
o r ganisation w h i c h  explains this: t h e  dominance by the male 
m e m bership and by the full-time o f f icers. Clearly, we can 
suggest that there are likely to be c o n n e c t i o n s  between the 
women workers' perceptions of the o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s  reduced r e s ponsive­
ness to their needs and lesser effecti v e n e s s  in p r o gressing their 
demands, to their u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  in the structure as a whole. 
And this can be seen to constitute s o m e  part of an expla n a t i o n  for 
the problems we h a v e  already begun to pose, illustrated in this 
chapter by the a b s e n t e e i s m  and p r o d u c t i v i t y  agreements. Thus,
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g i v e n  Che under-repre s e n t a t i o n  of w o m e n  and the over-representation 
of men, we can surmise that in the first example, m a n a g e m e n t ’s 
demands w e r e  likely to be all the m o r e  easily imposed; and in the 
second, the higher-paid men's interests w e r e  likely to be those 
that m o r e  readily predominated.
An investigation of the p r o b l e m  of representation in the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  structure is generally, as far as most explanations 
of wome n ' s  position in trade unions go. But it is apparent
to us that the analysis cannot stop here, because to do so, is 
to p r e sent the structure of representation as given and, as a 
causal factor, independent - wh i l e  it seems to us that it is 
neither. We wo u l d  argue that the representational structure is 
itself negotiated and negotiable. It is patterned by bargaining 
relatio n s h i p s  just as it also patterns them. And w h e n  we look 
at the barg a i n i n g  process in more detail (chapter 14 &  15) we can see 
just h o w  far this is the case.
If the pattern of rep r e s e n t a t i o n  also constitutes in itself, 
a p r o b l e m  requiring explanation - we need a framework adequate 
to e x p lain this as well.
(Why can't you go in w h i l e  the members are on strike?)
If you negotiate so m u c h  as a 6p rise to get them 
back they'll be doing it every five minutes and no 
agreement wo u l d  be w o r t h  the pa p e r  it was written on".
Mary (Branch s e c r e t a r y ) (8 6 )
Just as the lack of responsiveness of trade union organisa­
tions to women workers needs and interests, tends to be explained 
by the dominance of m e n  in the structure on the one hand and the 
w e a k n e s s  of the female m e m bership on the other, w i t hout either of
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those two features themselves being satisfactorily explained, 
so the lack of responsiveness of trade unions in general to 
(male and female) m e m b e r s ' n e e d s  and demands - tends to be 
e x p lained by the dominance o f  full-time officials and the w e a k ­
ness of the (fragmented) r a n k  and file in relation to the 
b u r eaucracy in the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  structure.
The m a t t e r  of ’the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  interest* underlying a 
diff e r e n t i a t i o n  of interest here, is of course central to any 
d i s c u s s i o n  of the responsi v e n e s s  of representational structures 
as m e m b e r s  are well aware! (87)
"...let's f a c e  it - Did you k n o w  that the union've 
have got shares in BSR?... Quite a lot. I found 
out 2 years ago - n o w  how long they have been in...
I tried to cal c u l a t e  it. I'm going back 5-6 years 
ago, we were all a s k e d  if w e  wo u l d  like to buy shares 
in BSR - a block o f  them. Well, let's face it - 
nobody here could a f f o r d  it! But I was s u r mising 
that the union, at the time - did go in then. But 
I think its wrong! That is w h y  we haven't had any 
official strikes! THEIR interest see! But, it 
shouldn't be a l l owed, I don't care what you say - 
they're not b r e a k i n g  the law, I was told - b e c a u s e  
I questioned it. But I still say, no union, 
whether its the G.M.W. or any - s h o u T J  have shares 
in the factory w h e r e  they've their union. I mean, 
they can have shar e s  in anot h e r  factory where they 
haven't got the u n i o n  - but not in the factory 
where they've got members, I think its wrong".
Jill (Final assembly, s u p e r v i s o r ) (8 8)
The question of 'the in s t i t u t i o n a l  interest' is n o r mally 
raised as problematic in the sense that it constitutes a division 
between 'the union bureaucracy' and 'the rank and file' a n d  under­
pins a contradiction w h e r e b y  the full-time un i o n  officer becomes 
'a m a n a g e r  of discontents' - having to b o t h  respond to and contain 
'the p r e s s u r e  from below'. A t  a m o r e  inznediate level than the
need to m a i n t a i n  the viability of the firm, (or the va l u e  of the 
shares!), we would argue that this is governed by the need to 
protect the bargaining relationship on whi c h  the institution is 
(also) u l t imately dependent. Thus we would m a i n t a i n  that to 
the extent that the viability of the union organi s a t i o n  is 
dependent u p o n  the institution of collective bargaining - these 
are the 'institutional needs' w h i c h  are determining in the first 
instance. Here, we must look, in order to discover w h a t  shapes 
organisational needs such that members' own representational 
structures - and the officials who operate w i t h i n  these - appear 
unres p o n s i v e  and, at times, oppositional. And we need to examine 
more closely what underlies the continuous process of "undemocracy 
with i n  the organisation and the precarious balance of c o n t r o l —  
over or by ? - the membership.
It is notable that, in so far as discussions about the 
'institutional interest' tend to remain w i t h i n  an intra - rather 
than inter-organisational framework, employers tend to h a v e  a 
somewhat shadowy presence.
"The union leader was continuously involved in 
e s tablishing and r e -establishing his credibility 
to his members. To achieve that more or less 
successfully, he had to engage in 'debate' with 
his members so as to bridge the gap between what 
he considered as a c h ievable and desirable and 
what his members thought desirable".
Lane (1974)p.249.
But the union leader has also, of course, to " e n gage in 
debate" - i.e. to negotiate conditions for the institution's 
c r e dibility with the mem b e r s h i p  - w i t h  the employer as well.
For example: what issues are to have negotiable status ("we know
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very well the Company a r e  not go i n g  to break that agreement" - 
referring to the m o v e m e n t  of labour clause)(89)the size of the "gap" 
(as in the quotation f r o m  Lane (1974) above); and the nature of 
the employers' own d e m a n d s  (i.e. the quid pro quo for agreement; 
"we've always said w e  w o u l d  ne v e r  ask for the e x t r a  there") (90). 
Most important of all, there is the n e c essity continuously, to 
n e g otiate with the emp l o y e r ,  the institution's p r o prietary status 
in terms of the s y s t e m  of represen t a t i o n  and the b a r gaining 
r e l ationship itself. Whenever, for example, m a n a g e m e n t  a l l o w  or 
e n c ourage the m e m b e r s h i p  to by-pass procedure or the shop 
stewards, and treat w i t h  them directly, institu t i o n a l  control 
is threatened.
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of this, an interesting incident occurred 
w h e n  the Industrial R e l a t i o n s  D i r ector o n c e  a l l owed himself to be 
way-laid o n  e n t ering a factory w h e r e  the w o r k f o r c e  was on strike. 
The union's regional s e c r e t a r y  had heard about it by accident 
afterwards:
J i m  Mason, Regional S e c r e t a r y  of the Un i o n  to T o n y  Stuart, 
Industrial Relations Director:
"You've w a l k e d  into a factory and talked to members 
not shop stewards. You' r e  not to do it again".
TS "I talked to a group including shop stewards".
JM "If shop s t e w a r d s  a s k  you to talk to m e m b e r s  on
the shop floor, you re f e r  them to me".
CT’ (top management) : "They're still our em loyees you k n o w  ) "
TS "Hang on! I realise the pitfalls of d i r e c t
communication, and a l s o  the pitfalls of ignoring 
them. KA i n v ited me to talk to members - is 
that w r o n g ? "
PS (union full-time o f f icer) "Yes. If there's go i n g  to be 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  it should be by w r i tten doc u m e n t s  and 
then c o m m u n i c a t i o n  should be w i t h  the union's 
r e p r e s entatives
TS "I'm fully a w a r e  of our agreement, and I've no 
intention o f  b r e aking it". (91)
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In extreme instances w h e r e  the mem b e r s h i p  are in revolt 
against their union, the officials m a y  well be driven to 
n e g otiate management's pro t e c t i o n  of their proprietorship 
against attempts by the w o r k f o r c e  to introduce alternative 
barg a i n i n g  channels. (92)
This propriet o r s h i p  is w o n  by the u n i o n  in the first place 
in the initial negotiations for 'recognition'. The bargaining 
relationship itself, therefore, is also 'bargained' and in this 
sense the agreement contains the employer's terms wh i c h  consti­
tute 'costs' for the m e m b e r s h i p  as well. (And in the next 
chapter we follow through some of the implications and consequences 
of the recognition agreement concluded betw e e n  the U n i o n  and B S R ) . 
To the extent then, that the trade union organi s a t i o n  is experi­
en c e d  as unresponsive to the needs of the membership, this is 
u s u a l l y  percieved as a c o n flict between the (conservative) 
b u r e a u c r a c y  and the rank and file. The 'institutional interest' 
is seen as the crucial source of this division. (93) But we 
w o u l d  ar g u e  that, to the extent that the workers' organisation is 
dependent upon collective bargaining, w h a t  constitutes the 
'institutional interest' is, crucially, shaped by the employers - 
and 'institutional needs' a r e  var i a b l e , b e i n g  determined by the 
b a r g a i n i n g  interests and relationships the organi s a t i o n  mediates.
It is the opposed character of these that has consequences for 
the degree of r e sponsiveness or democratic control in the 
r e presentational structure. To a greater extent than the explana­
tion it provides, the p h e n o m e n u m  of bureaucratic control in workers' 
organisations in g e neral^and the dominance of officials at BSR in
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particular -  r e m a i n s  to be e x p lained in terms of these other 
interests a n d  relationships.
COLLECTIVE BAR G A I N I N G  A N D  THE D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N  OF INTERESTS 
BETWEEN E M P L O Y E R  A N D  WORKFORCE.
" Y o u  see, the man a g e m e n t  - they're out for profits.
A n d  the u n i o n  - they're o u t  to help management 
m a k e  profits - and then h a v e  a share in them".
B o b  (Service man, M o u l d i n g  S h o p ) (94)
(What are the benefits of u n i o n i s a t i o n  for 
m a n agement?)
" T h e  un i o n  is a sign of the times. In the old days 
M a c d o n a l d  wo u l d  have had y o u  r u n n i n g  here there and 
e v e r y w h e r e  - and there w o u l d  have been lots of 
uno f f i c i a l  strikes and he would sack the lot and 
e v e n t u a l l y  he'd have run o u t  of labour. So in one 
way, the u n i o n  has done a good thing, because they 
h a v e  some c o n trol over their members. Not much, 
b u t  some".
Bob (Moulding Shop S u p e r v i s o r ) (95)
(How wo u l d  you feel about w o r k i n g  for BSR w i t hout 
a union h e r e ? )
"I would think that the r o l e  of uni o n s  in the 
factory is for the b e n e f i t  of m a n agement these 
days; as well as for the b e n efit of the employees.
It wo u l d  be d e s irable here, to HAVE a union in 
this fact o r y  - because of the sheer weight and the 
c o m p l e x i t y  of it. I w o u l d  say it was more bene­
ficial to the C o m p a n y  to have some sort of o r g a n i ­
sation than d e a l i n g  w i t h  the problems haphazardly 
and hit and miss. I d o n ' t  see its logical that 
y o u  could run a labour force as lar^e as this without 
a n  organi s a t i o n  on the e m p loyee's side to cooperate. 
The word I wo u l d  always seek wo u l d  be cooperation - 
I would ne v e r  seek c o n f r o n t a t i o n . ..
I d o n ' t  think you co u l d  possibly run this factory 
w i t h  the amou n t  of people, without having some sort of 
system. So I should say the s y s t e m  - even procedure 
y o u  see, wh i c h  is an elab o r a t e l y  built-up system - 
people a r e  sometimes w a r y  of it - sometimes they 
believe that its unwieldy, it d o e s n ' t  work fast 
en o u g t ^ o r  them. But you see, the greatest thing 
y o u  gain even then - it does protect them. So the 
fact is that a s y s t e m  is desirable, even to the point 
of being necessary"
G o r d o n  ( S t o r e m a n ) (96) my emphasis 1/c underlined
o r i ginal emphasis u / c  underlined.
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Bo th of these shop stewards expressed the benefits of 
u n ionisation to management in terms of increased control over 
the workforce. And implicit in this view, there was a g e n eral 
assumption that the workforce, in any case, would/should reap 
the benefit from this as well.
"I see it as our job - if there's problems, to 
point them out and try and get them improved.
If its to the work's benefit, then its got to 
be to our benefit in the end - or we should 
m a k e  sure that it is. I m e a n  if there's 
a g g r a v a t i o n  in various areas, its got to be 
the firm's benefit to try and solve it, hasn't 
it?"
E r n i e  (Maintenance, depu t y  c o n v e n o r ) (97)
To w h a t  extent c a n  we assume that the employees' i n t erests 
coincide w i t h  those of the employer at every level and w i t h o u t  
contradiction? Since few would cl a i m  this of the employment 
relationship, we need to explore a further highly significant 
aspect of interest d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in the bargaining relationship, 
and examine the way this is mediated through the structure a n d  
process of collective bargaining.
The m a n a g e m e n t  w e r e  out to m a k e  the profits. The union, 
by means of c o l lective bargaining, sought to benefit from a sh a r e 
in them. But as we have pointed out, as part of this bargain, 
m a nagement's claims and demands are posed, negotiated and in 
some part accepted by representatives of the workforce as w e l l .
So one of the benefits to man a g e m e n t  of unionisation, can be 
seen to lie in this system whereby their needs and demands c a n  
be presented and 'agreed' by the w o r k f o r c e  - in a form w h i c h  m a y  
be all the m o r e  e f f ective for being backed by a degree of com m i t m e n t
that might o t h e r w i s e  have p r o v e d  d i f ficult to engender.
Thus we have posed c o l l e c t i v e  bar g a i n i n g  as being a distri­
b u t i v e  process, whereby cos t s  and benefits are shared between 
m a n a g e m e n t  and labour on the o n e  hand, and between the ranks of 
l a b o u r  on the other. And w e  have suggested that the distribu­
t i o n  of these shares is g o v e r n e d  by the balance of power in both 
sets of b a r g a i n i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  - w h i c h  is in both cases, unequal.
W e  need to e x a m i n e  the s u b s t a n t i a l  terms of agreements which will 
r e f l e c t  this in order to e s t a b l i s h  m o r e  fully, the extent to which 
this is so, b u t  even at this stage, we c a n  suggest this point is 
i l l u s t r a t e d  in the outcome of the two agreements already discussed. 
T h e  first r e f l e c t e d  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  demands to a greater extent than 
the wo m e n  workers' needs, a n d  from the latter's point of view, it 
w i l l  be argued that the c o s t s  greatly out- w e i g h e d  the benefits.
T h e  second agreement, r e f l e c t e d  the m a l e  workers' demands to a 
g r e a t e r  extent than the w o m en's.
In both cases, the u n i o n ' s  ful l - t i m e  officials, who were the 
c h i e f  r e presentatives in b a r g a i n i n g  w i t h  management, played a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  role in m a i n t a i n i n g  the (unequal) p a t t e r n  of distr i b u ­
t i o n  embodied in these agreements, the lines of w h i c h  ran in two 
d i r e c t i o n s  - b e t w e e n  the e m p l o y e r  and the w o r k f o r c e  and within the 
w o r k f o r c e  itself. Theirs w a s  a central position, m e d iating the 
c o m p l e x  bala n c e  of pr e s s u r e s  in both sets of bargaining relationships. 
B u t  it is c l e a r  that it w a s  the g r e ater power of the employer 
o v e rall, w h i c h  o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  d e t e r m i n e d  the nature, extent and 
t h e  pattern of their b a r g a i n i n g  gains and, m o r e  importantly here, 
the i r  concessions. And to the d e g r e e  that the full-time negotiators 
w e r e  conmitted to u p h o l d i n g  the b a r g a i n i n g  relationship, they were
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also committed to e n s uring their members' compliance w i t h  the 
terms of the agreements. This, therefore, required o n  their 
part a relatively high degr e e  of control over and w i t h i n  the 
representational structure. And this in turn was o f  course 
likely to d i m inish their responsiveness to (certain of) their 
m e mbership's demands. (98)
"He seems like a m a n agement man".
(Why in particular, does he seem like that?) 
"Well the shop stewards have stood up s o m etimes 
and they've said something and it seems to be 
for the worker. And yet he stands there a n d  
he'll say "Oh but..." you know. And w h a t  he's 
saying is a repeat of w h a t  the management h a v e  
said. Its like he's standing up for them.
I can't bear that".
Barbara (Final A s s e m b l y ) (99)
Clearly we are giving no credence here to c o n s p i r a c y  
theories of complicity, or to subjective theories of bureaucratic 
incorporation. We are m e r e l y  pointing out that in col l e c t i v e 
b a r gaining w i t h  the employers, trade union n e g o t i a t o r s  are not
"juggling two s e p arate sets of interests: those 
of the un i o n  as an organisation, and tho s e  of the 
members w h o  n o m inally gave the o r g a n i s a t i o n  its 
raison d'être".
Lane (1974) p.243.
They are in fact, juggling w i t h  three.
We would argue that it was the balance of b a r g a i n i n g  relation­
ships (unequal) and the nat u r e  of the process of c o l l e c t i v e 
bar g a i n i n g  (distributive) w h i c h  generated in the f i r s t  instance, 
u n r esponsive structures w i t h i n  the representative institution.
The more that bargains embody the employers' i n t erest (as they 
always must to some degree) to be passed down to the workforce 
in exchange for benefits, the m o r e  grievances and d e m a n d s  are likely
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to be generated - as these costs impinge on the shop floor - to 
be pushed back t h r o u g h  the system again. To the extent that 
the negotiators h a v e  to rem a i n  committed to the terms of the 
agreements (as a t e r m  of the bar g a i n i n g  relationship) and to 
the extent that the employer can stipulate some kinds of issues 
as being less n e g o t i a b l e  than others - demands and grievances 
are likely to be blocked, parried or "traded" wit h i n  the repre­
s e n tative system. This process of ’grievance bargaining' 
itself requires a relatively high degree of institutional control 
to be w i e l d e d  o v e r  the r epresentational structure. (100) And 
t h i s  as a re s u l t á i s  rendered m o r e  ineffective in relation to the 
m e m b e r s h i p  in general, and, we w o u l d  argue, certain groups 
wit h i n  the m e m b e r s h i p  in particular.
This v i e w  of the d i stributive aspects of collective bargaining 
o n  the one hand and the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power in bargaining relation­
ships on the other, provides us w i t h  an approach to many of the 
questions raised in this chapter. To the extent that the employers' 
interests w e r e  p a s s e d  on through the bargaining process, the 
structures of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and n e g o t i a t i o n  established as a 
result of u n i o n i s a t i o n  would be rendered less responsive to the 
w o r k f o r c e  in g e n e r a l  and certain crucial sections - like the 
w o m e n  in p r o d u c t i o n  in particular. And to the extent that the 
m a l e  w o r k e r s  w e r e  in a stronger b a r g a i n i n g  position vis a vis 
m a n agement, the u n i o n  officials and the women workers, they were 
able to d o m i n a t e  the structures of r e p r e s entation and negotiation, 
w i t h  the result again, from the w o m e n ' s  point of view, that these 
structures would b e  rendered less r e s ponsive to their needs and
interests
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In the chapters wh i c h  follow, we u s e  this a p p r o a c h  to examine 
the position of the wom e n  in the w o r k p l a c e  and in the union in 
more detail. W e  are particularly inte r e s t e d  to e x p l o r e  the 
implications of these bargaining pro c e s s e s  and relationships:
What consequences flow there from? W e  h a v e  moreover, an 
important q u e s t i o n  which still remains to b e  addressed: what 
were the sources of this female m e m b e r s h i p ' s  apparent lack of 
bargaining strength?
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it was only fair that she should have done. So I said to her 
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meetings every two months as agreed. Branch Secretary replied that 
providing that the meetings could be carried out in a responsible
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In 197  ^ the company had tried to encohrage their employees to 
buy shares and a question as to the advisability of this was 
raised at branch (15.8.1974). A letter signed by the General 
Secretary and read out to the membership stated that:
"the Union's policy is to discourage our members from buying
shares in the company in which they work, since this might
tend to involve them in a conflict of interest as trade unionists."
(88) Ref JA 48/S5: 486-520
(89) Ref PW 16.12.1976/7
(90) Referring to shift work premiums for women workers. PS 28.6.1977/385
(91) Ref 21.3.1977/233
(92) "When it comes to the crucible of recognition or not for the 
insurgent group, the matter is one of life or death for the 
union far more than for management. Since collusion, as a 
rule, is the background of the insurgent's charges, the Union
will use pressure on management to give in on any substantive 
matter, but not on its ownership of the bargaining unit." 
Herding (1972) p. 296 (My emphasis)
(93) As we have noted in our previous discussion concerning the 
differentation of interests (between male and female workers 
Chapter 8), the effects of this are enhanced by various lines 
of separation in the experience of the various parties involved. 
As an example of this in relation to the full-time officials, 
we can note the comments of the branch administrative officer 
on the impact of the absenteeism agreement on the female 
membership:
"They've always had a warning system for unofficial absence.
If they're away without good reason - like a sick-note, they 
get called into the office to explain and given a verbal warning.
It doesn't mean a thing at all. They never DO anything about 
it. The company virtually turns a blind-eye - they're very 
lenient really.
I can't understand these women who go up in the air, if they're 
called in and get a warning! They should be able to see it 
doesn't mean a thing. But they come running to us in a state!
The trouble is, the company doesn't do it all the time .... 
sometimes they decide they've nothing better to do - and they'll 
have a purge and call them all in. At other times they’ll 
go for weeks - without doing anything."
Mary (Branch Secretary). 22.2.1977/1B5.
(9*0 Ref BM 9/S2: 120
(95) Ref BM 33/S4: 185-195
(96) Ref GH 22/S3: 810-904
(97) Ref Ec 37/85: 61-89
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(98) Opinions about the union officials were not directly solicited.
But some were offered and these confirm an impression that
the women members in particular did not feel their chief negotiating 
officers were as responsive to their needs and interests as 
they expected them to be.
"We're always having problems with Paul Silver - he's never 
available. We wanted him down here - we demanded him down 
here last week and the management got hold of him but we didn't.
The union couldn't - he always disappears when the union want 
him, but he's always available, for both press and management, 
he appears."
Of course they were always present at the branch:
"Mary West and Paul Silver, at branch - I could sit and listen 
to them for hours, you know, because they are knowledgable 
people; but ... they talk - they know what they're talking 
about, but not all us down on that floor know what they're 
talking about - and ... facts and figures and things like that.
Of course they've got that being done for them anyway - and 
they understand: but not all of us understand."
"The officials - go all around the bush, and they're not saying 
anything really. I think they're just trying to confuse the 
women that have bothered to go."
Overall, the officials did not seem 'strong enough' either,
"well, sometimes you feel they could put their foot down, and 
do a little bit more - could do with being a little bit stronger 
here, definitely could".
(99) Ref BB 26/ : 672-679
(100) "Private ownership of the grievance by the union organisation,
(is) the necessary condition for grievance 'bargaining' of 
this kind".
Herding (1972) p. 19^.
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CHAPTER 12_____ HANDLING PROBLEMS THROUGH THE UNION
What are the benefits to be derived from unionisation? What resources 
does the institution provide to enhance the power of the workforce 
vis a vis management? And how is the effectiveness of trade union 
organisation in relation to the problems of the membership on the shop- 
floor to be assessed? We begin this Chapter by looking at the utilis­
ation of resources accruing from union organisation on the shopfloor 
in relation to the women workers' problems. Thus we examine the 
involvement of the full-time officials negotiating with top management 
in the higher levels of the procedure; we look at the involvement of the 
body of shop-stewards which constituted the 'domestic' organisation at 
factory level, and finally we take a broad view of the extent of 
involvement of individual shop stewards representing women members on 
the shopfloor. Overall, we find that the use of institutional 
resources is minimal. What happened to the problems and issues we 
have already identified as being so significant for the women workers?
When we follow up some of the specific problems identified in 
PartTWo of this thesis: speed up, work intensification, disciplining 
and movement of labour we find these fell by the wayside at a very 
early stage. Why was the union machinery so ineffective? We analyse 
the procedural and substantive terms of the agreement by which the 
representational system was established and management's relationship 
to this as well. And we find that there are a number of features 
associated with shopfloor bargaining relationships which can be seen 
as having an impact on the ability and willingness of the female
membership to press their grievances.
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Using the institutions resources
In this section we are particularly interested in examining how the 
women workers' problems, identified in Part TVo above, were dealt with 
via the grievance handling machinery which was instituted following 
recognition of the union by the Company for collective bargaining 
purposes. In attempting to make some kind of assessment of 'effect­
iveness', three different levels of grievance handling are explored.
First, that which involved the union's full-time officers, second, 
that which involved the domestic organisation collectively i.e. the 
body of shop stewards meeting within each factory; and finally, the 
individual shop stewards - representing members on the shop floor.
We begin with an outline of how grievances were handled.
THE PROCEDURE
The formal agreed procedure for handling problems and disputes 
is reproduced in Appendix 1 Problems arising from the shopfloor were 
handled by individual stewards with the assistance, if necessary, of 
the factory convenor. Once per month all the stewards in a factory 
held a meeting, and reported on any problems they were dealing with.
If the next stage required the involvement of the factory manager 
the issue might be put on the agenda of the Joint Works Committee or 
else it might be taken up by the convenor personally.
If the issue could not be agreed at factory level i.e. 'domestically' 
(perhaps because it involved the workers of more than one factory — ) 
it was reported to the branch secretary and a stage 5 meeting was 
arranged between the union's full-time officers - the regional official 
plus the branch secretary - and the industrial relations director, 
accompanied by another manager above or equivalent to top-factory level.
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The final decision on all issues was taken by the Chairman, on 
whose behalf (and personal instructions) the industrial relations 
director was acting. If the issues could not be resolved in this way, 
or if the decision involved some change in company policy, the 
Chairman entered the negotiations himself. This was Stage 6, the final 
stage of procedure. (1)
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE FULL-TIME OFFICERS
To what extent does the grievance procedure at the levels of 
stage 5 and 6 reflect the problems experienced by the women workers 
on the shopfloor? Table 10 records the subjects covered by negotiations 
at this level of procedure during the first six months of 1977. (2)
These were meetings formally arranged, and can only serve as an 
approximate indication of the total space and attention accorded to 
these issues by officials and management at this level. They will, 
of course, have been discussed "informally" as well.
From the table, 39% (14 instances) of the 36 meetings recorded, 
concerned males and females in general; and half of these were on the 
subject of sick pay. 47% (17 instances) concerned the males alone: 
over a third of these (6 instances - and 17% overall) relating to 
skilled men specifically. Only 14% (5 instances) of the issues 
negotiated at this level concerned women workers in particular and two 
of these instances arose as a result of women workers striking. Since 
women constituted some 84% of the labour force, how is the under­
representation of their problems at this level of negotiation, which Is 
suggested here, to be explained? Does it, perhaps, reflect the fact 
that these grievances were less pressing? If it is not a measure of 
greater satisfaction with conditions, is it an expression of the 
women's higher degree of "apathy" in relation to the union?
Date
28.1
14.2
15.2
16.3
18.3
29.3
31.3
14.4
27.4
29.4 
2. 5
6.5
12.5
19.5
28.6 
30.6
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\Table 10 : The Operation of the Grievance Procedure
at Stage 5 and Stage 6
Level Subject Who (mainly or solely)
affected ___
S6 Staggered holidays Skilled males
SS Eversure factory Males
S5 Guaranteed week Males and females
Sick & Benefit Scheme Males and females
5 mins on clock Males and females
Autoshop Males
Evening payment Males and females
S6 Pensions Males and females
S6 "Informal.^ , ,.. Staggered holidays Skilled males
Sick scheme Males and females
Position of skilled men Skilled males
Fighting in factory 2 females
Theft incident Male
S5 Maintenance men SB Skilled males
Staff status - toolmakers Skilled males
S5 Upgrading setter(s) Males
"Informal discussion" -
twilightshift Females
S5 Dispute "Bonus strike" Males and female
S5 Mot err f nt of labour Females
S5 Sick pay Males and females
S5 Sick pay Males and females
S5 Toolroom dispute Skilled males
S5 Sick pay Males and females
S5 Dispute Sub—assembly (O.H)j Movement Females
of labour
S5 Eversure Males and females
S5 Subsistence Males
Loss of earnings (shift change) Males
Loss of earnings (result of
toolroom dispute) Females
Pay negotiations Males and females
S6 Sick pay Males and females
S6 Sick pay Males and females
S5 Night shift rules Males
Stacker truck pay Male
Downtime Males
Night shift pay Males
Regrading stores chargehand Males
Source : Field notes and branch diary
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But what does this mean? Were the problems never raised as 
grievances by the membership or were they brought to the union and 
dealt with at lower levels of the procedure? In which case, were they 
'lost' or 'won'? It is clear that we will have to look more closely 
at the level of the union’s domestic organisation and factory level 
grievance handling machinery.
INVOLVEMENT OF SHOPSTEWARD ORGANISATION AT DOMESTIC LEVEL
The body of shopstewards in each factory attempted to hold one 
regular meeting every month at which individual representatives would 
report problems they were dealing with. Grievances which required 
further action would be placed on the agenda for the next stage. What 
kind of issues were brought up therefore, at this, the only regular 
meeting of all shop stewards in the factory at Stourbridge?
Three initial limitations concerning this meeting were mentioned 
by the stewards, which can be seen to have coloured its effectiveness. 
Firstly, although they were supposed to take place every month in work's 
time, management's permission had to be sought beforehand. In the event 
of any industrial action this was usually withheld. Secondly, the 
agenda of the joint works committee meeting, which came out of this 
meeting of shop stewards, was limited by this factory manager to seven 
items (all of which had to have exhausted procedure). Finally, there 
appeared to be a rule thatany questions concerning pay could not be 
discussed.
Within these limitations, was the meeting a useful one - given
that this was the only regular opportunity for all the stewards to
discuss their problems together?
"...er, well, not really - 'cos the first thing 
they do is, 'Where's the cuppa teas - or coffees?'
....and it takes lO minutes, 15 minutes to get 
that arranged - and you settle down to....your 
shopsteward business of the day- sort of thing.
And they read off the minutes of the last one, 
and decide what they're gonna leave in - you 
know, what's been satisfied, and what 'asn't...
Then you go round to each individual shopsteward 
to see if they've got anything to bring up.
Out of 25, you'd 'ave 20 passes. And 5....bring 
something up. Well, surely, with a firm like this, 
there's gotta be something for every shopsteward 
to bring...? (3)
Jill (supervisor - final assembly) (3)
Indeed, three of the women shopstewards at Stourbridge who were inter­
viewed had never raised an issue at this meeting. What kind of issues 
were raised? Ernie, shop steward for the maintenance workers, was the 
Committee's Chairman:
"There's a lot of petty matters raised - the size 
of teapots, big teapots or little teapots.... it 
should be used for bigger things - working conditions 
and timing of jobs. But they tend to use it for 
petty things like toilets being cleaned...."
(Why do they?)
"P'raps its custom and practice - a mould they've 
got into...
Don't think I've got a thing against women...but I 
tend to find, you know - it's the girls as tend to 
bring up the petty things. Like I've spoken to one 
or two of the guys - shopstewards - there's about 
half a dozen of us I s'pose, and they seem to be 
concerned that it should be used for more serious 
things."
Ernie (maintenance,deputy convenor) (4)
Asked about an issue he had raised at this meeting himself, Ernie's 
example concerned a car parking problem (unsatisfactorily resolved) 
outside the maintenance department. Overall, the most common problem 
brought up at the Stourbridge factory shopsteward's meeting concerned
N
the ventilation and heating: "They're alwaysbrinqinq these Questions).... 
Ernie) (5).
Although, as might be expected, wider problems were aired, the 
minutes confirm a predominant emphasis on small 'welfare' type questions.(6) 
Can this picture be taken as a realistic reflection of the kind of 
discussion which tended to take place at this meeting? Michael had been 
a shopsteward for six months - his constituency was totally male. Working
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in the carpenter's shop he had never had much contact with the women 
workers nor awareness of their problems on the shopfloor. Attending 
the factory shopstewards' meeting now, a vast number had been brought to 
his notice.
(What are the main problems experienced by the women workers?)
"Hygiene at work. Cleanliness. Clean towels.
Sufficient toilet facilities, soap etc.”
Michael (carpenter)(7)
For movement of labour, discipline and domination, the pace and intensi­
fication of work, we are forced to look elsewhere. The problems we are 
interested in do not appear at this level of the organisational structure 
either.(8)
THE INVOLVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL SHOPSTEWARDS
We must look therefore at the grievance handling of the individual 
shopstewards representing women workers in the plant in order to discover 
the outcome of problems and disputes they raised. Before examining 
specific issues as they were taken up, it might first be useful to make 
some overall assessment of the level of stewards' involvement in handling 
the women workers' problems. This is difficult without using techniques 
of close observation. But some indications can still be gathered from 
information reported in answer to such questions as: How much time did
they spend on their duties as a shopsteward? Were they dealing with any 
problems currently? What were the most common problems they dealt with 
day to day? What did they consider to be their greatest achievement or 
success? And which were the easiest and which the hardest kinds of 
problems to deal with?
The picture that emerges is, of course, impressionistic. Two 
thirds of the stewards reported dealing with no problems currently.
And the amount of time spent overall appeared to be low, although
"In a week, it might be nothing” (Janet) ...'*twentyclearly it varied:
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\iminutes this week (in the office with a girl being disciplined) (Jenny)...
"Once it took me all day to find out the reason for line 3 getting bad
(low) performances - and the members on my line complained about me
being off my job"....(Edna). (No stand-in was generally provided).
Most of the stewards reported that their duties took up very little of
their time at work. Edna had even noticed a reduction in the amount of
time spent dealing with her members' problems:
"Some weeks I don't do anything at all. As a 
matter of fact it's getting less and less. Even 
since I've become a shopsteward it's getting very low.
(Is that the same for other shopstewards?)
I know one person...she's got 2 lines as well - 
and I think her problems get less and less as well."
Edna (final assembly)(9)
Was the small amount of time taken up because the members had few 
problems to bring? This can hardly have been the case. Much of the 
evidence presented in Part Two of this thesis, setting out the problems 
of the women workers, has been drawn along with numerous illustrations 
and examples, from the women stewards' own accounts. Indeed, when asked 
about the problems which did come up most often for them, the picture was 
confirmed: movement of labour, disciplinary proceedings, job values and 
performances (especially related, on the assembly lines, to bad parts) 
and ventilation. Only one steward mentioned an issue different to 
these.(lO) It would seem, therefore, that either these problems 
came up very infrequently or else the issues dealt with by the shop 
stewards representing the women workers were processed relatively 
quickly. Either way, the question then is, with what result?
What were the shop stewards' successes?
When asked what they considered to be their greatest achieve­
ments, over half of the shopstewards mentioned environmental improve­
ments to working conditions. None of these improvements were won 
without a struggle. Although it might also be argued that in several
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instances the company was bound to act under the Health and Safety 
at Work legislation.(11) Only two of the stewards mentioned a 
movement of labour/absenteeism/disciplinary problem. One who was 
involved in setting up a rota and one who prevented a girl who was 
late, being moved off her job as a "punishment". None mentioned 
gaining improvements in job values or performances. Perhaps it is 
the case that an improvement which is concrete and visible is more 
likely to stand out in the memory. On the other hand, it may also 
be the case that some issues are more readily negotiable. Were some 
problems easier to deal with than others?
From the stewards' replies it would appear that alteration to 
working conditions was one of the easier problems to take up: "Mind 
you, they'll see you - but they'll please themselves when they get 
it done." Going into the office with people being disciplined for 
absenteeism was also put into this category of "the easier type" 
of problem, as was: dealing with mistakes (for example, in pay) and 
taking up cases of unusual individual misfortune.
The most difficult issues were all those to do with the
organisation and pace of production and, of course, pay) i.e.
movement of labour, bad parts, performance ratings and job values.
Which are the hardest problems to do something about?)
"The dissatisfaction that they get, you know - 
working on a job where they can't get any money - 
make any money. They come to me and they say, 
there's something wrong with the job - it hasn't 
been timed right. Now there's no way that they'll 
come back and retime it - to the satisfaction of 
the members or me."
Sally (subassembly)(12)
(Which problem has been with you the longest?)
"Timing the Tetrad plugs. Each time - it's been 
taken through procedure... and they've moved the 
girls around - then I was moved to a different 
section. Hazel had the last dealing with it.
They finally put the job out to sub-contract 
(for a while). We've tried to get this job 
retimed for two years and it still hasn't been 
done. Well, they retime it - but only to put 
more on the count."
Pip (subassembly)(13)
To sum up, working conditions and personal issues were con­
sidered much easier to deal with than production ones. And anything 
which had to be taken up through procedure was more difficult to win 
than the type of problem which could be resolved straight away i.e. 
in discussion with the superintendant on the shopfloor.
The question which remains to be explained is that by the 
stewards' own accounts and the researcher's observation, the women 
workers at BSR daily experienced pressing problems which they attempted 
to respond to using the resources available. Chief among these was 
the system of representation and procedure established as a result of 
unionisation. But an examination of the grievance handling machinery 
from top to bottom reveals little trace of the problems which have 
been identified. What happened to them? If one were to adopt an 
institutional approach, it might be argued that their 'non-appearance' 
is an empirical reflection of their lack of significance for the 
membership. And therefore, due assessment of the importance of 
these problems offered in PartTwo above is vastly overdrawn.
Certainly, if the institutional arrangements had been taken as a 
starting point for the research, the organisation of production and 
employment relationships, as they affected the women workers at BSR 
would not have appeared as a problem in the first place. It is part 
of the project of this research however, to demonstrate the weakness 
of an empirical perspective which assumes, because it takes as its 
starting point, the unproblematic nature of institutions. And rather 
than taking the 'institution's' definition of a problem's existence
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or significance, we will show, on the contrary, how this definition 
is, in fact, constructed. And this very process of construction is 
problematic.
It has already been suggested that the shopstewards found some 
questions were more difficult to resolve than others. And since 
those concerning the organisation of production remain of particular 
interest to us, we turn now to look at some of these cases in detail.
What happened to the issues?
Since the problems we are interested in seem elusive when we 
focus on the grievance handling machinery, we need to start perhaps 
with the problems themselves. Here we pick up on a number of examples, 
all of which have been raised in the earlier part of this thesis, 
and follow them through. We begin with three problems of speed-up, 
one in the paint shop (continuous process plant), the second in the 
moulding shop (individual, automatic machines) and the third in 
subassembly involving team workers. The first two issues perished 
after inertia and delay in the higher levels of procedure and the 
third management won outright. We take up the problem of intensi­
fication by looking at what happened when stewards took up the 
problem of bad parts in final assembly. The problem continuously 
recurs because it is never taken up at the level where it might be 
resolved. In three examples of stewards in assembly sections 
Involved in representing members being disciplined for poor performance, 
we find no defence is, in fact, offered. And finally, we look
at three probLems associated with movement of labour,* 'unnecessary' 
movement, the 'no transfer' rule and movement resulting in loss of 
pay. We find that the first two scarcely have the status of a 
grievance as far as the shopstewards are concerned, while the third 
did have, and stewards were prepared to negotiate on the issue - 
only to find that the members often were not.
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SPEED-UP
In Chapter 4 above, we looked at the problems of speed-up and 
the intensification of labour. Here we examine what happened when 
these issues were taken up through the union machinery.
When the track in the paint shop was speeded up, the women 
complained to Kathy:
"So I went to see Pearl the convenor but she 
did nothing. Then the women forgot all about 
it, and that was it. It did slow down sometime 
back, - it just, suddenly went - and started 
going slower again. But after, they've speeded it 
up again....but the women aren't bothering now.
It's back to the faster speed now."
(Do you think Pearl should have done something about it?)
"Yes. Because - I asked for the count.... 
asked for what had been done the week before 
the track had been speeded up. So Pearl said 
'go and get the count then, and I'll come back 
to you'. But she never bothered, she never came 
back."
(And then....)
"it was difficult to tell anything from the 
count. Some days we'd passed 13,000, another 
day 18,000 - they only count the ones we pass.
So....now the women have got used to it...we 
can work at that speed now, so they're not 
bothering about it."
Kathy (Paintshop)(14)
Madge had tried to tackle speed-up in the moulding shoD.
This was difficult when it was done on individual machines, especially 
with the constant change of personnel, working four-hourly shifts.
So when a large number were affected at the same time, Madge thought 
it a good time to act:
"Well - I went to Pearl in the finish with the 
problem, it still didn't get fought though. I 
had actually - I admit to it, and they knew 
that it happened - I said, 'pass the word from 
shift to shift, when they put it up again', (and 
they've done it another twice). I said, 'Don't
do it. Don't turn it out. Tell them on the 
other shifts, and all stick together and we 
can fight it. If we all stick together we 
can get something done'. I mean, OK, it was 
possible to keep getting those counts out, but 
they were exhausting the women doing it.
Actually, there should be a way of going back 
over the cards, over the years and seeing what 
the performances were and what they are now.
But Pearl's never had the time to go through it 
with me. I mean, I asked her to when we had 
these women with the counts and we really 
thought we could have won that with 60 or 70 
women. If we couldn't win in that case.... 
so really, we're fighting a losing battle on 
the individual machines."
(Could you do that?)
"Oh yes, if I'd got the cards, I could do it 
easily. But whether they would give us the 
cards....and the women could tell you....But 
we could never get anything done about it.
Well I thought we should have been able to do 
something. Because to my way of thinking, 
there's no way they should put the counts up 
like that...But because I didn't know how to 
do it - I really think the convenor ought to 
have found a way. But she was involved in so 
many other things, it never ever got done.
If it came up again, I think I would insist 
on it being done. But it’s coming up on a 
number that you can fight on. Individual ones - 
you can win the odd one and lose the odd one, 
you know we really need some more information 
about it all."
Madge (Moulding Shop)(15)
In these two instances, where speed up was disputed through 
the union , the issues 'perished' as a result of inertia and delay 
after being taken into higher levels of procedure. In another of 
the disputes quoted in Chapter U above, concerning two new lines 
in the sub-assembly area - one with a manual and one with an 
automatic press - management won. The shopsteward opposed the 
ratefixer's suggestion that they be given the same timing. She 
wanted the count for the younger girls using the manual press, 
dropped -"by about lO - that'll please them, because really they'll
still have to work harder than the older ones." (Pru)(16) But the
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women working with the automatic press wanted to prove their line 
was the slower. The foreman swopped the two teams, putting each 
onto the other's line. Set in competition, each tried to prove 
the set-up they were now on was the quickest. By dint of special 
effort, the more experienced women managed to get a count out of the 
line with the manual press equivalent to what they had been doing 
using the automatic one - thus proving management's case. The 
shopsteward failed to oppose the move.(17) Her only suggestion 
had been, 'that they do week about.... that's where the union comes 
in. ' ( Pru) (18) .
INTENSIFICATION - BAD PARTS
On the two final assembly lines so many circumstances might affect 
the worker's pay that the main job of the steward was, in the first 
instance, to find out why the line's performance figures were lower 
than either the count might have suggested or the girls expected.
And, since one of the main reasons behind final assembly line workers 
getting less money for the same or (often more) work, was the supply 
of bad parts (See Chapter 4 above), this was one of the most common 
problems taken up by their shopstewards. To what effect?
If a particular component could be identified, the stewards 
might succeed in persuading management to stop sending them to the 
lines. Even supervisors used this channel sometimes. When Jenny 
took up the case of the faulty switchboxes, it was the supervisor who 
had sent the girls to see her, after they had struggled to fit them 
all day:
"They'd been down to quality control and they'd 
put grease on them and filed them and thev still 
couldn't get them in. (Finally) she told them 
to come through the union because the union will 
carry more weight with the management’"
Joan (final assembly)(19)
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But these successes, when they occurred, were short-lived. All 
the assembly line stewards agreed - this was a problem which was 
never resolved:
"You keep moaning and moaning and nothing seems... 
it's alright for the first few days and then 
it's all back to sqaure one again."
Edna (final assembly)(20) 
(Have you ever raised an issue at the factory 
shopsteward's meeting?)
"Well, only like the bad parts and things like 
that on tie line. But they haven't been dealt 
with. They always come again. They're OK 
for a couple of weeks, you know, after you've 
jumped up someone's back. But then - Oh, just 
a few weeks - it's gone again, you know.
Barbara (Final assembly)(21)
DISCIPLINING - 'POOR PERFORMANCE'
If bad parts were a problem they felt they could never resolve, 
disciplining for 'poor performance' was one many stewards clearly 
considered they could do nothing about, even in the first instance.
It will be remembered that management used disciplinary action 
in order to enforce the level of effort they required. When the 
woiran who had worked on crystals for 10 years was pulled into the 
office for poor performance, Janet was horrified. They'd never 
insisted on a count in that department, all they wanted was "good 
ones". But her only action was to advise the member that if they 
now wanted quantity instead of quality - then the woman should try 
to give it them.
On the final assembly lines Jenny was called in when a young
girl was disciplined for working inconsistently:
"She'll work the one hour and she'll get them 
on. And then the next hour she just doesn't 
bother.... (so the count drops)"
(And what do you do when you're called in?)
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well, I just have to go and witness the 
fact that she's had a warning for not 
doing the job. And there isn't anything 
else...All I can do is advise her to do 
her job."
Jenny (final assembly)(22)
Again:
"I was called in on a warning for bad 
inspection - which, of course, there is 
very little you can do...But this one girl 
really, had only been on the job 3 weeks, 
and she'd been taught, but she ought to 
have had a person with her all the time."
(Did she get the warning?)
"She got off fairly lightly. (But) she 
was warned, yes.
Pearl (sub-assembly convenor)(23)
MOVEMENT OF LABOUR
Movement of labour caused a lot of problems for the membership 
and, of course, for the shopstewards. A key issue was job security. 
This was constantly undermined because management could move workers 
onto jobs but did not allow transfers away from them. (Thus, they 
rarely had to sack workers, obligingly, they "sacked themselves".)
For the stewards therefore an important problem was to prevent 
workers being moved "unnecessarily", another was to ensure, when moves 
were made, there was no detriment attached and, finally, if a job 
proved unsatisfactory, that workers' requests for transfer received 
proper consideration. They were remarkably unsuccessful in practically 
every respect, especially in relation to the first and the last 
of these.
Have you had people in difficulties with the job they've been 
put on?)
"Many a time....take the leads section. People 
used to stripping rubber mats - and they come to try 
and thread a tiny cotton through a little bead - 
because that's what it's like."
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(Can you help?)
"No, they're forced to leave, again, that's 
through movement of labour."
(Can't they be transferred somewhere else?)
"No, because they say there's nowhere else 
they can put them. And yet they'll employ 
other people and put them on.
There again, there's a lot of people won't go 
on the lines....Smith turns round and says 
'Well if we can move one, they'll all be 
wanting to be moved - which is what you would 
get'"
Pip (sub assembly) (24) Emphasis in original
Two instances were cited where stewards had been successful.
In one, the girls had downed tools because a person was moved as a
disciplinary measure (for absence) and another girl, the supervisor's
friend, was not. (Nora(25).) In the other case, Sally had taken
action on her own initiative entirely:
"Sometimes there are cases, say where a woman 
is PHYSICALLY UNABLE to do a job, you know. Such 
as a woman - they put her on the cartridge 
section, and she had this thyroid problem, and 
it affected her eyes, and her eyes were literally... 
you know, they'd been operated on, and they were 
literally stitched together - and the one eye was lit­
erally stitched, and the other one was open, and 
she wore dark glasses, and...she was in a terrible 
state! And no WAY could she do cartridges, but 
they expected her to sit there and do it, you know.
(very fine work using a microscope) And I just 
saw red! And I went across and fetched all her 
stuff off her, you know - all the stuff away from 
her. I said, 'You can't see it....vou can't do 
it! * So they fetched her off the job, and put 
her on a job with a little press - that she can do, 
and now her eyes are much better - but they haven't 
put her back on."
Sally (sub assembly)(26) 
emphasis in original.
These somewhat extreme instances apart it seems that - however 
much the stewards deplored it - movement of labour as such, was not 
taken up as a grievance.
"I'd got one lady worked fifteen years on 
the tables, doing nothing else. She was in 
her late fifties. And they moved her onto 
the lines and she left within three weeks.
I did mention this to Mr. Smith at one of the 
meetings upstairs. I said, that was NOT the 
way to repay loyalty. And he said, 'Had I 
known about it, it wouldn't have happened.'
But it happens all the time!
(on another occasion) six women had a quarter of 
an hour's notice of moving into the next depart­
ment - no time to dispute it or anything.
Because when you come in the next day, all their 
cards and everything have been transferred to 
the next department - so it's nothing to do with 
your superintendant - and you can't fight it.
You're not a steward on the lines, so you can't 
go in there and fight it for them."
Emphasis in original Madge (Moulding shop)(27)
Occasionally, the members tried to fight it for themselves:
"A pick-up arms section stopped work because 
they were being moved into the lines downstairs - 
'cos you get a few, you get groups of people 
that'll stick up for one another....'"
(Did they succeed?)
"Of course, they didn't, because it's mobility 
of labour. They just had to do it. They 
just had to do it, that's all. They just 
started work again and they felt, 'poor us1, 
but nothing could be done, so...
(Did you have to tell them?)
"I had to tell them it was movement of labour, 
and had to try and convince them that they 
might like it better...."
Pip (sub assembly)(28)
When Sharon refused to go back into the paintshop and Kathy
went to see management about it:
"they explained to me why and I explained to 
Sharon, you know. And she went back in for 
a couple of days. But she had thought they 
were taking her off main-plates and trying to 
put her back on hand-spraying - which she didn’t 
like.
But you've got some people who try to make it 
worse for them. ‘Cos they kept saying, 'Oh
-5t9-
you stick to your ground Sharon, don't you 
do it.' And they couldn't understand 
really that she was going to get the sack."
(She would have would she?)
"Yes"
(Why?)
"Well that's the way it is here - you can be 
sacked for refusing to do a job."
Kathy (PaintShop)(29)
Thus Pru considered it was more in her members' interest to 
advise co-operation:
"It's better not to play up - or else they 
get spiteful. I say - 'Well do it today, 
and you won't do it tomorrow. If you don't 
do it today, you will have to do it tomorrow 
and the next day....'" (30)
This does not mean that the stewards did nothing to regulate
some of the effects of movement of labour. They did attempt to
ensure it was done 'fairly' - that is, to regulate management's
power of selection, to some extent, and to prevent victimisation.
"I maybe get one every two or three weeks.
A girl decides she's tired of being moved 
and sends for me. They object to being 
picked on and I say movement of labour doesn't 
mean the same person every time."
Lorna (final assembly)(31)
And both lorna and Pru explained how they tried to forstall these 
problems by keeping their eyes open and warning the supervisors of 
possible problems if they saw someone being moved too often. But 
as with the problem of management disciplining the membership, the 
approach of the stewards to workers being moved in the first place 
was very much one of 'there's nothing we can do about it'. And 
workers' or stewards' requests for transfers were simply not entertained.
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If we look at the second aspect of movement of labour mentioned 
above - that of ensuring, when moves were made, this was at no 
detriment to the worker, different problems arise. There was in 
each factory some kind of custom and practice agreement regarding 
the possible loss of earnings due to workers changing jobs.
There were many problems, however, because the terms were vague, 
differed between factories (and, it would seem, within them)! 
and they were unevenly enforced. On the other hand, if the steward 
was inclined, or pushed to do so, there was often some scope for 
negotiation here.
The company had agreed to pay average earnings for one month
to any worker given a 'permanent' move. This could be avoided by
deeming most moves 'temporary', whereupon the worker was paid the
value of the job (if it was fixed) or what she 'earned' if it was
'piecework' - usually the lowest day-rate because they lacked the
speed to achieve the output required. In the latter case, a shop-
steward might negotiate a better payment on the grounds that the
operator was putting in sufficient effort to deserve it:
"I had two cases yesterday.... and I got a 
75 performance for two members and I got 
a 70 for one. But they were going to pay 
them 66. And they were doing jobs alien 
to them, you know what I mean?”
Sally (sub assembly)(32)
But the amount the steward could achieve was, of course, related
to how far the members were prepared to push:
"The one was getting the same as the job that 
she always does. The other two...they told 
me they were satisfied. I was a bit upset about 
the one particularly, because she gets a 99 
performance, and they boosted it up from 66 to 
75, you know. And she said, 'Don't bother,' 
you know, 'I'm happy'. So, you can't really 
force their arm up their back, can you?! And 
the other one, she normally got a 75, and they
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gave her a 66 - and then they took the 
paper back, and...I told her to, you 
know, ask for more, and he came back with 
70. And she came to me, she said, 'I'm 
satisfied' - well, I could have gone up, 
p'raps, and got 75 for her."
Sally (sub assembly)(33)
On fixed performance jobs there was no scope for negotiation 
in terms of effort. Pip had tried to get the women on her section 
to refuse to do jobs like sweeping up - a problem at the moment for 
three of them:
"They had been getting 86 performance on 
their job. Instead of asking if it would 
affect their pay, they got the brooms and 
swept up....they should get someone to do 
it - we've argued with Smith about it before... 
but, of course, they still do it. And when 
they drop their pay - they soon moan don't 
they? Their pay was dropped to a 76 perfor­
mance and the case is still going on now.
Pearl has been brought in...."
Pip (sub assembly)(34)
In these instances, although the shopstewards had attempted to 
establish or maintain protections against loss of earnings, little 
was achieved because the membership were not prepared to follow it 
through. This issue is taken up in more detail below.
The cases presented above cover those areas of most crucial 
importance to the women workers at BSR - speed-up and intensificaion 
of labour, discipline and movement of labour. All of these relate 
to the need for establishing controls over earnings and effort on 
the shopfloor. But the union machinery appears to have been an 
ineffective means for doing so. Summarising: some issues (like tin 
two instances of speed-up) perished as a result of inertia and 
delay after being taken into higher levels of procedure. Others, 
feuch as bad parts) were taken up continuously by stewards - only to
reappear just as continuously because they were never resolved at 
source. Then again, issues (such as loss of earnings through 
movement of labour) might be taken up by the stewards only to fail, 
or be resolved inadequately, because the membership accepted a 
detrimental compromise. On the other hand, these were also 
problems, such as disciplining workers for poor performance, or 
management instituting movement of labour which were not even 
contested by the stewards in the first instance. And an example 
of the way these aspects were linked could be seen in the case of 
speed-up - which was lost because management were allowed to use 
effective tactics (involving movement of labour) in order to win 
it. And finally, there were issues (which as getting transfers) 
on which management refused to negotiate or receive petition, and 
the shop stewards, therefore, consistently failed to make headway 
on behalf of the membership.
How are examples such as these to be analysed? What underlies 
the effectiveness or otherwise of shopstewards in their handling of 
the members1grievances? Three aspects can be singled out for 
attention here. And, although it is clear that they affect each 
other, they are identified separately at this point. First there 
is the behaviour of management to be considered. Secondly, there 
are the procedural and substantive terms of the agreement entered 
into by the union. Finally, we need to identify, in relation to 
both of these, what kind of impact they had on the bargaining 
strength of individuals and groups of workers - their ability and 
their preparedness - to press their grievances.
Management and the shopstewards1 grievance handling
The first aspect to consider when assessing the effectiveness
of shopfloor union organisation in general and stewards' grievance
handling in particular - is the weight and flow of problems which
arise from the implementation of management's production strategy,
and secondly, the scope for and degree of concession offered to the
shopstewards in relation to these. Both of these have consequences
for the way grievances are pursued by members and stewards, as is
illustrated in the following examples:
"There was a problem with a job that they 
retimed - and no way would we accept it, so 
we threw it into dispute. And they were getting 
a 75 for it - and they are sti11 getting a 75 for 
it, and it's been about 6 months, you know. He 
won't give them any more, he says that this level 
should be done, kind of thing - he's got all his 
slide-rules and his calculator and....The women 
say, 'No way can we do it', so we've just thrown 
it into dispute, and it's up to them now, as to 
whether they get a 75 and they work to a 75.
They get a 75....if he got his timing in, they'd 
get about a 69, some thing like that, you know.
And yet they say that a job has to be"proved"to 
be....for an 80 performance, but there's no way 
they do though." Sally (sub assembly)(35)
As this, and a number of similar instances show, there was a 
strong sense in which the workers had to *run in order to stand still. 
Far from being in a position to improve their situation, management's 
production strategy produced such a weight and flow of problems that 
it became exhausting simply to maintain the status quo. a minimum 
level of 'tolerance' established by workers under these circumstances 
meant that a significant number of issues remained, frustratingly,
uncontested.
"There was one particular job that the 
women were getting, I think it was about 
120 performance - and along comes work study, 
changed the method - now they're getting an 
80. But here, once again is where I blow 
me top - not at management, but at the women!"
Sally (sub assembly)(36)
Of course, this minimum level of tolerance established by the 
workforce depended on other circumstances as well. One important 
one being, the possibilities of success - if a grievance was to be 
pursued. A combination of management's conscious strategy to limit 
concessions to the shopfloor and market circumstances which inhibited 
their scope to do so, set strict limits on what could be gained.
The membership's assessment of its own strength had continuously 
to be re-evaluated. In this example, the steward describes the 
effects of failure:
"I had a woman on the line with 8 years service.
She collapsed when she got home and she was rushed 
to hospital and had a big operation - stomach removed 
and plastic tubing put inside her....She was away 
about 6 months.... came back eventually with a note 
from her doctor saying she could only do light work."
The personnel officer was away and the person standing in, who 
knew nothing about the case, told the woman she would have to go back 
on the main line. Soon the supervisor came to Nora and said the 
woman should not be working on the line - the doctor had told her 
that if she wrenched herself it could be fatal. Nora felt the 
supervisor should take this up with personnel - it was management's 
responsibility - but she would not do this. So Nora went herself, 
and it was suggested the woman should be found a light job until the 
personnel officer came back on Monday.
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"Well on the Monday, the woman's ordered 
back to work on the line again...and she 
came in tears....so we both went to personnel - 
who said there was nothing she could do.
They hadn't got a job. I said,'You can't 
tell me that in this factory, there isn't 
a little job SOMEWHERE you can find for this 
lady.' No! They wouldn't budge...."
The woman went back on the line and couldn't do her job. She started
crying again. Nora took her to the nurse and explained the
situation. She asked if the woman could be checked by the works
doctor :
"The nurse said, if she's not strong enough 
to do her job she shouldn't come to work.... 
fehe's at bloody work though!) She said there 
was nothing she could do. So back I went to 
personnel and X argued....No. They wouldn't 
budge....I told the woman to get a passout and 
go home...She was crying again."
After work Nora talked over the case with her husband, and the next
day she passed on his advice:
"I said, *1'm only telling you because I've 
discussed this case with my husband - and he's 
a very strong union man - and he's told me to 
tell you to file in a complaint right away, for 
unfair dismissal. You've been forced out of 
your job.' And I sent her up to union (branch) 
office. I told it to personnel too - in the 
hopes they would change their mind - but they 
didn't....
About a week later, one of the girls saw her 
up in Brierly Hill. *Oh,’ she says, 'I've had 
a lovely letter from the BSR,' she says - 'and 
Mr. Smith says, that he didn't know anything 
ABOUT it, and there's a job up in the cartridge
pen from 9.30 - 3.30___ ' I ASKED SIX TIMES
UPSTAIRS, TO LET HER INTO THE CARTRIDGE PEN.
THEY FLATLY DENIED-AND FLol'LY REFUSED IT.
And, of course, when you go back and you tell 
the women on the line 'NOTHING!' You g«t nothing.
And they say, 'No bloody good that union is. We'm 
paying our money for nothing' which, I s 'pose in a 
way is RIGHT isn't it? I mean they ARE aren't 
they? I mean, she's been paying it for 8 years 
and there wasn't a thing as could be done! And
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then after - to send her a 'lovely letter' 
like that and say 'he didn't know anything 
about' the case.... !"
Nora (final assembly)(37)
In Nora's opinion the officials had taken this individual's 
problem up as a special case, and sorted it out with management - 
although she was never informed about this. What mattered, in the 
end, was that, once again the union organisation on the shopfloor 
was shown to be totally ineffective.
These aspects of managerial policy: the nature, weight and flow 
of problems arising from their production strategy, together with 
the tightly constrained limits of concession in their bargaining 
policy where the women workers were concerned, had obvious conse­
quences for the scope and effectiveness of shopstewards' grievance 
handling and their members' confidence and preparedness to take up 
the issues. Naturally, if we are attempting to assess the strength 
or effectiveness of any particular group - like the women workers in 
comparison with the men - we need also to have some measure of the 
amount of pressure which is required in order to be^  effective i.e. 
the ' slope ' of the bargaining relationship's well as a measure of 
the bargaining strength and resources they have at their disposal.
In the earlier part of this thesis and again here, we are proposing 
the context of management's production and bargaining strategy is 
crucial in respect of the first of these - i.e. the degree of pressure 
required. At the end of this Chapter, we return to examine its 
relevance for the second - the extent of the workers' bargaining
resources.
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The collective bargaining agreement : Procedural and Substantive
terms
Clearly, the ability of the shopstewards to extract concessions
and curb the exercise of management's power on the shopfloor is
itself a factor determining how much managers are prepared to concede
and also in limiting from the outset the weight and flow of problems
having a significant impact on the membership. In this section
the effect of the basic union management agreement on the process 
of grievance handling is examined from the point of view of the shop- 
stewards who, as representatives of the union as well as the 
membership, were responsible for ensuring adherence to the agreed 
terms. These terms constituted the basis of the company/union 
bargaining relationship and had both procedural and substantive 
aspects. Both structured the representational/negotiating 
activity of the shopstewards - indirectly through the impact on 
the membership as well as directly.
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS : THE MOVEMENT OF LABOUR CLAUSE
25. Both the Company and the Union subscribe to a policy of increasing production and operating efficiency. T o achieve this end the Company will be free to introduce method improvements and new equipment but will consult with the Union as regards payment to be made to employees arising therefrom, and to decide whether or not work should be done within or sub-contracted outside the factory. Due to 
the large number of female employees and the type of work carried out in the factories, the work force has to be balanced in all sections each morning The Union recognises that flexibility, interchangea­bility and mobility of labour within the factory are essential for its prosperity and to ensure continuity of production.
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When the women assembling the pick-up arms were told to disband 
and go to work on the final assembly lines they stopped work in protest. 
When their shopsteward pointed out 'I had to tell them it was movement 
of labour, and had to try and convince them that they might like it 
better....' (Pip)(38) she was complying with clause 12 of the agreement.
12. I lie names and locations of Shop Representa­tives shall be notified in writing by the Union to the Company, who shall acknowledge receipt of the notification. Each Shop Representative must undertake to accept responsibility for carrying out his or her duties in accordance with the principles and procedures defined in the Agreement and shall accept personal responsibility for ensuring to the best of his or her ability that his or her constituents comply with the Agreement.
This evident conflict of interest caused problems for both members and 
shop stewards. Jill, who was a shopsteward and also a supervisor, 
discussed this in relation to doubling-up, an activity her own 
members (supervisors) had to initiate although she could see herself 
that it was something the operators should dispute through their own 
representatives. But it was not a problem the representatives could 
take up as a grievance:
"Now that (doubling-up) is a problem they should 
take up - but they prefer to take up wage queries.
I mean, the supervision, they're employees as well.
They are told to tell the girls to double-up.
Now as far as they are concerned, they are doing 
their job by tellin' 'em to double-up. But it 
is up to the union reps - well, the girls first - 
to ask for the shopsteward....But....the shop- 
stewards never encourage the girls to come to 
them with that complaint anyway. They 'ave 
brain-washed 'em into saying 'Mobility Of Labour)
You're here to do a job) And if they can find you - 
whatever job it is - doublin'-up, sweepin' up - you 
do it!' Well, it's wrong! But the shopstewards 
'ave drilled that into the members - and the members 
do not go to the union about it. (The shopstewards 
have actually told them that?) Oh, the mobility of 
labour - you're here to do a job - if the management 
can find you a job, you've got to do it.
(^ Why do they tell them that?)
^Because it's an easy way out by sayin'....and it 
causes no problems by sayin': 'Mobility Of Labour 
Document'."
Jill (supervisor - final assembly)(39)
One of the most important consequences, in terms of shopfloor
union organisation and grievance machinery was that the membership did
not bother to use it. Edna could see that movement of labour was
one of the most serious problems affecting her membership - but they
did not come to her with their grievances, nor for support if they were
disciplined for making a stand themselves:
"Cases like being moved on the line all the time.
Well, we have got a movement of labour policy, but 
there's being moved and being picked on - to keep 
being moved all the time. And so - they say, 'Well,
I'll have to go in the end, so I may as well go now.
If I've got to go all through all that....' , you 
know, so they go. Well, if the supervisor says to 
them to call me in - or what, I don't know. But I 
can't interfere - there's been quite a few of those.... " 
(What disciplinary cases do you deal with?)
"There again: I hear about things, but they don't 
get to me. Like - if supervisors ask someone to move 
and thev refuse - they're took in the office. When 
they come out, they sort of seem to move, so whatever's 
said to them - they can't ask for me, because otherwise... 
I've said to them, you should ask for me! Say you want 
your shopsteward in - but they never seem to come back 
for me so...."
Edna (final assembly)(40)
The agreement, therefore, was one reason why, although the problems 
of the membership were legion, the grievance load of the shopstewards 
was light.
"....at the moment, I think union 'ave put it over 
to the members - wrongly, I think so - about the 
mobility of labour. And they think, 'I've GOT to 
do it.' And I think also, they think 'Well, if 
I refuse, what's the union gonna do? I'm gonna land 
up doin' it anyway'. And that is the feelin' on 
the shopfloor - and they rarely go to union."
Jill (final assembly supervisor) (41)
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There were wider consequences than this however. Pip was 
particularly incensed by the way movement of labour was always justified 
in terms of the workers' absenteeism. When it was clearly the most 
important part of management's overall production strategy, the effect 
of this persistent 'reasoning' (that it was their own fault) was to 
disarm much of the membership's protest. They also remained alienated 
from the union:
"The members don't think the uniorfs doing 
enough." (What do they want the union to do?)
"They're really angry about the movement of 
labour. Twelve months ago, we had a strike 
at Old Hill over it...Because, we think it's 
wrong of Paul Silver and Mary - well it's Paul 
Silver actually.... to do with this book (The 
Blue Book agreement)"
(What happened with the strike?)
"Well they lost, of course, because they put 
it down to absenteeism again. You see they 
blame that - absenteeism."
(Do you think the workforce will ever get to
the point of saying - we're not having it any more?)
"No, because it's the top union that's doing it.
We've taken it to branch. I've taken it to 
branch - I said it shouldn't have been accepted 
the way it was, because it's been abused.... I've 
said it to Ferguson and he said he didn't know 
anything about it! But he DID - it was an 
agreement made between management and the union.
Without consulting the shopfloor - and that's 
been 6-7 years ago. And I've got that against 
them myself - movement of labour."
(And you don't think the workers will say w6're not 
having it anymore?)
"No, because if they turn round and say they're fed 
up with it, they just say, 'Well if you've got to 
be moved - you've got to be moved'. And some 
people resent it. They say, 'Oh, I shan't come 
to work, or I shall leave....' But you find move­
ment of labour is always blamed on absenteeism - and 
I disagree. I disagree, because it's really just 
to suit themselves.”
Pip (sub assembly)(42)
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From the shopsteward's point of view, of course, there were many 
problems associated with making the agreement work: 'We're doing manage­
ment's job.' They attempted to get the agreement changed and raised 
the issue through the branch. Apart from this, they also tried to 
limit its effects by seeking to redefine the meaning of the movement 
of labour clause itself.
(The movement of labour agreement - does it help at all?
"No it doesn't. I've had endless arguments with 
Mary over it. You see there's mobility of labour 
and there's movement of labour and they're two 
entirely different things. Mobility of labour 
means you can be put onto another job. Movement 
of labour means the job being moved say, from 
upstairs - moving a machine downstairs....You do 
the same job but it's been moved."
Pip (sub assembly)(43)
Another strategy was to try and limit the scope of the agreement, 
for example, by stipulating that movement could only be made within - 
but not between - sections. But there is no evidence that movement 
was prevented in this way.
When the women on Kathy's section in the paintshop were asked to 
go onto the grinding machine in the EPS plant they complained about 
having to move because the noise was intense and damaging. (It 
affected their balance as well as their hearing). The two sections 
were quite separate, but because the EPS had been added to Kathy's 
constituency (i.e. she represented them as a shopsteward), they were 
now considered to be linked. Her discussion of this incident raises 
too,the personal feelings of guilt and discomfort at having to police 
the agreement as the representative of the union, rather than act as
the representative of the members.
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(Is there anything you have done as a shopsteward that you have 
kicked yourself for?)
"In a way yes - at the EPS I was told that if it 
was a job on your section - it was like, included 
in your section - you couldn't refuse to do that 
job. Now, the grinding machine comes under the 
EPS and, when the women said to me, 'Do we have 
to go on the work.' I says, 'Well, as far as I know, 
that job's included, like, on our section and you 
can't really refuse to do it.' And then Pearl 
came over like,, and we was talking about it. . . .And 
anyway I felt guilty saying that - but....In a way 
they had to do it, because it was included in our 
section. But I didn't like the idea of having to 
TELL them that, you know what I mean? Because I 
knew how they felt and the way it was."
Emphasis in original Kathy (Paintshop)(44)
Jill, as a supervisor on the assembly lines had found it particularly
difficult to act in accordance with both the requirements of her job
and her own 'union principles' which opposed movement of labour -
especially when it led to doubling-up jobs:
"It's true - WE are allowing it! Even me! I've 
got to admit....I'm not actually a shopsteward for 
my girls on the lines - but I ....you know....It kills 
me when I 'ave to say to a girl, 'Double-up!' Now,
I used to say to 'em 'When I ask yer - refuse'. But 
I was...When they refused, and they was taken in the 
office: 'Well, supervisor told me not to!' So I 
thought, 'Dann it! If they can't speak for themselves 
and use their own mind, I'm not gonna give them any 
advice anymore!' You know....But you've got 
partly to blame - the operators themselves for 
doing it: but you've also got the union - for allowing 
it. And it's done all over the shopfloor you know - 
it's terrible!"
Jill (final assembly supervisor)(45)
Why did the shop stewards find it easier to make the agreement work
than to represent their members' grievances?
"The trouble is with a lot of the union people - they 
don't follow through their convictions - they're scared - 
which is a pity. I mean, I'm scared - there's no doubt 
about it - I shake like a leaf when I'm in with John 
Smith.... Well the shopstewards, they would like the 
backing of the union - and this union here, well they 
won't get it."
Jill (final assembly supervisor)(46)
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p roblems WITH PROCEDURES
(Have you done anything you have kicked yourself for afterwards?)
"Yes, I didn't go through procedure properly - I 
didn't lose the case, but I could have"
Janet (sub assembly)(47)
The procedure for dealing with requests,complaints and disputes 
was set out in the Blue Book agreement. Most of the women stewards 
discussed the use of these procedures as being highly problematic.
In this section we look at some of the aspects in which they were 
found to be so.
Edna referred to the procedures as "a protection for management".
She described how they acted as a considerable disincentive against
members raising a grievance in the first place, and how this caused
frustration for herself as a shop steward:
"If the girls have got a problem on the line then 
they tell the supervision, then, if the supervision 
can't sort the problem out, she tells the forewoman, 
if the forewoman can't sort it out, she tells the 
superintendent, and, if the superintendent can't sort 
it out, he calls the shopsteward in - and we take it up."
(So the members don't come straight to you?)
"Well not....this is procedures. Some do go out of 
of procedure sometimes and you have to say - can you 
go back into procedures - you know, to go through 
in the right manner. Before they actually see me - 
they have to see at least three people, and then I 
have to go back and follow their tracks.... Well, it's 
a protection to me, that seems a protection to 
management - really, isn't it? Because that means 
there isn't a person that can come to the shopsteward 
unless management knows about it."
(Have they come straight to you?)
"There have been occasions - and I've had to tell 
them to go through the procedures - quite often.
(And have they come back to you?)
No, actually, they sort of - 'Oh, it's not worth 
it...' Yes, many a time.
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But....There are some problems they probably 
have and they can't explain to the management - 
but they can explain to us better... Because you 
can see the worker's point of view - because 
you've got the problem too. But, of course,
I can't say anything about it, because if they 
did come with a problem to me I know I could do 
something about it - but I've got to tell them 
to go through the supervisor, the forewoman and 
the superintendent. And I know that - once you 
say those three people - that's it: 'Oh, bugger it 
then!' And I think, you know, that it's a good 
case. But they just think_ 'Oh, if I go to the 
superintendent, I may as well tell him myself 
anyway - what's the point in coming to you?...'"
Edna (final assembly)(48)
One of the reasons why the use of procedures had an inhibiting
effect was because, in order to be able to process a grievance in
been
this way, it has to be an issue which has already/defined as negotiable. 
Thus the procedures themselves become part of a process of defining 
problems out of the sphere of union action.
(Have you ever had a problem you couldn't deal with in procedure - 
and gone outside it?)
"You can do it occasionally. Everybody has a 
problem sometimes that you can sort out by having 
a quite word. When it happens like that, it's 
usually the members asking the impossible so you 
just have a quiet word in their ear and make ’em 
see sense you know."
Elizabeth (Machine Shop)(49)
"If I think there is a case for the union to be 
involved, I tell them to go through procedure.
Ask for me first, but go through procedure. I 
always tell them to go through procedure, because 
that's the first thing they throw at you: procedure - 
i f you don't "
My emphasis Pip (sub assembly(80)
But quite clearly, apart from the question of defining the problem, 
it was the way in which the procedures rendered the shopsteward 
passive in the first instance, and forced the individual member into
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initiating any action, which served more effectively than anything 
else, to filter out problems from the grievance machinery.
(Do you have members who find difficulty in doing the job they are 
put on?)
"I find this happens quite a lot really, on the 
main lines, but they don't all get to me. You 
know, I don't always hear about them, because I've 
also got to stand there and do a job. I can't just 
go and walk about like the supervisors do - and 
unless people bring it up to me, then there isn't 
a thing I can do about it. (So how do you get to
hear about them?) Well, through gossip, back-chat 
like, on a dinner time or a break-time. They'll 
say, 'They've moved her again....oh, you know she's 
only been here a week and they're moving her.' And 
like, this dinner-time, a girl was saying she was
on five.... she's new, she's on a month's trial and
she had five jobs yesterday. She said, 'I shouldn't 
be having five jobs - I'm new....' She's not 
talking to me as a shopsteward, she's just telling 
the supervisor - and I sit by the supervisor. As I 
say, she's just had the coat*- and she said, 'Well, 
if you're a bit slow on the job, I've got to find a 
job that you're going to get used to - so you can 
pick your speed upi BUT, look at it this way - 
there is that point of looking at i t — but I look at 
it this way,if they don't give them TIME to pick up their 
speed, how are they going to know that they're 
suitable for that job? But they don't come through 
the proper procedure and see me. If I poked my nose 
in, then - all I'd get off the management was - 'Well, 
did she ask to see anybody else before she saw you?'
Well, she hasn't. So it's up to them isn't it? I 
hear about quite a few things like that, but it never 
actually gets to me so - either they've sorted it out 
or they don't bother....
Edna (final assembly)(51)
In this case, Edna also refers to the extra problem of being 
rendered passive in the sense of being tied to her job and less able 
to discover problems that arise. Jill who was a supervisor was not 
subject to the same immobility and she could see how this might enable 
her to do the job of a shop steward more effectively.
*just been made a supervisor: given a blue overall.
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"But this is what I'm arguing about. The shop- 
stewards ....wel1, so long as they can avoid 
trouble.... they keep away from it anyway. Now 
I don't mean to say go and nose it out - but 
for God's sake once a day, go up to your members - 
'Have you got any problems?' - which I do to mine.
Because I mean, my members are all over this 
factory, upstairs, moulding, everywhere. But 
sometime during the day I ' ave to hit one of those 
departments, an' I always ask them - if they've 
got....and they 'ave, they've got problems every 
day...(laughs) not serious ones, but.... little 
grumps and groans."
(But most shopstewards are not allowed to do that - the 
member has to come to them? Can a line steward 
go down her line?)
"No, but I mean, I'm talkin' about before the bell 
goes at 8, - which is their own time, admittedly."
"....because if you wait for permission...I know it 
shouldn't be withheld....1 mean, like the case on 
line one, not so long ago - the girls asked for 
the shopsteward, they'd got a problem with the 
count - and...it wasn't convenient for them to see 
the shopsteward. Now, when the shopsteward heard 
that, she should've gone right into the office and 
said - you must not withhold reasonable access - 
sort of thing. But no! She give 'im 24 hours!
Bend the rules a bit,'cos BSR bend 'em,so why 
shouldn't we! And that's where they walk over us 
really."
Jill (final assembly supervisor) (52)
It is interesting to note that in two instances, mobile service­
men represented the women workers. This was in the moulding shop 
where the women were isolated, being widely separated and hidden from 
each other by the huge machines to which they were also effectively 
tied by the count.
One way of overcoming the problem of immobility and isolation and 
to get grievances raised might have been to hold meetings of the members 
on a section. This was forbidden and would have been difficult to 
achieve without drawing unwelcome attention on the open shopfloor - 
which was extremely crowded in any case - providing little space in 
which to meet. The same constraints did not apply to the men who
mostly worked in shops or sections of plant separated off from the open 
floor. Many of them, in addition had relatively greater freedom of 
movement attached to their jobs. Overall it was clear that the proce­
dures themselves served to inhibit, to a very great extent, the 
possibility of the problems experienced by the women worxers being 
articulated as grievances, through the system of representation provided 
by union organisation. For example, on the main assembly lines:
"The lines are very complicated - in work, 
union-wise - in every way. I mean, it's the most 
strenuous work, I think, in the factory. The most 
frustration is on the line and well - as we call it - 
sweat... Everything! And it is - I s'pose they've 
made it - more complicated on the lines, to get to 
your shopsteward, because...Well, in one way it's good 
for us, but in another way it's very good for the 
management. Because, I s'pose, if we had to take up 
every case, we wouldn't have a job on the line! But 
I never seem to get round to any cases really these 
days. So whether they're not coming to me or they're 
just saying, 'Oh, blow it,' you know - because they do 
get like that.....
I agree with what the girls say to me sometimes. They 
say, 'Well, if we've got to go through the supervision 
and the forewoman and the superintendent - let's take 
it up ourselves. What are we paying a shopsteward for?
What are we paying the union for?'- which....I 've got 
to agree with them. And, they say, 'It's a protection 
for management! which again I’ve got to agree with them.
I mean - it's not a protection for the girls is it?"
My emphasis Edna (Final assembly)(53)
There were also problems however, when grievances were raised.
It was the common fate of many issues simply to "perish". That is, they 
remained unresolved and the workers gave up, apparently, pursuing their 
"complaints, requests or disputes". Two features of the procedure 
itself seemed to promote this. One was the built-in delay associated 
with having to follow through all the stages. Although the first 
significant level of decision - making on management's part was 
probably superintendentt on the final assembly lines, for example,
there were another two stages before this. There was plenty of
-568-
scope for managers to pass decisions on, further up the line, in order 
to increase the delay. Secondly, at the higher levels of procedure 
(i.e. once the convenor had been brought in) the member(s) and frequently 
their stewards too, lost their involvement in the issue and matters 
could more easily be allowed to drop or be "traded".(54) Related 
to this question of levels and 'effectiveness' is the point that 
effective decision-making within (both management and) the union structure 
lay with the top officials, while the impact of the problems and
pressures for change impinged on the membership at the bottom i.e. on 
the shopfloor — at the point of production. It is one indication of 
the extent to which the channels between officials and membership more 
effectively communicated the interests of the former than the latter, 
that the grievances we are examining failed to appear at the higher 
levels of negotiation, or only made such an appearance as part of the 
process of being 'lost'. It is necessary, of course, to explain why 
this should be the case. Here, however, we note that delay and the 
loss of effectiveness associated with higher levels of procedure 
constituted a problem for the women in the union at BSR.
Some of the grievances which we looked at earlier were handled
by the shopstewards (for example, bad parts) but only to reaopear
because at shopfloor level no significant impression could be made on
managements production policy. The question of negotiating levels
was, therefore, highly relevant to the shopsteward's effectiveness in
handling the members' problems.
"I get on OK with my own superintendent, but if 
problems get passed up the line then I'll get 
no satisfaction. If it's a problem that can be 
DEAI.T with by the superintendent then - all well 
and good - we don't do too bad."
Eunice (final assembly)(55)
-569-
< •*This meant that on the larger issues the shopstewards were less 
effective altogether.
"I don't think the union is strong enough at all."
(How could it be stronger do you think?)
"Well I've got no authority really at all, you 
know I've got to go higher up all the time.
I've no..., I won't mention the factory but 
there (Leyland) the shoyistewards can call the 
strike and then go and explain what's gone on.
I mean, here I've got to go and explain, and 
then it's got to be 'phoned higher and higher, 
you know until....And even then - they say,
'No, you can't stop work"'.
(And the shop stewards are responsible for 
keeping the agreement?)
"I know what I've got to do like, but there's 
a load of cases where I think - it's just not 
fair, I should be allowed to do something, but 
I can't without going higher, you know?"
(What sort of issues would you particularly like 
to be able to do something about?)
"Well I'd like to be able to help the women more.
Like, where their performances drop - waiting timey 
the money and like....your waiting time, it's 
only day rate. And it does affect your money 
quite a bit. I'd like to help them there. And 
the bad parts situation and things like that."
(How much could you be down with bad parts and 
waiting time?)
"You could be a couple or three pounds down, 
depending how much waiting time we've got."
(How could you remedy that?)
"Because it's not our fault we're waiting is 
it? It shouldn't affect your money, I don't 
think."
(So you'd have average earnings for waiting?)
"Yes".
(And what could you do about bad parts, pay them 
for the units they've made?)
"Yes. Because like, we have bad main plates and 
they get right to the final inspection - they're 
no good. They've got that bad scratch on them - 
they can't go through, or they've got impurities 
in the metal. That's a unit the girls aren't going 
to get paid for."
(So they should be paid for all the units they put 
together, bad or good?)
Yes. Or they should make an allowance for breakdowns 
because we get about 40 a day I should imagine. You 
know, a good day and a very bad day - it would
-570-
average out about 40. I mean, there's 
not always anything the paint girls can do 
with them - if it's too bad.
Barbara (final assembly)(56)
Apart from the question of the way their effectiveness was linked 
to different levels of negotiation which was in turn governed by the 
grievance procedure, there were other specific features of the pro­
cedure itself, in particular the built in delays, which can be related 
to the large number of grievances left unresolved - or resolved in 
management's favour because they were simply abandoned.
Jill had a case which ran for five weeks. A line was 
being disbanded and management wanted to 'take the coats off' the 
supervisors and to make them into operators again.
"It took me 5 weeks and...When I say 5 weeks, 
actually.... I failed to agree the first time, 
then it took a couple or three days for me to 
get back in again on the next phase....Actually, 
that's what it was - it was time WASTING it wasn't 
time arguing. It was time-wastin' till my next....
Because I kept just registering failures to agree."
Emphasis in original Jill (final assembly
supervisor)(57)
Eventually she got to stage 4 and a meeting in the conference room 
with the factory manager, Mr. Smith. When he saw that she was prepared 
to go to stage 5, meeting the industrial relations director which meant 
the dispute was to be taken outside the factory, he came up with a 
solution.
In this case, the dispute did not 'perish' as a result of the delays. 
In the next example, this did happen. Significantly, it is one of the 
(very) few instances where a steward described an attempt to take on 
one of the problems we have been concerned to explore: doubling-up -
the intensification of labour.
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"What happened was, someone didn't turn up - 
it was absenteeism again. And there was a girl, 
she was o n ‘weights,' and she had to do'heights’ as 
well - so that was 2 jobs. She said, 'they’re 
always picking on me'. And I know she'd been doing 
it all week and it was getting very tiring. So I said,
'Well, you should complain', I said, 'but don't do 
it out of procedures - go through the right procedures.'
Well, she did and I took it as far as the works 
manager. You know I went through the supervisor, the 
forewoman, the superintendent and now I'm with Mr.
White. Well, while I was fighting it with Mr. White, 
he said, Til come back to you on this matter' - and 
things like this. And he said it was all caused 
through absenteeism. Well, I was going to put in 
a failure to agree to see Mr. Smith. That's what I 
WAS going to do because I wasn't getting any satis­
faction off Mr. White.
The following day, I came into work and I realised 
I'd left my heater on, which I was drying my clothes 
round, and I was afraid in case it got too hot and it 
singed....my husband was going to complain. So I 
asked for a pass-out. This was at 10 o'clock. Well, 
when I came back at 11 o'clock - the girl who was 
complaining, had doubled-up. She went back to it, 
she doubled-up again. She said, 'Oh, in the end, I've 
had to do it'. So, of course, it made me look - while 
my back was turned - it made it look as tho' I was 
causing all the disturbance and the trouble. And 
you've got the supervisor saying - 'she's a troublemaker, 
she is.'
Well, they would never complain to supervision anyway - yet 
they WERE complaining to me. And I just needed that 
time to go through the procedures. It took three days.
When I started to complain, they stopped doubling her up 
for three days. But when I went home the one day, from 
lO o'clock to 11 o'clock - and everyone in the factory 
knew about it - she'd doubled-up. And these are the 
problems you get - unless you've got your eye on them 
all the time - they do it. So what's the point in 
fighting?”
Edna (final assembly)(58)
It would appear that some issues are more 'perishable' than others: 
and presumably one of the factors in the case above was the operator's 
assessment that, ultimately, the union did not oppose movement of 
labour. She would not have support from the officials, and she would, 
eventually, have to do it. In assessing the difference in 'perish­
ability' the question of wider support for issues in dispute is an
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important aspect o£ how long they can be sustained. This is parti­
cularly the case when 'unofficial action* seems to be required in 
order to put pressure on the grievance procedure itself - as in the case 
of the faulty gauges on the welders: "It's been over two months.
He just keeps saying - the parts are coming - but they're losing as 
much as E2-E3 per week." Sarah(59). These workers had not yet taken 
action. In the example of a group of workers who did - on the pick-up 
arms section, it will be seen that in doing so, there was a risk of 
having the issue removed from the 'recognised' agenda of negotiation 
altogether, support from officials usually being conditional upon 
procedures being properly followed.
There was risk involved too, for the shop stewards, who frequently 
went 'out of procedure' in order to deal effectively with an issue - 
in particular, to avoid it's death by delay.
(Have you done anything you have kicked yourself for afterwards?)
"Yes, I'm inclined to overstep procedure sometimes. I 
just can’t see the sense in going through supervisor, 
senior supervisor, chargehand and superintendent, and 
by the time all that's gone through.... 11’s something 
so stupid - that the girls....when they tell the 
supervisor, she might be busy. So it might be 2 hours 
before the other one gets told about it. And sometimes,
I've even dealt with a case before it's even gone to the 
next stage - I've often done that and I'm being pulled 
up because I've not gone through procedures.
I think if a girl's got a problem she should be able to ask
for permission to go off her line to see her shopsteward.
Or ask for the shopsteward, without having to go all 
through this rigmarole."
(Do they ever come straight to you?)
"Oh yes."
(Do you have to send them.... ?
"I do but I don't. I deal with it myself when I can.
(Have you ever tried to change that?)
"They wouldn't change it. Never - if it's in the 
book of rules"
Tracy (final assembly)(60)
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Of course, in theory, the use of procedures is supposed to
constrain management and thus protect the membership.from arbitrary
or precipitate action. In practice, however, it would seem that it
was the shopstewards (and the membership) who had their powers to
initiate action constrained to a much higher degree.
"The older women who don't answer back, they just 
sit there and take it. Even people that really 
want help - but you can't help them unless they 
come to you - you're not allowed to step in any 
old time - though sometimes you do...."
Janet (sub assembly)(61)
Since management retain the initiative in any case, through 
asserting managerial prerogatives (also written into the agreement, 
clauses 25, 26, 27, 34 and 35), the grievance machinery is, in the 
first place, largely a mechanism for processing workers' responses or 
defences, rather than a means of them initiating changes for themselves. 
This is, of course, the situation with grievance procedures generally 
(62). But still it has to be explained why, even in this limited 
respect, in some workplaces the system is more responsive to workers' 
needs than in others.
Management and shopstewards' grievance handling : the balance of 
power on the shopfloor
There appears to be no intrinsic advantage or disadvantage to 
either management or the workforce attached to formal/written agree­
ments as averse to unwritten, custom and practice 'rules'. In respect 
of either of these the advantages and strategies of each side will 
change, depending on the issues and circumstances. Written terms 
tend to have the character of being more inflexible and more widely 
generalised. To the extent therefore, that they reflect the balance 
of power pertaining in the employment relationship, they tend to
rigidify it.
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The bargaining agreement at BSR contained a number of written,
substantive terms which expressed the employer's interest - we have
examined one of the most significant from the women workers' point
of view - the movement of labour clause. This both reflected and
consolidated management's power on the shopfloor. In written form it
did this all the more effectively - from management's point of view:
"We don't normally have much trouble with it at all.
And, invariably, we have the full co-operation of 
the shopstewards - if we do have movement of labour.
I mean, they know the rules - the rules are clearly 
laid down - full movement of labour."
Barry White (factory manager)(63)
And they would have liked to have had the new disciplinary procedure
for absenteeism ('the absenteeism agreement') established in a similar
form, for the same reason.
"The absentee procedure must.... should be put in 
the book. We’re working from a separate agree­
ment now, which is more or less custom and practice, 
but is not in writing - that would be a good thing 
to have in. ..."
Barry White (Factory Manager)(64)
Procedural terms, on the other hand, do not codify the balance of 
power in quite the same way, and neither do arrangements for setting up 
the representative system. (They both still express this, of course, 
to the extent that management retains the initiative and stewards are 
rendered passive) and features such as the number of stages or the 
time limits may improve or exacerbate this). But the procedure itself 
is a standardised form of communication, operated within the system of 
representation which runs in three directions: between membership, 
management and the union organisation. Often (but not always) 
established in the first place as a result of strength having to be 
used on the workers' side, the balance of power in the employne nt 
relationship may be more readily expressed subsequently, in the degree 
of tilt or 'slope1 of these channels thereafter.
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We have already noted a lack of responsiveness in the procedure 
at BSR such that it appeared to work more in management's favour.
We now go on to examine further, their degree of domination over the 
representative system as a whole.
The relationship between the system of grievance processing and 
the relative (in)effectiveness of the union on the shopfloor is 
illustrated in this example, where Janet contrasts management's 
initiative and freedom of action with the shopstewards' and members' 
activity of 'grieving':
"Last week management tried to tell the members 
that they couldn't have any more passouts. Well, 
the shopstewards said - No, they couldn't tell 
them that. But they still tried to say the women 
must bring letters and appointment cards in. Well, 
many appointments are done by 'phone or at the hospital 
and at very short notice.... the managers don't have 
to think about who is going to let the gas man in....”
"(And) people don't know about or use procedure in 
the way they should do - so they don't come to me 
with their problems....And management can use this 
against the shopstewards. They say, 'They don't 
do anything for you.'"
Janet (sub assembly) (65)
We can now go on to see how the whole area of managerial initiative 
was not confined to the organisation of production, labour control or 
to rule-making - as in the example above. It extended, crucially, 
into the system of shopfloor representation itself. Overall, manage­
ment played a significant role in shaping the grievance handling 
activities of the shopstewards. Edna expressed this quite clearly:
"I was once going to have a girl walk out because 
she had a lot of stock on the floor and she couldn't 
cope. And management didn't seem to be taking much 
notice of her. And I fetched her back and said,
• 'Don't get walking out, don't be stupid,' you know,
'i'll go in the office with you and sort it out'.
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And we have got satisfaction there, everything 
came off alright - she didn't walk out and she 
took her coat off and went back to work. I 
think it's when the pressure gets on top of you, 
you know and you just can't cope really. But that 
was because I saw her walking out and I ran after 
her you see. If that had been another case I 
would not even have known about it.
You see,they say DON'T RELY ON THE MANAGEMENT. 
but you have to rely on the management. You 
have to rely on the management for a good many 
things here really. Because if you go to them 
and say 'Are you alright.' and they give you a 
problem on the line, then you're going out of 
procedure . Until they have actually seen the 
management you can't do anything - so, you have 
to rely on the management to fetch you in.
Because if the management don't think you ought 
to be called in, then they needn't bother had they?"
Emphasis in original Edna (final assembly)(66)
But, quite apart from taking advantage of that aspect of the 
grievance procedure which denied initiative to the stewards, there 
was, alongside this, a whole area where management was given the 
initiative in the union’s representative system. Together with the 
grievance procedure, the Blue Book contained management's disciplinary 
procedure which backed up the rules and substantive terms in the 
agreement.
"Occasionally, you get the maverick who throws up 
and says, 'I'm not going to do that job'. So you 
follow through the procedure."
Barry White (Factory Manager)(67)
This procedure had been used 'offensively' by management right
from the start - as is revealed by the convenor's discussion of the
union's ear)y days.
"One of the main problems we'd got was perpetual 
absenteeism. The procedure - in the Blue Book, 
was printed immediately the union came in, with 
verbal and written warnings administered to the 
workers. And the shopstewards were immediately 
involved in this."
(Did the absenteeism improve?)
"Oh no, you'll always get this in a women's factory..."
Pearl (sub assembly convenor)(68)
She didn't feel that absenteeism had been any worse before the
procedures. The difference they made was that the women were brought
before the management in a more systematic way. And all she hoped
was that: "The right words were used". Brought back to the present
day the convenor considered absenteeism again:
"It's worse when the school holidays are on with 
smaller children or three or four at home - you 
can't leave them. We even get it when the 
Blackpool illuminations are on - or a lot will 
have the Friday off if they're going away for the 
weekend. Or else, the women have time off if 
their husbands have a winter holiday...."
(Do they get a warning for that?)
"(hesitates) - well yes, but it depends...."
(Do you think they should )
"Not really, no. But, there you go again, it's
in the procedure. It was drawn up by the GMWU
and the company not the likes of us you see, it was by
the officials and...But, let's be honest about it,
as long as they (the members) don't repeat the practice -
well, those are scrapped. It doesn't go onto the
record or anything really.
The only thing that I've got about those warnings, quite 
honestly, is that - you get people go to pieces - and 
you do. Alright then, if there's theft, pilfering 
or over-booking, then by all means, or passing bad work - 
and I would say that is when warnings should be given, 
but not...."
Pearl (sub assembly convenor)(69)
As we can note from this, "the shop stewards were immediately 
involved" in this disciplinary offensive. And it is clear that if 
the membership were inhibited from raising "complaints, requests or 
disputes" through the system of representation and the institutional 
channels provided - the same could not be said of management.
It is clear that right from the earliest days of unionisation, the 
bulk of the shopsteward's representational function was initiated by 
management - when the shopstewards were called in to witness disci­
plinary action.
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"When the union first came in - I didn't know, 
that when I came to, shall we say, stand for 
the welfare of that member - whether she was a 
member or whether she wasn't. But at that 
time it didn't mean anything to me because I 
was a shopsteward over that section - and I 
took the problems, because I was probably asked 
to by the superintendent - to go along to the 
office with Mrs so and so....and I wouldn't know 
whether she was paying her union dues or not."
Pearl (sub assembly convenor) (70)
When Edna therefore referred to her grievance load being reduced,
she saw management as being partly responsible for this:
"I did once have a case of absenteeism, where they 
kept having time off...but we used to go in every- 
time with our members - when they used to be taken 
into the office to be given a warning. But now, 
for the last six months, the superintendent hasn't 
sent for us in. And the members are not asking so,
we don't go in with them. It's very.... you know,
we're sort of being...They go in, and they ask - 
why are they away and one thing and another - and 
whatever's said to them, I don't know....
The only time that they've asked for me in,is when 
they actually signed on the warning. But, of course,
I don't know what's going on - because I haven't been 
in before - I don't know how many days she's had off, 
and if they're doing the right procedures or anything 
like that. It's very complicated really and, the only 
time that they've called me in is when it really gets 
bad, you know and I don't think it's fair, because 
they're sort of flinging me in the deep end. I mean, 
how can I stand up and fight for 'em when I don't 
know how many days they've had off, or what for, or 
anything? But I don't think it was fair with the 
superintendent NOT telling them, because I don't think 
he says to them - you can have your shopsteward in."
(Can you do anything about this?)
"No, not really, because they turn round and say - well 
they can't want you because they know they can ask for 
you, they don't ask for you, so we don't send for you - 
you see. But I think if the management and the union 
could work it a bit better, then you wouldn't have to 
ask for the shopsteward. I think management should 
already turn round to the people that are concerned and 
say - well, I should have your shopsteward in. It is 
a difficult situation, because it's all down to your 
members - if they don't ask for us, then how can we....?
I mean, I can't say - ask for me or I'll threaten you!
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Or anything like that. I mean it's up to....They 
know that I'm there."
Edna (final assembly)(71)
Management's domination of the union's system of representation 
was significantly maintained by the degree of initiative they assumed 
in instigating disciplinary action against the women workers i.e. 
the weight and extent of this disciplinary load. A major consequence 
was to render the structure of representation at shopfloor level 
even less responsive to the women workers, and tilted more firmly 
towards management:
"The management of BSR are very fond of getting 
the shopstewards to do their duty - things that 
I think shouldn't be to do with a shopsteward in 
a way - such as carrying information. When they've 
got any information to pass over to the members 
then they shouldn't have to ask the shopstewards 
to do it for them."
Elizabeth (Machine shop)(72)
One of the reasons trade union representation is put forward as 
promoting good industrial relations practice is precisely because of 
the channels of communication which are facilitated. But isn't it 
also relevant to ask whose interests are being represented? Why?
And to what effect?
"I don't think we ought to be involved in telling 
people what they've got to do - I think that 
should be management's side. I think we're 
there to help the members, not push them into 
doing things."
Janet (sub assembly)(73)
The terms of the bargaining relationship were heavily weighted 
in the employer's favour. Management's retention of their prero­
gatives in every aspect pertaining to the organisation of production, 
ensured their almost unfettered dominance over workers on the shopfloor. 
And this, together with their retention of initiative in respect of 
disciplining, ensured their dominance over the representational system.
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We should note that both of these are areas traditionally 
eschewed in trade unions' collective bargaining practices, to
the extent that these are patterned on a 'counter-vailing power' 
model, and mainly focus on compensatory aspects of labour - rather 
than its Jeyiec or mode of utiliatior,. Herding noted this differen­
tiation of interest, in relation to the American plants he studied.
"....in both unions (auto and steel) the local,
'non-economic' working conditions were matters 
of high interest for the rank and file, whereas 
the leadership stressed, and won from management, 
concessions in areas such as employment stabili­
zation (for a diminished workforce), fringe benefits 
placing a premium on long service, and higher off- 
job rewards.”
Herding (1972) p.34
The union officials at BSR repeatedly contended that it was in 
the best interests of the membership, for the firm to be run as 
efficiently as possible - it's survival did indeed depend upon it.
On these grounds they could not justify 'interference' in respect of 
either production or labour force organisation/control. A division of
labour was acknowledged in this bargaining policy whereby it was up to 
management to make due profits and: "the union, they're out to help 
management make profits - and they have a share in them." This is the 
basis of the pluralists' view of collective bargaining whereby 
"everybody gains". But we also need to examine - what are the costs? 
And who bears them?
Conclusions ; Causes and consequences
We began this Chapter by enquiring how far the women workers at 
BSR benefitted from the machinery established as a result of union­
isation - given the serious nature of the problems they experienced 
on the shopfloor. We found that their utilisation of these institu­
tional resources was minimal. Moreover the resources appeared to be
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least effective in precisely those areas we have identified as having 
greatest significance for the development of the women workers' job 
controls and bargaining resources.
Examining some of the issues specifically, we found that many 
problems were never raised as grievances in the first place, or they 
were raised by members but not taken up by stewards, or they were 
taken up, only to be lost - because they perished after delay, were 
rapidly abandoned by the membership or were simply won outright by 
management. As an overall consequence,the membership's ability and 
willingness to either take up or pursue grievances was reduced and 
the shopstewards suffered from frustration, or were soon voted out 
of/gave up office, because of the problems they either failed to take 
up or when they did - to win.(74) How are these problems to be 
explained?
Our analysis of the collective bargaining agreement setting out 
the terms of the bargaining relationship goes some way towards providing 
an explanation. Firstly we have seen how particular aspects such 
as the movement of labour clause directly constrained the grievance 
handling of shopstewards and grievance-raising of the membership.
Secondly, we have been able to demonstrate that the trade union's 
'compensatory' bargaining policy - which is also reflected in this 
agreement - fitting in with management's tight guard over certain 
prerogatives, left the latter almost wholly unconstrained in respect 
of production and labour control. As a result, access to, and the 
utility of institutional resources (the procedure and representative 
system), from the women workers' point of view was further reduced. 
Indeed, management was able to swing these (even) more in their own
favour.
Thus in two significant respects, the sources of the women 
steward's ineffectiveness in respect of their members' grievances, and 
the latter's lack of involvement with, indeed, alieration from the 
union organisation on the shopfloor can be seen to derive from the 
institutional arrangements and relationships - rather than their 
own female/personal capacities. In what follows, we take up an 
examination of the causes and further consequences of this in more 
detail.
CAUSES
In the previous Chapter we have proposed that collective bargaining 
involves the distribution of both costs and benefits, and the balance 
of power in bargaining relationships determines the nature and extent 
of these. We have been particularly concerned to explore the impli­
cations or effects of this unequal distribution, firstly between the 
employer and the workforce, and secondly, within the ranks of the 
labour force itself. One consequence we have already proposed is 
that the greater the predominance of the employer's interest carried 
in joint bargaining, the more unresponsive the representative structures 
of the union are likely to become, from the point of view of the 
membership. And in this Chapter we have shown how this was the case 
with regard to the grievance machinery established as a result of 
unionisation.
A second consequence we have identified as having a bearing on 
this question of distribution is the pattern of representation within 
the organisation. Two problematic features - the dominance of both
the male membership and the union's full-time officers are seen to be 
related to both the balance of distribution and the lack of respon­
siveness of the structures in relation to the women members. But
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we have suggested this relationship is complex, because the pattern 
of representation is also an outcome determined by other sets of 
relationships - and therefore, remains, itself, to be explained.
In the conclusions of this Chapter, therefore, we can usefully 
show how the primary (inequal) bargaining relationship between employer's 
and union's representatives served directly, to structure the pattern 
of representation on the shopfloor. This is a particularly inteiesting 
case study because it draws together a number of the points already 
made and illustrates, in terms of a single issue, how bargaining 
interests and relationships structured institutional arrangements 
and policies in such a way as to render the union organisation problematic 
for the women workers especially. Again, it concerns the distri­
bution of a 'cost'element (from the worker's point of view), and 
draws attention to the impact of this at every level of the union's 
organisational structure: from the full-time officials through to 
the factory convenor and down to the shopsteward handling members' 
grievances on the shopfloor.
CASE STUDY : NEW STARTERS
"Union security tends to become a privilege 
imposed on one sector of the working class and 
is accepted by management, for the price of 
maintaining or even creating (as in the con­
struction industry) a non-union sector with less 
rigidities in wages, fringes, employment guarantees, 
and particularly in work rules."
Herding (1972) p.35
In 1976 the union officials f nalistd an agreement with manage­
ment which, as the preamble stated, was intended "to formalise practices 
which had been in operation in the company since December 1974".
At this time, the union side had accepted the company's proposals on
redundancy in return for lOOi. union membership in the plants. The
union had, of course, been qiven sole bargaining rights as part of 
the original recognition agreement (i.e. since 1970), but as we have 
pointed out, for a number of reasons - especially the high rate of 
turnover maintained by the firm - there was always a significant number 
of non-members in the workforce. We have also noted how one conse­
quence of unionisation may have been to 'stabilise' employment in the 
firm, to the extent that the rapid cycle of lay-off/re-recruitment 
characterising Macdonald's day, seemed to have given way to a reliance 
on "natural wastage"/re-recruitment with the incidence of lay-off 
less frequent (although possibly more extensive) than before. From 
the women worker's point of view there may have been a sense in which 
this 'stabilisation' of employment was more apparent than real.
Because, as we have demonstrated, management's reliance on "natural 
wastage" informed their practices in relation to the mass of women 
on the shopfloor, engendering an equally chronic form of employment 
insecurity which was now, moreover, directly linked to driving, work 
intensification and speed-up. On the other hand, unionisation had 
introduced a system of representation and some requirements for 
consultation between the workforce and management which the latter 
did, also, have to take into consideration.
We have already pointed out the contradictory requirements of 
'flexibility' and 'stability' from the point of view of worker and 
employer, and the necessity of 'flexibility' for the latter remained 
just as strong - possibly strongei - in the period following union­
isation than before. When the feasibility of the old, straight 
hire and fire methods was largely removed, as far as the bulk of the 
labour force was concerned, we have noted that they were not removed 
altogether - but pushed down to one particular section of the workforce,
which was also the weakest the new starters.
Management wished to retain the system whereby they hired more 
workers than they needed, used them, if they were school-leavers, 
as cheap labour for a month, selected those they wanted and fired the 
rest. They granted the union a 100% membership facility, whereby 
before starting work all new recruits would be given a union applic­
ation form and told it was a condition of employment with the company 
which would then immediately proceed to deduct union dues from their 
wages. The quid pro quo for this was that new starters would not be 
covered by the system of representation. Thus the final clause of 
the union membership agreement reads:
"Notwithstanding any of the foregoing each new 
starter must complete a four week probation period 
with the company, subject to the conditions of 
probation i.e. discipline, dismissal etc., without 
the need for consultation."
We can see in this a nice illustation of Herding's point, 
reproduced in the quotation at the head of this section. What 
happened when these 'costs' incorporated in the agreement, were borne 
by workers on the shopfloor? (75)
The problem of job insecurity was, as we have seen, particularly 
acute for the women workers and, therefore, a major concern of their 
shopstewards generally. The needs of the new starters, a parti­
cularly vulnerable group in any case, were, clearly most pressing and 
nearly all the women stewards memntioned the problems of this group. 
(Problems which they had, themselves once directly experienced.)
"I get really upset, I get uptight because 
I've got three lines, I'm shopsteward over 
and the motor line. And they bring these 
girls - a new one, straight from school, and 
they put her on a line. And some of these
operators that we've on now - we've been on 
those lines 2, 3 and 4 years. And you just 
CANNOT expect those young girls to keep up. . . 
and instead of splitting the jobs - if they 
were only given one small job to begin with - 
once she gets up speed on that one, build it 
up, gradually! But they don't. They 
give her the full job - And it's PATHETIC 
to see them you know, it is really - they get 
all uptight and they get ever so upset."
(How many stay?)
"Not many"
(Do they leave or are they sent down road after the 
trial period?)
"It is up to the supervisor. If they don't think 
they're going to fit in, then they're sent up the 
road before the month's up. And then I butt in 
and I'm not s'posed to. I do a lot of butting in 
when I'm not s'posed to! You know, because I don't 
think these kids have had a fair trail. We had 
a case about a month ago. A girl was put on the 
line for one day, and for the rest of the week and 
the following week she was put on labouring - fetching 
sub-plates. So on the Friday she (supervisor) must 
have taken her upstairs and said she wasn't suitable.
She came to see me (we've always been told it's 
nothing to do with the union for the first month like.
I can't see this, because when she starts, her union 
money is stopped anyway - out of her first week's 
money). She came up crying and said he'd told her 
she could work a week's notice or finish on Friday.
I asked what - the jobs she'd done. I was so angry!
Saw the superintendent - arranged she should have 
another week's trial and be left on one job. After 
all that, she came for another couple of days, then 
never came again. After I'd taken all that trouble...! 
(But) I don't like....you know, well I've got a 15 
year old so I mean she's going to leave school - 
she might come here - she might.... that could be my 
girl if you look at it....''
Emphasis in original Tracy (final assembly)(76)
not
It woul<ybe unusual, therefore, to find a story such as that 
recounted by Jenny, who was a shopsteward for women working on one of 
the final assembly lines. She also represented men and women 
workers in the machine shop nearby. The only thing that was slightly 
different about this case was that the member concerned was male.
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A seventeen year old lad, who was a new starter, had been told
by his foreman (an 'old style' manager with a reputation for bullying)
that he was going to be sacked.
"His foreman didn't think he was suitable for 
the job;he wasn't quick enough. But he hadn't 
been here a month, he'd only been here two weeks.
And he asked him, apparently, if he could be a bit 
quicker, but he didn't give the child time to learn 
and he sacked him. So somebody must have told the 
child who I was and he came over....He was serving the 
lines, taking the parts to the lines. But apparently 
he wasn't....He was serving those quick enough, 
they were never out of parts, they didn't lose any 
money. But apparently he was falling down on other 
little jobs. But it is like I was saying to the 
foreman when I was talking to him. He said they 
sent him to 'the cage' or something, for some parts.
And they'd had to go and look for him. So I said 
'Well, let's face it, it is a big factory! And to 
put a child in a factory and just take him up once 
and just show him where it is - and say now you go 
up there and fetch it....' Apparently the child 
had got lost. So I mean it isn't his fault. So 
I looked at him and I said, 'Well shall I tell you 
something? If you sent me up', I said, 'I'd be lost - 
because I've never been up, and I've been here 6 years!'
So I mean, it's got to be frightening for a child of 
that age!"
Jenny had taken the matter up with the convenor and got the lad trans­
ferred to a different job.
"I saw him the other day as a matter of fact, and 
he said, 'Thank you ever so much, I'm ever so happy 
now’."
Jenny (final assembly)(77)
But all had not been quite as simple as it sounds. The deputy 
convenor, acting convenor at the time, (he succeeded to the post at 
a later date) explained the conflict of interest this grievance had 
raised within the union side. The topic came up in interview, as 
part of a discussion about the differences between the men and the 
women in the union and the discussion is particularly interesting 
in a whole number of respects - so it is reproduced in full.
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(Do the women raise things you don't think the union should be 
involved in?)
"Yes. Size of teapots and toilet paper not soft 
enough. It's just the fact that they bring that 
sort of thing up - it isn't that dear to their hearts.
You can use the time or effort on something more 
important. You know, like when I negotiate or any­
thing with the management, I put a lot of effort in...
Well I don't like doing/for such a small stupid 
problem. I prefer to save all that flannel for a 
big problem. You know, to get a big problem solved.
I mean there was one the other week, the women were...
There was this young kid, he was being sacked - he hadn't., 
they don't come under the union's protection until 
they've been here for a month. In their first 
month, if they don't come up to the standard, they're 
got rid of you see. Well this guy was being got rid 
of - and he's a very nervous chap, you talk to him and 
he starts to - I don't know, if he's had an accident 
or something he starts shaking like this, you know,
'Course the women, when this happened - they go all 
motherly to him and 'Oh, Ernie, what are you going to 
do about this?' (This was when I was acting as convenor).
I says, 'Well look - really I can't get involved, 
you know. He's got a month....! so Iwent and saw the 
superintendent who he was working for, he says, 'Mate 
he's a complete waste of time.' I saw a couple of 
guys he was working with, 'Mate he's useless - he's 
come here and he don't even know how to hold a broom 
like'.' So that was it. They'd convinced me he was 
no good and I didn't want to get involved.
But the women were getting quite irate about it, you 
know and they even had me at the Branch Meeeting about 
it like. And Paul came up. And Paul backed me up, 
he says, 'Look, we can't - if the kid's no good,' 
he says, 'We don't want people here who aren't any 
good because they won't be any contribution to us 
they'll only be a bloody drag on us....' sort of thing. 
Anyway the women were still irate about it so...
(What was his job?)
He was only a labourer. When I say only a labourer, I 
mean that in...I don't mean I look down on labourers 
or anything like that, you know - But he was only a 
labourer like, you know what I mean?
So I went in to see John. Now I didn't want to go 
and see John, because, you know - you can't always get 
iri^ o see John - but....I had to use me charm: 'Look 
John - I'm not looking for a victory - this kid....' 
and all that. And I got him to get all his records
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out, references from his last place - all the bloody 
personnel were running round here, there and every­
where bringing all the records down - I felt, oh a 
prat! And he warned me, of course, that I'd no 
business whatsoever getting involved with it because 
the union don't protect anyone until they've been here 
a month. Anyway from his records we found out that 
he was an inspector at his last place. So I got John 
to get him a transfer into the Inspection.
'OK Ernie,' he says, 'but it takes a month', (not to 
train an inspector but to assess 'em, you know, their 
capabilities). He says, 'Now in that month, he'll 
be over his months....' (you know, because he'd only 
done 3 weeks) 'he'll be over his month's time,' he says 
'and by then he should come under your jurisdiction.'
He says 'I'll transfer him to inspection as long as 
you give me your word that if he's a waste of time 
I can get rid of him.' Well I had to give him my 
word.
Now - I'd used a lot of, .1 don't know, charm, whatever you 
like to call it - to achieve that. But it was, it 
was wasted, you know. I didn't want to do it. And 
I was proved right, because the chap over the Inspection 
is ever such a nice guy and he came up to me the other 
day and said, 'Look, I'm ever so sorry' he said,
'bout that kid - I put him in the quietest area of 
the factory - on the goods inwards', he says, 'and 
he just hasn't got the potential' he says, 'he's just...'
And I'd warned the kid. I said, 'Now look, you've 
got a second chance, ' I said, 'So work your bloody 
roe out and have a go - 'cos once you've been here a 
month, you know, on the new job, you'm OK.' Well I 
mean he ought to have known then he'd really got to 
put himself out hadn't he? - for a month.Well, then 
the gaffer - he says his attitude isn't right or 
anything - and I believe they're getting rid of him 
this Friday or they might have got rid of him last 
Friday. So all that effort was completely wasted, 
and I didn't want to do it anyway. Because if somebody's 
no good, I don't want him at the BSR anymore than the 
management do, because it's going to be no benefit to 
me you know. But from pressure from the women - they 
forced me, shall we say, into taking this case up, and 
I just didn't want to do it, because it was proved to 
me that the kid was no good anyway. I mean, they 
were chuffed because I got him transferred. But at 
the end of the day he's still gone up the road like - 
I only delayed it. The firm genuinely tried but, he 
did it OK for a week and then his attitude was just - 
well, like the attitude of any of the young kids 
today really - their attitude isn't right is it?"
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(78)
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The marked contrast between the significance of the issue (job security) 
for the female-production worker and ordinary member - at the 
bottom of the collective bargaining and representational 
structure, as averse to the male - indirect worker and lay full­
time union officer - at the top, is illustrated by the fact that 
*this issue gave rise to the only occasion in Edna's experience
that the women working on her line had "given her their backing" .
They had stopped work for about 15 minutes - until the problem was
(successfully) resolved.
"I had one girl and she'd been moved numerous 
amounts of times. She couldn't get used to the 
speed on one job because the supervisor kept moving 
her. And in the end she turned round and she 
said that she wasn't quick enough and they were 
sending her up the road, as they call it, on the 
Friday. And I went to my members and I said do 
you think it's fair that this girl should go up the 
road when she hasn't been on one job long enough to 
learn the speed? And they fought, that was the 
only time. They all stuck together and put down 
their tools, they stuck out. And they moved her 
off the line - they didn't send her up the road but 
they moved her off the lines and they gave her a job 
that she could cope with."
Edna (final assembly)(79)
This case study illustrates the cross-cutting pressures and 
interests within the union's representational structure, deriving in the 
first instance, from the deferment of the employer's interest onto the 
workforce through collective bargaining. It was reinforced by both 
the institutional interest in the firm's viability and the size of the 
surplus ("won't be any contribution to us") and the co-exploitative 
interest within the workforce ("no benefit to me").
The deferment of the employer's interest arose as a result of the 
inequality of power in the bargaining relationship which became codified 
in the terms of the membership agreement. We have also been able to
* n relation to the n e w  starters a^ain
see how this inequality would be maintained as a consequence of the
bargaining process itself - which is reciprocal. Through the concerns
deputyof the /convenor, we are given a view of how the whole process of 
bargaining subsequently had been tilted by the impact of the original 
agreement. Negotiating at factory level, he was tied into the 
institutionalised system of reciprocity established in the first place 
on strongly sloping ground. Thus he now 'owed the employer one' 
and on balance he feared this future concession would be greater than 
the one he had gained.
Thus once again we have shown how, when we are examining the 
effectiveness of the women stewards' grievance handling on the shopfloor, 
this has to be set in its institutional context. Wherein power 
inequalities underpin the differentiation of interests - between the 
employer and the workforce as a whole, between the union as an insti­
tution and its membership, and between men and women inside and out­
side the organisation. The women steward s’relative ineffectiveness, 
and the women member s' lack of strength in general (even if not in 
every particular case) can be seen as an outcome - a consequence - of 
many of the problems they are usually taken to 'cause'.
CONSEQUENCES
What are the effects of these institutional arrangements and 
processes which transmit the employers' interests as costs to the 
workforce and in doing so render these channels problematic from the 
latter's point of view? What are the consequences for the workers of 
bearing these costs? What impact did the deferment or distribution of 
these have on the particular groups which finally bore them?
We have already suggested a number of ways in which management's
production policy had a deleterious impact on the women worker's capacity 
to develop or maintain job controls, either in terms of the task or in 
terms of their relationships with each other. Now we can see that 
a free hand in this respect was the major part of the 'costs' accepted 
by the workers' representatives on their behalf.
For example, the movement of labour clause in the agreement was 
part of management's 'price' for union 'recognition' as sole bargaining 
agent for several thousand members on check-off. This substantive 
term of the agreement was management's demand, accepted as part of the 
quid pro quo of the 'collective' or more correctly 'jointly' constructed
'bargain' between management and the union officials in return for 
representation rights. Its effect was to enable management to pass 
down the 'problem' of flexibility onto the workers - they now bore the 
'costs' of producing 'efficiently' in this manufacturing sphere.
And we have already outlined the impact of this in terms of the under­
mining of workers7 job controls and employment security.
Yet there are further implications to consider which were 
subsequent upon the (re-)distribution of the costs of production 
between management and the female workforce. Who, among the women 
workers was to bear them? The style of these negotiations was often 
recriminatory. The worker who was moved onto the absentee's job for 
example, felt victimised - she blamed the absentee - who had her own 
burden of domestic problems. As we can see, the solidarity of the 
workgroup was weakened as a result of the workers having to share out 
and bear the costs between themselves.
(What issue would you most like to take up?)
"Well, there's the movement of labour I would 
like to be able to sort out. But it's a contract 
that's been signed - and I can't do a damn thing 
about it. But it's something I don't think was 
for the working class, you know - the people itself - 
that it's dealing with. I mean that was definitely 
a management's.... It's good in one way. I mean it 
does keep the work flowing down the lines but, there 
again, I don't see why the people should have it - 
the strain put on THEIR shoulders, through other 
people not coming in. Surely that's a management's 
problem? That's what they're there for. Not the 
orclinary worker on thq, shopfloor or the union 
which - they are ‘-hrowxng it onto the working people - 
really, in their own way.
Well, it's like - if someone has got bad health or 
they've got a child like I have - I mean, so far,
I've been pretty lucky, I haven't had to have too 
much time off with my little boy which..you never 
know what can happen in the future. Say they have 
got problems...We 11 - just imagine how the OTHER 
person's going to react to that person, when she comes 
back - after having time off and their life's been 
difficult! I mean, it's not good for relationships 
between people on the floor. And that to me is a 
management's problem and they should be dealing with 
that - NOT the worker. But yet they - if you know 
what I mean - they've got a sort of thing going for 
them, where the worker sorts it out for them. Because 
they've VICTIMISED the one that's been awayjthat other 
person, she's saying, 'Oh you should come bloody in 
more often!' you know, and things like this, which, to 
me, I think it's all wrong."
Edna (final assemblv) (<?o)
Original emphasis u/c underlined, my emphasis 1/c underlined
In another example, we can see that because the union machinery 
was rendered ineffective as a result of the agreemert allowing manage­
ment to discipline workers for poor performance, again the workers' 
frustration was turned inwards as a result of being unable to avoid 
having to bear the costs themselve^, to destructive effect:
"like when I went in the other week with the 
warnings, it ended up a right babble. Nobody 
would sign their warnings (on the counts).
They were a bit incensed. In fact it got quite 
bad, because one youngster - well, about my age - 
she was so incensed she went and shopoed two 
women. She says, 'Warning me for counts', she 
says, 'And so and so's walking about all the 
while!' So then managemont-qive me the names
»  •and their machine numbers! She said,'111 come 
back and give you their bloody machine numbers.... 1 
And THAT could have caused problems...."
Emphasis in original Madge (Moulding shop)(81)
Overall, we would argue therefore, that the bargaining resources 
of the women workers were continuously being depleted as a consequence 
of bearing and re(distributing) management's 'costs', passed down 
through the medium of joint bargaining.
Ih addition, we would argue that the women workers bore these 
costs to a greater extent than the men. This was for two main reasons. 
On the one hand, structured by the sexual division of labour, the 
position of most of the women workers in the system of production was 
similar - in that they derived fewer bargaining resources from their 
position in the labour process in the first place, than the men. As 
we have seen in Part Two, as a consequence of management's production 
policy the scope of the women workers to develop job controls was 
consciously minimised to an extent that most of the men's was not.
As a result the male workers were in a stronger position to defer costs 
passed on from management generally - away from themselves and onto 
(mainly) the women workers. (82) On the other hand, many of the costs 
were distributed unevenly in the first instance, bearing more heavily 
on the women workers fr<. m the start.
(Pulls out a copy of the blue book - the union/management agreement).
"WELL, this is loaded, you know - for the manage­
ment. And, there's an agreement between the union 
and management on what they call performance - that's 
you know, how hard we work - the level of performance - 
our output. Now if a woman doesn't REACH this req­
uired output - they have her up to office and they 
say: 'You're not working hard enough!' And outside 
there, there's a bloke (maintenance) with a white
coat on - that's sat there 8 hours a day, and 
all he does is chat the girls up! And they've 
got women in there, and they're threatening 
them with suspension and....all manner of things, 
you know - because they're not working hard enough!
Sally (sub assembly) (83)
Original emphasis upper case underlined
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h a n d l i n g PROBLEMS THROUGH THE UNION
Footnotes
(1) Stage 7 involved resort to ACAS. This was never used where 
decisions of any significance were involved^ i.e. that would 
set a precedent. Occasionally, where it was known the members' 
demands would be 'disallowed ', negotiators on both sides were 
prepared to let somebody else pronounce the refusal.
(2) It includes an account of an "informal chat" between the officials 
and the chairman "to sort out a few problems" before the regional 
officer went on holiday.
(3) Ref JA 17/52 : 684-700
(4) Ref EC 15/53 : 110-163.
(5) Ref EC 16.
(6) Items the women stewards mentioned they had raised at this meeting 
were: supervisors labouring, the problems of new starters and 
lack of training ("I've brought that up....and I noticed, on the 
last agenda, they hadn't brought that up to John...(JA18)) , 
absenteeism, and bad parts on assembly lines ("but they haven't 
been dealt with....they always come again (BBIO)).
(7) Ref MC 11/sl : 22-32.
(8) Items arising from the shopstewards' meeting are put on the agenda 
for negotiation with management.
Joint works committee meeting Old Hill February 1977, subjects 
Bolts on doors.
Meals at Portersfield arrive cold.
Re-siting clocks 
Cartons in gangways.
Security.
Cover for motorbikes.
Need for.
Meals in machine shop - choice of sweet.
Meals in machines.
Constant breakdown of Wal1 Tex machine in the 
machine shop.
Repairs.
Blocked gangways.
Lack of space between lines.
‘"Mrs Wood then produced the bacon sandwich which she had received
at breakfast time. Mr. Turvey agreed that the bacon was not up to
the usual standard and said he would look into the matter".
covered :
Toilets : 
Canteen :
Ventilation 
Congestion :
Carpark :
Redecorating: 
‘Canteen :
Production
machinery:
Leaking roof: 
Assembly-line 
track : 
Congestion :
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(9) Ref EW 21/S3 : 115-120.
(10) A male serviceman representing women in the moulding shop gave 
"the supply of materials and shortage of containers" as the most 
common problem he was involved with. It was, of course, part 
of his job as a labourer to supply these.
(11) E.g. :Extraction fans in the paint shop (KA)
Extraction fans on welding machines (SH22)
Extraction system for silk-screen printing (SB13)*
011 cleaned off the floor in the moulding shop (MB24).
*Silk-screen printing: Getting extraction fans
"Where I work, it's a very, very big room, you see.
So it didn't affect me, but it affected the girls 
that worked around. And we had hell of a fight!
12 months it took me - to get that job shifted.
And he still didn't....he didn't wanna know what
I was telling him, about the girls that worked on 
this particular job - that you had to use this 
aerosol spray, you know. And, these girls, they'd 
got nausea, sore throats, headaches, tiredness.
They used to go home on a Friday, and they'd still 
got the taste in their throat on a SUNDAY, you know....
Some had rashes.... And, finally, it took the girls....
they had to down tools you see, before he really....
It really opened his eyes.
We had a health and safety meeting, and this was on 
the agenda, and I was telling them all about these 
girls - what they were going through. And he said, 
'Right!' he said, 'We'll have one of these girls up'.
I suppose, I think he thought, that seeing the 
Managing Director there, she was gonna quiver and 
go to pieces, and say, you know, 'Nothing's wrong with 
me, I'm alright'. But she didn't - I was proud of 
her - I'd got me fingers crossed under the table, 
you know! So he said, 'O.K.' he said, 'We'll have 
the doctor in to examine you'.
The doctor came in, he examined all the girls, and 
he recommended that the job be moved to a more 
ventilated area. He recommended that the aerosol 
spray, had not got to be used any more....It wasn't 
HARMFUL, you know - he said that they wouldn't DIE 
or anything. But it was very, very....you know, it 
was very....bad. It was unpleasant, it was very 
unpleasant for them....
They moved the job, they put a ventilator 
system in - that draws it from underneath...
They've even had new MACHINERY at £1,000 each.
So, why didn't they do that in the first place?
It took us 12 months of shouting and screaming 
and banging tables.... Well, not literally, but 
it took us 12 months of trying to tell him, what 
was happening to those girls.”
Sally (sub assembly). Ref SB13
(13)
(14)
(15)
(12) Ref SB 23-24/S3 : 9-24.
Ref PW 43/S4 : 247-263
Ref KA 56/S1 J 210-221
Ref MB 32-33/S3 : 800-856 and M13 18/S2 ; 450-490 and MB 20/S2 :569
(16) Ref PLIO
(17) Instead she had tried to encourage the younger girls to prove 
their slower speed had not been due, as management maintained,
to the fact that "they talked and didn't work properly as a team”.
(18) Ref PLIO-11
(19) Ref JG 24/S2 :314-347.
(20) Ref EW 8/S1 :471-473
(21) Ref BBIO/Sl : 585-595.
(22) Ref JG 25/S2 : 356-378
(23) Ref PB35/S5 : 799-819
(24) Ref PW 32/S3 : 600-630
(25) Ref NB9.
(26) Ref SB23/S2 : 873-931.
(27) Ref MB 35/S4 : 60-91.
(28) Ref PW44-45/S4 : 383-4
(29) Ref KA23-25/S2 : 217- 2<
(30) Ref PL12.
(31) Ref LG8/S2 : 80-86.
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(53)
(54)
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Ref SB24/S3 : 22-58.
Ref SB27/S3 : 214-236.
Ref PW31/S3 : 528-550.
Ref SB21/S2 : 725-747.
Ref SB20/S2 : 687-708.
Ref NB20-21/S2 : 1042 - 53:88.
Ref PW44.
Ref JA38-39/S4 : 712-760.
Ref EW9/S1 : 562-572 and EW15/S2 : 266-280.
Ref JA21(b)/S 330-54. 
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Ref PW
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Ref PW51/S4 : 703-710.
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Ref JA17/S2 : 684-746.
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Richard Herding refers to grievances being 'traded by officials 
as part of the process of maintaining bargaining relationships 
with management. Management likewise make decisions to: concede, 
pursue, stick on or let drop Issues in a strategic fashion - 
which reflects as much as it maintains or changes the current 
'state of play' in bargaining power relationships. See Herding 
(1972) .
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Ref BB13/S1 : 751-814.
Ref JA.
Ref EW15/S2 : 390-468.
Ref SH17.
Ref TS12/S3 : 97-120.
Ref JS12/S2 : 650-
The ineffectiveness of grievance procedures as a means of workers 
initiating changes in the workplace and its far more limited use 
in this respect than as a defensive measure is discussed in Beynon 
(1973) and Herding (1972).
Ref BW2/S1 : 40-47.
Ref BWlO/Sl : 313-329.
Ref JW11/S2 : 450-479.
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Ref PB21-22/S4 : 70-84.
Ref EW15/S2 : 320-356.
Ref OH5/TI : S2:24-30.
Ref JW10/S2 : 416-420.
No data is available but the branch secretary complained that the 
turnover was very high.
Probably to an even greater extent than they had been before the 
agreement. Pip explained how the labour exchange had withdrawn 
its facility of referral from about the time it was drawn up.
Four years ago# just after redundancies# they used to advertise 
at the labour exchange. Someone went after a job and asked for 
work at BSR. The official told the woman - she'd have to go and 
enquire herself because they no longer had dealings with BSR. 
Because they'd sent so many people there and they were out again
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(55) Ref OHT3/22 : 160-170.
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(75) Probably to an even grea 
agreement. Pic explain' 
its facility of referral
“Four years ago, just after redundancies, they used to advertise 
at the labour exchange. Someone went after a job and asked for 
work at BSR. The official told the woman - she'd have to go and 
enquire herself because they no longer had dealinqs with BSR. 
Because they'd sent so many people there and they were out again
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in less than a month - they finished the service. The labour 
exchange got tired of sending people here and after a month they 
got the sack'.'
Pip (sub assembly). Ref PW31/S3 : 571-595.
(76) Ref TS4-6/S1 : 420-520.
(77) Ref JG18/S2 : 16-40.
(78) Ref EC30-31/S4 : 585-700.
(79) Ref EW13/S2 : 1-60.
(80) Ref EW17/52 : 690-757.
(81) Ref MB32/S3 : 710-744.
(82) See,, e.g. the instance of work intensification and the servicemen
cited in Chapter 4. 
(83) Ref SB8/S1 : 638-664
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CHAPTER 13______ UNEQUAL PAY NEGOTIATIONS 197 3-1978
"So in actual fact, you see - in theory they 
got equal pay, but in practice thev didn't."
Gordon (storeman)(1)
We have argued that the impact the union's bargaining policy, 
concentrating on the distribution of surplus value rather than its 
rate of extraction, had (and has) particularly serious implications 
for women workers. This is because, as a result of their weaker 
position in the labour market and the sexual division of labour both 
within and between firms, women are recruited into those areas where 
the rate of exploitation is highest. At the same time, women are 
likely to benefit least from the distribution of 'reward' through 
collective bargaining. Where they predominate - in the secondary 
sectors of employment - there may be less surplus to be distributed 
and/or others (i.e. males) with greater bargaining Dower, having 
necessary experience/skilIs or occupying key positions in the labour 
process, reap a greater part of the reward.(2)
At BSR we have pointed out a particular form of relationship 
pertaining between male and female workers termed 'co-exploitation', 
whereby most of the men, as a result of their position in the labour 
process in relation to the women workers, derived a direct interest 
in the rate of exploitation of the latter - whose effort, in this 
labour intensive system of production was largely responsible for the 
size of the surplus. And as we shall go on to show, these males did 
also consistently reap a /^«ater share of the total part of the reward 
accruing to labour.
In this Chapter we analyse the pattern of distribution of benefit 
or reward, as averse to cost, through collective bargaining. Wo 
proceed by examining the contents of agreements concluded as a result 
of pay negotiations conducted at HSR between 1073 and 1978. However,
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we also look at the minutes of branch meetings (where available) at 
which the main elements of the annual wage claim were discussed and 
the negotiating team put together. This is because we are arguing 
that the process of collective bargaining extends well beyond the 
meeting with management. Both beforehand, and afterwards, groups of 
workers are engaged in negotiating the distribution of costs and 
benefits with each other. In the main body of this Chapter, however, 
our focus is less on the mechanics of this process than with its 
results. We are examining the outcome of these inter and intra - 
organisational negotiations over the distribution of reward - as this 
was embodied each year in the annual pay agreement.
In the conclusions we begin to take up a discussion of the process 
of collective bargaining, concentrating on negotiations which take 
place 'internally' i.e. between different groups of workers, in order 
to explain the outcome of patterns of distribution already described. 
Our analysis of one case study here, points forward to an investi­
gation pursued in the following Chapters of important elements dis­
tinguishing the bargaining position, resources and relationships of the 
men and women workers. One of the main questions we are concerned 
to explore is : what are the implications for the women members of the 
(unequal) bargaining strength of the males?
First, however, we need to describe the outcome of wage bargaining 
with management, as this was expressed in the final pay settlements.
And we need to note that, apart from the existence of Equal Pay Leg­
islation, pay bargaining in the period 1973-1978 was, to a highly 
significant extent, governed by various incomes policies. So some 
of the implications of this for the bargaining process and its outcome, 
should, perhaps, be mentioned first.
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The Context : Incomes Policies 1978-1978
During this period (1973-1978), for which some records relating 
to pay negotiations at BSR still exist, wage bargaining at company 
level was strongly circumscribed. First, by the statutory incomes 
policy of the Conservative government (1972-4) and secondly the TUC 
and Labour government's Social Contract (July 1975 - July 1977) and 
stage three (1978-9). (3) The annual wage negotiations which took 
place in June were, accordingly, limited by the currently prevailing 
'norms' or 'guidelines' relevant to each phase or stage of incomes 
policy in these years.
Apart from the fact that pay negotiations were thus fairly closely 
specified, there were other broad features characterising the period 
which had an impact on wage negotiations at company level. Three 
which appear to have been particularly relevant for the collective 
bargaining process at BSR, were: the compression of differentials, 
the increased use of 'external' agencies in wage settlements and 
changes in the content of 'formal' negotiations.
THE COMPRESSION OF PAY DIFFERENTIALS
At a general level, compression of pay differentials occurred on 
at least two axes between 1970 and 1976. On the one hand, there was 
a (temporary) closing of the overall differential between men and 
women's earnings which occurred as a result of the Equal Pay Act.
And, on the other hand, some compression of pay relativities occurred 
between grades in particular industries, notably engineering.(4)
Whether this was directly attributable to incomes policies or not, 
such consciousness increasingly fuelled sectional demands from, for 
example, higher paid (white, male, skilled) qroups in these industries 
especially.(5)
In the Midlands, from 1975, union officials generally were put
under pressure from strong sections of the membership more and more 
opposed to their unions' continuing observance of the social contract. 
Nationwide this build-up of frustration eventually forced changes in 
TUC policy, but not before sections, such as the male skilled at BSR 
and separately groups of the semi-skilled too ^"We're not taking home 
much more than the women....") had shown themselves prepared to take 
matters into their own hands. Ironically it was BSR's female manual 
workers, believed to be the least dissatisfied - in terms of pay policy 
in general and their own wages in particular - who staged the most 
dramatic protest at this time, with a mass, 'unofficial', strike 
affecting all four West Midlands factories in March 1977.
Broadly, therefore, the impact of Pay Policy on bargaining 
relationships at BSR could be seen in a marked frustration, which was 
expressed in two main ways. First, a strongly critical view of the 
unionbecame general amongst the membership as a result of the officials' 
insistence on their adhering to a wage-bargaining policy which stoically 
ignored the fact that the company was making record profits (they 
doubled twice in this period: once between 1971 and 1973, and again 
between 1974 and 1976) while the workers' living standards were not 
even being maintained.(6) Secondly, the period seemed to be more 
dominated than usual by sectional claims put forward by small groups 
of male workers who found themselves better placed than most to demand 
'special treatment' from their union officials as well as from manage­
ment.
THE USE OF EXTERNAL AGENCIES
Another general feature of pay bargaining under incomes policy 
which had a visible impact on bargaining relationships at BSR concerned 
the growing use of 'external agencies'.
Hugh Clegg notes two structural features of the trade union 
movement characteristic of this period. One was the growing centrality 
of workplace organisation in trade unions (coupled with a general shift
to plant-wide pay agreements) and the other was the "notable....
increase in the status and authority of congress and it's general 
council" at this time.(7) More than this though, the actual admin­
istration of the social contract brought those two levels into direct 
relation to each other in a quite distinctive way.
The TUC, eschewing the statutory approach and machinery of the 
conservative government, had taken on a voluntary 'vetting' and guidance 
role for union negotiator' The Department of Employment too, had
set up an advisory service for both sides. As pressure on the 
negotiators at BSR grew, there was increasing resort to both of 
these bodies by the union officials (in the case of visits to the 
Department of Employment, jointly with management) for "rulings" on 
the (un)feasibility of general or sectional claims put forward by the 
workforce.
It is not surprising to find that, as a consequence, the focus 
of bargaining pressure became rather remote and diffuse from the 
workers' point of view: it was also uncertain. This was because the 
level of decision-making itself became the subject of negotiation 
between the officials and management. They now had the choice whether 
to 'allow* the decision to be seen to be made by an outside body and 
to adopt Vierely a mediating role* themselves or whether to (and how 
long to) keep matters in their own hands. The appropriate focus of
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pressure within the union structure itself became similarly problematic 
from the members' point of view, with an increasing number of direct 
appeals being made from the shopfloor to the regional and/or the 
national General Secretaries.
While, clearly, it was convenient for negotiators on both sides 
to manipulate these different levels of decision-making, there 
remained a danger that an overplayed 'mediating' stance would encourage 
the membership to by-pass them (e.g. by appealing directly to the 
Department of Employment or ACAS themselves). On the occasions when 
this did happen the union's negotiating officer denounced the groups 
and the stewards involved in the strongest terms.(8) (Those who tried 
a direct approach to the regional office were simply turned away).
The overall effect of referring to outside agencies for 'definite 
advice' on bargaining issues could, therefore, be seen at every level 
of negotiation. On the whole there seemed to be more at risk in 
doing so from the workers' point of view: since one consequence of sub­
mitting those claims judged to fall outside pay policy to administrative 
decision, was that they then gained an 'illegal' and officially desig­
nated 'non-negotiable' status. And this tended to sap further support 
for pursuing the case. Indeed under pay policy, the process of 
negotiating the status flegal' or 'illegal') of any claim had to be 
added on to that of negotiating the claim itself.
This leads to the third feature of bagaining under pay policy - 
the changes in content or issues taken up at every level of the process.
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THE CONTENT OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS
An early policy decision on the union side, in response to restricted 
wage bargaining, was to instruct officials to look for improvements in 
so-called 'fringe benefits'. (After all, the organisation still had 
to 'deliver' some 'goods' in order to retain credibility). Conse­
quently, the question of sick pay, bereavement and pensions had been 
raised with BSR management as early as 1972. Since none of these 
was implemented until 1977-8 however, it is difficult to judge how 
seriously they were being discussed.
It was only as a result of the explosive 'bonus dispute' which 
signified widespread dissatisfaction with the union especially,that the 
schemes were brought toward completion. And it could be argued that 
by this time the union side was certainly in need of some bargaining 
successes. But the overall effect was rather bizarre - with, so it 
seemed, strident pressure from the membership for one set of demands 
being met by consistent negotiation across the bargaining table, on 
quite another.
1973
"By the time the majority of employers took 
action (to implement equal pay) from 1973 to 1975, 
they could see that it was possible under the 
legislation to reduce their responsibilities 
under the Act without breaking the law, or to 
opt for methods of implementation which kept 
increases paid to women to a minimum."
Snell et al (1981) P.63
The Equal Pay Act was passed ir. 1970, but was only brought into 
force at the end of 1975 along with the Sex Discrimination Act. In 
the meantime, employers had been advised to bring their pay structures 
into line with the Act's requirements by stages.(9) The process 
was extremely slow. Most employers seem to have left implementation 
until the last moment and to have used the run-in period for reorganising
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jobs and pay grades so as to minimise possible equal pay claims and 
costs.(lO) The period was also covered by the Conservative govern­
ment's statutory incomes policy which included a total pay freeze 
from November 1972 until March 1973. Under stage II following this, 
equal pay rises were permitted outside the limit of El + 4%, such 
that the percentage differential between men and women might be 
closed by up to one third by the end of 1973(11).
Neither the management nor the union side at BSR seems to have made 
use of this opportunity, as no equal pay increments were negotiated 
until June the following year. The semi-skilled women, therefore, 
continued to receive for a further twelve months, basic rates which 
produced minimum earnings levels some 20% lower than their male counter­
parts. (12) (The differential in terms of actual earnings would, 
of course, have been considerably greater than this).
1974
"The women all gave up some of their rise to 
the men - well there were so many of them it 
meant another couple of pounds for the skilled."
Mary (branch secretary)(13)
Negotiations for the annual claim in June 1974 were carried out 
under stage III, the most complicated phase of the Conservative 
government's incomes policy. The principle of 'kitty bargaining' - 
where a total sum was made available for division - was continued, 
and a general ceiling on pay was set at 7% (excluding overtime) or 
alternatively E2.25 per person. A further 1% of the "group pay bill" 
was also allowed for reducing anomalies or "obstacles to the effective 
use of manpower". And once again, equal pay increments remained 
outside pay policy restriction.
%
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During the autumn and winter of 1973-4 minutes of the branch and 
its newly formed branch committee record the male workers' dissatis­
faction with pay(14). Their general frustration is indicated, for
example, by a proposal put before the latter body in March 1974, that 
a separate branch meeting be held for the male workers alone. (15)
And another proposal that more male shopstewards should take part in 
the pay talks. It was decided to extend the negotiating team to 
seven. (The principle that different groups of men should have 
separate representation in negotiations had long been established — 
for example, in relation to the skilled grades). Meanwhile, specific 
groups of male workers were pressing forward separate claims.
Among the skilled men, it was the maintenance workers who had 
taken the lead. Representatives from all three factories had held 
a separate meeting (i.e. outside the branch) with the two full-time 
officers to discuss their own claim. As a result, a letter had been 
sent to the company in the New Year proposing a maintenance agreement 
and new wages structure for this particular group. The new branch 
committee ratified this course of action after the event, and it was 
not reported at the branch.
The male, semi-skilled 'indirect' workers, on the other hand, 
lacked both the tradition and basis for separate organisation. They 
were a much more dispersed and heterogeneous group, comprising, for 
example, warehouse checkers, stores and servicemen, and they had been 
voicing their dissatisfaction with their low earning levels consistently 
at the branch but, to little avail. Since they had fewer opportunities 
than the production workers to boost their wages with bonus pay, their 
interest lay in raising basic rates. But given the Imminence of equal
pay comparisons, the company were naturally concerned to hold basic 
rates down for as long as possible. At this particular moment 
therefore^ this group of male workers threatened to become troublesome, 
particularly once 'equalisation' linked their vote on the wage claim 
with the womeris. For the men would then have little to lose, in 
encouraging the latter to stand out with them - for the kind of 
increases the company was always going to be far happier paying to 800 
men than 8,000 women. Accordingly, when the demands of this group of 
men were presented in such a way as to leave the basic rates undis­
turbed they certainly found a more sympathetic response from the 
company than might otherwise have been expected. Specifically, what 
this group was asking for was the £1 lieu bonus, which was already 
paid to the skilled men, to be extended to the male semi-skilled - as 
part of the annual wage claim.
In fact, this claim was conceded in March 1974 i.e. prior to the 
annual settlement in June. And it was even back-dated to November 
1973! It would appear this was part of a 'deal': the semi-skilled 
men would stay quiet for the annual wage claim (set in train from April) 
and, consequently, increase the likelihood that the women would accept 
a minimal wage settlement (in terms of its impact on basic rates).(16) 
And this offer would appear better than it was from the women's point 
of view, because of the inclusion, for the first time, of an 'equal pay 
increment'.
Although the final wage award was extremely complex, the pattern 
of distribution was quite plain (17). It favoured the men. And 
this despite the fact that the women received, on top of their basic 
£2.25, an additional payment of £2.68 towards equal pay.(18) Even 
when this extra sum is included, It still remained the case that the
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women, who comprised 77% of the labour force, only received 75% of 
the total wage award including equal pay'. If the equal pay increment 
is taken out of the reckoning altogether, only 58% of the net award 
went to the three-quarters of the workforce who were female. Male 
workers, comprising just 23% of the labour force received 42% of the 
final settlement (19).
These facts are the more remarkable, given that this was a period 
of pay policy more strictly specified than any other before. And 
all BSR's workers, male and female (bar the 400 skilled) were due to 
receive the flat £2.25 allowed! Where, then, did the extra money the 
males received come from?
In the first place, the whole of the 1% of the wage bill allowed 
for 'flexibility* was allocated for distribution to the male section 
of the workforce, less the amount used for restructuring certain grades. 
And as it happened the grades restructured were all male too. Including 
one, inspection, which had been deliberately constructed to avoid equal 
pay comparisons.(20) In the second place, a re-distribution was 
arranged which took away some of the women's award and gave it to the men. 
Thus 4,338 adult women 'gave' 6 pence of the £2.25 rise which was due 
to them, to the men, contributing a total sum which was almost matched 
by the 262 junior females. Their 'donation' amounted to almost £1 
each!
Nor was the sum thus acquired (plus that from the 1% 'flexibility' 
allowance) distributed equally among the men. Just over half of it 
went to the 400 skilled workers who received, in consequence, double 
the basic award, which they (and everyone else) were due. 800
semi-skilled males shared the remainder, with the 500 male indirect 
workers getting twice as much as the 300 bonus workers on direct
production.
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Undoubtedly, one of the reasons the women workers allowed this 
internal redistribution to proceed, was the fact that their equal pay 
increment produced a relatively large wage rise at the time. And, 
if the implementation of 'equal pay' had taken a step back, it was 
soon due to take another one, because management had also agreed to 
renegotiate male rates only, at the end of the year.
Accordingly, a male wage claim and matching negotiating committee 
was put together the following November. Their demands included the 
consolidation of threshhold payments into the basic rates (so that they 
would be reflected in shift and overtime premiums). And average 
earnings for holidays (shift and overtime workers again the most 
affected). Apart from the three convenors and two full- time officials, 
the negotiating team included one skilled and one semi-skilled male 
from each of the three factories plus one (skilled) representative 
from the outlying Portersfield toolroom. (It is worth noting that 
under this scheme, the skilled men as a whole were over-represented by 
more than 2:1 in relation to the semi-skilled males).
Consideration of the male wage claim was delayed until February 
1975 however, because during December the company commenced short-time 
working (five days for males and three days for females) prior to the 
announcement of redundancies in the new year. In the event, the company 
agreed to consolidate the £4.40 threshhold payment into the males' 
basic (19) rates. And for one particular section - semi-skilled 
production workers in the autoshop - to consolidate a part of their 
bonus earnings as well, to enhance the basic rate further. They 
agreed to consider consolidating the previously conceded £1 lieu bonus 
for indirect males and to allow the men to renegotiate in June. (But 
they did not concede average earnings for holiday pay, which continued
to be paid on basic rates).
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"We got the £2.00. Then he offered £1 and we 
pushed to £1.50. We promised we'd not use 
this towards equal pay. That was only fair."
Paul (union official)(21)
In contrast to the complex final stage of the Conservative 
government's pay policy. Labour instituted the TUC's proposal in 1975, 
of limiting pay rises to £6 per week for all full-time adult workers 
earning less than £8,500 per annum.(22) The only exceptions allowed 
were equal pay increments for women. But these limits were not made 
operative in relation to BSR's annual wage settlement until the latter 
half of the 1975-6 'stage' i.e. not until the following year.
Meanwhile, the issue of equal pay had been raised at the March 
1975 branch meeting and the officials announced that it should be 
attained in June. In April the demand was incorporated into the 
branch's proposals for the wage claim, which included: £15 across the 
board, average earnings for holidays, a sick pay and pensions scheme, 
a reduction in the working week and extra holidays, further discussion 
of threshhold payments and consolidation of the lieu bonus plus a 
request of up-grading for Progress chasers (men). The skilled men 
asked if they could negotiate their own claim separately - they had 
not, apparently, succeeded in negotiating a satisfactory agreement on 
the last occasion. Women asked again for the introduction of job 
evaluation to ascertain their rates under equal pay, but the officials 
were against the idea.(23)
The company offered increases in basic rates ranging from £5.50 
for skilled men, £4.26 for semi-skilled men and £3.92 for women, plus 
an additional £1.13 here to "achieve" equal pay. The 'non-discriminatory'
1975
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basic rate apparently aimed for, (now designated the rate for 'general 
assembly') seems to have been pitched somewhere between the males' 
unskilled and semi-skilled rates.
The company's next offer reflected pressure from the male workers
(particularly the skilled) plus an admission that some further increment
was due to the women, if the firm was to comply with the Equal Pay Act
by the end of the year. Accordingly, the men were again allowed a
wage 'review' in December and the women were awarded a further £2.71
to be paid from the 1st January, 1976. This was to be the "only amount
paid to females, i.e. no other amount to be paid as a result of that
review."(24) The agreement stated further that:
"If any amount is paid to males as a result of 
the December review, this will be paid in such 
a manner as will not enable further claims for 
women under the Equal Pay Act." (25)
In addition £1 was given to maintenance fitters and electricians, on the 
understanding that no other groups would put forward further differential 
claims. But these 'improvements' did little to satisfy the male workers.
They did better out of the final offer, which was accepted by 
ballot. (26) This stipulated that all male grades would now have an 
extra £2 lieu bonus, on condition that no claim would be submitted under 
the Equal Pay Act and the men would not subsequently seek its consoli­
dation into their basic rates. (27) Ultimately, this annual award.
wherein the BSR women were supposed to achieve equal pay looked like this.
Increase in 
Basic Rate
Lieu bonus 
(Males)
Equa 1 pay 
increment 
(Females)
Shift Workers' 
increase 
through 
premiums
Total
Skilled males 5.50 
Semi-skilled males 4.26 
Females 3.92
‘maintenance and electricians
_anly)___  ___
2.00(+1.00*)
2.00
Nil
Nil
Nil
1.13
1.83(+1.33*)
1.42
Nil
9.33(11.66*)
7.68
5.05
(up to 7.76 
at 1.1.76)
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Considerable frustration must have remained among the male workers 
as a result of their meagre awards during the first relatively free 
period of collective bargaining experienced for some years. The women 
workers had gained more substantial rises as a result of their equal 
pay increments, but the continued lack of equality in practice, epitomised 
by the men's £2 lieu bonus and attached 'no-equality clause', clearly 
engendered frustration (and confusion)within their ranks as well. (28)
This would have been much compounded when the men, once again, 
returned to the bargaining table in December 1975. As it was probably 
at this point that a further £1-50 supplement to the lieu bonus was 
negotiated for all male day-workers, again on condition it would not 
be generalised to the women because of equal pay. This bonus was 'in 
lieu of' the extra money accruing t.o shift-men as a result of increases 
in basic rates being multiplied by their shift premium.
1976
"We got the £1.50 and the back pay because the 
girls took the action. But not the £2.00 the 
men got".
Paul (union official) (29)
When the wage claim for 1976 was discussed by the branch early
in that year, it appeared there was little which could be achieved
beyond the flat £6 allowed under stage 1 of the social contract (1975-6).
The main demand of the male workers for average earnings, including
shift allowance, for holiday pay, had therefore to be held in abeyance
"until incomes policy allows". In the first week of April a strike broke
out among the women at the Old Hill factory - which was almost a riot:
"The wage agreement was accepted bv ballot 
(in June 1975). But they found out about part 
of the lieu bonus (the £1.50 awarded to male
day-workers in December 1975) and there was a 
strike at Old Hill.
We sat, the convenor, me and the shopstewards, 
getting abused. And we said we couldn't negotiate, 
it had been accepted by them. It was terrifying!
They got a chap by the legs and they were dangling 
him over the staircase. The afternoon shift came 
on, and they were told there was no strike and to 
work normally. But these kids went around, whipping 
the chairs out from under them, as they sat to work 
on the lines. We wouldn't negotiate until they 
calmed down. I told them they couldn't have it.
We met the company, they wanted to see what would 
happen. I told them they should get the police, 
someone was going to get killed! The company 
wouldn't though. Ferguson, the chairman was there.
We told him we weren't going to break that 
agreement. Then he called us in - 'Come on, we're 
not messing about any longer!* He let us down!
Never again - no agreement will be worth the paper it 
was written on. Another day and it would have been 
OK. Then they wanted it back-dated! But he 
wouldn't - then he had to.
The convenor at Waterfall Lane said, on principle, 
she wouldn't take the money; they weren't entitled 
to it!
This month he'd have said - sack the lot! But it 
was the time - production was all he was interested 
in then.'
Mary (branch secretary) (30)
The women's success spurred on the shift-men, whose demand for 
the El.50 lieu bonus as well was included in the annual wage claim at 
the April branch meeting. (31) At this meeting also, a request was 
made for the extension to women, of the E2 lieu-bonus given to the 
males in the previous year. But the officials refused to take this up 
at all, on the grounds that this bonus was part of the 1975 wage deal 
which the female members had voted to accept, and in doing so they had 
also "accepted" that the £2.00 would be excluded from a claim for equal 
pay (32). At the same meeting, we might also observes
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"It was agreed that union contributions should be 
increased from 18 pence to 25 pence as soon as 
possible, as 'Equal Pay' had now been achieved."
The 1976 wage negotiations, in accordance with union policy to 
support the social contract and wage restraint, produced a £6 flat-rate 
supplement paid to all grades. Nevertheless, for women workers at 
BSR, as elsewhere in the country, this increase constituted the largest 
single award they had ever received.
1977
"Under no circumstances will phase two of the 
Government's legislation be accepted".
With their wage negotiations in June, BSR found itself at the 
tailend of each stage of the social contract. From August 1976, 
awards were to be limited to a 5% increase, with cut-off points at each 
end of £2.50 and £4. If this was negotiated in June 1977 it would 
have to run for a full year - even if the limits were relaxed two months 
later. And, given the build-up of pressure against continued restraint 
in the union movement as a whole (reflected in many of the 1976 con­
ferences) , this possibility seemed likely. On top of this, the 
company had announced record profits in 1976: out of £284 million, 
they could afford to pav more.
Workers at BSR began to register an intention not to be bound 
by the stage two award for twelve months, early in the year. And 
a discussion between some male workers and the branch secretary in 
February revealed two different approaches to the question. The men 
proposed that the union side should refuse to negotiate with the 
company in June, and wait until August to see what the new terms might 
be. The union officials, mindful of their leadership's commitment to
uphold the social contract, favoured going into negotiation in June 
under stage two - with a proviso that they would return to the neg­
otiating table "as soon as pay policy allowed". While the motion to 
the branch in February reflected the latter course of action, it did 
not reflect the intentions of its proposers. (33) The struggle to 
define branch policy in the direction desired by each group lasted a 
further, confusing, nine months.
In May, the company asked for a meeting to discuss the forthcoming 
wage negotiations. Conscious of the need to clarify the situation, 
the regional official raised the issue at the branch committee meeting. 
His arguments were to accept the stage two award in June and reopen 
negotiations after July 31st when this phase was due to end. In 
his view, the risk of deferring negotiations lay in perhaps losing 
the award altogether "like when Heath came in, in 1974". Arguments 
against this were put forward by two male toolroom workers. As they 
saw it, settlement under stage two meant accepting the"twelve month 
rule and they were happier to take on the company than the government. 
(And behind this was an implicit question: would the union support 
them if they did attempt to renegotiate after July 31st?) The vote 
on the committee went 4:6 against the officials' proposal to settle 
in June, albeit with a stated intention to return. But it was still 
unclear what the committee's policy might be instead - beyond their 
own stated intention not to negotiate at all until further guidelines 
(on the next stage of incomes policy) were available.
At this meeting, and at the meeting of joint shopstewards held 
subsequently (which confirmed the committee's decision "to await 
further guidelines" again,against the recommendation of their officials), 
the regional officer set forward his wage bargaining aims. These were 
a need firstly to "do something about differentials" for the skilled
men; and secondly, to improve the incentive element in the piecework 
scheme for the women in the hopes it would lift their 'spontaneously' 
falling performances. In order to appease the disaffected males, he 
also proposed widening the negotiating team of 7 - 4 convenors (for 
the first time, all female) plus 3 elected - to 12: "to include all 
skills" (specifically, more skilled men) "like we did in 1974".
There was confusion at the branch meeting held subsequently.
No-one had written down the branch committee's proposal - and the
officials were nervous because almost the entire evening shift of men
in the auto-shop had clocked out in order to attend:
"We've been in the dark....and we were concerned.
We were under the impression you were going to 
accept stage 2, so we came down to vote it out...."
But a proposal from the floor to accept the recommendation of the
branch committee and joint shopstewards "not to accept phase 2 but to
wait for guidelines on phase 3, before starting negotiations" was
overwhelmingly carried.
A few worried comments from some of the female stewards at the 
end, testified to the fact that no-one - outside certain groups of 
the men - had really discussed this issue or informed the women workers 
about it: would they accept the decision and forgo the rise? What if 
the company put it in their paypackets anyway? The women would spend 
it. And as long as the officials kept saying they might lose it 
altogether, the women were bound to say: "let's take what we can get!"
The branch secretary regretted not writing down the decision of 
the branch committee - she was sure it said negotiations on phase 2 
would be "held in abeyance". But now the proposal stated clearly 
that stage two would not be accepted and there was no more juggling that 
could be done. The proposal was put to the company with a demand for 
the eventual settlement to be backdated: this however, the employers
refused.(34)
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The government and the TUC were keeping quiet about their future 
plans - there was a possibility that the matter might drag on into 
the autumn. With the risk of having more to lose, the lack of previous 
consultation among the female membership loomed an even larger problem. 
If the majority of the women accepted or demanded a June settlement, 
the men would fail. While this would have rescued the union officials 
from adherence to a mandate thev could not see their way to supoort, 
their feelings were contradictory. Such a split carried the possibly 
greater danger of an attempt by the disaffected skilled men to break 
away from the union and 'go it alone'. The memory of Pilkingtons 
still loomed large.
Some basic questions concerning democracy and decision making 
in the branch were therefore raised:
"The women won't accept the vote at branch.
The men won't accept the vote of the floor."(35)
How was the dilemma to be resolved?
In the days of separate ballots recording refusal or acceptance 
of the company's final offer following wage negotiations, the majority 
of the women accepting always outnumbered the majority of the men who 
refused - much to the latter's contempt. But then the case for 
refusing never really had to be made, because the men were alwavs 
allowed to go back and negotiate separately. Now, for the first 
time, the men who had pushed through their decision had to consider 
how to make out their case, albeit after the event, to the majority of 
the women workers (who had not been party to the long series of 
discussions which had undoubtedly gone on in toolroom and machin<^4hop 
over the past few months).
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It was decided to put out a circular from branch office to inform 
the whole membership.
A WAGE INCREASE IS DUE FROM JUNE 1ST 1977 UNDER 
STAGE II OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. THE BRANCH 
COMMITTEE AND SHOPSTEWARDS RECOMMENDED THAT WE 
DO NOT ACCEPT THIS RISE OF E 2.50 AND PRO-RATA 
FOR PART-TIMERS, UNTIL WE HAVE MORE INFORMATION 
ON WHAT IS TO HAPPEN ON WAGES FROM JULY 31ST 
WHEN STAGE II ENDS.WHEN WE SETTLE WE WOULD WANT 
IT BACKDATED FROM JUNE 1ST.
The interests of the officials were again reflected in the wording of 
this, which gave the impression of postponement rather than refusal.
But this was to no avail. Ultimately, the officials had to withdraw 
from any obvious association with the wage negotiations because the 
company "broke" the social contract by agreeing to an increase of 10%; 
in effect, skipping stage 2 (5%) and following the stage 3 guidelines 
instead. (36)
1978
"Really, from our idea - everyone, as I see it - 
gained."
Ernie (maintenance, d e D U t y  convenor)
Stage three of the Labour Government's incomes policy comprised a 
10% pay limit, the option to introduce self-financing productivity deals 
(on top of the 10%) if "further flexibility" was required, and 
continued observance of the twelve-month rule. There was also provision 
for maintaining or restoring differentials - variations being permitted 
within the overall pay limit for the negotiating group. Because stage 
2 had been passed over, this had, in fact, comprised the basic frame­
work of the 1977 wage negotiations at BSR. It still remained operative 
therefore for the following series of negotiations in June 1978 as well.
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The final settlement of this year reflected the much increased 
militancy of the skilled men which had been building up throughout the 
previous twelve months. It also reflected an anxiety on the part of 
both the union's paid officials and the company to appease them - eased 
by the firm's continuing prosperity. Profits in 1977 still registered 
over £20 million.
The bargaining aims set out by the regional official in the previous 
year were largely fulfilled in 1978. The negotiating team was again 
widened "to include representatives from all skill groups". With a 
new and additional category now inserted above the "semi-skilled' and 
"skilled", namely, "craftsmen". The highest paid male workers were, 
therefore, substantially over-represented.
The company was looking for higher productivity and the union- 
side for more money. Besides asking for an overall increase, again, 
of 10%, it was argued that the other two main planks of their wage 
claim - to improve differentials and increase the incentive element 
in piecework pay - were necessary to increase both pay and efficiency.
(A specific aim was to speed up the final assembly-lines).
Looking at the final settlement, therefore, we can note straight 
away that the two aspects of most relevance to the women workers, 
both depended on a higher work-rate. First, the bonus element in 
the piecework system was increased, but on a curved basis. For 
performances up to 100 it remained at the original price of 12*jp per 
point. Pay for performances between 100 and 105 was increased by lp 
per point and 2p on the final assembly lines. Pay for performances 
over 105 was increased to 16*jp per point. (Hardly any production areas 
could achieve this and none of the final assembly lines). Secondly,
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it was agreed to implement the productivity scheme which had been 
instituted the previous year: it would now go 'live'. The pay-out 
from this (distributed on a percentage basis) was also dependent upon 
final output levels. (37)
It s e e m s  t h a t  n e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  t w o  a s D e c t s  o f  t h e  w a g e  a g r e e m e n t
particularly reflected the wishes of the female membership.
"The increase which was negotiated - increasing 
the payment per point over lOO performance - 
doesn't amount to anything in reality. They've 
just wrapped it up in a good parcel. The 
younger girls on the lines think it's OK, but 
the older women upstairs are more sensible and 
realise the scheme is not good enough - we want 
a better paying scheme altogether."
Elizabeth (machine shop)(38)
But even the younger girls on the lines were not very impressed:
"Pay's been increased for performances over lOO....
there again, you've got to do more work - to 
get the extra pennies like. (What do the girls 
think of that?) They think it should have gone 
up for below lOO."
Barbara (final assembly)(39)
In the 1977 wage-claim discussions, a serious bid had, in fact,
been made by the women members to get their officials to negotiate
improvements to the payment system:
"We asked if the points system could be charmed 
and they (the union officials) said - no way.
Because it means changing the rate books they 
said the only way that we could help the main 
lines was a bit of bonus on what they earned.
But it's not working out like that....
It was the craftsmen wanted it, because it goes 
on how much you're earning von see. They're having 
overtime and they're earning a good sum - they net 
a good thing out of it. But. where there's no 
overtime, like the women on the lines - von get 
the same wage every week - and it's not so much as 
the other people.... They were all for It, the
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craftsmen, but us on the main lines, and the 
lower paid - they just, you know WE DIDN'T 
WANT IT REALLY....We wanted the points system 
- We wanted more money for our points system. 
Like for one point we get 12*jp in a pound.
Well, we wanted that changed, we wanted say, 
15p, something like that. It's been 12*:p ever 
since I've been with the firm. It used to be 
2/6d — it was good mcnsy th?n... 1
Edna (final assembly)(40)
And this year:
"We did get our 10%, plus a productivity scheme.
But, for us, the productivity scheme isn't 
working through bad parts and things like that.
So....we didn't really get anything extra, only 
the 10% really - when you really look at it"
Edna (final assembly)(41)
Apart from an overall increase in pay, the three main demands of 
the male workers concerned: consolidation of the now numerous supple­
ments and bonuses into basic rates in order to provide higher earnings 
through overtime and shift working; average earnings for holiday pay 
(instead of basic rates) - again this affected overtime and shiftworkers 
especially; and finally improved differentials - of particular concern 
to the skilled groups (or rather those who designated themselves 
"craftsmen": namely the toolroom and maintenance workers).
In the final agreement consolidation was achieved for all of the 
manual workers and this was done in such a way as to achieve enhanced 
differentials at the same time. The sums consolidated into basic 
rates were: the £6 award of 1976; the lieu bonus (£4.50 male day workers; 
£3 male shift workers; £2.50 females) and the 10% increase of 1977.
Ernie from the Stourbridge maintenance department explained how this
was done:
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"We consolidated last year's 10%, but we consolidated 
it for everyone - and it was OUR idea that, consolid­
ate last years 10% - OK, we'll do it like this...
We broke the workforce up into groups and consolidated 
10% of an average earnings figure for each. (Based 
on rates for 40 hours).
10% craftsmen @ av. £90 = £9 consolidated onto the rate.
Really, from our idea - everyone as I see it, gained."
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(42)
"If you take it on average, we - as the craftsmen, 
have probably had somewhere in the region of 18%.
And the women..you know - excuse me referring to 
them in that term..(That*s correct!) It's alright, 
because I know your feelin's.... (No! They're women)... 
er, they probably had about 15% you know, something 
like that, 14 or 15%."
One or two anomalies had also appeared though,as Ernie again explained:
"When the lieu bonus for shift workers (£3) and 
for day workers (£4.50) was consolidated into the 
basic rates - straight away, when the shift bloke 
and the day bloke work together like on a weekend, 
they're on different basic rates aren't they? It's 
only talkin' about 4p...you know, but it's quite 
dear to some people's hearts....
Now the firm have conceded to pay a shift worker 
on the same basis as a day man, when they work 
together.
....So while there's a different basic rate - it 
doesn't really make any difference..I think it 
makes about 50p per week difference - you know, 
bu* still..some people Ifeel pretty sore about that....'
He sanehow failed to notice a much bigger 'anomaly' whereby sex- 
based differentials had been (re-)introduced into basic rates, three 
years after their supposed abolition. These differentials 
had two major sources. One was the lieu-bonus noted above, which 
still stood at £2.50 for the women as a result of the (un)equal pay
skilled
others
women
@ av. £80 = £8 
@ av. £70 = £7.50 
@ av. £50 = £5 H
II
• I
• I
• I
II
II
• I
• I
In the end they had done quite well:
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(43)
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(44)
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agreement of 1975. It now reappeared in the basic rates alongside the 
consolidated average earnings increment. This consolidated increment, 
the second source of inequality, nicely took account of the higher basic 
rates and special bonuses accruing to the male workers alone. In 
the full awareness that these, for most of the men, would be immediately 
translated into further enhanced earnings by shift and overtime 
premiums - to which males alone had access.
As a result of the settlement therefore it can be said that a 
sex-based differential was firmly established within the "unisex" 
semi-skilled grade and the gap between men and women's rates and 
earnings in general was significantly widened.
Conclusions: Unequal bargains:
Every year the male workers received a larger share than the 
women of the total sum which the company was prepared to concede overall 
to labour. This unequal share did not simply occur in the usual, 
'unconscious' way that it normally does. That is whenever percentage 
wage increases are implemented and the workers on the higher rates 
just happen to be men. As we have seen, the men at BSR also received 
various extraordinary direct payments and also consolidations which 
gave them a larger share of the kitty. And we are considering this 
before taking account of the effects of differential access - also 
favouring the male workers - to either the higher paid jobs or overtime 
and shiftwork, both of which also contributed to the men having higher 
earnings. What we are noting is that, simply in terms of the annual 
share-out, the men got more than the women.
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This was the case even during the implementation of equal pay.
The latter can more accurately be viewed as a process of grade re­
structuring, during which the women received some extra pay supplements, 
rather than one of re-dlstrlbution in terms of effecting any significant 
alteration in the proportions accruing to men and women workers.
Conscious efforts were made, in fact, to achieve the first as far as 
possible without upsetting the overall balance of the second. In 
the wage deal of 1974, for example, when scope for effecting the 
1 normal1 pattern of distribution through management was too restricted, 
it was brought about in a direct fashion, with the women 'giving* 
the men part of their annual increase and keeping their extraordinary 
supplement, as it were, intact.
Having examined the outcome of collective bargaining as here, 
on wages, it becomes necessary to explain the patterns that emerge.
In the previous Chapter we showed how the employer's interest was 
carried in the process of joint-bargaining and examined what further 
implications flowed from this, in terms of the union's organisational 
structure on the one hand and the actual position of the women workers 
on the other. In this Chapter we have been looking at the outcome, 
not only of joint-bargaining - whereby the amount of surplus the employer 
concedes to the workforce is negotiated, but also 'collective' bargaining 
whereby the pattern of its distribution within the workfroce is neg­
otiated by the workers themselves. As we will endeavour to show, this 
bargaining process also has further implications in terms of the organ­
isational structure of the union and the position of the women workers
overall.
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Part of the process of examining why the union's bargaining 
structure was less effective with regard to the women workers must be 
to examine how and why it was more effective in relation to the men.
In doing so it should certainly not be assumed that the male workers' 
demands were necessarily met in full - or that the men felt satisfied - 
as this was far from the case. What is being examined here is the 
relative strength of the men in relation to management, union and the 
women workers, which was reflected in their domination of the domestic 
organisation and bargaining structure. The main components of this 
will be analysed in the following Chapters by examining the main sources 
of the men's greater bargaining power and also the way it was used.
But we can begin the discussion here by looking more closely at
events leading up to the conclusion of the 'Craftsman's Agreement'
in 1978. This entailed a considerable amount of 'internal negotiation,
taking a variety of forms, among different groups of workers. And
the outcome appears to reflect their differential bargaining strength -
not only in relation to management but also to each other.
THE "CRAFTSMEN'S AGREEMENT"
"We can really hold the company to ransom,
I s'pose - because we can switch all the power 
off, and no-one can work, you see."
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)
We have already noted that the wage settlement of 1978 incorporated 
the "craftsmen's agreement". This resulted in widened differentials 
within the skilled (male) grades, notably between the "tradesmen" and 
"BSR - skilled". It also resulted in the overall differential between 
men and women being increased to an even greater degree and, furthermore
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allowed the differential basic rates within the "unisex" semi-skilled 
grade to be restored. The wage settlement could also be seen as 
affecting the men and women differently. Since, broadly speaking, 
most of the direct production workers and those on piecework were 
female, the two most relevant parts of the package - one giving 
"enhanced incentive pay" (but only on performances over lOO) and the 
other a "productivity" increment (also based on output) were for this 
group in particular directly conditional on a higher work-rate.
So the pattern of distribution of the proceeds from bargaining 
with the employer once again favoured the men in general and certain 
skilled groups among them in particular. This outcome was pressaged 
by the pattern of representation on the negotiating team (widened from 
7 to 12) which included, apart from the four female convenors and their 
male deputies, representatives for the semi-skilled males, the skilled 
grades (men) and the 'craftsmen'. Thus, men in general were greatly 
over-represented and the skilled grades especially so. As we have 
already suggested, and as we can now go on to see, this pattern of 
representation along with the structure of the claim itself was the 
outcome of bargaining processes which had preceded the meeting with 
management. What was the main substance of the internal bargaining 
concerning this wage claim about?
As we have seen, the method advocated by the 'craftsmen' to 
achieve both a generalised increase of 10% and more greatly enhanced 
differentials was to consolidate bonuses and supplements into basic 
rates and also to consolidate 10% of an average earnings figure 
(calculated on 40 hour rates). This figure was selected to cover a
particular group. Sections and individuals had first to be allocated
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to these groups - each of which would then incorporate a range of actual 
rates and earnings - and all within the one 'band' would receive the 
same 'average earnings' increment. The process of grouping itself 
was, therefore, crucial and the subject of considerable internal 
negotiation before the employer was even approached.
One instance of the negotiations concerned the female supervisors. 
Their shopsteward, Jill at Stourbridge, made strong representations to 
the wage negotiating committee that these women should be grouped with 
the Chargehands (their male equivalent) who were graded as skilled, 
rather than with the rest of the women workers, as was first proposed. 
Although supposedly on the same grade, female supervision were on 
lower rates than their male counterparts who received an extra supple­
ment for "setting" (even when they did not do it) which the women did 
not get. If the latter were 'banded' with the men, they would get 
a rise of E8 per week (based on 10% of the skilled grades' average £80) 
rather than £5 (based on the women workers’ average - £50).
Jill was successful in her argumentss although Terry, the shopsteward 
for the male chargehands considered the chargehand grouping to be 
anomolous as a result - because, as he saw it, the band now included 
'semi-skilled' (i.e. the female supervisors) and 'skilled' (the male 
chargehands) together. In his opinion, this resulted in the calculated 
average being £1.18 below the average of the skilled (male) group 
"proper". It was difficult to discover whether this did, as he 
claimed, result in some male chargehands actually beino paid at n lower 
rate than the skilled grades they were supervising (since they all 
presumably got the £8). But there were certainly objections raised 
by these men to a basis of classification or calculation, which 'joined' 
them to their female counterparts.
i
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He did not, by the same token however, see anything odd about the 
fact that he, as a chargehand in maintenance, had succeeded in getting 
himself classified in the top 'craftsmen's' grade, along with the 
chargehands in the toolroom (receiving a £9 increment instead of an £8 
one). Because only the chargehands in these two areas were so 
classified - separately from their fellows, and in this higher 'grade'. 
So, who were the craftsmen?
Only the toolroom and maintenance workers were included in this 
category and it is clear that the development of the 'craftsmen's' 
classification at BSR supports in crucial respects arguments about how 
the construction of,or accession to,skilled status in general is based 
on bargaining strength as much, or more,than any other technical or 
'objective' criteria. The position of the carpenters at BSR highlights 
this point particularly well. The answer to the question ’when is 
a craftsman not a craftsman?'seems to be, when he's a carpenter and 
he's not invited to the meetings.
The carpenters' shop was at Stourbridge. Fifteen of the twenty 
workmen in the building maintenance department were based there, 
the rest being stationed at the other factories. Their shopsteward 
was Michael, a fully qualified and experienced carpenter, who took a 
great deal of pride in his craft. He also acted as union represen­
tative for the thirteen workers in the garage, situated further down 
the yard.
Michael was extremely upset:
"I'm on the verge of hysterics over our craftsmen's 
business, now I can tell you! That's the only 
time in my life I've ever been so utterly...well 
humiliated if that's the right work for it. That 
somebody can NOT class us as being equal to them!
....we are known as craftsmen throughout the 
world. Yet for some reason we have been 
omitted from the BSR's craftsman's agreement."
Michael (carpenter)(45)
Emphasis in original
The carpenters had never been invited or informed about the 
'craftsmen's' meetings either.(46) Why had they been excluded?
Ernie the maintenance department's shopsteward explained this in terms 
of a weekend overtime ban once instituted in his department which the 
carpenters had been reluctant to support at the time.
Another possible explanation - although not advanced as such - 
was that because the carpenters • were paid at a lower rate than the 
maintenance engineers, to include them in the 'craftsman's' category 
would have lowered the average on which the 10% wage increase was 
based. (They had, in fact, been included in the 'skilled' category, 
receiving an E8 increase rather than the 'craftsmen's' £9. And the 
garage, paid even less, had been grouped lower still).
It appeared that the carpenters had not previously been aware of 
any discrepancy in their rates and they were now, of course, anxious 
to gain parity with maintenance workers on the engineering side.
Their first (and minimum) demand however was to be given (back) the 
title of craftsmen. Ernie's explanation as to why this group, which 
already carried craftsman status, had not achieved classification as 
such, points once again to the basis of skill distinctions and titles, 
in bargaining strength and resources. And his response indicates 
how far the carpenters had lacked, or failed to mobilise these, not 
only in relation to management, but crucially in relation to the 
maintenance engineers themselves. He makes it clear that inclusion
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in the top category had had to be negotiated in this way, since it
was not automatic - by title - nor did it rely upon technical criteria
(which the carpenters would probably have met more throughly than the
maintenance men, in any case (see below p.639)).
"Carpenters are craftsmen, don't get me wrong.
Garage mechanics - debatable as far as I'm 
concerned, but carpenters are craftsmen - 
definitely. But, I didn't see, and the rest 
of us didn't see, why we should fight on their 
behalf, when they weren't prepared to back us 
up. If they wanted to achieve something they 
must achieve it themselves, because they've had 
the opportunity and they abandoned us, as we 
saw it. So, although at this stage we've 
got no real objection to them becoming craftsmen, 
we don't see that we should fight for them. You 
know, they ARE craftsmen - don't get me wrong, 
but - OK if they want to be craftsmen - do what 
we did___ "
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(47) 
Presumably, from this point, the carpenters would have to begin to 
negotiate support for their future claims with these other workers.
But what is also made clear in the above statement of the maintenance 
workers' position, is the fact that the garage workers would require 
far more bargaining resources - in order to attempt to do the same.
If the carpenters had (so far) been unsuccessful in the process 
of internal bargaining through which the pattern of distribution of 
benefit was established, we need now to examine why and by what means 
those who gained the largest share, succeeded. Here we can see that 
the process of internal negotiations by means of which toolroom and 
maintenance workers established priority for their demands, took place 
on two main fronts: with other groups of workers and with the union's
full-time officers.
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To an important degree, the final outcome was promoted on the
basis of organisation and momentum developed around their separate
claims for special treatment pursued by both toolroom and maintenance
men in the previous period.
"It was the biggest mistake the company ever 
made - when they gave permission for a meeting 
of the maintenance men in all the different 
factories. Never knew each other from Adam 
before, but once we got together - that was it - 
one body....We started making demands and voicing 
complaints."
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(48)
The union officials had already been forced to respond to the 
demands of these two skilled groups, building up pressure to pursue 
sectional gains throughout the years of incomes policies which, in the 
main, prevented their negotiation. (At BSR, moreover, the male s' 
frustration had been given an added spur because the concurrent equality 
legislation also had had the effect of putting an end to the men's 
traditional expectations of returning to the bargaining table 'for a 
second bite' - i.e. to negotiate their own special claims). Toolroom 
workers had been pursuing a claim for staggered holidays, and a special, 
comprehensive claim for the maintenance men had already been drawn 
up and unofficially submitted for the company's 'future consideration' - 
with unofficial support from the officials - despite the fact that 
incomes policy did not permit this and other groups had not been allowed 
to do the same.
But when the 1978 wage claim came up for consideration at the 
beginning of that year the union's full-time negotiators still remained 
bound to the government's pay guidelines which ruled the claim out.
Fears that the skilled men would attempt to break away from the 
organisation altogether in order to pursue the separate negotiations 
they had so long desired were spurred on by an awareness of a generally
increased confidence in the workforce which had resulted from their 
success in pressurising both company and union to skip stage 2, only 
six months earlier.
In the New Year shopstewards from toolroom and maintenance in
ail factories nad joined forces to draw up Uieii special claim jointly.
And first of all they found they had to bargain with their own union
officials. The regional official could neither agree to negotiate
the claim nor refuse to do so. In a difficult position he and the
regional secretary played what might be called, "an old-fashioned
one-two". As Ernie who was the new shopsteward for the maintenance
department at Stourbridge recalls:
"Well, first of all we tried to get rid of Paul 
Silver - which we did do -although we've still 
got 'im. We refused to 'ave 'im as our negotiator, 
you know, because we didn't think he'd...er, I s'pose 
Paul has to negotiate for the majority, and the 
majority are semi-skilled women and that, so... 
you know, we didn't think we were gettin' a fair 
deal out of it. And we had him... We went over 
to Jim Mason (the regional secretary) - a deputation - 
and had him thrown out like. At the end of the 
day, he still negotiates and that - you know... It 
was pointless really, we didn't gain anything, I mean...
We had a big meeting up the labour club,and he was thrown 
out, and Jim Mason came - and he was gonna look after 
us and...'Oh, you've got the best negotiator now - You'm 
alright now...' you know. But he was a waste of 
time. We had him in on a few meetings, 'Oh, you'll 
get that!' - But he never...You know, from experience 
afterwards...because I've since become deputy convenor - 
I've found Paul a good negotiator.
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor) (49)
Clear signals of management's determination to resist the men's 
claims meant that the latter needed to decide on strategy. Accordingly, 
they planned the first of a series of four mass-meetings, involving the 
toolroom and maintenance workers from all of the factories.
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"Anyway I should say it was about April this
year - and we started having collective meetings
from the four factories. All the craftsmen -
that's the toolroom and the maintenance - started
having meetings. And when we had a meeting, we'd
all switch all the power off at all the four factories -
so everything came to a standstill.... We used to
hire this labour club, I think it was Cradley Heath 
somewhere, and we just used to go out and close all 
four factories down - just to go there to have our 
meetings. Now, although it was only to have a 
meeting, this did have some effect, because it made 
the management realise that we could shut the four 
factories down and that we were going to do this, 
that and the other. "
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(50)
Shutting off the power was undoubtedly an effective tactic. Not
least because it had never been done before - at any of the factories,
let alone all of them simultaneously.
"We kept fighting for things and we were gettin' 
bits 'ere and bits there, and....They agreed to 
let us have an individual vote on holidays and wage 
rises etc and our own page in the rate book... and 
all this was goin' on - and then we came round to 
this year's wage negotiations, (in June) and...We 
suddenly appeared as "craftsmen", you know. Like - 
it was broken down into*craftsmen','"skilled" and"semi- 
skilled,-' you see. So really, we had achieved a 
status of craftsmen, and...I s ’pose you could say - 
when the consolidation onto the rates and that, was 
put - we were....the top, you know. ...We worked 
out what our average was, and broke that down to 
40 hours, and had that put onto our rates...We 
gained by that, as I said, we gained quite well by 
that. “
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(51)
The process of internal negotiations through which the two groups 
of men in the toolroom and maintenance department established an 
unequal distribution of benefit with priority for themselves also 
involved them in some bargaining with their fellow workers. In 
particular they found themselves having to negotiate with the women 
for a degree of acceptance, or at least acquiesence to their aims.
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When the men switched off the power they closed down the com­
pressors. This effectively immobilised large sections of production, 
and assembly because so many of the tools were powered by compressed 
air. The women therefore had no work and lost their wages.
"Now, we were 'rats of the week' then, you 
know - you used to walk round the factory and 
be booed and sneered at, and everything - and 
you know...er, p'raps they didn't fully under­
stand our problem...anyway, we were trying to 
get the craftsmen's agreement drawn up...."
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(52)
"The women were shouting and screaming, 'Oh it's 
alright for you! I'll come in and work weekends...'
I said, 'Look, you can come and work my weekends, 
every weekend - but find out what your husband 
says when you're missing every weekend'".
Terry (maintenance chargehand)(53)
The men heard a rumour that the women were planning to "pass some­
thing against them" at the branch. "So we as craftsmen from all of 
the factories decided that we were all going to go up like". Ernie 
got up to speak and was called to the front where a microphone was put 
into his hand. Although he was a shopsteward he had never attended 
a branch meeting before.
"I was nervous...
No votes were passed so we didn't gain or 
lose anything by it really, you know, we 
just....I think we got across to some of 
the women our feelings like. You know, 
the blokes gone to tech.for seven years and 
that, and people can come into the BSR and 
be BSR-trained and get the same sort of 
money you know, after we've given up....
It isn't seven years now, but some of the 
older group have given up seven years to 
be trained We got some of the women on
our side you know what I mean? - Not all 
of them....
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(54)
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"Well, if they're craftsmen and they have...got 
a degree, then they deserve, sort of a gap don't 
they? I mean, otherwise it would be silly them 
going learning a trade wouldn't it? But what... 
one thing I don't believe in, is that they should 
get all the cake, you know, and we get the crumbs.
Because after all's said and done, I know if the 
girls've got no...(qualifications). If they 
haven't had to pass a course or anything, they 
(still) work damn hard. And I think everybody 
deserves so much. Yes, they're (the men) s'posed 
to have a little extra, but not (as much) as 
sometimes they do - it's quite a lump sum.
(Do you think they get better treatment than the 
women?)
Oh yes, I think they do really. Because I mean, 
every factory looks after their experienced man
don't it? - their craftsman.... "
Edna (final assembly)(55)
"It wasn't proved they were all time-served - 
there were no indentures shown. It was taken 
as the reason - that they were...."
Pearl (sub-assembly, convenor)(56)
(What do the women think about the craftsman's agreement?)
"Well, they'm all against it, aren't they!
The women get up in arms when they know what 
the men are earning."
Pip (sub-assembly)(57)
Some attempt was made by those designating themselves 'craftsmen',
to justify the distinction on technical grounds. In particular, they
based their claim on the fact that they had been "indentured" and had
trained at night-school for periods of five to seven years. This
was not, in fact, true of those interviewed and it was probably only
true of a handful altogether. As the shopsteward from maintenance
(who had been presenting the above arguments in full, and had been the
one to do so at the branch meeting) eventually admitted:
"Well, I didn't actually complete a full apprentice­
ship. Here's me shouting about - 'We did seven years' 
and we want our differentials back'. I only did 
three years and got a bit involved with ban the bomb 
and all that - I went off to London with me mates and 
bummed around."
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(58)
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This did not, apparently, detract anything from the main arguments 
which were used by the workers in maintenance and the toolroom to 
distinguish themselves from the 'BSR-skilled' especially, and also 
to justify to the workforce in general their claim to a larger slice 
of the cake and their "own" agreement. The problem was posed in terms 
of differentials.
"Well, I'm shopsteward for the maintenance. . .We are 
the craftsmen. We were pee-ed off with Government 
legislation etc., etc. There were guys cornin' in 
being ' BSR trained' - blokes pullin' trucks about, 
and they were endin' up as setters. And us guys who'd 
gone to tech, and college and that, you know - got all 
our qualifications - the difference in money was only 
a couple of quid you know...I mean, not just here, 
it's the same all over the country really, isn't it?
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(59)
(What do people mean when they say 1BSR-skilled'?)
"There's none in maintenance - when you're talking 
about 'BSR trained' you're talking mainly about setters 
and inspectors. They're usually labourers, and then 
they have a go at setting. They go away for a week 
or a couple of weeks up to one of the factories and 
somebody shows them how to set up a press. And that 
was our biggest argument. They don't get the same 
money as us but the differential was very, very close... 
Considering they'ji come off the streets virtually - as 
a labourer and had done a couple of weeks training - 
the difference in their money to our money was a couple 
to three quid. I mean, compared to people who've been 
to tech, five years....and also they couldn't do a job 
elsewhere, where they're not the same machines...."
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(60)
Alongside arguments which referred to training for seven years 
("We say that...actually, it isn't seven years - I think it's only 
five") ran another strand which sought to justify a larger share - on 
the grounds that these workers in contrast to the 'BSR-trained', 
possessed transferable skills. (It might well have been argued that 
those without transferable skills deserved the greater compensation) . 
Ultimately, this distinction, together with all the other concepts which 
were used to justify an unequal distribution, was found to be confusing:
"Oh, all supervisors - they're classed as skilled.
And....as I say, 'craftsmen' and 'skilled', to me
- it's just the same thing, but two different words.
Alright they'm....I mean, I'm 'BSR-skilled' - well, 
all the supervision here are 'BSR-skilled'; but 
there is also 50% of the 'craftsmen' - well, the 
maintenance men are BSR-skilled'. They couldn't 
go and get a job anywhere else - what they're doing
- because they're BSR-skilled'.... though a lot of 
'em 'ave got the indentures, or whatever the word 
is....
Jill (final assembly, supervisor)(61)
Apart from the attempt to present their case directly to the
membership at the branch meeting, the 'craftsmen' also found themselves
having to admit the convenors into their 'special' meetings. This
again meant them having to negotiate, to some extent, with the other
workers' interests - which the convenors and deputies were representing
"Convenors and deputies now go to meetings, but at 
first - remember it was in pay restraint - we were 
more concerned with ourselves, shall we say, than the 
women and we objected to it a little bit. (They did 
try once and we refused to let them be involved 
you know). But then we saw the sense in it you 
know, it's only fair that the convenors should have 
been kept in the picture as to what was going on, so 
if the rest of the members wanted to know- they'd be 
in the picture what had actually gone on. So - the 
convenors and deputies did used to come to our 
craftsmen's meetings in the end.
(Were they involved when you were organising for the 
agreement?)
"They weren't involved - in a sense we...they didn't 
take any part in formulating it, or negotiating. They 
were just present to see what was going on. Inevitably 
they sort of chirped in, or if it was going to affect 
some of THEIR members they'd say so - quite rightly 
so. But actually we negotiated for ourselves, they 
were just there to observe."
Emphasis in original Ernie (maintenance, deputy con­
venor) (62)
But, although the lines of internal negotiation ran in every 
direction, they were not all weighted equally. So the final part to 
be illustrated in this section develops further the question of bar-
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gaining strength and resources and their use in relation to other 
workers.
In this instance, the resources 'belonged* to the 'craftsmen'.
When the maintenance men shut down the power supply which they con­
trolled as part of their job, they utilised an effective means of 
forcing home their own special claims against management:
"We control the water pumps for the moulding shop.
We control the compressed air and that controls 
the factory and the boilers. When we say to the 
boilerman, 'Come on Tony, we're out!', he'll say 
'Hup,are we off for the day?' CLICK! Everything's 
off. That's it, it's like that."
Terry (Maintenance chargehand)(63)
It was also an effective means of forcing agreement from the rest 
of the workforce as well - to an unequal distribution of benefit in 
their own favour.
"After that (the 'craftsmen's' success) I found 
the women had a lot more respect for us, you know - 
they said, 'well, we don't mind the guys! you know,
'they're the man of the 'ouse', and all that....
Although they weren't sayin' this before, you know - 
They saw that we got something out of it, and they 
had more respect for it."
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(64)
What we have seen in this account is the not unexpected circum­
stance whereby strategically placed groups can win favourable treat­
ment. But we are interested in exploring further the processes 
through which this is achieved. This is because we would argue, 
that structural inequalities in the bargaining position of different 
groups of workers which results in an unequal distribution of benefit 
within their ranks has further and on-going implications. And we 
are looking specifically at what impact the 'strong'male workers at 
BSR had on the position of the 'weaker'females.
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This requires a more sophisticated view of bargaining relation­
ships than is normally offered in industrial relations literature, 
where,if inequalities between different groups of workers are acknow­
ledged at all,discussion may consider the potentially undermining 
impact of the weakly organised on the stronger. And where the impact 
of one group's power over another within the collective bargaining 
process itself is analysed, it is only the unequal relationship between 
the worker and the employer which is usually considered. But we have 
proposed the importance of, and focussed attention on, 'collective 
bargaining' which takes place within the ranks of labour. What are 
the implications of unequal bargaining relationships here?
Therefore, we need to ask: what further consequences arose for 
other workers as a result of the toolroom and maintenance men's mobil­
isation of their superior bargaining resources? What impact did this 
have on the uniorfs organisational structure? What impact did this have 
on the bargaining position of other workers - particularly the women?
In some respects the dominance of these men over/within the union's 
bargaining and representational system can be seen to have had a similar 
effect from the point of view of the women members as management's 
domination did,with the predominance of the skilled group's interests 
and their over-representation at key points in the organisation (such 
as the negotiating team) hiIting the structures and rendering these 
less responsive to the women's (and other workers') competing or alter­
native needs. (The decision to implement the productivity deal on a 
percentage basis might be taken as a single, illustrative example).
The first general consequence for other workers we might note, therefore, 
is a reduction in bargaining resources - to the extent that such
institutional structures are a source of these.
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But the unequal bargaining relationship between workers in this 
case study can be seen to have other more direct effects on the 
position of the 'non-craft' workers. We have already noted that costs 
for the workforce, deriving from the employer’s interest, can be re­
distributed within their ranks by stronger groups, to be borne by those 
with lesser bargaining 'strength' - with the subsequent impact of 
diminishing this still further. But there is a further question of cost 
distribution arising here. Specifically, who is to bear the main costs 
of the dispute? This is an issue which was also negotiated between 
different groups in the workforce. And what we find is that the 
'craftsmen', who were in control of the most crucial bargaining 
resources in relation to management, i.e. the switches, were again 
in a position to impose their decision (this time on the distribution 
of cost rather than benefit) onto other workers. Moreover, the 
interests reflected in their decision are quite clearly again^those of 
co-exploitation, as the following incident shows.
On each occasion that the 'craftsmen' had stopped the factories 
the women lost their wages. (It is not clear whether the 'indirect' 
male workers did so to the same extent) . A deputation, representing 
the female production workers went to the maintenance men to ask for 
their support. They wanted the power switched off in order to get 
management to pay their wages for the periods they had been laid off 
because of the 'craftsmen's' meetings. The argument of the maintenance 
steward shows that the men clearly saw there was a choice - either the 
women or the employer should bear the main costs of their dispute:
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"One thing should be sorted out - when there is 
any disruption, like when they switch the power 
off, that all the girls should have been paid.
It wasn't their fault, management should have 
been forced....The girls should have been com­
pensated in some way. But I mean, I don't want 
to get a situation where everybody's on strike 
every five minutes because they know they're 
going to get paid for it, because that's all very 
well, but at the end of the day you know, you end 
up on the scrap-heap don't you - the company does 
anyway - they just can't afford it.
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(65)
Since the women were not in a position to organise against the
men, the latter ignored their request. When they were forced to make
a small concession - to give notice of future meetings - (many women
travelled over 20 miles to the factory from the outlying areas), it
was mainly as a response to pressure deriving from management.
"....See, the management uses it. We promised we'd be 
back by a certain time. We've kept that promise, 
we will always be back by that time. But management 
by then have always sent the women home - used it see - 
'Oh well, it's the maintenance that's outi Whereas 
we've also promised we'd try to give between 48 and 24 
hours notice to the shopstewards and convenor before 
we went out and we kept that promise as well. At 
one time we'd just say, 'out' and that was it, but 
then they began...-because of the complaints, we 
thought about it...'Be fair', we got agreement from 
the lads and 'we'll give you due notice' - which we 
were doing."
Terry (Maintenance chargehand)(66)
More general implications for the position of the women flow from 
this example. The craftsmen were well aware that in making their 
achievements they had set an example which others would be seeking to 
follow. This could be, and was, expressed in the classic manner of 
the "wage-pull" hypothesis: everyone might gain as a result of the 
initial breakthrough or 'lead' that these particular groups had taken.
i
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"We'd got together and decided we were gonna stick 
together. We're achieving a little, you know, a 
little bit at a time. And I think the women admire 
us for this - because like, just say we're top of 
the tree - whatever we achieve they've got to achieve 
something as well. Because the management know 
that if it's seen that us craftsmen have switched 
everything off and they've got this - well they know 
very well that however mild and meek the women or 
the other semi-skilled gonna be, they're not going 
to stand for it - they're going to want something 
as well. So whatever we achieve they've got to 
give it collectively - in a way - to all the others 
haven't they?"
Ernie (maintenance, deputy convenor)(67)
My emphasis
But could the other workers utilise the same avenue to success?
For in order that gains might be more widely generalised it would be
necessary for the bargaining resources to be similarly generalised or
shared. Since no other group could assemble resources of comparable
power to back up their position in collective bargaining it certainly
might be expected that others would seek to enjoin some of this
strength to their own account, in particular those with the least
resources available from their own position in the labour process,
such as the women workers. However, the 'craftsmen* controlled the
switches and it is clear from the responses of both stewards representing
the maintenance side, that the women would have to negotiate with
these men for the use of this bargaining resource - (before they could
get into a strong enough position to bargain with the management).
"Meself...I get the impression that the women 
are sort of hopin' that if there's any problems 
we'll automatically stick by 'em, and switch the 
power off and everything - which we would do - 
but I mean, not willy-nilly for...You know it 
would have to be a good....a good thing you know, 
and we'd have to believe in it like - you know.”
Ernie (Maintenance, deputy convenor)(68)
(ny emphasis)
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"We have found over a period of time that when 
the girls on the line begin to get upset they'll 
up and out and there's no reason for it. They 
won't explain to us why they want it (the power) 
off."
(Have the women ever asked you - the maintenance 
men - to stop the power?)
"Well, they've come up. But they've come up in 
a big deputation sort of thing. And the blokes 
won't be forced like that, they want to know the 
reason. If a couple of female shopstewards went 
to the shopsteward in maintenance with the con­
venor and said, 'Look - could we explain to the 
lads why we're going out and ask for their backing....' 
(When was the last time you had a deputation?)
"Oh, when there's been disputes on the lines.
(Do you think theiE would be a time when you would 
actually stop it for the women?)
"Well, dependent on what it was. And if they 
came and explained themselves without getting too 
emotionally upset and this, that and the other.
Because some of them do, they do start crying, as 
I've said...And if they came and explained it 
quietly, correctly to all the lads in the shop.
And then we could discuss it - they'd go out and 
we'd discuss it. And if we thought it was, you 
know, worthwhile, and we thought that it was for 
a good reason, we'd go out with them.
Terry (maintenance chargehand)(69)
(my emphasis)
It is clear that the 'craftsmen's' position of having control
over the switches put them in a strong position not only in relation 
to management but the union officials and the rest of the workforce 
as well. They could significantly influence the bargaining agenda 
in terms of what other groups required or could aspire toj they could 
also impose their own interests upon it. While we have shown that 
the 'craftsmen' had, themselves, to negotiate some support for their 
aims, the amount of organisation and energy required to do this bears 
little relation to that which the women(or the garagemen) for example,
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would have to generate in order to successfully impress their demands 
for equality on them. The bargaining resources utilised by the 
'craftsmen' against management can thus be seen as a source of bar­
gaining strength in relation to other workers as well. And neither 
equality,in the face of the demands for differentials,nor a reduced 
rate of exploitation, in the fac«. of the interests of co-exploitation, 
would be likely to find a place on ary agenda this group of men controlled.
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Chapter 13 Unequal Pay Negotiations 1973-1978
(1) Ref GH 11/S2 : 397-411
(2) For a brief discussion of some of these points see: "Women's Pay 
in informal payment systems" Christine Craig, Elizabeth Garnsey 
and Jill Rubery, Department of Employment Gazette, April 1983
pp 139-148.
(3) Details of these can be found elsewhere and are mentioned here 
only where applicable e.g. Clegg (1980) chapter 9.
(4) "In 1972 the margin between the earnings of an engineering fitter 
and an engineering labourer was 37%. By 1976 this figure had 
fallen to 27% (in the Midlands).... the margin between the skilled 
male machinist and the male labourer fell from 65% to 49%, and 
that between the skilled electrician and the labourer from 53%
to 35%." Clegg (1980) p.370.
(5) Hugh Clegg notes that, while such narrowing is by no means reflected 
in the overall earnings distribution of either men or women, 
compression certainly was significant in particular industries
like engineering. He is more inclined to relate such changes in 
pay relativities to the rate of price inflation than the conscious 
strategies of governments. Thus, sharp reductions in differentials 
coincided (as during the war), with rapid price inflation (e.g. 
1974-5) and as the rate of inflation slowed, differentials widened 
again.
(6) Yet how could this policy be changed? Tired of passing ineffective 
resolutions through the branch, the BSR membership was hard 
pressed for constitutional ways of expressing their views to the 
leadership. A suggested one-day demonstration strike (from the 
semi-skilled men in the machine shops) was put down by officials 
and a giant petition organised instead. This was delivered to 
David Basnett at Head Office by the mass of BSR stewards who had 
hired a coach for the occasion. The trip almost had to be called 
off because of the membership's own action - "the bonus dispute".
See Sandwell Evening Mail 22.3.1977.
(7) Clegg (1980) p.376.
(8) E.g. January 1977 Roy (shopsteward) goes to London for advice 
from ACAS and the Department of Employment on ways to get more 
money for males in automatic machine shop (Old Hill).
8.2.77 P.S. (r.o.) to meeting of the shopstewards committee, Old 
Hill: "I object to this. If Roy wants to know anything about 
pay policy...I object to R0y going over my head. If he wants 
to throw stones, I'll throw some back . It may well be that the 
members here are not being well served. In fact, some statements 
Roy has made are detrimental and one member at least has suffered 
from it...."
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(9) Ministers in the Conservative administration managed to avoid 
making this an enforceable requirement and employers advised 
each other on the methods of implementation which would minimise 
costs to themselves (i.e. gains for the women). E.g. 'Equal Pay : 
A Further Paper of Guidance with Particular Reference to Job 
Evaluation'. EEF July 1971.
(10) See for example: Incomes Data Study No.56 July 1973; Department of 
Employment Research Paper no.20 and Mandy Snell (1979)
(11) The minister decided to waive his powers requiring firms to have 
brought women's rates up to 90% by the end of 1973.
(12) On average women's rates were 10% lower than men's in the engineering 
industry in 1973 and 12*j% lower across the private industrial 
sector as a whole. But these comparisons are with the unskilled
or lowest prevailing male rate.
Minimum earnings levels at BSR 1973
£ per 40 hours p. per hour %
Females 18.00 45 80
Skilled males 25.00
Semi-skilled 22.50 56
Unskilled 20.00
Source: Guaranteed Week Agreement 12.11.1973.
(13) Ref 23.2.77/149
(14) At only 3 points in the minutes of 1973-4 is there any indication 
of the women workers' dissatisfaction with pay, viz : fixed 
performance (4.4.74 - no discussion); grading (15.8.74 - referred
back to domestic i.e. individual factory level); complete restructuring 
of the piecework system (4.4.74 - turned down by the officials).
(15) It was pointed out that since this was against union policy, it 
could not be done.
(16) The lieu-bonus:
"It started off as an agreement for timekeeping.
Toolroom got it first - maintenance next, then it 
went to the rest of the skilled men. Then when the 
ladies came onto equal pay, they dropped it down to 
the semi-skilled men, just to...It was a bit of...
They did the equal pay in two jumps and It was just 
a little thing to keep the men ahead."
Terry (Maintenance chargehand) Ref TO 17/S3:231-
(cont'd )
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"I brought up the question of the El bonus for 
the men. This marked me out.
In actual fact, my department, we don't have a lot 
of problems in respect as toolroom and maintenance 
do, we haven't got the wage structures you see.
So, of course...! told Ellen (convenor) that - once 
we were told we'd got (the) lieu bonus, they were 
satisfied, that satisfied them for a long time - I_ 
can keep the semi-skilled men off their backs. They 
don't have a lot of trouble with them. So we don't 
GET a lot of the issues that a lot of the departments 
get. In fact probably less aggro comes from the semi­
skilled men than any other department.
Gordon (storeman) Ref GH 9/S2:240-268. 
emphasis in original (upper case underlined). 
my emphasis (lower case underlined)
(17) The 1974 wage award (see ArpaidLxi* for details in full)
Female adult F/T E4.87 + equal pay (£2.68)
Female junior F/T £3.97 + equal pay (£2.68)
Male skilled £4.84 + 1/3 shift allowance of £1.61 where appropriate 
Male semi-skilled (p'wk) £3.00 + 1/3 shift allowance of El.oowhere
appropriate
+ 5 shift allowance of £1.50 where
appropriate
Male semi-skilled (Indirect) £3.60 + 1/3 shift allowance of £1.20 where
appropriate
+ 5 shift allowance of £1.80 where
appropriate
Junior Males £1.85 
OAP £2.25
(18) This was supposed to be half of the differential between the men 
and the womenh rates. (i.e.
Male piecework base rate £24.20 
Female piecework base rate 18.84
Differential £ 5.36 (50% : £2.68)
(19) Total wage award per week £30,693
Total amount of wage award to females £23,134 (or 75%) 
Number of females (full-time equivalent) 4,600 or 77% 
Total amount of wage award to males £7,559 (25%)
Number of males 1,377 or 23%
Total wage award - net of equal pay increment £18,143
Total amount to females net of equal pay £10,584 (or 58%) 
Total amount to males £ 7,559 (or 42%)
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(20 See Appendixk
Male Inspection - creation of a new 'technical' grade.
Builders and motor mechanics - an award to reduce their differential 
with maintenance. And heavy drivers - an addition to their 
base rate.
(21) Ref 9.3.1977 p.131.
(22) With no increase for those earning more than this.The TUC had 
proposed the cut-off point of £7,000.
(23) Branch minutes 4.3.1975.
(24) Company's offer 11.6.1975 Clause 3.
(25) Ibid Clause 4.
(26) For full details of the 1975 wage settlement see Appendix 5
Results of ballot 13.6.1975
Accept Reject
Skilled males 81 288
Semi-skilled males 95 841
Females 3295 851
(27) Shift workers were not, up to this point in receipt of the initial 
£1 lieu bonus; because they could always 'make more' out of the 
pay-policy-restricted rises where these were reflected in shift 
premiums. The £1 was to compensate day-workers who could not 
'make' this money.
(28) "I am a cleaner at BSR Garretts Lane. This 
cleaning involves ladies toilets, reception 
areas, some offices and lunch tables.
We have 2 men pensioners sweeping up part- 
time and these men get more money than us 
two lady cleaners.
My manager and union rep (MB) say this is 
because they get a loo bonus, what I want 
to know is why, when they do not touch the 
loos in their job.
1 have been trying to alter this for about
2 months now and now I have been advised 
to write to you.
I have been told there is nothing they can 
do about it owing to a union clause. I want 
to know why when it is supposed to be equal 
pay these days. Hope to get an answer from 
you soon."
Letter received at the branch office.
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(29) Ref 9.3.1977/131
(30) Ref 16.12.1976/E106.
(31) But the company refused to break the £6 limit and the 
claim was taken to the Department of Employment which 
was, indeed, outside pay policy. So they didn't get 
resulting anomaly had lasting effects because in 1978 
policy supplements and lieu bonuses were consolidated 
rates.
shift men's 
ruled it 
it. The 
all pay- 
into basic
(32) "It was pointed out that the £2.00 lieu bonus given to the men, 
was part of the 1975 wage deal and the female members voted for 
acceptance of this deal and that the £2.00 would be excluded in 
the claim for 'Equal Pay'."
Branch minutes 29.4.76. (m 59)
(33) Motion to branch meeting 24.2.1977 (placed at the end of the agenda 
and not discussed through lack of time).
"The members of the 69/BSR branch are not prepared 
to accept the 5% allowable under the social contract, 
as their wage increase for 12 months from their wage 
agreement, 1977.
We therefore, reserve the right to renegotiate a 
further increase as soon as government policy 
allows."
(34) "The Branch Mandate states clearly under no circumstances will
phase two of the Government's legislation be accepted, and the 
pay settlement must be deferred until we have further details 
of phase three, when settlement must be back-dated to June 1st, 
1977. If the fina) settlement should revert to phase two or the 
1st August if settlement is in phase three."
Communication to the company following branch meeting 12.5.77 
(p.301 and 344b).
(35) Exchange at Branch Committee meeting 26.5.1977
"In fairness to the factory floor workers - decisions always 
come from the factory floor. You're telling these women now, 
that because 200 men turned up to the branch meeting, they're 
going to be done out of what they're entitled to."
Trevor (branch chairman)
"Rubbish'. Get it right, many women agree with us - it's not 
just 200 men - women as well. You're giving the wrong impression.
Keith (Shopsteward, toolroom)
"The women aren't just working for pin-money - therefore they 
have a right to have a say in their wage packets..."
Trevor
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"What I'm saying is, it's up to us to make sure they 
do backdate and the women don' t lose anything."
Keith
(36) A further consequence of the stewards' attempts to safeguard 
their position was a historic meeting between shopfloor and staff 
(in Matsa : 100% membership agreement) representatives. Normally, 
wage negotiations for office staff opened on July 1st following 
the manual workers' settlement. Traditionally, relations between 
the two groups of workers were very poor and the 'union' sides 
had never shown an inclination to co-operate. The manual 
workers, in particular, saw the staff side as "jealous of”, and 
"parasitic on", their "superior strength". Now, however, the 
former required a common wage policy because if the staff side 
agreed to settle, the manual workers would be forced to follow 
suit. At a tense meeting, co-operation was agreed and future 
meetings mooted.
(37) Apart from workers' efforts the level of output and therefore 
performance was as much dependent upon the supply^ flow and quality 
of parts as well as the distribution of units ((good and bad 
paying") - outside their control.
(38) Ref OH4/TI : 475-500.
(39) Ref BB19/S2 : 143-150.
(40) Ref EW21/S3 : 215-220.
(41) Ref EWll/Sl : 800.
(42) Ref ECiv/Sl : 245-261.
(43) Ref ECv/sl : 285-290.
(44) Ref ECv/Sl : 310-325.
(45) Ref MC11 & 30/S3 : 886
(46) Although part of the same building, their shop opened onto the
yard. Compared to machine maintenance, their work, too, was far 
less integrated into the main body of the factory.
147) Ref EC19/S3 : 365-380.
(48) Ref EC7-8/S? i 480-518.
(49) Ref ECii/Sl : 179-200.
(50) Ref ECii/Sl : 200-210 & 19/S3 i; 400-420
(51) Ref ECii-iii/Sl : 217-225.
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(52) Ref ECii/Sl : 215.
(53) Ref TM16^-S3 : 150-155.
(54) Ref EC13/ S3 : 31-60.
(55) Ref EW6 (b) /SI : 345-362.
(56) Ref PB9/S2 : 270-280.
(57) Ref PW46/S4 : 460.
(58) Ref EC 50/S 6 : 220-230.
(59) Ref ECii/Sl : 173-180.
(60) Ref EC 20/S 3 : 470-514.
(61) Ref JA44/S5 169-180.
(62) Ref EC18/S3 : 329-350.
(63) REef TM22/S3 : 521-530.
(64) Ref ECiv/Sl : 218-225.
(65) Ref EC32-33/S4 : 761-800
(66) Ref TM23/S3 : 568-590.
(67) Ref EC8/S2 : 545-560.
(68) Ref ECiv/Sl : 225-235.
(69) Ref TM23/S3 : 546-604.
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CHAPTER 14: CONTROL IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS
DISPUTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF "COSTS"
"It was agreed that everything possible had been done..."
In the previous two chapters we have examined the impact of 
collective bargaining on the women workers from the point of view of 
its distributional aspects. We have identified the main problems 
as deriving from unequal power in the bargaining relationships: first 
in respect of the employer and secondly the men. These together 
reinforce the institutional structures as mediating and imposing the 
interests of these two groups as against those of the women. We have 
asked - what are the consequences of this? In both cases we have 
found that the structures themselves are rendered unresponsive and 
more difficult for the women members to 'work'. They are therefore 
required to use comparatively greater bargaining strength in order to 
utilise these effectively. On the other hand, we have noted that 
the absorption of 'costs' has the continuous effect of diminishing this 
strength and the bargaining resources at the women workers' disposal.
There are further aspects to be considered which arise from 
institutionalised bargaining inequality, because this process of cost 
deferrment, which arose as the main consequence, did not go uncontested. 
In fact it continuously generated opposition and collective resistance 
on the part of the women workers, and some examples of this will be 
described.
In this chapter and the one following, therefore, we are going
to be looking at several case studies, all of which concern men and 
women workers at BSR on strike or taking industrial action against 
management during the period of investigation. There were some very 
marked distinctions in the 'men's' and the 'women's' disputes, so much 
so, that most of them could quite clearly be delineated in this way.
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This was even the case when mass action s,uch as 'the bonus strike' 
involved both the men and women workers at the same time.
Viewed broadly, the most interesting and obvious contrast 
between the sexes was that industrial action involving the males 
chiefly concerned 'compensatory' or 'consumption' issues (the 
distribution of reward); while those involving the women centred, 
almost exclusively, on control issues (the distribution of 'costs').
We are not, of course, trying to maintain that these 'types'of 
issues are totally separate. But there are some important distinctions, 
nevertheless, which we would see as having a bearing on trade union 
organisation and structure, whether it is men or women who are involved. 
The special significance of this from the female members' point of view 
lies in the fact that, we would argue, production control issues in 
general are even more crucial for women workers than they are for men .
(And in this research as a whole we have shown in detail, how this 
might be seen to be the case).
In his study, first published in 1920, Carter Goodrich saw "the 
workers interests in Industry" as falling into two main sets. The first 
concerned the 'consumption' aspects of employment, the second concerned 
'production' aspects. Although the two are linked, it is the latter 
which fits most closely "the issues of discipline and management which 
are the frontier of control". Goodrich (1975) p.20.
This concept, therefore, designates the meeting point of interest 
conflict between employer and labour, over the organisation of production. 
It 'ebbs and flows' as it reflects temporary shifts in the bargaining 
power of either side. But the terrain, he notes, has already been 
unequally divided; most if it having been 'claimed' by the employer and 
rendered non-negotlable (as is frequently and explicitly stated in 
agreements which set down managerial prerogatives).
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Thus, although both the worker's ’consumption'and 'production'
\
interests are the subject of collective bargaining, they are not 
equally so. And as long as this is the case relationships are 
likely to remain fundamentally unchanged.
"An employer's control over industry is not 
destroyed by the fact that he has to buy labor 
with much the same equality in bargaining that 
he buys other factors in production. And 
matters ot toilets and airspace and welfare work 
are after all not vital to absolute power over 
the actual organisation of production". 
ibid pp. 53-54.
Bargaining over wages, hours and conditions comprises, of course, 
the dominant field of trade union activity. And asking "what degree 
of control do trade unions exercise over the relations of man to man 
(sic) in Industry - the employment and discipline relationships; and 
over the relations of man to the work itself - ?" He gives the answer:
"directly and explicity, very little" 
ibid pp. 54-55.
We are, here, interested in exploring further the links between 
these two areas of collective bargaining and also the further implications 
of such 'institutionalised prioritisation', of the one sphere (consumption) 
over the other (production).
We open with an account of two strikes which occurred within the 
space of a month. The first involved women alone, on the final assembly 
lines at the Old Hill factory. It was clearly a response against 
intensified working instituted by management in this period. The 
union officials were brought in to negotiate a settlement - not only 
with management but with the workers concerned. Wo know tha* 
management had already set the bargaining agenda,production issues 
were non-n<*q<ii ¡able; and the union negotiators were committed to 
protecting the members' earnings in the context of an efficiently managed 
firm. How were these different sets of interests 'managed' in the
bargaining process?
First we find that the women had tovnegotiate with their officials 
(unsuccessfully) on the content of 'their demands'. Secondly, 
the 'real' issues no longer the main subject of negotiation at the 
bargaining level the women had managed to achieve by taking action 
were displaced 'downwards' to a lower level of negotiation at which 
they could not be successfully resolved. Finally, we see that while 
some of the issues (in this example 'bad parts') might, by dint of 
special effort, be forced onto the bargaining agenda - only to be 
redefined and repositioned; others (like movement of labour) might 
never make it at all. In the first dispute the issue remained below 
the surface of even the initial set of 'negotiations' - between 
members and officials. However, it was so crucial that without some 
indication of its 'presence' the strike itself becomes less easy to 
understand.
Movement of labour was central to the other strikes examined as 
well. In the second case study - the 'bonus dispute' - both men and 
women workers at all four factories were involved. Here again, we 
can identify some interesting aspects of the way 'demands' are 
formulated, and the 'pre' bargaining process which takes place before 
officials and management 'meet'. Institutional mediation through the 
system of representstion and the domination of the men together 
resulted in the women workers' grievances either having no 'presence' on 
the bargaining agenda, or if they were there, being in a somewhat 
'translated' form.
By a series of coincidental 'accidents', however, there was a 
'break' in the edifice whereby a few women workers found themselves in 
a position to talk directly with managers and, subsequently, the 
officials; and when this happened the underlying pressures 'explaining' 
the strike were suddenly brought into view. In the scries of
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negotiations between management and officials held subsequently, 
however, it is possible to see how heavily these had (once again) 
become overlaid by other sets of interests which shaped the bargaining 
which actually took place at this level.
Having examined two disputes where movement of labour was a 
somewhat 'hidden' item on the agenda, we then go on to look at what 
happened on those occasions it was so explicitly the issue in dispute 
that the members' demands could hardly be 'negotiated' into other 
'forms'.
We have already suggested that when the distribution of 'costs' 
is directed 'downwards' (i.e. onto the workforce as a result of joint 
bargaining), their distribution subsequently is the subject of further 
'negotiations' within the ranks of the workers themselves. These 
take place continuously and as we have also suggested - with disruptive 
and divisive effect. But when, as a result of the build-up of pressure 
arising from the accumulated mass of unresolved grievances, the workers 
go on strike ,the question is forced onto the 'joint' bargaining table 
again. The members attempt to effect another kind of re-distribution 
of this cost, back onto the employer. When this is blocked the process 
of negotiating a redistribution amongst themselves takes place once 
more - only this time in a semi-official or institutional form which 
gives us a quite unambiguous view of the process.
The Lines' Strike
Early in March 1977 there was a stoppage on the final assembly 
lines at the Old Hill factory. The strike marked a period of 
intensified working which had been taking place in all of the factories. 
New orders were scarce at this time of year, and management had been 
running down the workforce fairly rapidly (by stopping the recruitment
of operatives), striving at the same time'to maintain the previous 
high pace of production. In this part of the season when output was 
not really ’wanted’ - in the sense that it was going to stock - 
there was paradoxically much more pressure on the workforce than when 
large orders were being rushed through on short deadlines in the latter 
part of the year. This occurred as a result of the process of 
intensification already described and the more numerous opportunities 
taken by management, for experiments in increasing productivity.
The main problems experienced by the female employees concerned 
increased movement of labour and bad parts. Whole sections were liable 
to be broken down at short notice and the workers dispersed. This 
effected a reduction in output in certain areas where this was required, 
and also provided labour with which to fill in the ’gaps’ caused by 
’natural wastage* when whese became a problem elsewhere. Bad parts 
put into assembly effected both a reduction in overall output and 
directly reduced workers' earnings, whilst maintaining the same high 
pace of work (the operatives were only paid for the number of units 
packed). It was the increasing impact of both of these practices 
which led to the strike at Old Hill, where a smaller range of cheaper 
models meant they had an even stronger effect.
As we have already noted, complaints about having to work with bad 
components were a constant issue for the women working in assembly.
And in the first three months of the year, the problem was experienced 
in an even more acute form. Girls on the final assembly lines at Old 
Hill were frequently finding their wage packets reduced by E2-E3. And 
matters came to a head on Wednesday 9th March, when line 6 downed 
tools on receiving wages sheets which showed their earnings reduced 
by £2.50 compared with the previous week. Many had been complaining
of exhaustion from the number of units they were handling on the line - 
some were circulating six or seven times - and clearly the women were
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only being paid for a relatively small fraction of the work which they 
had had to do.
Workers on the other final assembly lines rapidly followed suit, 
and within a short time all 500 women on the 9 main lines had stopped. 
They came in to work the following day but on taking their places 
refused to begin until their demands had received some attention.
The rest of the workforce continued to work normally. The union 
officials were called to an emergency meeting at the factory. And shop 
stewards told them that the operatives wanted 'something done about' 
bad parts being put on the line. They also wanted a proper system of 
allowances to be negotiated, which was not totally reliant on 
management's discretion. While this was being worked out, they wanted 
to be paid at a fixed performance level (i.e. a guaranteed wage, giving 
close to average earnings) instead of continuing with an 'incentive 
system' which had grown dependent on an increasingly arbitrary count.
"We were put on a breakdown. We worked very, very 
hard. They said we'd be paid fair, but they 
wouldn't tell me what we'd be getting. When we 
had the pay sheets - prior to doing the breakdown, 
we'd had two bad days due to bad work - he'd 
paid a 94 and for the breakdown period tool 
It was disgusting he did that - we sweated our guts 
out...." Shop Steward, line 9 (1).
In these discussions, which were taking place prior to the 
officials meeting management, the process of negotiation was already 
in train - between the members' representatives and the full-time 
officers on the bargaining issues themselves.
The officers straight away voiced a reluctance to argue for the 
women to be paid on a fixed performance, even on a temporary basis, 
being concerned, apparently, with the possible impact on output of 
losing the 'incentive' element: "willthsy give a proper effort to
get this?" (the shop steward's reply was indignant). And fearing what 
would happen if the stoppage spread to other areas - management were
always very quick to lay other sections off - their aims were to
secure some financial compensation and an immediate end to the strike.
Paul Silver (Union Official)
"Would the girls go back if we asked for a guarantee 
to pay average earnings for that week?"
Shop Steward "No, not if its a week"
Mary West
(Branch Secretary)
"The company's trying to get the work ... 
to get a breathing space".
they need
Paul "I’ll ask Tony Stuart (Industrial Relations Director) 
if he'll accept average earnings for the week"
Mary "We don't want the dispute going to other 
it's just for the lines". (2)
areas -
On meeting the 'employers' side', performance figures for all 
of the lines were called for and examined. An improved 'offer' for 
those suffering a reduction in earnings in the previous week was 
jointly established.
There was an obvious gap, throughout these discussions, between 
the needs and aims of the workers themselves and this line of negotiation. 
Even from the factory managers' own account it can be seen that the 
women had wanted action on the problem of the bad components itself.
When line 6 stopped work, the production manager had already offered 
to pay - at a performance level above their usual average - if they 
would simply start work again in order to clear the congested lines.
But the women had refused.
"They said they wanted all the units taken off 
the line. I said I'd pay an average performance 
of 119 for these particular ones. So they said - 
put it in black and white, we don't trust you.
So we did.
And then they came back and wanted all the 
components off. We checked them, and they were 
alright.
Then they wanted the part-assembled off - so I
said we'd put a chalk mark on and I'd pay
average earnings for those components. But
they still wont go back". Bert Long (factory manager).
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The outcome of these negotiations between the full-time 
officials and top management did not reflect the aims of the members 
in taking action. Management agreed to make up the wages of those 
who had suffered a drop in the previous week to the level of the week 
before. While this offer was accepted, the line Stewards continued to 
voice concern that the operatives would still be getting bad components. 
This, the officials declared, was a matter which would have to be resolved 
in 'a factory-level' discussion.
Predictably, the factory-level discussions, held when work had 
been resumed, resolved very little. Only the production manager, 
line stewards and the convenor were involved.
A report from Quality Control had shown that when 144 units 
assembled on line 9 were checked, 133 (over 90%) were faulty. Over 200 
actual faults were found giving a rate of 140 faults per 100 units.
Three quarters of these faults had their sources elsewhere (i.e. 
they did not derive from work done on the final assembly line). When 
components brought to the lines on one day were checked, over 3,000 
major items were found to be faulty together with an uncountable number 
of smaller parts batched in tins. Against one item, 38,000 'jinch 
screws with the thread missing, was appended a note to the effect that 
supervision had been told these screws must be used "at lines' cost". 
Management's response was to blame the workers in sub-assembly, and 
to agree to investigate inspection procedures. They also promised 
to show the line stewards how allowances for rejects and bad components 
were already built into job values.
Other demands which had been listed by the line stewards included 
the need for two floats per line, fair distribution of better paying 
units, lower counts on heavier units, and a proper system of assessing
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compensation for 'problem work' which reduced the earnings "through 
no fault of their own".
But in a subsequent discussion to inform managers in other 
factories about this meeting "in case they tell you there's been big 
give-aways", it was clear that management's use of discretion had 
remained fully protected, and although the floats had been guaranteed, 
a line was to be broken to do i t . M a n a g e m e n t ' s  response to the 
request for improved pay overall through lower counts, or higher 
values was that this would only be considered (when pay policy allowed) 
if "brought up as a serious trade union request" (meaning, by the full­
time officers).
Bad parts, the problem of having to work with them as well as the 
unsystematic discretionary 'method' of compensation, where payments had 
constantly to be (re)established and earnings were,in any case, always 
at risk, was as we have noted above, a constant grievance of the women 
workers on assembly. It was continuously taken up by the shop 
stewards (and also 'local* supervision) but it was always designated 
a 'domestic* issue by the negotiating officials. This designation served 
as an effective means of pushing such grievances back down the bargaining 
levels whenever they threatened to (re)appear. Occasionally, as in 
this instance, pressure and frustration built up to such an extent 
that the women stopped work and attempted to get matters resolved.
While this was successful to the extent that it engaged both the full-time 
officers and top management, i.e. propelled the issue into a higher 
bargaining level, further efforts foundered on the policy of both parties 
only to negotiate the financial side of the questions involved, to 
rescive the immediate stoppage and not to contest production practices. 
Pushed back down to lower bargaining levels each Individual section had 
again to battle with a problem they could not, on their own and at
that level, resolve.
In contrast to bad parts, however, movement of labour failed
\
almost entirely to achieve recognition as an issue in the stoppage 
at all. But from the shop stewards' comments it was clearly a 
significant aspect of the dispute as far as their membership was 
concerned.
The company's policy of not replacing workers meant that not only 
was the incidence of mobility (and doubling-up) increased - its scope 
was extended as well. As productive capacity was contracted, throughout 
the factory workers were moved not only within areas or sections, but 
between them - to a much greater extent than before. And whole 
lines or teams were 'broken down' and the workers dispersed to fillin 
'gaps' elsewhere.
But so far was this from having the status of a negotiable 
grievance, that in the initial meeting between line representatives, 
officials and management, the production manager was able to restate 
the same threats he had already been making to the workforce, namely his 
intention to break down line 7 altogether as a disciplinary measure,
(they were the lowest performers) to set an 'example' to the others.
This was not taken up by the officials, nor was the underlying issue 
of under-staffing ever raised, even though this was, clearly, at the 
root of the problem of increased labour mobility and doubling-up which 
was having such an impact on all of the final assembly lines.
In the issue's constructed 'absence' from the negotiations, 
the lines' strike appeared to revolve solely around the workers*loss 
of earnings due to bad parts. As a result, when the officials called 
for the figures, the full extent of the stoppage became rather less 
easy to understand. Only three of the final assembly lines had actually 
suffered a loss of earnings in that particular week. Three, indeed,
had done bettor than in the week before.
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Line Performance Performance
last week this week
1 104 106
2 1 0 7 118
3 l o o l o o
4 H O n o
5 107 l o o
6 1 1 9 93
7 9 5 96
8 1 0 8 108
9 104 95
(first to stop 
(threatened with break)
Although the women operatives on the main lines at Old Hill 
took up work again, it was not resumed at the same pace as before.
A re-evaluation of the relationship between earnings and effort appeared 
to have taken place, being encapsulated in a generally held view 
"that there was little point in them killing themselves - they didn't 
get any more money for it". And from this time, performances appeared 
to drop 'spontaneously'. Even improved incentive pay incorporated 
by the union officials into the wage deal of the following year, made 
little apparent difference either to this or the general downward drift 
experienced in the other factories as well.
Meanwhile, in this particular period, the same increase of pressure 
which had precipitated strike action at Old Hill, was being experienced 
in some degree by women working in the other factories as well. Within 
ten days of the line workers' dispute at Old Hill, all four of the 
West Midlands plants became involved in a second, much larger strike, 
which had, seemingly, a quite different cause.
The Bonus dispute
"Car'thave bonus under social contract. Let the 
Department of Employment do the stopping."
On Friday March 18th, 1977, a large contingent of shop floor 
workers at the Waterfall Lane factory downed tools, as did women on 
some of the final assembly lines at the other factories. On the 
following Monday (21st) output was halted at all four of the West Midlands
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plants when the majority of women workers in each one stopped work.
And full normal working was not resumed again until the end of that 
week.
The strikes had been triggered by the company paying out a bonus 
to the office staff. This was in line with their practice of the 
previous nine years and had been carried out with the Department of 
1'mployment's approval, and also in accordance with their guidelines 
which specified precisely how the payment should be made (in order 
to properly comply with the social contract). The shop floor workers 
took action in the first instance because they wanted a bonus as 
well. And,in general, their dispute could be seen as marking a long 
period of pent-up frustration; with pay held down as a consequence of 
union-agreed wage restraint, while the company's profits soared well 
beyond previous record levels. Indeed, this view of the strike - as 
a mass demonstration of protest against the social contract - was the 
one most commonly held. It was articulated by those male workers already 
gathering sufficient momentum to instigate the 'breaking* of Stage II 
later in the year. And it was the main explanation advanced by both 
union officials and company management.
It was curious, therefore, that the main body of strikers was 
made up of women workers who had had relatively little to say about 
the social contract prior to the strike,and beyond demanding the bonus 
added little on the subject during it. It was notable too, that with 
the possible exception of Waterfall Lane, most of the male workers appear 
to have continued to work normally throughout the week! Were there 
other explanations of the strike - particularly in relation to the 
women - which were given less prominence than the dominant view?
This would seem to have been the ca.se for wherever they found a relatively 
independent forum for discussion, it was clear that as far as the women
workers were concerned, the strikes punctuated a period of increased
\
pressure - discipline and work intensification - on the shopfloor and 
sprang out of a mass of unresolved, production-related grievances.
Two meetings were held on the Friday, the day the stoppage began.
At the first, an "emergency informal meeting", when the union officials 
and convenors met members of management, two notices were drafted 
by the company for dissemination to the shop floor. One set out the 
position regarding the bonus paid to staff. The other contained an 
agreement to resume discussions on the sick pay scheme and also movement 
of labour. ("Subject to the findings being able to be implemented")
How had these particular items found their way onto the agenda?
Management were looking to make 'an offer to negotiate', which 
could be used to encourage an early return to work. But the most readily 
identifiable demand of the strikers concerned pay, and since this was 
disallowed under the social contract, other "allowable" demands had had 
to be identified before any offer to negotiate "on condition the strikers 
return" could be made.
Movement of labour was undoubtedly an issue of close concern - 
to the female membership especially. However, the most likely explanation 
for its immediate appearance on the agenda was that a number of male 
workers had recently suffered a loss of earnings as a result of shift 
changes which had been instituted at Waterfall Lane. Their convenor 
had been made well aware of their problems and, along with her colleagues, 
had been coming under pressure because of the lack of progress made in 
the long drawn-out and inconclusive negotiations being carried out at 
convenor level (see below) on arrangements regarding pay for workers moved.
The sick pay scheme, on the other hand, was put on the agenda 
by the union officials. It was an issue the membership had little 
awareness of at all, negotiations having been initiated by the full-time
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officers and carried out exclusively between themselves and top
management. Again, the issue had been long drawn out, but now the
officers were anxious to have something to deliver to the membership
(4)in order to boost the union's credibility.
At the meeting of shop stewards from all of the factories later 
the same day, the negotiating officer again posed sick pay as a 
'demand' - although the main issues raised from the floor came from the 
men and concerned pay and the problem of the social contract. In 
the end it was decided to send a petition to the TUC calling for an end 
to incomes policy. But on the following Monday, although they came in 
to work, the majority of the female employees soon stopped again.
This time output from all four factories was completely halted.
The full-time officer was on holiday, so it was the Regional 
Secretary who attended the meeting of shop stewards held in the afternoon 
on the first full day of the strike. Fuelled by the company's recently 
announced record profits and the consequent extra bonus paid to the 
staff, discussion ranged over the problem of how shop floor workers 
could get more money out of the company within the terms of the social 
contract. The most coherent set of demands was put forward
by one of the maintenance men. These derived from the series of meetings 
they had been holding over the previous months (see below).
* Representation at negotiating level for skilled workers.
* Staff status for maintenance personnel plus paid overtime
and the annual bonus.
* Average earnings for holiday pay.
* Free overalls.
* All bonuses to be put onto holiday pay rates.
* A sick pay scheme paying average earnings.
And from the male pieceworkers came demands for relaxed piecework 
rates and average earnings for movement of labour. Since most of these 
demands were outside the social contract, it became a problem for the 
meeting to find a set of items on which to negotiate. It was not at
all clear on what basis an orderly return to work might, otherwise, 
be organised.
Male shop steward: " I propose they should go back while we negotiate"
Female shop steward: " Negotiate - what for?"
Male shop steward: "Negotiate for what we can get"
Female shop steward: "Its already been stated, there's nothing you can
have"
Branch secretary: "That's not true, you can get a sick scheme and a
pension scheme ..."
(Boos)
The union officials had already made it clear that a full return 
to normal working was their precondition for taking up the members' 
demands at all. Nor would these be for negotiation in the first 
instance, since the conditional promise was only to take the demands, 
with management, to London for clearance from the Department of 
Employment.
The Regional Secretary declared that he had made a note of the 
main demands: "Movement of labour - we'll try to get them to do 
something. The skilled men - that's in the pipeline. There isn't anything 
else is there?". A meeting with the Department of Employment was 
arranged with management for the Wednesday, "in case Waterfall Lane 
don't go back tomorrow".
Normal working was not resumed by the women at any of the factories 
on the following day (Tuesday). Cheerful groups picketted the 
main gates turning away lorries. Most of L’ne shop stewards were absent, 
having travelled by coach to London, bearing a petition against the 
social contract to the Union's head office. ^ ^ The negotiating
officer visited the Stourbridge factory and there discovered a meeting 
in progress between the factory management and some twenty female
shopfloor workers.
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The women were listing the main grievances underlying their 
strike. And, interesting to note, none of the items they mentioned, 
had been raised at all during the shop stewards' meeting of the 
previous day. A stream of complaints was being voiced directly at
management: poor ventilation on the shop floor, movement of labour,
absenteeism and above all the bad treatment of workers. Suggesting 
the managers should leave, the official began by outlining the benefits 
the workers had gained from the union. A pension and bereavement 
scheme, higher wages and, in the pipeline, a sick pay scheme. Again 
the women workers repeated their points. Working conditions were poor 
and the women were badly treated:
"The company has low schedules - its reflected in 
bad treatment of the workers. We are pushed around 
more and with less courtesv than ever".
"It's as if they're trying to MAKE you leave"
"We're moved about much more often - is a mobility 
agreement necessarily a 'transferability' agreement?"
"The girls have to put up their hands to go to the 
loo, they are allowed 2 minutes"
"We are poorly paid - and can't earn our money 
because of the bad parts. We cannot live on our 
wages”.
The official suggested there should be a working party set up to 
investigate these problems. But a further subject of complaint was 
the union itself and, in particular, their own workplace organisation. 
The convenor was criticised for being autocratic and too sympathetic 
to management. There seemed little the members could do , Even the 
shop steward elections had not been held properly. (When ballotting 
should have occurred as a matter of course, it had been decided 
representatives need only stand for re-election "if the members were 
not satisfied"). The union official could only suggest that
since they elected their representatives, the answer lay in their own
hands.
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On the Wednesday normal working had'Still not been resumed and 
the planned trip to the Department of Employment had to be postponed.
In three factories sections of sub-assembly had gradually taken up 
work again but at Waterfall Lane,most of the workers were still on 
strike on Thursday. The officials organised a secret ballot at this 
factory and finally, with a 75% vote in favour of a return, both-they 
and the Industrial Relations Director departed, thankfully to London.
Five items were presented for decisions as to their ’allowability1 
under the terms of the social contract: payment of bonus to the
hourly paid; payments to workers transferred; discretionary increments 
in the rate book (affecting skilled men); a sick pay scheme with the 
inclusion of bereavement. Of these; the bonus was ’disallowed’, 
sick and bereavement pay ’allowed’ and discretionary increments had 
to be ’off-set’. Payments made to workers transferred under movement 
of labour had to continue on whatever basis they had been made before.
The bargaining agenda between union officials and management was 
thus finally shaped, and negotiations began on three items: Movement 
of Labour, the Sick Pay Scheme and Bereavement Pay.
"The company agree to this meeting taking place 
subject to full normal working.
We would request our members to work normally 
to allow these discussions to take place"
(Notice to members from full-time officials 
28.3.1977).
As we go on to examine, the negotiations on movement of labour 
did not address in any significant way, the problems of the female
membership.
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Movement of labour disputes
We have previously seen how movement of labour was the cause 
of numerous problems for the women workers, undermining job security, 
job control and earnings. Despite this, the issue had little 
presence in the grievance procedure. Both this and the low degree 
of effective handling it received from shop stewards, could be related 
to management's determination to protect,and thus their refusal to 
negotiate,any aspect of this particular core feature of their production 
policy. This was facilitated by the union's endorsement of their 
aims in the joint agreement. The impact on the women workers was 
twofold. In the first place the preparedness of individuals and groups 
to press their grievances was clearly reduced; while at the same time, 
the actual practice of movement of labour itself could be seen as 
significantly diminishing their strength and, therefore, their ability 
to do so.
It has been maintained that the effect of this production practice, 
much enhanced by its incorporation as a substantive term in the 
agreement, was to facilitate the passing down of production costs 
engendered by fluctuating demand and uncertainty, onto the female section 
of the workforce in particular. This (re)distribution between employer 
and workforce had subsequently a disruptive impact on shopfloor 
relationships. This was because the costs then remained to be distributed 
within the ranks of the workers themselves, and the effect of the 
internal negotiations this engendered was to accentuate competition and 
lines of division be tween them.
These points can be illustrated by examining the course of a 
series of disputes which centred on the issue of labour mobility at 
Old Hill. And, to the extent that the union's negotiating officers 
had a particular interest in upholding the agreement, the processes by
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which they did this and the impact of these processes on the union's 
domestic organisation and the position of the women workers within it, 
can also be identified.
WHO BEARS THE COST?
At the November 1976 branch meeting, movement of labour had (again) been 
raised by women members and the discussion was minuted thus:
"Once again the serious problem concerning the 
movement of labour was discussed at length, when 
it was felt that the full-time workers were getting 
a rough deal and that part-time workers were not 
having to take their full share when movement of 
labour was necessary. As the question of movement 
of labour was being discussed with Mr.Stuart and 
the convenors, it was agreed to leave it with the 
convenors to get the best possible deal for all 
members. It was vital that movement of labour 
be allowed to continue, otherwise we could be in 
a position like some industries where no work was 
available in some areas, lay-offs occur. It 
must be done, however, on a fair basis.
The convenors to negotiate with the company for 
average earnings or average for the job, whichever 
is the greater when movement of labour does 
take place". (Branch Minutes 30.11.1976).
The discussion had been instigated by a letter signed by 45 full-time
women workers in sub-assembly, at the Old Hill factory. This had been
given to the shop steward, who was herself a part-time (9.30 - 3.30)
worker, representing both full and part-timers, on the sub—plate
section. A gap between the issues being negotiated and the substance
of the grievance is immediately obvious. The problem as stated concerned
first, management's selection of workers to be moved,and the perception
of a preference here detrimental to full-time workers. (Working a
full day they were more likely to bo moved off their jobs to fill gaps
on the final assembly lines; while 9.30 - 3.30 workers were more likely
to be left on the section). Second, the question of union/shop steward's
support (of, presumably, both movement in principle and the criteria of
selection), with finally, a proposal aiming to redress the balance in
-676-
favour of full-timers, and a demand for union 'backing'.
LETTER FROM SUB ASSEMBLY/WOMEN WORKERS AT OLD HILL 
FACTORY.
1 "In the union rule book nothing is stated
'full-time' or 'part-time' labour. Management 
and union reps apply movement of labour to 
full-time labour in preference to part-time 
labour.
If twilight shift, 9.30 - 3.30 shift have backing 
of the union about stopping on 'their jobs' 
now is the time full-time labour must have some 
backing and security. What is the point of the 
BSR employing only full-time labour when this 
full-time labour is to supplement the part-time 
labour.
Suggestion 1
Part-time labour, twilight shift must supplement 
full-time labour. Only as a last resort should 
full-time labour be taken off jobs. NOT while 
part-time labour is still working on same jobs, 
e.g. 8.O'clock worker taken off. 9.30 a.m. 
worker comes in and is left on, also twilight shift.
Suggestion 2
"Last in, first off", on over-manned section 
should only apply when twilight is stopped, then
9.30 - 3.30 and then full-time.
Reason: BSR have always employed part-time, which 
means this rule can only result in full-time labour 
losing jobs as they are last in on most sections.
Since BSR policy of not employing part-time labour 
has only been in effect 12 months, the union must 
now in the rule book recognize full-time labour.
If not, the BSR and union are defeating their own 
object of employing only full-time labour.
The members concerned had insisted that the item be brought up at the
branch meeting, even when they were told that it would receive no
support from the officials. "Paul says this is the best thing we've
not in the agreement" (Branch Secretary). And the arguments of
the latter were, indeed, once more made to prevail.
When the workforce as a whole began to be run-down in earnest in 
the new year ("we're losing about 40 per week"), labour mobility was 
stepped up (and this was particularly the case at Old Hill). "If they 
wore bad managers - they would lay them off when there was no work ...
it's a protection". (Branch Secretary). But the demands of the
\
women were to work shorter hours.
Meanwhile, problems for the full-time workers on sub-plates 
had become even more acute. The factory manager explained why:
"Its with the turn-over of labour, we've got an 
imbalance. Certain, easy, silly jobs - there's 
not much turn-over ... On sub-plates, where 
you've got slack values and they can pace 
themselves and the heaviest thing they pick up 
is a completed sub-plate - only 21bs...
They're frightened they might be moved onto the 
main line. That's why they're doing this, trying 
to protect themselves. They don't want to be 
moved. But when I've just made a few alterations 
we'll change all that. I'm going to move them 
all permanently". Bert Long (Factory Manager).
This time an anonymous letter was sent to the Regional Secretary:
Again, the matter was raised at the branch. The minutes for 
February 1977 record:
"Movement of labour: once again this problem was 
raised and a heated discussion took place. This 
matter was at convenor level". (Branch Minutes 24.2.7/) .
The full-time women workers on the sub-plate section at 
Old Hill had been demanding that part-time workers should be 
moved first to fill in 'gaps' on the lines. And also that the evening 
(twilight-shift) should be stopped altogether if there was 
insufficient demand for components, such that day-workers had to be 
moved off their sections. But the problems of the twilight shift 
workers in respect of movement of labour and the degree of protection 
they felt they received from the union - were, if anything, even 
greater. And it had been the complaints of this group of evening 
workers (at the Waterfall Lane factory) which had, in fact, put the 
item back onto the branch agenda, in February.
"Maybe movement of labour is to be carried out 
in all factories, but surely, this could be 
put into perspective. When a girl that has 
worked on a job for months or years and then 
moved to another job, without being told for how 
long. It does not seem fair, when they could 
bring the girls who were originally doing the 
job back.
It seems as though the girls on the 5.15 p.m. -
9.30 p.m. shift are getting a raw deal. Perhaps, 
it is because these girls can only do these 
hours . (management) realise this, also this is 
why we are used as the 'buffer shift'. To 
suit management 'once again'.
How far does the union think it can push these 
girls? All factories have their own set of 
rules and regulations. Who has negotiated ours?
And accepted them. Surely rules such as these 
can be used amongst management and chargehands.
Is there one set of rules for one sht ft and 
another for the white collar workers?".
(Branch Minutes 24.2.1977).
A month later the final assembly lines at Old Hill were on 
strike because of the shortage of labour leading to regular breaking 
of the lines, and the loss of earnings due to bad parts. This was 
scarcely 'resolved* before all of the factories erupted with the 
'bonus dispute' with again, movement of labour close to the heart.
As a result of this strike, the issue had been forced onto the
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negotiating table at an 'official' bargaining level at last. But 
here discussions were restricted to the matter of payment.
Management's terms for agreement were clearly stated and conceded, 
as the full-time officer's notes for the meeting records:
"Company must be able to select who moves 
if this agreement is to be made". (7)
The problems, therefore, remained with the women workers on the 
shop floor. And within a month of the issue's so-called 'final 
settlement', there was a strike in sub-assembly at Old Hill.
The full-time officers first met 'informally' 9 of the women 
workers from the section, accompanied by their shop steward. The 
officials explained how the 'buffer-shift' system and the movement of 
labour agreement were supposed to ensure that there would be no need 
for lay-offs. The women in turn explained how there were 135 workers 
on sub-plates, six part-time (9.30 - 3.30) and 3 full-time lines with 
15workers on each. The full-time workers were being moved onto 
the main lines because their work was no longer required in the same 
quantity - they had, in fact, been prevented from starting work on 
their usual jobs in the morning.
"Linda started. Bert Long said, 'stop greasing - 
you've got no job ...'. He said, 'I'm the manager 
here and from Monday you don't EXIST. And if you 
carry on I'll stop the work'.
They're even taking girls OFF the main lines 
to put us on because they promised us a sitting- 
down job. But we don't want this".
Betty (Sub-Assembly).
The officials insisted the women agree to a 'temporary transfer' 
without loss of earnings. (On their own jobs these workers achieved 
the highest levels of performance in the factory at 125). But the 
women refused. "If we move, we're half agreeing to what the company 
wants us to do". Moreover the workers on the main lines were prepared
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to support their action as they too "were fed up with being messed 
about endlessly - their shop-stewards have already told us they won't 
have us .... 1
The officials had found themselves able to arrange a meeting 
at Stage 5 (with the industrial relations director, Tony Stuart), 
cutting short the procedure. The (part-time) shop steward from sub­
plates attended along with two of the full-time workers (also ’out of 
procedure').
The opening negotiations between management and full-time officers 
concerned the terms of negotiating and this immediately entailed 
concessions by the union side; which in turn had to be 'negotiated' 
with the membership (on this occasion, at the official's elbow).
Tony Stuart (industrial relations director)
"I said this morning - make it temporary then - 
but I must insist that we do get this ...
We'll have 'temporary' then I'll sit down and meet 
you".
Paul Silver (union official)
"Have they moved or not? I don't want to 
discuss it before they move on a temporary basis 
either".
So the first main discussion was a sharp exchange between the 
full-time official and the two women members who were putting him 
under pressure to negotiate what was manifestly, from the officials' 
point of view, an 'unwanted grievance'.
The two women members 'unofficially' representing their colleagues 
along with the 'official' shop steward, responded that the girls would 
not move unless they had an assurance in writing that the transfer was 
temporary.
Paul Silver: "I'm not writing anything down. Once I've said
it's on a temporary basis then the girls must move".
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Tony Stuart:
Paul Silver: 
Shop Steward: 
Paul Silver:
"It's not up to the trade union to give 
notices in writing - h'e' s said he's prepared 
to negotiate".
(Adjournment: Tony Stuart leaves).
"Until the girls move .... "
"They won't ___ "
"Well hard luck then".
The women explained that:
"the girls are frightened if they move 
temporarily, they'll be split up and not 
get back together again".
And they thought that if they moved the industrial relations director 
and union officials would refuse to meet. They had no confidence in 
the union: "Give them a letter!" The official explained that he 
had already put himself out on their behalf.
"We've got two operators in on the discussion - 
which is most extraordinary ... I went to the 
Secretary of State to get this agreement 
(on earnings for movement of labour). I'm 
seeing it sticks. I'm not putting it in 
writing. I've got 9,000 to look after.
How can I do that for you?"
The women played their final card:
Val (Shop Steward): "Please explain what the women say about 
the union"
Phyllis: "Well you know - there's another union who
can come in and negotiate for us ..."
Eileen: "No other union would allow this ..."
Paul Silver: "Don't threaten me! If you're not satisfied
you complain to Jim Mason or David Basnett.
We've got 9 stage 5's out-standing. We 
shouldn't even be DOING your case."
Finally, and reluctantly, the women went back to persuade their
colleagues to move. On their return the meeting re-started. Three
sets of interests were being negotiated here. We begin with management*
MANAGEMENT'S POSITION:
"This company survives or dies by movement of labour".
(Tony Stuart)
The starting point was clearly stated. At present they were
building for stock, not taking any workers on and they needed to
use movement of labour. "We're not prepared to have people sitting
around clocking up waiting-hours". At present they did not need
such a high output - it had fallen to around 64,000 units per week
(8 )from a more 'normal' level of 70,000. The policy (of dropping
the output while retaining the pace - not stated) using 'natural 
wastage' to reduce the number of workers, had brought problems of 
imbalance because labour-loss was fastest on the main-lines and 
slowest in sub-assembly - especially on the better-paid sections like 
sub-plates where the highest performances could be achieved. As a 
result too many sub-plates were being produced. Management wanted to 
reduce the number of lines there from 9 to 7, using the labour to fill-in 
the gaps in final-assembly. Where, as a result of the recent stoppages 
in this area - they had also agreed to provide a proper complement of 
'floats' so that the women could go to the lavatory during the day.
They needed full-time workers to do this. They had already taken out 
one of the three full-time sub-plate lines and now they wanted to 
take out another. When full-time women dug their heels in, the part-time 
lines had agreed to move on alternate days with them. But this was 
less satisfactory for management who were arguing for a 'permanent' 
transfer. On length of service this would mean line 3. But they 
had all flatly refused to go - even to 'take their turn' on a temporary 
basis - since they well knew they would never be allowed to return.
Paul Silver: When will you need them, all back?
Tony Stuart: "When we're on the 70,000 mark ..."
Paul Silver: "You anticipate getting back to that output level?"
Tony Stuart: "When will we want them? Crystal ball stuff.
But will we ever get them?
Every year bar 1974-1975 we've had a rush 
getting into August. We usually see the 
signs now, though the worry is - we haven't 
yet ... We certainly expect a Christmas rush 
to materialise".
Bert Long: ”1 don't think we'll ever get the line performances
up again anyway".
Within the requirements set out by management, the union officials 
sought to find a means of getting their members back to work. The only 
possible solution involved some section of the membership having to bear 
the 'cost'. What was actually being negotiated from now on was which 
group could be most easily made to do so.
THE UNION OFFICIAL'S POSITION.
"What's the solution to this one? Whatever 
I do can't be right". (Paul Silver).
The first proposal from the union official was that - since the 
girls would not accept a permanent transfer - the fairest solution was 
to agree a rota. But this shifted the burden onto the women on the 
main lines - who would continuously have to work with 'green'labour.
When this was pointed out the regional official was immediately mindful 
of the recent stoppage by workers on final assembly and their present 
deliberate, lower performance levels. ("Wo do accept the problems of 
the main lines"). So the other 'solution' - possibly acceptable to 
the sub-plate workers - of a temporary transfer with average earnings, 
was also put out of court. This was because performance levels were 
lower on the main lines and nothing irritated the workers there more 
than having their own performances lowered by the introduction of
inexperienced workers who were, at \
the same time, being paid higher wages. (At a level of performance 
that was, in any case, unattainable in final assembly).
The direction of cost distribution reverted back to the sub-plate 
workers again. Who was to go? Select a few workers from each of 
the full-time lines? Select one of the lines as a whole? How 
to choose? Management stepped in quickly with a warning that this 
discussion threatened to encroach on their prerogatives:
Paul Silver: "Why can't we take 4 off each line rather 
than 12 off one line ..."
Tony Stuart: "We're talking now about methods of selection..."
Paul: (Changing the subject) "The girls like the 
jobs on sub-plates ..."
Bert Long: "So would I if I had it. It's the daftest 
job on the floor."
But, of course, none of these 'solutions' were acceptable to the 
women - this was after all, what they were on strike about.
Paul Silver: "Move them onto other jobs and move 
those workers onto the lines ..."
It was pointed out that labour was already being drafted onto the main 
lines from all areas of the factory.
Paul Silver: "Have you asked any of the 9.30 - 3.30 workers 
to go full-time"
Val: "No-one would. Thev all want to aet ON TO 
that shift. Not off it.
Paul : "Draw lots to move"
Eileen: "No. The other lines would kick up worse. 
Some have been here 8 years".
Before seeing how the union official resolved the issue, we need to
look at the arguments of the women who were affected:
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THE MEMBERS' POSITION
\
Paul: "The company's need and OUR need is that we should
fill in the lines. Because we agreed this last week".
Eileen: "But if 9 move and 7 leave - what happens - they go
back to another 7 - and so it goes on".
The women's arguments against moving were based on three 
fundamental points - the protection of employment, earnings and job 
controls. In the main they addressed these arguments to the union 
officials.
The job on the main lines was harder, more demanding and stressful 
work. It was also lower paid. Performances here varied between 100 
and 108, while on sub-plates the women could get 125, paying £50.50p 
The difference (at 12*jp per point) was £2 - £3 per week.
"I've got a mortgage £102 per month and three 
babies. My old man's a bus driver - he works 
day and night ... out of £50 I take home 
£36 or £37". (Eileen)
A bigger problem, however, was that a number of the women in
sub-assembly could not cope with the job on the main lines. They
would be forced to leave:
"Betty's got arthritis. Eileen's got asthma.
7 out of 9 of us 've got to leave - because 
they can't do the job". (Phyllis).
The need to protect themselves extended, crucially, to their 
position in the labour process itself in ways we have already discussed 
concerning job control. Here, taking precedence over the preservation 
of individual worker's practical skills and experience, was stability 
in terms of their internal relationships, because herein lay the 
core of their controls and their collective strength (i.e. their 
bargaining resources). The women argued vehemently against both 
management's and the union official's suggestions that a few workers
should be taken off each lino:
"Those 15 women are like one «person producing - 
the 15 are all producing one sub-plate"
(Val)
"The girls are frightened if they move 'temporarily' 
they'll be split up and not get back together".
The suggestion that selection from each line should be made 
on length of service did not make it any better.
Paul Silver: "It's a normal union principle: last in first out” 
Eileen: "Where's that in writing?"
Paul: "It's not put in writing. It's a union principle"
Eileen: "Well, it's not like that here".
On the basis of seniority, Phyllis would not, in fact have had to 
move off her job. But she volunteered to do so - if her whole team 
could go onto a main line together. This time her arguments ran up 
against management. Because they were both talking about the same 
issue - job control:
Tony Stuart: "Take 7 from line 8 and 7 from line 3 and re-group.
We've discussed all ways and it must come back 
to the company selecting".
Phyllis: "How about taking a whole line and putting them all
together on a main line, and training them up ?
Leave it to us to get the speed up - I'll move. Line 
7 is only half a (main) line - there's only 35 on.
Move the 35 and put my team on. That's a permanent
way and the girls will accept that".
Bert Long: "That's not the object of the exercise - which is,
to fully man existing main lines, so that they 
have the normal number of floats"
Phyllis: "No-one will be frightened then, 'cos they can go at
their own speed. That's what's frightening them”.
Bert Long: "At the moment, they're sitting alongside an
experienced girl. And the experienced girl won't 
be moved 'till she's competent". (9)
Like the union officials, the women themselves were forced to
consider 'solutions' which entailed passing the 'costs' of mobility 
onto another group of women workers. The divisive impact of this proce 
of internal distribution was quite clear.
.
.
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"Move line 3 - they don't do half our work - 
they're the worst line on thè section - the 
worst for performance and for absentees”
But line 3 had been the main cause of'trouble* in the first place, and 
management were chary about exacerbating this. They also had longer 
seniority than line 8.
Phyllis : "Take a twilight shift off - they do 1,100 per 
night"
Paul : "Take two 9.30 - 3.30 lines off"
Bert Long : "We'd meet the same problem"
The industrial relations director's observation that the union- 
side seemed to have an approach which saw the part-time workers as 
inferior prompted a curious discussion about the way the 9.30 - 3.30 
shift was being"abused" by the workers.
Phyllis : "It was brought in for wives with young children, 
but everyone on its a grandparent - Val is!"
Bert Long: " ....At the time it was a good move - when we 
couldn't get the labour. But now its totally 
ineffective. So since I've been manager we’ve 
not started any more. ... they all want to 
get on that shift".
Eileen : "It's been abused"
Val : "No! You can't say to them - just 'cos 
you've a grown family, you're to go full-time"
After the discussion had gone round in circles a few more times, 
the women began to pose questions about what would happen next.
Eileen's proposal that "someone who's not involved with unions or 
management" should be brought in, was quickly countered by the
Industrial Relations Director, who also stalled on the question of 
taking the issue up at the next stage of procedure; which would involve 
the company Chairman. The issue was simply not negotiable at this 
level. Strictly, it was not negotiable at any level at all.
So the union official posed the alternatives: either they would have 
to call the 9 women (with least service) in, "and toll them there was
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nothing we can do"; or "we register a failure to agree and go to
stage 6 - the Chairman". His solution which he put to the women
was for them to ask management "to leave it as a temporary transfer"
and to "ask for a stage 6". The Branch Secretary missed the
implications of this and was clearly worried by the proposal of
continuing, not only to negotiate the issue, but also to take it
up higher in the procedure.
"What about the other groups - the other 
factories ... But we'd have to look at the 
whole lot. Where do we end, taking movement 
of labour to stage 6? Every single one will 
come up! And if you widen it . . . ¡‘
But the implications were not lost on the workers.
Eileen: "Meanwhile, we'll have to leave!"
Paul: "Don't leave"
Phyllis: "Betty's got a slipped disc and arthritic legs ...
Stage 6 - it could take months?"
They asked again for the assurance about the transfer being temporary 
to be written on a paper to show the other workers. The official 
refused, "suggest they come in for a quick natter". And then it was 
clear, that the game was up:
"We can't now. They’re all scattered" (Val)
Once the women had agreed to move they had won their point of 
getting the negotiators to meet, but they had lost the means of 
winning their case. And with the suggestion that the whole issue 
ought to be taken up at a higher level in order to be resolved (which 
was true) but without the means of ensuring it would be - they were 
finally beaten.
Phyllis: "The part-timers will say - told you so. Told
you you'd have to go on the main linos".
Paul: "You might as well go. I can't see a solution"
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Phyllis: "If it went to stage 6, would I be able to
see Mr Ferguson?"
Paul: "No - only convenors".
The union official asked for the two girls to be paid for the time 
spent in the meeting. The factory manager, who had also missed the 
point, quibbled: "If we pay them for this morning I can guarantee 
we'll get a lot more of this nonsense". The two experienced negotiators 
had the last word:
Paul: ".... We've widened discussion so neither the
company nor the union'll be embarrassed by a 
dispute over movement of labour. So if you're 
not prepared to pay them ...."
Tony: "Leave it".
Two days later the deputy convenor at the Old Hill factory visited
the branch office with some sick notes. He reported that two girls 
had run off the lines the previous day. He'd seen them in the 
personnel office writing a pass-out - Betty, who'd got a bad back, and 
Eileen, with asthma and a bad back. He didn't know what had 
happened afterwards. He agreed with the Branch Secretary, "there's 
not much you can do, is there?”. "No".
MRS GENNARD AND MRS HINGELY.
"It was agreed everything possible had been done
for the two ladies". (Branch Committee Minutes 26.5.1977).
Three weeks later management were wanting to move workers into 
the press shop because they were short of main-plates. They selected 
four from sub-plates and four from the pick-up arm sections in sub- 
assembly .
The shop steward tried to protect her members and the Industrial 
Relations Director complained to the Branch Secretary about it. She 
was causing some disnatisfaction:
I
"She's been here 14 years o'dd (she kept harking 
back to Macdonald's day). Oh - once they were 
moved then they never came back. I tried to 
explain - it wasn't like that. We couldn't 
carry on in the same way etc". (Tony Stuart).
Two of the workers who were sister-in-laws, had supported each
other and refused to move.
"They are adamant - they won't go in. They've 
had some bad accidents on the big presses in 
the family, so they're frightened."
(Irene, Convenor) (lO).
The steward had argued strongly on behalf of her members, so:
"We found them some nice cushy jobs in inspection.
But would you believe it? Those girls STILL 
weren't satisfied - after we'd done all that 
running around ...." Tony Stuart.
The convenor had got the factory manager to agree that it was "only" 
movement of labour where before it had been a permanent transfer.
But the distinction made no difference to the women, who even refused 
management's request to do the job "for just two weeks — to build up 
stock to keep the lines going".
The problem had been caused in the first place as a result of the 
workers' responses to management's attempts to intensify the workload 
during falling demand - by restricting output. This was also a 
'protection' against mobility because sections "over-producing" were 
broken down. Falling performances following the strike on the main 
lines had been generalised: women in the press shop had dropped theirs 
from 105 to 90, causing stocks to fall and making it difficult for 
management to keep the main lines fully supplied. In order to break 
these controls over their work pace, management required a team of new 
workers on the job(note how they were being drawn from separate sections) 
who would not, immediately, be in a position to control their output in
the same kind of way.
But Mrs Gennard and Mrs Hingely refused to be moved. Apart 
from their fear of the presses, one of them suffered from dermatitis 
and could not wear the gloves which were necessary either on the 
presses or in inspection. Finding a basis of mutual support in their 
family as well as their working relationship, these two women were 
unusually persistent. They came to work each day, sitting at their 
old jobs waiting to begin: "They're sat there, doing nothing - and 
refused to move all week!" (Tony Stuart).
Such a long stand was unprecedented and the convenor - somewhat 
at a loss - brought the matter up at a Branch Committee Meeting.
(The only occasion the minutes record the issue being raised on 
this body).
"They're not being paid. They're coming in 
again at 1.15 today - I don't know what 
to do. The procedure is exhausted ..."
Irene (Convenor).
Faced with this 'everyday' problem - suddenly so starkly posed
by the unusual actions of these two women, the shopstewards found
themselves perplexed.
Keith (Shop steward):
(Toolroom)
"Is there still work available on their own job?"
Irene (Convenor) :
(Old Hill)
"Yes ... Now it's only movement of labour, where 
before it was 'permanent transfer'. I don't 
know whether to tell them to go home or what ..."
Ettie (Convenor.Waterfall Lane):
"It's not your job. You wait till the company sends 
them and then fight for their jobs back"
However, the Branch Secretary argued that the agreement should be up-held: 
"You'll never be able to suit everyone". The implications began to 
dawn on the shopsteward from the toolroom as if for the first time:
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Keith: "What you're saying is - they should get a 
two-day suspension and be sent, down the road!"
Mary West (Branch Secretary) "oh no!"
Keith: "Well what?"
Irene : "Well, I'll tell them to go ..."
Ettie: "Oh no!"
Mary: "You have - a shop steward has - to stick to the 
movement of labour agreement and use the procedure. 
When she's completed negotiations, she must walk 
away and say, 'I'm sorry, I've done what I can', 
and go to the next job".
Keith : "And when they're sent off, all the sections will 
go with them!"
Mary: "But we can't make a special case - we can't have 
privileges .."
Keith: "So there's been an agreement between union and 
management over the movement of labour, and 
there's nothing anyone can do about it?"
The union had brought out a booklet, "The Law at Work”. Wasn't 
there something in there about 'constructive dismissal'?
"It doesn't apply. We've got a movement of 
labour agreement. The company say - we didn't 
agree to that book". (Branch Secretary).
Once again, there was 'no solution
Irene : "I'll tell the women I've exhausted procedure 
and there's nothing more I can do for them. 
Now it's up to them. They keep asking for 
Paul Silver".
Mary : "They can't have Paul Silver. He made the agreement. 
The only alternative to movement of labour is constant 
lay-offs" .
Trevor : "And if we allowed that, we wouldn't be doing our job"
(Branch Chair)
The Minutes of this meeting recorded the outcome
"The committee agreed and recommended that there must 
be no special cases on movement of labour clause.
It was agreed that everything possible had been done 
for the two ladies by the convenor". Branch Committee 
26.5.1977 .
Conclusions
We opened this chapter with the observation by Carter Goodrich 
that trade unions "institutionally" had little to do with 'production' 
as averse to 'consumption' areas of disputed control between employer 
and worker. We have stated our interest in explaining further the 
links between these and also the implications for both workers and 
their unions, of institutionalising priority of the one (consumption)
sphere over the other (production).
Goodrich, like others who were inspired by the shop stewards' 
movement, reflected on the impact of workers' attempts to incorporate 
production control demands within an organisational context - during 
a period when their bargaining power had been greatly increased as 
a result of wartime conditions. He concluded:
"The movement won its chief support by appeals 
to simple and very practical war-time issues; 
its chief effect may possibly be in the field 
of trade union structure" Goodrich (1975) p.lO
Herding examined more closely the impact of job controls on 
trade union structure - similarly noting the "mis-fit" of the 
institution in relation to these,which had been so dramatically 
highlighted by the 'democratising* challenge of the war-time movement. 
He notes that even today, workers' experience has been
"... that in order to make progress at the 
level of command over the workplace, they had 
to fight the union (which they still identified 
as holding their side in labour-management 
conflict in any issue) either before or along 
with the company”. Herding (1972) p.3o2
And that:
"Battling the union at one time or another, is 
the tall order facing the revolts; even when 
overcoming the barrier they have to retain, 
not lose, the gains of the past and bargaining 
power for the future ". ibid. p.300.
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In our case studies we have shown the problems which arose for 
the women workers at BSR when they attempted to challenge management's 
production policy through the union's representational and bargaining 
structures. Even when the earlier problems we have identified in 
terms of important issues not being raised as grievances or taken up 
at appropriate bargaining levels had been overcome as a consequence of 
the members taking industrial action, this was, in fact, almost the 
limit of the women's success.
As we shall see in the next chapter, in contrast to male 
workers who forced access to the bargaining table in a similar 
kind of way, when they finally got there, the women found themselves 
faced with still further obstacles to negotiation - which it would, 
apparently, require an even greater scale of action to overcome.
They were, therefore, currently unable to prevent the underlying 
problems being pushed back down to lower bargaining levels or to 
alter the fact that the only issue which was going to be negotiated 
at the level they had achieved, were the stoppages themselves.
We would argue that this was partly a consequence of the women 
workers' lack of bargaining strength in relation to both management and 
their own o-g-inisat ion,(for which movement of labour was significantly 
responsible). But as we have noted, the relative ’weakness' of any 
group has to be assessed in terms of the 'strength' required. Clearly 
the organisational and bargaining resources necessary to dispute 
production issues with management on the one hand and to re-shape their 
own institutional structures on the other, were considerable - why 
did the women not pursue 'easier' 'consumption' demands - concerning 
pay and (environmental) conditions? As we have also seen in Chapter 1J 
they did, in fact, do so. tilt it is also the case that the women met 
opposition in the area of 'reward' distribution from the male membership 
which significantly diminished the extent of the gains they might have made.
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If institutional structures are already fashioned more 
appropriately for 'compensation' (Herding) or 'consumption' (Goodrich) 
bargaining than production or job control - to the extent that they 
actually militate against the latter - what are the implications of 
this? We would argue that job controls underpin bargaining resources 
necessary for negotiating in either sphere. And the relatively 
greater 'strength' of some groups of the male workers - especially in 
relation to management, the female membership and the union - reflected 
in their relatively greater success in 'compensation* bargaining,is 
an illustration of this.
We have suggested that in a number of respects, compensation 
for workers is gained at the expense of job or production controls; 
and, institutionally, at the expense of the means for developing 
and maintaining these. In terms of the workplace and bargaining 
relationships we have described at BSR therefore, we can further 
propose that much of the male workers' gains were made at the expense 
of the women workers' organisational and bargaining strength.
In the next chapter, we examine some of the male workers' 
disputes, which, in contrast to the women, were mainly concerned with 
compensatory or consumption aspects, i.e. the distribution of 'reward'. 
And we can identify more closely, some significant features of this 
'more'mainstream' trade union activity at workplace level.
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Chapter 14: Footnotes
(1) Field notes: Ref 9.3.1977/176.
(2) Field notes: Ref 9.3.1977.
(3) The stewards did, unusually, manage to extract a written 
assurance that when work picked up, those moved would be 
given the choice to return. It is most unlikely that 
such an assurance would have been given if the stoppage had 
not taken place.
(4) The strikes appeared to come completely out of the blue, 
but the membership's dissatisfaction with the union was 
well known. As the regional secretary commented: "Irene 
came in on Saturday, saying people wanted to drop out of 
the Union. I told her if they did, let them, and then go 
in and get the company to sack 'em. She had no idea this 
was coming off though". Jim Mason (Regional Secretary)
Ref: 21.3.1977/231.
(5) The bonus was paid in December on an estimated profit figure 
of £20m. The year-end profits were £29m so an extra payment 
was therefore due.
(6) "This is to confirm that 50 shop stewards from the Midland 
factories of BSR Ltd were at the Head Offices of the Union 
today and held a meeting with David Basnett, the General 
Secretary.
The shop stewards discussed with David Basnett the problems 
of the membership. David Basnett said that the Union could 
not support any action by the members to break the social 
contract - but did assure the shop stewards that he would 
report on the meeting to the Executive of the Union".
Jim Mason (Regional Secretary) 22.3.1977.
(7) Negotiations: "First conference following strike" 29.3.77. 
Apart from movement of labour, the other two items on the 
agenda wore sick pay and bereavement pay.
(8) The highest output from this factory in the previous year had 
been 76,500 units per week. The highest ever had been 83,000 
per week (achieved four years' earlier).
(9) The 'experienced' girls on either side of the inexperienced 
one exerted a strong driving effect. They were not doing 
the same tasks, so the possibility of assistance w .js not 
the aim.
(lO) Ref 26.5.77/356.
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CHAPTER 15 CONTROL IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS : DISPUTING THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF 'BENEFITS’.
In Chapter 8 we examined some important implications of the sexual 
division of labour and the sexist ideology underpinning its inequality, 
from the men's point of view. This was to try to show how it resulted 
in the male workers' problems, interests and experiences being struc­
tured differently to those of the women. One consequence was identified 
in the quite particular conception that the men had of the female 
workers' problems and interests. And some of the implications of this, 
in terms of the kind of recognition, priority or support accorded to 
these issues were discussed. A further consequence which was identified 
concerned the men's greater facility for sustaining job controls and 
collective organisation.
The main internal sources of this greater facility arose from 
differences in the organisation of the labour process as it affected 
the male workers and also in the different nature of their authority 
relationships with both the women workers and management. While there 
were variations in the way these aspects affected men in different 
sections and skill groups, such features as (a relatively greater) 
physical mobility, job 'ownership' or entitlement, freedom from dis­
cipline-based driving, scope for discretion in work performance, and 
also for social interaction, characterised in general the position of 
the male workers in the labour process compared with that of the women.
What consequences flowed from the male workers havj ng more resources 
and hence greater bargaining power than the women? This important 
question will be examined in this Chapter through the use of case studies 
in order to analyse how such resources were used. And to Identify
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what the processes were by which some groups of male workers in part­
icular were able to succeed in not only promoting their own interests, 
but also in influencing the extent to which others could do likewise.
In our examination of the 'craftsmen'sagreement7we saw how the 
maintenance and toolroom workers were engaged in bargaining with the 
employer, their own full-time officers and their co-workers/members. As 
a consequence of their stronger bargaining position in relation to all 
three, they succeeded in gaining priority for their interests in the re­
presentational structures and control over the bargaining agenda. We 
have suggested that to the extent that the interests of these workers 
contradicted those of others (for example the women) in respect of pay 
('equality' versus differentials) or work-rate ('the size of the cake'), 
yet were made to prevail over them, the union machinery was rendered 
unresponsive to the latter. As a further consequence of this, the 
employer's interests were all the more easily imposed. Our argument 
here has been that the absorption of 'costs' (employer's interest) 
by any section of the workforce is never without effect, the tendency 
being to weaken the group's bargaining position and reduce the bar­
gaining resources at their disposal. Our approach is, therefore, to 
examine the impact of unequal bargaining resources between different 
sections of the workforce, not only in terms of the outcome vis a vis 
the employer, but also in relation to the (subsequent) position of 
various groups of workers on the one hand and the institutional 
structure of bargaining and interest representation on the other.
The first question we need to ask is perhaps, what was the basis 
of the men's greater bargaining resources?
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p o s i t i o n IN THE LABOUR PROCESS AND PRODUCTION RELATIONSHIPS
Although inextricably linked to the men's relative strength in 
the labour market generally, we are particularly interested in their 
stronger position at the workplace itself. So to begin with, we will 
identify, at a general level (that is,bearing in mind variations 
between the men) those resources which derived from the male workers' 
position in the labour process broadly contrasted with that of the 
women.
While other features, such as the crucial positioning of a 
process within the production system may serve to enhance bargaining 
power, we would argue that bargaining resources are fundamentally 
embedded in job control. And insofar as a central component of this 
is the regulation of work effort, it can be seen that the male workers 
were, in general, better placed than the women.
Looking first at their position in the production process; very 
few male workers were tied to highly interdependent, repetitive,rapid 
flow-line jobs. In terms of, for example, the use of discretion, 
physical mobility and especially, time, much of the work done by the men 
was characterised by more space - insrery sense. In other words the 
sections of the labour process thev occupied were "more porous", while 
those of the women were "more dense".
If we turn next to examine the different position of male and 
female workers in terms of relationships in the labour process, a 
similar kind of point can be made.
We have already seen that the women's relationships with each other 
were structured by distinctive patterns of co-operation in the labour 
process. We noted, in particular, the strong pressure to maintain 
consistent levels of output which was exerted through them being part
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of a very closely integrated system of co-operation with few "boundaries" 
or "buffers" inbetween. Whatever action was taken by one group 
quickly affected a very large number and it was difficult to control 
the scope of impact. Apart from the fact that the men were far less 
closely tied to each other by interdependent working, the particular 
nature of their relationship with the women workers was another source 
of 'space'. Obviously, in some areas the work of the men depended on 
that of the women in a fairly direct way - for example in the warehouse 
at the end of the final assembly line. But significant groups of 
males were 'indirect' workers and their relationship with the women was 
mediated in various respects. Taking the maintenance and toolroom 
workers as an example (the 'strongest' group), it can be seen how this 
relationship could be to their advantage. If the women stopped work 
these men could continue - often more work, rather than less, being 
'available' to them. On the other hand, if the men stopped or slowed 
down, the extent to which the women might feel the impact remained to 
some degree, under the men's control. This was important because, if 
the women (few or many) began to lose money, this could sometimes put 
the men under more immediate pressure than the management. So this was 
something the latter also attempted to control.
Finally, if we look at the authority relationship with management - 
distinctive features of the men's and women's position again emerge. 
(Which is not to deny that there were also differences between different 
groups of the men particularly along age and skill lines). Certainly, 
however, the adult male workers were not subjected to the same degree 
of disciplining or to movement of labour, either generally or selectively
applied. Individually, therefore, they were more secure in their jobs.(l) 
They were also better able to regulate their expenditure of effort and 
protect against intensification since the boundaries and content of 
their work were both relatively well defined and known.
Most important of all perhaps, collectively, the various groups 
of male workers were better able to sustain their levels of regulation 
through established patterns of control because the social relationships 
which underpinned these were subjected to far less disruption from any 
source.
Viewed broadly, therefore, structural differences which arose from 
the men's position in the labour process can be identified in three 
main areas. That is; in relation to the nature of the work itself 
and the time and "space" available; the relationships between workers 
which evolved through the system of co-operation; and the impact of 
such managerial strategies as disciplining and movement of labour.
The balance of these differences meant that male workers could maintain 
a higher degree of job control and sustain stronger, more stable work 
groups. This in turn meant that they had greater bargaining resources - 
since these could be more easily generated and maintained. The men 
also had greater scope to use these.
What impact did this structured difference in bargaining strength 
and resources have on the union's domestic organisation?
We will now go on to explore the main processes through which 
certain groups of the men did attempt to promote their interests via 
the collective bargaining machinery; although with differing degrees
of success
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The first case study concerns a group of 'BSR-skilled' male 
setters who tried and failed to make a sectional gain, but succeeded 
with a more general issue/demand. The second case involves a group 
of male toolroom workers who bargained successfully for a (sectional) 
improvement in their conditions (specifically - staggered holidays).
And the third case details the maintenance men's dispute which led 
to their successful claim (along with the toolroom workers) for 
increased differentials. The contrast between the two groups - 
'BSR-skilled' and the 'tradesmen' - raises many points of relevance 
in relation to the women workers, in terms of whom, the differences in 
the features identified were immeasurably greater.
While touching on a number of different aspects, overall, these 
case studies show how and with what effects, the collective bargaining 
process and the machinery sustained by the trade union organisation 
are subordinated to the function of controlling the distribution of 
costs and benefits. Essentially, the scope (who is involved), content 
(what is negotiated) and timing of this. They allow us to see how 
distribution in general, and these aspects in particular, are funda­
mentally determined by institutional means; being affected by the 
levels of bargaining, the channels of negotiation available and the 
positions of representatives/negotiators in the structure. As a 
result, these become not simply a means of bargaining but in crucial 
respects, the subject of it as well. In every case we find bargaining 
over substantive issues is combined with bargaining over the insti­
tutional structure and process. And because this is so closely linked
to the question of access to negotiation, it can, for some groups become
a prior question, completely subordinating the substantive issues 
originally at stake.
The clearest illustration of this 'dual' process in collective 
bargaining can be seen in relation to the struggles over representation 
in general and the convenorship in particular, which related in a 
complex way to both the processes of negotiation internal to the work­
force and the bargaining which took place with the employer. And 
in the case studies we can see more clearly how the structure of 
representation - who is represented and at what level - is as much the 
outcome or determination of prior bargaining processes as it is also 
a 'determinator' of these.
We begin by looking at the dispute concerning male workers (in 
the skilled grade) who worked in the automatic-machine shop (known as 
the auto-shop) at the Old Hill factory. This case study illustrates 
how the use by management and union officials of institutional mech­
anisms to control the 'progressing' of the mens' demands (particularly 
in relation to their access to appropriate levels of negotiation) 
led to these becoming the predominant focus of the latter's bargaining 
effort. We begin to see also, that a number of different bargaining 
channels exist (or can be established) and management, officials and 
members strive to utilise these to their own advantage. The most 
marked difference in bargaining channels can be seen to lie between 
those recognised as "official" and operated according to the established 
procedure (here referred to as 'inside' channels)) and those we would 
deem "unofficial" because they involve various departures from this 
(here referred to as 'outside' channels). Finally, this case study 
illustrates how, why and with what effect, the question of representation 
could become a key bargaining issue.
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The auto-shop men's dispute
The men in the auto-shop wanted more pay. Like everyone else in 
1977, they chafed under the Government's restrictions and looked for 
ways to increase their earnings. In particular they had been asking 
the company to guarantee weekend overtime working. But five weeks 
before Christmas, when delivery orders had been completed and the 
units being built were going for stock, the Chairman sent out a memo: 
r»  more workers to be taken on and overtime to be cut. Leading-hands 
and setters in the auto-shop responded by refusing to do certain 
fitting or maintenance work which they had carried out in overtime 
as part of the routine of operating the multi-spindle machines - unless 
they were given extra money for doing it. And an overtime-ban was 
instituted in response to the cut rota.
A certain amount of moral indignation on both sides accompanied 
this dispute. The men felt that management, who constantly pleaded 
that they were "most regretfully" tied by pay policy and could do 
nothing, should demonstrate their goodwill by making an effort, at 
least, to look for ways of giving the men more money. On the employer's 
side, the industrial relations director was indignant that, having 
recently conceded a status quo clause (shortly to be included in the 
"blue booli), the men should immediately be refusing to operate it.
He was not inclined even to negotiate with the union official on this 
dispute unless the men "stopped breaking the agreement".
On Friday 21st January the men stopped work because five of them 
had been paid 72p less that week as a result of the action being taken. 
The female operators in the department went home. Officials and 
management hurried over to meet the men and their two stewards, Chris 
representing the setters and Roy the male machine operators. (Female
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operators had their own steward, Pat). But the leading hands and 
setters refused to return to status quo. And on the Monday Roy went 
to ACAS for information about the men's entitlements.
The union officials had already made one attempt to head-off this 
dispute by agreeing to hold an informal 'clinic'. Their practice 
of meeting disaffected sections (frequently disavowed in public) 
nevertheless failed on this occasion. They had arranged to meet 
the auto-shop men in a pub one evening to hear their grievances and 
try to persuade them to return to normal working. Nobody turned up.
The Branch secretary had sent the message through Irene, the convenor: 
either it had not been passed on, or the men had decided to boycott 
the meeting.
The convenor’s position had become increasingly difficult as the 
actions of this small group threatened to lose more money for the 
operatives, many of whom were women who did not work overtime at all.
She was also aware that one outcome of her attempts to balance the 
various interests involved, was that the auto-shop men and their stewards 
tended to try to by-pass her - going straight to the officials or 
management. And the less enthusiasm she showed for their dispute, the 
more they attempted to do this. A struggle had been going on for 
some time, therefore, over her position as a mediator between the 
section's stewards and higher levels of negotiation. While she 
mediated this in relation to all groups, the men in the auto-shop 
harboured particular expectations of priority in relation to their 
demands - the previous convenor had been a tool-setter himself.
i
Because many aspects of the men's actions raised questions about 
control within the union's domestic organisation, this had constituted 
a major topic of discussion from the beginning of the dispute. An 
example of just such a conversation took place a few days after the 
stoppage, between the branch secretary, the convenor and the factory 
manager. The fact that the men had constantly been allowed to hold 
meetings amongst themselves, was seen by the branch secretary as the 
source of the problems - a control issue which the factory manager 
pointed out, both union and management shared.
Bert Long "Irene should conduct meetings upstairs, not
(Factory Manager) the shop stewards."
Mary West
(Branch Secretary)"Years ago, they never had any meetings upstairs - 
till Chris went up and started this.
I could control them then."
"I went to the canteen and told the men and 
everything I told them Roy contradicted me."
"....I hear of meetings long after they've happened"
"Denis (manager) tries to stop it..."
"Only weapon we've got is to dock their time 
off - or lock the canteen door."
"Then they'll be on to me to get it back, it's 
a vicious circle."
"They won't use the vending machines either.
That's another hobby-horse of mine. They 
go to the canteen to make tea....
I think we all have problems up there - 
branch and management. And I can't see 
any answer to it all. Common sense won't 
prevail."
"Jim Mason (union's regional secretary) will 
have to come up and get them back into line."
Field notes 25.1.1977.
Looking at the question of control more broadly, it was clear that a 
major area of concern on the union side was the extert to which the 
men were going outside of the institution's formal and Informal
Irene
(Convenor)
Bert
Irene
Bert
Irene
Bert
Mary
-707-
structures. In the first place, they had not pursued their case 
through the grievance procedure) secondly, they had taken their case 
directly to ACAS and finally, they had failed to meet the officials for 
an informal meeting. That is.they had passed over the opportunity 
of going outside normal procedure when this had been officially offered. 
As the branch secretary observed: "It would do us a favour if the 
company was prepared to let them stew. It would show them they can't 
just throw out the procedure like that."
ACCESS TO THE BARGAINING TABLE : ' INSIDE/OUTSIDE ' NEGOTIATIONS
As a means of enforcing the procedure and also of preventing the 
membership taking action in order to put pressure on themselves in 
negotiations, the union officials had generally adopted the policy of 
refusing to negotiate unless there was a return to normal working 
and the procedure had been followed correctly by the membership. 
Therefore, it might be considered surprising to find that on the 28th 
January the auto-shop dispute had been fitted onto the agenda of a 
Stage 5 conference with the company. Space had, indeed, been made 
to accommodate the item within the context of the official procedure, 
despite the fact that the men remained 'out of line'. Even if it was 
down for "informal discussion” on the agenda, to distinguish it from 
the other items which were properly for "negotiation", it was there 
and so were the shopstewards.
At this meeting, the regional official put the men's case regarding 
the loss of pay which led to the stoppage and the steward's claim that 
they had been prevented by the factory manager from pursuiig their 
demand (for maintenance work to be done in overtime) through the 
official procedure - something they (now) wished to continue to do(2).
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Having established the membership were back in procedure, it was 
interesting to note how the official and industrial relations director
were content to remain outside it themselves - for the time-being:
Paul Silver "I suggest an extraordinary meeting at Old
(Union Official) Hill with the convenors and shopstewards....
to discuss the position relating to the auto­
shop: leading-hands' and setters'dispute on 
Friday; status quo and the way it operates; 
our accusations against management and payment 
for the women laid off." (my emphasis)
Tony Stuart "I accept on condition this is not an accepted part
(I.R. director) of procedure."
Field notes 28.1.1977.
And the shopstewards were given permission to hold yet another meeting
in work's time (also 'out of procedure') in order to explain the position
to the men.
The extraordinary meeting was conducted by the Industrial Relations 
director. The factory manager and auto-shop superintendent were 
present, along with the convenor and her deputy; Roy and Pat were there 
to represent male and female machine operatives respectively, who had 
lost earnings as a result of the auto-setters' action and the Friday 
stoppage. Chris put the case of the leading-hand setters - they were 
asking for more money for doing the 'fitting' aspect of their work.
The basis of (one of) their complaints) against shopfloor management
was that the latter had refused to allow the issue to be taken up through 
the stages of the procedure (presumably as a way of refusing to give 
it the status of being negotiable in the first place).
Once it had been established that, since the setters had done
fitting jobs for the past seventeen years, they were not entitled to 
any extra pay under the social contract, they quickly came to the main 
points at issue.
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"All around us we see companies finding ways 
to pay people for doing jobs they've done 
before or will continue to do....
Are you prepared to look for ways of making 
payment for setters to do this job?"
(States position under social contract) "No, 
it's our policy and the trade union we negotiate 
with, not to condone the breaking of it."
"Get the national officer here - we'll tell him.
We can't get him."
"It's your machinery. If you as a member 
want to get in touch with an official....''
"Everyone is saying 'attack the social contract, 
it's destroying you'".
"Make those comments to people who have influence. 
Industry was excluded from drawing up the social 
contract so you can save those words for other 
ears."
Field notes 2.2.1977.
The convenor then asked if the Industrial Relations director would
be prepared to go to the Department of Employment with the union
official. The director responded by making this conditional on the
men returning to'status quol' When the stewards replied "That's one
thing they won't do. That's their only weapon." The director attempted
to re(locate) the whole issue totally within the "normal” procedural
channels (which would have meant, in a sense, defeat for the men).
Tony Stuart "Well, it's got to go back to stage 5, stage
6 and stage 7 - that's ACAS."
The convenor again offered the 'choice'
"The men won't revert to status quo. Therefore, 
it's the next stage (of procedure) cr the 
Department of Employment."
Tony Stuart "I can't cut procedure short".
Irene "I've been advised by Paul Silver (the union
official) to ask for this".
On receiving this information the director agreed to meet the official 
again at stage 5 to discuss the issue.
Chris
( Shopsteward 
auto-setters)
Tony Stuart 
(Industrial 
Relations Dir.)
Chris
Tony Stuart 
Chris
Tony Stuart
But when Roy then tried to present his case for the semi-skilled
men's loss of earnings he was met with the procedure straight away.
"I suggest you start at Stage 1. You don't 
have access to me".
Before being refused payment in any case, since the loss was due to 
an industrial dispute (this being in line with the guaranteed pay 
agreement, agreed with the union(3)). What had been the outcome, then, 
of this series of negotiations with management? What had been gained 
and what had been conceded by the parties involved?
One of the basic demands of the auto-setters was abstract - that 
the principle behind their specific claims concerning the performance 
of certain job tasks on overtime-rates, should be accepted. That the 
company should, therefore, agree that they wanted to find more money 
for the men and thus, concede first that the claim itself be given 
negotiable status and second that negotiations would be progressed.
In effect, therefore, by agreeing to meet the union official at 
stage 5, the company-side had made concessions on both of these last 
two points. What the skilled grades had gained by their actions was 
thus access to the relevant level(s) of negotiation. And an important 
point was that they had had to go outside the "normal channels" in order 
to make this gain. But a condition of this concession - the qulc^iro- 
quo of the 'agreement to negotiate' - was that the whole group should 
proceed to operate within the institutional structures once more.
(Theie was a suggestion too, although not so firmly insisted on at this 
point, that the return to normal working was a further condition of
negotiation).
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From the men's point of view there were costs attached to accepting 
even the first of these conditions. The male operators' claim for 
loss of earnings had been sent back down 'the snake' to square one of 
the procedure again. And, since it could not succeed while it was 
kept within the terms of the company-union agreements in any case, at 
some point something extra would, again, be required to force it to be 
taken outside the official structures (and the boundaries delineated 
by the agreements) for treatment as a special case.(4)
Overall, a large part of the bargaining activity in which manage­
ment and auto-shop men had been engaged can be seen as being concerned 
with: establishing the negotiable status of the claim (as much as the 
substantial claim itself)» gaining access to the appropriate bargaining 
levels,and sustaining its progress through them. This was so much the 
case that as it developed the whole dispute appeared to become almost 
entirely transmited into one concerned with these issues.
INTERNAL BARGAINING : CRISIS IN REPRESENTATION
Six days after the extraordinary meeting between auto-shop stewards 
and top management, another special meeting - this time involving the 
whole body of shopstewards at Old Hill - had to be called by the union 
officials in order to sort out a breakdown of procedure and represen­
tation which appeared to have taken place as a consequence of the auto­
shop workers' dispute. How and why had this breakdown occurred?
The meeting had been prompted specifically by a vote of no con­
fidence in the convenor and deputy emana i.ing from the auto-shop, which 
had been sent in to the branch office. The incident as a whole serves 
to illustrate first to what extent the procedure and system of repre­
sentation had itself become a crucial focus of bargaining» and secondly, 
how far the collective bargaining activity of this group of workers 
extended beyond management, to encompass the union officials and, more
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broadly, the rest of the workforce via their representatives as well. 
Before setting out the discussions which took place at the meeting 
itself, it may first be useful to expaifl on some of these points.
If it is true that all representatives have interests attached 
to them, then it is also the case that in a representative system, 
interests need representatives to carry them forward. In some areas 
of the workforce therefore, groups of workers had struggled to have 
their "own steward".
In the auto-shop the problem had become one of gaining priority 
amongst many competing interests, for their aims. Because the degree 
of priority accorded affected both the kind of access afforded to the 
bargaining channels available,and the degree of effective progress 
which could be made within them. (The comparison with skilled (trades) 
men below provides further illustration of this). But effectivity 
also depended on the levels at which representatives had access to 
negotiations with management and the procedure was important in respect 
of this.
The procedure provided access to the negotiating table which was, 
in theory, open to everyone. But because the most effective level of 
decision-making only really began at stage 5, the procedure served as 
much as a filter with built-in delays as it did a facility offering 
access. It thus constituted a focus oftergaining activity in itself.
So also, did the various positions in the representative system.
A convenor, for example, had better access to management and union 
officials than individual stewards, and, as has been noted elsewhere, the 
higher the level of procedure, the more control over negotiations passed
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away from those with an immediate interest in their outcome. Extra 
urgency was added to the desire of this particular group to keep control 
over negotiations in their own hands because in contrast to the 
previous (male) convenor, who had accorded more automatic priority to 
the auto-shop's concerns, the present female incumbent appeared less 
inclined to do so.
It is maintained here that controlling the levels that issues pro­
gressed through was an important means of controlling the substantial 
aspects of negotiation - specifically, who bargained over what. To 
the extent that both the procedure and positions available in the 
representative structure were significant in this process, it is clear 
that they must themselves become negotiable. As also, must the very 
progress of an issue itself, given the perishability of most disputes. 
Parties to these negotiations, that is those with a particular interest 
in attempting to exercise varying degrees of control over bargaining 
content, include not only management, the negotiating union officials 
above individual factorj/company level^ and convenors (that is, those
within it), but also interest groups among the workers themselves.
In the body of stewards as a whole is represented these numerous 
different interests - all competing for bargaining priority. Thus 
it can be seen that, when one group uses "muscle" against management, 
it is also a way of forcing the outcome in terms of this internal 
process of negotiation as well. That this could put a strain on the 
union's domestic organisation as a whole, is Illustrated by subsequent
events in the auto-shop dispute.
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As we have already seen, the auto-shop workers had succeeded in 
their attempts to by-pass stages in procedure and also the convenor, 
and gain direct access to management and their officials by going 
'outside' the formal system - (although at the cost of being redirected 
'inside' it again). Now this section's representatives attempted to 
'capture' the convenor's position for themselves. (5)
At the meeting which was chaired by Chris, the auto-setters' shop- 
steward (but run by the regional officer with the branch secretary in 
support) the vote of confidence was taken before discussion of the 
auto-shop was allowed to proceed. The convenor had a clear majority, 
her deputy, Jerry from the maintenance department, won it by a narrower 
margin of 15 votes to 9. The regional official then made an address 
in which he set out the informal discussion (at the stage 5 conference), 
the informal meeting subsequently arranged with management, and the 
proposed visit to the Department of Employment,as being the most the 
setters could possibly achieve. He went on to advise a return to 
normal working. When Roy announced that they wanted an official in 
to deal with the auto-shop's problems and asked if he was prepared to 
meet the stewards, the full-time officer took the opportunity to make 
a strong statement about the need to keep within the established 
structures of the procedure and the system of representation. He 
then went on to sharply admonish this steward who had been to ACAS 
for advice:
"I object to Roy going over my *’».id. . .he is an 
official of this union and I object to him or 
anyone else going to ACAS and the Department of
Employment.... No purpose is served by him getting
the Information from these departments. All the 
information he requires is in the hands of the 
convenor or branch secretary. If a member wishes
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to go, well and good. But no elected repre­
sentative should do It....Last week my secretary 
had Roy on the phone and I was in Uttoxeter. I 
told him to go to the branch secretary. I'm 
sure you'll agree it would be impossible to operate 
in this way....you must use your convenor."
Field notes 8.2.1977
on the matter of the auto-shop's complaints against the convenor,
little was said by the stewards concerned at all (one being in the
chair anyway) - beyond a few attempts to suggest that they might have
been excluded from discussions with the factory manager and that they
wanted greater involvement for stewards in the factory generally.
But there was no discussion of this beyond the convenor's reply:
"At official stage 4's, I've never refused to let 
shopstewards involved in particular departments 
in. But you come down in a group and go straight 
to the factory manager. And that's not the 
procedure."
Pushed back into procedure, the male auto-shop stewards had 
attempted to progress their claims through the 'normal'channels by 
capturing the convenor's position, which would give them the necessary 
access to higher levels of negotiation. But they had failed to find 
support from the other shopstewards and found themselves even more 
firmly positioned in terms of the formal procedure than before. They 
then moved to change the procedure and structure of representation 
itself,in order to make it more responsive to their particular demands. 
First by arguing for a higher status designation for their own repre­
sentatives, and secondly, by asking for an additional stage to be 
inserted in the procedure which would give their representatives direct 
access to top factory management.
Thus, we find that in the latter half of the meeting the focus
of the discussion swung round to the status of the steward, Vin 
Brown (who was also present). Vin represented a group of skilled men - 
some 23 toolmakers working in a small outlying workshop called Porters- 
field, which was some way from the main factory; but, because they came 
under the Old Hill management, their representative had always been 
included in that factory's domestic organisation.
Vin was also a regular attender on the branch committee and it 
was through this body that the branch secretary had argued for him to 
be given the title of 'convenor'. This had occurred in the second week 
of January, after the toolroom workers had begun to show increasing 
signs of impatience and disaffection with the union over the lack of 
progress on their long-standing demand for staggered holidays. The 
branch secretary's proposal,which she put to the committee was, in 
fact, a 'consolation' concession of increased representational status 
for these men, in the hope that this might head-off their possibly 
impending action. The case for his increased status had been argued 
by the branch secretary on 'technical' grounds - that Portersfield 
was a separate factory etc. And, although at the time the rest of 
the committee acquiesced with little discussion, at two subsequent branch 
committee meetings attempts had been made by shopstewards to reconsider 
the question. But the officials were able to insist that their 
original decision must stand.
Now, four weeks after this decision had first been put through 
the committee, the men in the auto-shop were asking for their 'own' 
convenor. The central question of (privileged) access this position 
provided had been posed particularly sharply for them at the stage 5
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conference (discussed above), where their actions had forced a space 
on the agenda for their demands and a physical entry 'to the bargaining 
table' for themselves. But Vin Brown had been there as well, having 
gained accession through an entirely different route - one, moreover, 
that had been 'sponsored' by the officials. However this had been 
achieved, it was certainly not forthcoming for the auto-shop as the 
officers proceeded to point out. Against demands for separate re­
presentation and (improved) access,the latter went on to argue:
"Any section could say that: we had this at (Stourbridge 
- a shopsteward felt no-one could represent 
his members on nights but...
My personal view is that too many come in on stage 5 
now... "
As might, by now be apparent, a number of issues concerned with 
representation were being negotiated throughout this meeting, not only 
between the auto-shop representatives and the officials, but between 
the officials and the whole body of shopstewards, and also, to some 
extent, between the auto-shop representatives and the rest of the 
shopstewards.
The final item, therefore, to complete what can be seen as a 
series of negotiations around the same topic, was Roy's request for 
another stage to be inserted into the procedure between four (at factory 
level) and five (all factories) - presumably as an alternative means of 
giving 'section stewards' an entry to negotiations involving the 
officials and top level management. This, the official replied,
1»would mean a change in the blue book. An answer which seemed to 
convey sufficient finality to end the discussion.
What progress, meanwhile, was being made on the substantive items 
constituting the actual claim itself? Keeping his side of the
bargain, the union officials and the industrial relations director
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subsequently visited the Department of Employment in London for 'a 
ruling' on the men's specific demands. Predictably, the reply, set 
out in a letter passed on by management, was that the setters' claim 
could not be considered under the terms of the social contract. But 
not only was the substantial demand turned down, or lost, in this 
manner, so too was the claim's negotiable status and also the bargaining 
entry that the men had previously won. In order not to leave the 
negotiating table completely empty-handed, the auto-shop stewards had 
in the last resort asked management for a letter to be sent to their 
members from the company, stating that they would, at least, be 
prepared to negotiate "when circumstances permitted". But their answer, 
this time, came straight back in an official letter from the TUC, 
passed on by the branch secretary, stating that....
"The advice which the TUC has consistently given 
negotiators is that they should avoid making 
specific commitments for the implementation of 
improvements on dates after July 31 1977."
The men had lost all of their demands for more pay and the company
then began to threaten that they would begin to make lay-offs unless
they resumed "normal working".
On the 18th March the "bonus" strike began. The men in the auto­
shop continued working although their representatives attended the joint 
shopstewards meeting addressed by the union's regional secretary (the 
official being on holiday). The main topics pursued by the auto-shop 
stewards concerned the social contract: finding loopholes, and legitimate 
ways around it, getting rid of it or forcing the company to break it.
But at the end of these discussions,organising a return to work was a 
problem - what could be offered in order to achieve this? What was 
offered, on condition the strike was ended, was merely another trip to
the Department of Employment by the union official and the industrial 
relations director with a further list of demands for "vetting". As 
the regional secretary's notes neatly expressed it: "Can't have bonus 
under social contract. Let the Department of Employment do the 
stopping."
By the second week of April the auto-shop workers' formal request 
for extra overtime had been taken through the procedure and arrived 
at stage 5. Accordingly, the claim was negotiated at a proper con­
ference with appropriate arguments being put by the regional official 
and industrial relations director respectively. But, using the 
"correct channels" was clearly no guarantee of success because the 
latter refused to make a special case for this group of men. "There 
are ^OOO other employees who could ask for the same."
When the union's own procedure for properly responding to a 
failure-to-agree at the final stage was invoked subsequently - it was 
also in vain. The union official brought the reply of the regional 
executive on the question of the men taking industrial action in support 
of their claim. The committee recommended an immediate return to 
normal working and were "not prepared to recommend for any disruption."
The men in the auto-shop had again failed in their negotiations 
with both the union and management, to secure support for any kind of 
sectional gain. Perhaps as a consequence of this, they increasingly 
directed their energies into a more generalised demand - to prevent the 
company from restricting their wage increase to within stage 2 guidelines. 
In their growing resolve to effect this (as other avenues of improving 
their position were closed) they found wider support - particularly from 
other groups of male workers who were seriously discussing this question.
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Meanwhile, negotiations within the union side on the question of
representation were maintained. In May, at a meeting of the branch
committee called to discuss policy on this wage claim, the question of
Vin Brown's status as 'convenor' for Portersfield was raised once more.
This time it was by Pat, the shopsteward for women in the auto-shop
(as the only representative from this department on the branch committee)
"There's going to be a lot of controversy: if 
Portersfield can have their own, the auto-shop 
want theirs."
She argued that, since Portersfield came under Old Hill's manage­
ment and was still incorporated into that factory's domestic organisation 
"You've got two convenors under the same management, and that's never 
been known". The officials argued that the "extra” representation 
was necessary because Portersfield was a separate factory and there 
was little communication between the two. "We wanted someone from 
there who could deal with stage 4's - not someone they didn't know at 
all." They also argued that although only a small group (only 23) 
the skilled men's representative had always been treated as a "senior 
steward", that "he was doing nothing different now and that only his 
title had changed". And (revealingly) the branch secretary added:
"The lads there don't want anyone else getting involved".
Later on the same day at a meeting of the joint shopstewards, 
again called to discuss the wage claim, the issue of Vin was brough: up 
by Chris the auto-setters' shopsteward, who raised the question as 
soon as the proceedings were opened. His general argument was that, 
since there was no committee of shopstewards to elect him, Vin Brown 
could not be a ''convenor “ and as such - who was he answerable to?
Meanwhile, negotiations within the union side on the question of
representation were maintained. In May, at a meeting of the branch
committee called to discuss policy on this wage claim, the question of
Vin Brown's status as 'convenor' for Portersfield was raised once more.
This time it was by Pat, the shopsteward for women in the auto-shop
(as the only representative from this department on the branch committee)
"There's going to be a lot of controversy: if 
Portersfield can have their own, the auto-shop 
want theirs.”
She argued that, since Portersfield came under Old Hill's manage­
ment and was still incorporated into that factory's domestic organisation 
"You've got two convenors under the same management, and that's never 
been known". The officials argued that the "extra" representation 
was necessary because Portersfield was a separate factory and there 
was little communication between the two. "We wanted someone from 
there who could deal with stage 4's - not someone they didn't know at 
all." They also argued that although only a small group (only 23) 
the skilled men's representative had always been treated as a "senior 
steward", that "he was doing nothing different now and that only his 
title had changed". And (revealingly) the branch secretary added:
"The lads there don't want anyone else getting involved".
Later on the same day at a meeting of the joint shopstewards, 
again called to discuss the wage claim, the issue of Vin was brought up 
by Chris the auto-setters' shopsteward, who raised the question as 
soon as the proceedings were opened. His general argument was that, 
since there was no committee of shopstewards to elect him, Vin Brown 
could not be a ''convenor “ and as such - who was he answerable to?
Chris's specific objection however centered around the fact that Vin 
had recently examined sections of the ratebook referring to the auto­
shop in order to establish a claim for his own members. Finally,
Chris voiced objection to the way the position had been established 
in the first place:
"There's no way Vin Brown can be a convenor under 
the rule-book. It's been done through the back­
door, or rather the front door - in front of the 
branch committee.”
The Chairman intervened:
"Will you be satisfied if it's decided here and 
now - if we vote in favour of Vin being made a 
senior steward and not a convenor?"
Chris: "Let's not hoodwink each other. He's on all the
meetings and stages (of negotiation through 
procedure). There’s nothing that says senior 
stewards can go to all meetings."
The officials pointed out to those present that a vote in favour of 
"demoting" Vin was a vote to diminish representation for a group of 
workers and reduce their "rights". This went against their previous 
"custom and practice" of increasing the representation of the skilled 
men especially - for example, by special co-option of their repres­
entatives onto wage negotiating teams, as had always been done in the 
past. The meeting voted 36-25 in favour of confirming Vin as a "senior 
steward". But with what effect, it was not clear.
Tne struggle over representation also continued within the Old Hill 
factory's domestic organisation. When Jerry, the deputy convenor was 
voted out as shopsteward for the maintenance section, the convenor, 
Irene's, attempts to retain him as her assistant by finding him a 
position representing female supervision was stopped by specific 
objections from the auto-shop. These led to the branch secretary
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writing to the company to indicate that such an arrangement was not 
acceptable. As a result of an election held subsequently Pat, the 
female steward from the auto-shop, was elected as deputy convenor in 
his place.
Even so, members and shopstewards in this section still found
themselves having to negotiate access for their grievances, not only
through but with, the convenor and also the branch secretary.
Irene "The auto-shop men are asking for a clarification
(Convenor)0^ the wa9e sheets today. They came....I
refused to see them all, it was a deputation.
So Bert Long (factory manager) sent them all 
off again."
In due course, however, this issue must have been dealt with,
in the sense of being taken up through the procedure, since eventually
it was registered by the convenor for negotiation at stage 5. When,
a week later, Chris asked the branch secretary to take up another
stage 5 reference involving the promotion of a machine shop charge-hand
he got rather less response, as the officer herself explained:
"I know that discretionary awards are not allowed 
under the pay policy - we've been to London often 
enough....I just said no, he couldn't have it."
And, even when the request for this reference was put in to the
branch office to be formally registered at stage 5 in any case - it
still did not go onto the agenda. Sorting through the items listed,
the negotiating officer decided that he wanted more discussion with
the steward first.
"And Chris has asked for a branch committee 
meeting and a meeting of the joint shopstewards 
to discuss the wage claim....Paul says they're 
not to have it - they've already had one and 
they're not due for another 2 weeks - he's not 
prepared to attend so they can't have it. I'll 
not be dictated to - I said to JM (regional 
secretary) yesterday - I'll not have them question­
ing my authority any more - they can't go demanding 
this and that..."(branch secretary) 25.5.77/349
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The men kept up a continuous pressure on the union machinery to 
force some responsiveness towards their demands, as a result of which 
the officials' control over this became increasingly explicit. In 
the main the men had failed to exert sufficient control over the 
bargaining process to make sectional gains. But the movement against 
the acceptance of stage 2, in which the auto-shop had been particularly 
prominent, was finally successful (see Chapter 13 above). And at the 
end of that year, Russell, a 'new' stopsteward in this department was 
elected the factory's convenor, with a woman from the sub-assembly 
area as his deputy. So this group of men did eventually succeed in 
their struggle for increased representation in relation to other groups 
as well.
In the next case study we look at a group of male workers who were
successful in advancing a sectional claim i.e. in making the machinery
'work' especially for them. We look at what was involved in terms
of the system of representation, finding that the most notable feature
was separation within the bargaining structures which the men's position
in the labour process facilitated.
The toolroom men's dispute
"Members have asked if it might be possible for 
some of the male employees to be allowed to have 
staggered holidays. Mr. Silver said this would 
be discussed informally with Mr. Ferguson."
Minutes:branch meeting 17.10.1972
This case study concerns a demand for staggered holidays in the 
toolrooms. At a certain point this dispute coincided with that of 
another skilled group - in the maintenance department. What emerged 
was a joint demand for special treatment which finally materialised 
in the form of the "Craftsmen's Agreement" negotiated with the company
in 1978. Our aim, in this section, is to examine and compare some of 
the processes already identified in relation to the auto-shop male 
workers' demands which were being taken up at the same time. There 
are some interesting contrasts to be found in the differing fortunes 
of these two groups of male workers. It is hoped that analysis of 
these may help to throw some light, in turn, on the position of the 
women workers in the bargaining process.
It was immediately apparent that the skilled men at BSR tended 
to gain the attention of both management and union officials more 
readily than other groups of workers. While some aspects of this 
remain to be examined, there were a number of background features 
which also appear to be relevant. For example, the initial impetus 
behind the union recognition struggle at East Kilbride had come from 
the skilled 'tradesmen' who were members of the AUEW.
The company therefore remained wary of this group of relatively 
expensive and scarce workers whose counterparts in the West Midland^ 
motor industry also retained a reputation for strong, sectional 
organisation and militancy. The agreement conceding scle negotiating 
rights to the GMWU for all BSR's factories in the West Midlands (the 
AUEW was recognised in Scotland) closed the door on the "enfranchisement" 
of those skilled men who retained their membership of the various 
craft unions appropriate to their trade; at least, until they finally 
agreed to join the GMWU as well. But, after their experience with 
Pilkingtons, this union also had reason to beware of any group suffic­
iently disaffected to threaten an organised split from the ranks. If 
notUng else, therefore, these toolroom workers - who constituted the 
largest section of skilled tradesmen at BSR - tended to find in both 
management and union officials a more ready audience for their grievances.
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At the time of the study (1977-8) BSR employed around 70 tool- 
maker s/repairers. Just under half of these worked in the Portersfield 
toolroom, a factory which was separate from the 4 main production 
sites. Slightly more were employed in a toolroom attached to the 
Stourbridge factory, and about a dozen toolmakers were distributed 
across the other 3 plants, where they were mainly engaged in on-site 
repairs.
Like other skilled groups the toolmakers at BSR were looking to 
improve their pay and conditions both relatively and absolutely. 
Staggered holidays had been an early demand (as the branch minutes of 
October 1972 quoted above, show). The company operated a policy of 
fixed holidays for all workers; different arrangements to accommodate 
the appropriate number of days, being discussed and voted on in advance, 
for each year. The policy was strictly operated for all employees 
including management (if only because there were inadequate personnel 
resources to allow flexibility) and no exceptions were permitted.
Of course, some workers, such as maintenance and a few toolmakers, 
were, of necessity, engaged in work which could only be carried out 
during shut-down periods; a3 a result fewer - of their holiday-days were 
•tied' (6).
It appeared to the rest of the toolroom (and other indirect workers 
including the office staff) that there was more scope for flexibility 
regarding their holidays than the company would concede. This part­
icular issue became bound up with the skilled tradesmen's desire to 
improve their conditions and have the company give expression to their 
special status in relation to other groups of workers - particularly 
the "BSR-skilled" - such as the setters and inspectors. Impetus behind 
the demand built up rapidly once a general compression of differentials
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was perceived (realistically or not) to be occurring as a consequence 
of incomes policies. And, to the extent that the issue encapsulated 
a demand for better treatment, it was spurred on by an awareness too 
that the numbers of toolmakers employed had been falling (for example, 
from 32 to 23 at Portersfield over the past 18 months), although the 
workload had not, and more tools were being bought-in from outside 
the company.
The request for staggered holidays for toolroom workers had been 
put into the formal procedure once the informal discussions (presumably 
held at the end of 1972) had proved fruitless. Negotiation on the 
issue, between top management and union officials, began in September 
1976 and was still continuing into the New Year. It was probably to 
stave off increasing frustration at the lack of progress on this 
and other of this group’s demands at this particular time that Vin 
Brown was given the status of 'convenor' at Portersfield (where he was 
the sole shopsteward). And the same month (January 1977) a meeting 
was held at stage 6 of the procedure for a final decision on staggered 
holidays from the company chairman.
Present at this conference were the two full-time officers, the 
four female convenors, with their four male deputies (one of whom was 
also a tookmaker) plus Vin from the Portersfield toolroom and Keith 
from the toolroom at Stourbridge. Negotiations took place on a number 
of different levels, that is, not only between the official and the company 
chairman, but also between the officials and the skilled men and between 
the skilled men and those representing the other sections of the workforce.
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The official presented the men's case in the context of pay policy 
restrictions and the need to give "extra incentives" to the skilled 
men. He recalled occasions when the company had been prepared to 
give special treatment to this group of workers in the past. However, 
the chairman refused their request on the grounds that this would 
"open the floodgates" and thus 'impair efficiency". In short, he felt 
he could not afford to set this precedent. Calling for a recess, the 
union official pointed out to the skilled men present that the procedure 
had now been exhausted (bar resort to ACAS, which neither he, nor the 
chairman wanted). What further course of action did the men envisage? 
The toolrooms' representatives outlined a proposed strategy of blacking 
all tools made since September (when negotiations on the issue began).
On behalf of other workers represented at the meeting, however, it was 
pointed out that, while this would not affect the pay packets of the 
toolmakers, it would certainly affect the pay of operatives - when 
machines started to go down. "You're putting pressures on other 
people to make the company change their minds". There was, moreover, 
a danger that industrial action could escalate if management decided 
to lay off a toolmaker for refusing to do a job. The official then 
pointed out the complex (and time-consuming) process of having a 
strike made official and the unlikelihood that one involving some 10,000 
workers would be. Faced with deadlock and now under pressure to offer 
something himself, "I've always tried to get special consideration for 
skilled men, I feel they are under-valued," the official then proposed 
they should ask for a pilot scheme to run for one or two years. But 
the union-side had to "offer" something in return for this. Certainly,
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the men would guarantee cover during holidays when reguired (management 
had sometimes found problems here) and the company could avert indus­
trial action and also have an opportunity to assess whether or not the 
scheme impaired efficiency. (7) But the main "problem" of restricting 
the scope of any special arrangement to this group alone still remained 
and something had to be "offered" on this one.
Paul Silver "Can we guarantee that it won't be extended
(official) to other groups?"
Mary West 
(branch 
secretary):
"We could - we could just refuse to take 
any more (demands) up."
Paul "We would have to take it to branch to
back up our assurance. The branch will 
have to agree to the pilot scheme."
Keith (toolmaker, 
Stourbridge) It would be thrown out.
Paul "I disagree. If he (the company chairman)
agrees - he won't accept my word that it 
would not set a precedent. I'd have to 
take it to the branch committee. And we 
would recommend they (the branch) did accept 
it on the grounds that we don't want to 
impair the efficiency of the factory."
When the proposal was put to the company chairman it was clear that
he feared pressure from office workers for flexible holidays would be 
much increased by any concessions to the skilled men. And the former 
were not covered by assurances to limit the scope of the agreement from
this branch, since they were in Matsa, a separate section with their
own branch and full-time negotiating officer. It was left that the
company would write to the union with their answer. If they refused, 
then a "retrospective failure to agree" would be registered.
If they agreed, then the branch committee would recommend that the
branch accepted limited scope for the agreement. There was no problem
envisaged about the branch committee doing this. Those present at the
negotiation,including the three toolroom workers, constituted the bulk 
of it and the two negotiating officials were also always in attendance.(8)
When the Chairman's subsequent refusal was communicated to the tool­
room workers at Stourbridge, they began their blacking straight away.
The officials took the letter to Portersfield and outlined the possible 
alternatives remaining. The men could apply for permission to take 
strike action through the 'proper channels' of the union; do nothing; 
or go to ACAS. By pointing out straightaway that the first and last 
courses of action would be fruitless, the officials were indicating 
that the issue would now have to be processed outside the formal 
channels. Going on to make an explicit statement to this effect, the 
officials gave what was tantamount to permission and also support for 
this.
"There's got to be some way of paying for skill.
The skilled toolmakers have made an important 
contribution....but I don't think it's any use 
going to the union to escalate it. You've got 
to decide whether to resolve it between the 
toolroom and the company or drop it."
Paul Silver
Permission for separate and informal pursuance of the dispute would 
also imply the officals' acceptance of the men's proposed sanctions. 
Indeed, the officials indicated their willingness to go along with this. 
But they also pointed out various other possibilities now opened up 
to the men once the formal channels had been dispensed with. Direct 
access was one:
"I think you should make your disgust clear to 
Ferguson. You must ask him what his intentions 
are for the skilled men - when he can do something.
You work in a factory where you are dominated by 
females. He should be coming down here and saying 
what he's prepared to do for you. The skilled man 
has been undervalued for too long...You*11 have to 
go to him with your demands."
Mary West (branch secretary)
In the second place, the negotiating official indicated that the men 
should continue to look for meetings with the company at the top level.
He was prepared to be involved (i.e. to ignore the fact that a failure
to agree had already been established at stage 6).
A major part of the discussion between the men themselves (as 
averse to the previous discussions which had taken place with the 
officials) concerned support for the blacking. There were two questions 
to be faced: the need for support within their own ranks and the 
necessity for them to show solidarity with Stourbridge. With half a 
dozen abstentions, the vote went in favour of taking action. And their 
steward reminded them: "That means if one goes out we're all out.
We've had this before..." Later on the same day, the officials met 
the toolroom workers at Stourbridge, this time in the presence of 
Ellen the convenor. The question of the possible impact of the 
blacking on the women production workers was soon raised.
Floor (male tool-
"I suggest we keep the ban on."
"I don't disagree with your ban, but it's 
unfair if it hurts someone else."
"Well you've got to hurt yourself as well."
"When they want something, do they consider 
us....when they vote on the wages?"
"If you put a ban on tools, some out there 
will be sent home. You may want their help 
sometime."
In relation to the issue of staggered holidays itself, the position 
of the women was also discussed. In effect, the men felt the women 
workers already had staggered holidays - because many took the time 
off (ignoring the fact that this was unpaid and at the risk of disci­
plinary action) to have holidays with their husbands. The vote to 
continue the blacking was carried overwhelmingly.
room worker):
Paul Silver 
(official)
Ellen (convenor) 
Floor:
Ellen
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In the second week of February the officials met the company
Chairman and Industrial Relations director one evening for a long
"informal" discussion covering a number of currently outstanding
issues. Since Ferguson still could not see his way to conceding to
the toolroom workers' demands, discussion ranged over management's
responses to the tookmakers blacking and also their attitude to the
skilled men in general.
"The skilled men, all they want is attention.
You need to show your appreciation. You've 
got to see them as being something different - 
where are you going to get them from when you 
need them? They are over-ruled the whole time 
by women - the semi-skilled - if I were a skilled 
man....Maybe eventually you can close the tool­
room, but at the moment you couldn't operate 
without them."
Branch secretary (reported conversation)
While the dispute was not resolved at this meeting, in principle, it 
was agreed that more would need to be done for the skilled men.
Shortly after this the maintenance men took action over an attempt 
by management to cut overtime and reduce manning. The two groups 
(maintenance and toolroom) eventually came together in pursuance of 
a general claim for improved conditions and differentials which manage­
ment and union were already - as we have seen - predisposed to accept. 
Agreement on staggered holidays for toolroom workers was finally 
reached at the end of April - to run for a trial period of two years. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND SECTIONAL GAINS
There is an argument by which it is proposed that stronger groups 
making sectional gains, open up the way for those in a weaker bargaining 
position to make gains they might not otherwise have had. Our exam­
ination of the bargaining process however also suggests that sectional
gains reflecting and resulting from unequal bargaining resources may 
also have an opposite effect - in terms of their impact both on bargaining 
and representational structures and on the position of other workers 
in the labour process. We can see this when we compare the positions 
of the auto-shop and toolroom workers.
On the same day that the officials met the toolroom workers and 
proposed they move outside the formal channels of negotiation, the shop- 
stewards committee meeting, which had been called as a result of the 
auto-shop workers dispute, had been held at the Old Hill factory.
As we have seen, the main concern of the officials at this meeting had 
been to force the auto-shop workers (through their representatives)
'back into line' and they had adopted a fairly attacking and aggressive 
stance towards activity they defined as falling outside the formal 
channels.(9)
Apart from the contrast in tone and approach to these two disputes 
which had been running concurrently throughout January - it is clear 
that the auto-shop men had had to do far more in order to gain initial 
access to effective levels of negotiation than the toolroom workers.
The former had had to use the strategy of going outside the formal 
channels (breaking procedure and stopping work) in order to get their 
demands onto the bargaining table in the first place. And they 
clearly needed to put explicit pressure on their own negotiators as 
much as on management in order to progress their demands. Indeed, 
this point of contrast had not been lost on the auto-shop's repres­
entatives. It was expressed in the demand for their own convenor 
and their attack on the status of Vin Brown. Why did one group of 
the membership face greater difficulties than the other?
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In the first place certainly it was clear that both management 
and the officials were pre-disposed towards being more sympathetic to the
skilled ”tradesmen." (lO) (as averse to the "BSR-skilled"). Both
j
shared the attitude that these workers deserved "better treatment" - 
not only in terms of what they were getting at present but also in 
relation to other workers. While this more sympathetic attitude 
would, undoubtedly, have helped the 'tradesmen', there were other 
significant differences in the position of these two groups of male 
workers both inside and outside the labour process which need to be 
considered. Outside, the 'tradesmen's' qualifications and their 
exercise of (some degree of) control over access to jobs meant the 
company was, for the time-being anyway, more dependent on them than 
management would perhaps have liked.
But another reason why the employers seemed more ready in general 
to make concessions to this group of workers rather than the other 
including the concession to negotiate in the first instance, was because 
the costs (gains from the workers' point of view) could be much more 
easily contained. (The importance of this factor is not diminished 
by the fact that, as we have seen, the demand for staggered holidays 
was initially refused,since it was mainly on this count.) What does 
this process of limitation entail?
It would seem that 'containment' depends upon the degree of 
separation of any group concerned at a number of different levels.
And, as we shall see, management, union officials and the men had an 
interest in controlling this. But the extent to which this control
could be achieved varied between the two groups.
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Some degree of separation for the toolmakers derived from their 
position in the labour process. Whereas the auto-shop workers were 
linked directly into production, producing machined parts for assembly 
(with few stocks) and paid on piece-rates; the former were indirect 
workers, paid on time-rates.
From management's point of view separation and differentiation may 
be useful to the extent that it limits the degree to which concessions 
on particular issues made to one group may be applicable to others.
The auto-shop workers' demands for more pay and overtime could scarcely 
be confined in these terms, and as it happened, there appeared, at the 
time, to be insufficient separation and differentiation to narrow the 
applicability of the toolmakers' demands for staggered holidays either.(11)
Another implication arising from the different positions of these 
two groups in the labour process concerned the degree of control which 
each could exercise over the scope of any sanctions they applied.
Although the other side of this was the readiness (or otherwise) of 
management to minimise the impact on other workers, the auto-shop, 
being directly linked into the production chain, was probably less well 
placed than the toolroom to control the extent of any impact from 
their actions themselves.
Management's ability to utilise divisions in the workforce to 
limit the scope of concessions is, to an important extent, hindered by 
unionisation. Sectional gains and unequal bargaining are contradicted 
by membership-in-common, broad-based constituencies and 'cross-repre­
sentation', a democratic ideology and formal equality within each 
trade union organisation. And certainly, in this case, separation of
the bargaining structures was less complete than it might have been if 
different groups of workers had belonged to different unions. So 
how could sectional and unequal gains be achieved/maintained within 
one, supposedly common,bargaining structure? And with what effect?
We find that in order to 'manage' these contradictions, the union 
officials had to resort to manipulation of the representational and 
bargaining structures at every level - a process requiring on their 
part, the maintenance of a high degree of control over these. In 
order to concede the limitation (or containment) of staggered holidays 
to toolroom workers only,for example, the full-time officers needed 
to be able to ensure branch agreement to this - facilitated by their 
control over the branch committee.
The logic of sectional bargaining was fragmentation and separation 
in the system of representation on the shopfloor paralleling the interest 
divisions and bargaining strength of work groups or particular sectional 
categories. The biggest divisions along these lines ran between 
the women and the men - who each had 'their own representatives', 
resulting as we have noted, in a high degree of inequality proportion­
ally between the two groups in the structure. But as we have also
seen in these case studies, there were also divisions between the men.
And again, where these were not reflected in separate representation - 
the separation had to be effected by some other means. The position 
of the 6 toolmakers stationed in the Old Hill factory illustrates this 
point nicely.
Too small a group to have their own steward, they had been added 
to the constituency of auto-setters and inspectors (skilled grades) 
in the auto-shop - they were therefore represented by Chris. Since 
it was precisely this category of "BSR-ski 1 led" that the toolroom workers
at Portersfield and Stourbridge had especially wished to better them­
selves in relation to, they showed the same degree of enthusiasm 
about Chris's involvement in their deliberations as he had shown for 
theirs.
Since there was no convenient separation here in terms of the 
representation of the two groups, the solution was to exclude Chris 
in order to achieve it. That this was warranted on the grounds of 
containment, even at the expense of the Old Hill toolmen's repres­
entation, was made clear:
Irene (convenor, "Our toolroom have not been notified.
Old Hill): They have no idea what's going on with
the holiday dispute."
Mary West (branch
secretary): "Those up there should be included."
Irene "Chris is going to demand to be there
as their rep."
Mary "Well he won't be able to...And it
won't include the auto-shop - only 
the toolroom. They'll have to go it 
alone."
(Ref 18.5/326")
Reference to 'going it alone' was most often used to indicate 
when a section of workers were "legitimately" to use alternative channels 
of negotiation to the main ones provided and this is another aspect of 
the separation of bargaining structures. One of the chief ways that 
sectional bargaining was managed by the union officials (and also the 
strong groups of workers themselves) was to construct an area of 
bargaining activity outside the 'normal' channels of negotiation and 
the union's formal organisation structure. As a consequence these 
bargaining activities and the substantive issues pursued within them 
tended to have a very low "public" profile indeed. And we find that,
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while retaining a significant presence on all the union committees, 
groups of skilled 'tradesmen' did not need to use these structures to 
discuss or further their own interests. The contrast between the two 
groups of male workers, as well as that between males and females, in 
this respect is clearly illustrated in the branch minutes. (See pp 466-70 
above). Here we can see that the sole occasion recorded in this period 
that an issue affecting toolmakers was raised in this public forum was 
staggered holidays - back in October 1972. Thereafter, there is not 
a single mention, in either the branch or branch committee minutes, 
of this or any other demand emanting specifically from this group.(12)
What were the further consequences of creating such alternative 
official/unofficial bargaining channels? To the extent that these 
constituted a further bargaining resource available to some groups more 
readily than others, they magnified inequalities in bargaining strength 
in relation to management. But they also had an impact on internal 
bargaining relationships as well, as we have seen when comparing the 
toolroom workers with the men in the auto-shop. The former had been 
given a means of by-passing negotiations with other groups of workers 
for bargaining priority or access, while the latter had been forced 
to do so, and thus prevented from possibly making gains at other workers' 
expense.
Nor did the toolroom workers have to utilise 'outside' or 'unofficial' 
channels of negotiation with management in order to 'by-pass' these 
internal negotiations, since having their 'own' convenor provided this 
group with an alternative entirely within the 'formal' system. This 
was certainly true of the toolroom at Stourbridge, for whom Vin was 
as much their representative at the higher levels of negotiation as
Ellen was.
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As we have seen, the auto-shop stewards had taken up the issue of 
unequal representation in relation to the status of Vin and themselves! 
not only because they desired the same advantages (such as access to 
higher negotiating levels with management which were not mediated by 
a convenor who would balance their interests against others) but aiso 
because they felt disadvantaged by the toolroom workers' superior 
bargaining position in relation to themselves. To the extert that this 
was the case, presumably other groups were similarly, so disadvantaged.
We therefore need to enquire in what ways this might have been.
The men in the toolrooms could continue to progress negotiations 
on their demands with management through alternative bargaining channels 
made available on an informal and a formal basis, without being required 
to subject these to the scrutiny of other workers. But to the extent 
that they remained integrated within the factory's domestic structures 
as well, they were party to the internal negotiations other groups had 
to take part in - i£ other workers still had to bargain with them 
for priority/support in relation to their demands, and there was no 
need for the toolroom men to operate the reciprocity they were in a 
position to demand.
In May the auto-shop stewards had again tried to get Vin banned 
from attending the Old Hill factory's shopsteward meetings. They also 
attempted to stop him (through representations to the branch committee) 
from being invited to the (newly instituted) convenor^ meetings "unless 
discussions are about Portersfield." The branch secretary defended
his presence there:
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”He has to know what's going on. And, if you 
don't want him at Old Hill, then say so - and 
he can go to another factory....Waterfall Lane 
and Stourbridge would certainly allow him to 
sit on their committee."
(Branch secretary 326/18.5 and 353/26.5) 
The issue which had sparked off the autoshop stewards complaints 
about Vin’s participation in the factory forum specifically concerned 
the access to and use of information in the context of the two groups' 
sectional claims (and gains). While the autoshop's specific demands 
had been blocked (and they had been forced to spearhead a general 
demand regarding the next wage claim), the toolroom workers had done 
better for themselves. And by May they had achieved an 'in principle' 
agreement for future special consideration from the company and agreement 
had also been reached on the issue of staggered holidays.
Even so, at the Portersfield factory particularly, the men were 
still looking for alternative ways to get improvements in their pay. 
Especially since they had, by now, discovered that seven of their number 
were being paid on the lowest rate for this category of workers in the 
rate-book, while none of the toolmakers at Stourbridge were. Vin 
was, accordingly, preparing to make a claim for re-grading. Since 
there was a "rule" that each category of worker could only have access 
(through their representatives) to the page of the rate-book pertaining 
to themselves,Vin had had to go to the autoshop to ask for a view of 
theirs. When he was refused, he went to the branch office, and from 
there (or elsewhere?) he had obtained a copy of the autoshop pay-rates 
which he pinned up in the Portersfield toolroom. It was when this was 
spotted by a visiting maintenance worker from Old Hill, who carried 
the news back to the autoshop, that the trouble began again.
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The autoshop workers complained about intrusion into their privacy,
and the reasons why this should be feared were not difficult to find.
The skilled and semi-skilled males in the autoshop were on relatively
higher rates than their equivalents elsewhere, and their earnings were
on a par with (some claimed they were higher than) many of the toolroom
workers. This was partly because the former worked shifts, but it was
also due to the fact that, over the years the autoshop males who were
on piece-work, had managed via "domestic agreements", to achieve a
number of special bonuses. These, in conjunction with various
'consolidations' along the way, put them on higher rates of pay.
"And so, you see, they are frightened, that 
since these have been brought to light and 
general attention drawn to them, that while 
they won't lose them - these couldn't exactly 
be taken off them - it will be that much harder 
in the future to get such concessions."
(Ref 18.5/327)
Paul Silver (Regional Official)
Thus we can see that a further feature deriving from pressures to 
contain the scope of bargaining concerned the ability of all parties 
involved to control (the spread of) information. This ability again 
might be partly determined by the positions of different groups in 
the labour process and their degree of 'connectedness'. However, it 
also derived from the way that interest groups were related to each other 
through the system of representation and the bargaining structures.
And it is clear that control over information engendered as a 
consequence of unequal or sectional bargaining had, like the other 
aspects identified in these case studies, wider implications for the 
union's domestic organisation. Viewed broadly, the main consequence 
of this phenomenon of 'protecting' sectional gains by secrecy was to 
significantly reduce the total amount of information available and 
circulating through the domestic organisation as a whole. And, since
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access to and control over information can be seen as an important 
bargaining resource, there was a reduction in this from the point of 
view of the workforce, if not for management or the union officials.
The toolroom workers' demands for improved pay and conditions 
eventually became conjoined with those of the maintenance men, resulting, 
as we have seen, in the 'Craftsmen's agreement'. In this final case 
study, examining aspects of the bargaining process in relation to 
groups of male workers, we look at the maintenance men's dispute.
This raises three particular issues: the question of representation, 
again the focus of 'internal' bargaining activity; the problems of 
control arising from the use of 'outside' bargaining channels and finally, 
the process of negotiating the distribution of 'costs' of workers' 
disputes.
The maintenance mens dispute
Sixteen fitters were employed in the large moulding shop at Stour­
bridge to do machine maintenance and setting. They worked two eight- 
hour shifts alternately and shared the opportunity of overtime on a 
Saturday morning. This had first been instituted when, for a period 
in the past, production had taken place on Saturday morning, requiring 
four men - two for setting and two for oiling and greasing. Even 
though, for the female operatives, Saturday morning production had long 
since ceased, the men had maintained these overtime hours. That is, 
until November, when, as we have already noted (in respect of the auto­
shop) , the company Chairman had ordered a cut in overtime. The factory 
manager at Stourbridge had agreed that two of the fitters could continue 
to do the oiling and greasing on a Saturday morning. The men were not 
happy with this, but as demand slackened and more of the machines lay 
idle, management went on to intimate that they wished to reduce manning
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on the section altogether. When this idea was firmly resisted, the men 
were told that all oiling and greasing was to be done during their 
"normal" 40 hour week as "they now had plenty of time to do it".
On the day after the Branch meeting at the end of February, at
which the negotiating official had given a report on the autoshop
dispute and its outcome (the Department of Employment had refused to
allow more pay for maintenance duties which auto-setters claimed were
'extra'), the moulding shop fitters took action. They refused to oil
and grease any machinery in "normal" time and demanded the reinstatement
of overtime for doing this work.
"We took our overtime problem to the convenor, 
but she said there was nothing they could do on 
it, the union couldn't fight on overtime - so 
we decided to go ahead unofficially"
Terry (maintenance) (14)
The plastic moulding machines leaked a lot of oil and a week later 
(March 4th) the one producing control arms went down. This threatened 
to halt the main assembly lines within a very short time, and at an 
emergency meeting with the factory manager, a failure to agree at stage 
4 was registered and a stage 5 conference was hastily arranged. In 
return for this the men agreed to continue oiling and greasing "until 
the procedure at stage 5 has been exhausted."
It was in the week following that Terry called a meeting for the 
skilled men i.e. maintenance and toolroom together, at Stourbridge. 
(Prior to this, the toolroom and maintenance had been meeting separately) 
But, fearing the latter were "jumping the gun", the toolroom workers 
refused to attend. The stage 5 conference had been arranged for March 
16th, however, and with both disputes on the agenda, it is probable that 
they did finally meet together sometime before this.
- 7 K 3 -
At this time, the toolmakers' action over staggered holidays had 
begun to take on an entrenched look. Additionally, workers in the 
Portersfield toolroom had been pushing a demand for staff status through 
the procedure as a possible alternative route to improving their 
conditions under pay policy. The issue had made rapid progress through 
the various stages and was registered at stage 5 by Vin in the last week 
of February. However the stage 5 conference had been instigated by 
the maintenance men's dispute, and the inclusion of the toolmakers'
'staff status' demand was something of a token gesture. This was 
because neither the officials nor management had any enthusiasm to pursue 
it and, although Vin had registered a stage 5 on the issue on February 
21st, no date for a meeting had been set. As a consequence of this 
by the second week of March Vin had had to face a vote of no confidence 
from his members because the officials had still not dealt with their 
request.
Although the meeting was a stage 5 conference, it did not include, 
as was customary, convenors and deputies from all of the factories.
Apart from officials and management, only Ellen convenor and Terry, 
maintenance chargehand and shopsteward from Stourbridge, were present, 
along with Vin from Portersfield.
Three topics were negotiated at this meeting with management: 
the maintenance men's dispute, the toolroom workers' claim for staff 
status and the placing of a special agreement for the skilled men onto
the bargaining agenda.
On the first matter, management returned with an offer of Saturday
overtime for two men for 6 weeks in return for discussions taking
place within this period on moving four of the setters off the section.
Debate on this last point was particularly interesting, because only
the manager and the branch secretary maintained a position consistent
with that normally applied with regard to the women workers.
Paul Silver "I will not discuss a reduction of
(union official): manning in the moulding department.”
Tony Stuart: "I can see you won't. But I can see the
(Industrial Rela- men might. You'll be the first to 
tions director) criticise us for inefficient management - 
and it would be inefficient to over-man 
by 20%"
Ellen (convenor): "When he's talking about moving these
setters off and putting them elsewhere - 
If he tries to do this they're going to 
crib___ "
We've
"But they were taken on as moulding setters..."
Mary West : "Well, they'll just have to move
(branch secretary)got movement of labour - "
Terry (mainte­
nance shopsteward)
Mary :
Paul:
Ellen :
"We'd have to come to some arrangement, 
we can't have 16 men standing around with 
no work!"
"I'm not agreeing to any movement until the 
matter is discussed by the men - only if the 
members agree...."
"They'll throw the lot out - they'll want 
to know where they're going to be moved 
too and everything else.... "
(Field notes 192-193/16.3)
Negotiations on the toolroom workers' demand for staff status were 
conducted in a quite particular way. The formal request for parity 
with development engineers (on staff) was treated perfunctorily, with 
the industrial relations director responding that in the first place, 
manual workers would be no better off since staff did not get overtime
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pay and in the second place, it would not be allowed under pay policy 
anyway. What was really being negotiated here however was a request 
from the trade union official already presented in his opening address, 
to re-open discussions along the lines of those first held in 1974 - 
for a "special agreement" covering both groups of skilled men. (15)
Since the Industrial Relations director had, as yet, no brief from the 
company Chairman on this matter the negotiations here were simply about 
placing the item on^to a future agenda and a declaration on the union 
side of their preparedness to do so. (To the extent that we have 
argued that what is negotiated across the bargaining table is (already) 
the outcome of previous bargaining processes, we can see in the officials' 
'preparedness' at this point the successful outcome of pressure from 
the skilled men on their negotiators to bargain on the issue)
The two discussions were deliberately run together, and, although 
the second was much more implicit than the first, it was picked up 
readily by the Industrial Relations director who was now coming under 
pressure (as was the union official) from three separate groups of 
skilled men. Vin however, responded more warily - it was not precisely 
what his members had asked for.
Tony Stuart: "Now that the company stands clear on
the terms of reference, the matter stands 
in abeyance until we consider it.... although 
I think we're talking on very dangerous 
territory if we go away thinking that if it 
does happen it'll only be for skilled men...."
"We're applying for it for toolmakers in 
any case...."
"But I have wider responsibilities.
(to the union official) At some stage are 
you prepared to say it's for this group 
(the skilled) and this group only?"
I think we could be...I can't at present 
confirm....
(Field notes 195/16.3)
Vin:
Tony:
Paul:
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In the following months, the two groups, maintenance and toolroom, 
continued to pursue their separate claims - separately. When the 
March 'Bonus strike' erupted two days after the above negotiations had 
taken place with the majority of women production workers at all four 
factories stopping work, the toolrooms continued to work normally and 
did so throughout all four days of protest action. And it would appear 
that most of the maintenance workers did so too. They had no need to 
join in or to lose any pay.
Throughout April, demands arising from the strike were negotiated. 
And, while the skilled men joined in discussions appertaining to these, 
their own disputes were progressed separately and not debated in the 
open forum.
The maintenance workers held several meetings in works' time and 
put together their own claim which was submitted to the company in the 
third week of April. Six weeks after producing a letter from David 
Lea of the TUC's Economic Department, preventing any further discussions 
concerning the future for the auto-shop, the regional official forwarded 
unofficially, the "maintenance men's detailed claim for the company's 
consideration , when the pay policy allows".
The toolroom workers continued to dispute the company's proposed 
holiday working arrangements even though these now incorporated the 
principal of staggered holidays for a trial period of two years. They 
refused to return to "normal working" until at least two of the clauses 
were satisfactorily resolved. One of these related to who should be 
included in the arrangements. Agreement was finally reached at the 
end of April (17), but not before twenty women on an assembly section 
had lost money as a result of their action. (While men in the toolroom
continued to work overtime.)
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r e pr e s e n t a t i o n AND CONTROL IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS
A major feature of the maintenance workers' dispute was the 
accompanying struggle over representation which was (like the auto­
shop) an integral part of it. As we have already pointed out, 
representation is negotiated and the outcome reflects the balance 
between the bargaining strength and interests of management, the 
union (through the officials) and the different groups within the 
membership. The bargaining process involved is, therefore, fairly 
complex. Looking at two incidents involving maintenance workers we 
can, however, see that the battle to maintain control in this area 
centrally concerned the full-time officials - especially the branch 
secretary.
First we can note that the maintenance men, like those in the auto­
shop, were looking to 'capture' representation at convenor level as 
a means of more effectively advancing their own interests.
Ellen had been convenor at Stourbridge from the beginning. She 
had maintained her position by firm individual 'rule' and the close 
support of a similarly long-standing clique of female shopstewards which 
she was in no hurry to see changed. There had been some dissatisfaction 
expressed by the membership over the way she had conducted the recent 
annual elections. Instead of handing round nomination forms as usua), 
incumbent stewards had gone round the members instead, asking them if 
they were satisfied that they should continue in office. And a ballot 
had only been held if the members had requested it.
Ellen was away on holiday when the 'bonus strike' occurred. One 
consequence of the resulting turmoil and general airing of dissatisfaction 
was a demand that she should be removed from office as convenor. The 
men immediately seized the opportunity and a petition demanding her
resignation awaited her return. The maintenance chargehand in the
moulding department explained:
"I'm not all that popular down here - I’ll be 
quite honest - with a lot of the shopstewards,
I got the blame when Ellen the previous convenor 
stood down because it started on one of my sections - 
quality control actually. They sent out a Round 
Robin, or whatever you want to call it, and it was 
signed by hundreds of people and they said they
wanted me for convenor. If - I s'pose if I was
prepared to come off shifts I might have been 
convenor, but I wasn't prepared to come off shifts 
because I would lose too much money. But then,
as I said to them, 'Fair enough, give us a chance
we can talk it out with the management,' (because 
previous convenors hadn't been shift workers).
And we talked it out but they (management) wanted 
me on days. And as I said at the time, I'm losing 
too much money, I've got a family to look after, to 
work days, I've got used to a certain rate of pay, a 
certain standard of living. The only way I can 
keep that is to stay shift-paid."
Terry (maintenance chargehand)(18)
A number of the older women had refused to sign the petition and, 
apart from the men, it was mainly the younger women who did so. At 
first Ellen refused to resign, saying that the convenor was elected 
by the stewards, not the membership. In the steward s'committee 
the vote of confidence went in her favour. But, because the member­
ship complained, eight of the women stewards decided to stand for 
re-election on their sections, on the basis that, if elected, they would 
vote for Ellen again. But Ellen resigned (and not all of her supporters 
were re-elected either).
When management insisted that they wanted a day-worker (probably, 
neither they nor the officials were anxious to see the maintenance 
chargehand in such a powerful position), Terry stood down and Pearl 
was elected convenor with Gordon, the storeman who had represented the 
semi-skilled males in the 1974 wage negotiations, as her deputy. The 
skilled men were not happy with this. Questlonning the 'fairness1 of
having one male and one female, they argued for separate representation 
at this level for the skilled (even if this meant having two males in 
position) because they did not consider a male semi-skilled worker 
could represent their interests adequately. The question of separation 
and containment necessary for making sectional gains is probably relevant 
here. Indeed, Gordon had initially been instrumental in getting the 
skilled men's lieu-bonus 'generalised' to the semi-skilled males.
(As part of a 'deal' to minimise gains to the women.Tl>e latter had had to 
go on strike against management and the officials to get some of this 
lieu-bonus for themselves). But, after twelve months when Gordon tried, 
and failed, himself to displace Pearl, Ernie, another maintenance steward, 
was elected as deputy. And he did eventually 'succeed' to the position 
of convenor.
At around the same time as Terry the chargehand in maintenance was 
making his bid for the convenorship at Stourbridge, there were also 
problems at the Old Hill factory. These took a slightly different 
form, which reveals rather more clearly perhaps, the complex of 
different interests involved in the question of control over repre­
sentation.
The convenor of this factory was a woman, Irene. For a while her 
duputyhad been Roy, the semi-skilled steward from the autoshop. She 
had found it difficult to work with him and so, prior to this study or 
either of the disputes described, he had been displaced by Jerry - a 
steward from the maintenance department (and therefore, in a skilled
grade).
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Surprisingly, two weeks after the skilled men at Stourbridge had 
attempted to put their representative into this position, the (20 or 
so) maintenance workers at Old Hill demanded that their steward should 
give up his post.
"The skilled men are always complaining they 
haven't got sufficient voice - so we got a rep. 
from the skilled to be deputy convenor. Now they’ve 
demanded he should give up his deputy convenorship...
(And when he wouldn't) they asked for another shop- 
steward. "
Irene (convenor. Old Hill)(19)
"The chaps have been asking him for things in 
the shop and he's been putting others ' 
problems first - so they've been getting 
fed up.”
Paul (maintenance)(20)
"Their arguement is that they want someone up 
there all the time."
Jerry (maintenance, deputy convenor)
The contradiction revealed here is that, although these positions 
were desired because of the way they could be used to facilitate the 
advancement of sectional interests, they also required to some extent 
the representation of other interests as well. And in the Old Hill 
factory, the maintenance and toolroom workers were a relatively smaller 
grouping than they were at Stourbridge, so their representative as 
deputy convenor was always likely to be engaged on someone elses' 
business (particularly the mtoshopfe ).
When his constituents in the maintenance department complained 
about the quality of representation he afforded them, Jerry preferred 
to keep his position as deputy convenor and to look for another "less 
demanding" constituency elsewhere. This quite suited his department 
which was free to elect another representative while still retaining
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access to the higher levels of negotiation which Jerry's continued 
occupation of the post provided. It also suited the convenor who 
preferred to keep her (rather passive) deputy as a bulwark against the 
continuous threats forthcoming from various other sections of male 
workers (particularly the autoshop) and so she set about finding him 
another section of workers he might represent.
As has been noted, control over representation was central to the 
bargaining process and all parties involved in the latter had an interest 
in it, although they used different means and had different resources 
at their disposal. The branch secretary was especially influential: 
maintaining as high a degree of control as possible over representation 
in all of the factories. (This appeared, in fact, to be a major
function of her office) But it was a crucial area for the convenors
too, and being closer to the constituencies in the workplace they were 
better able to influence how these were shaped, who should be nominated 
and when elections might be held. Finally, as this minor drama at Old 
Hill was played out, a number of other interests could be seen to have 
had an impact on its outcome - such as management's.
An early source of opposition to the proposed arrangements was the 
foreman who objected to having two men out of some 25-30 skilled 
(maintenance and toolroom) leaving their jobs to go onto union business. 
These arguments were readily picked up by the branch secretary, who 
further elaborated them along the lines of "fairness" of representation; 
although it was clear that the grounds for the official*:, opposirion 
were rather more complex than this.
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The precedent being claimed to legitimate Jerry's strategy was 
Terry at Stourbridge who had "found himself" a shopsteward's position 
by canvassing various groups who were effectively unrepresented. He 
had, in the process, sparked off demands from the workers concerned 
that they should have "their own steward".
As noted earlier, the pattern of representation is the outcome of
(continuous) negotiation which is, in the first place, internal and
inseparable from the bargaining which takes place on substantive issues.
But representation is also a bargaining resource in its own right and
happened to be the main one available to the officials. In order to
use it as a means of control; of dispensing or withholding bargaining
priority, as a bargaining counter vis a vis the membership and as a
source of power because it was a resource which various groups required,
the officials needed to have a degree of independent control - over both
the areas represented and the individuals who were chosen to represent them.
Both of these were threatened by initiatives like Terry's and the
branch secretary was in no hurry to have this 'precedent' repeated
(especially in view of the control problems already arising from this
particular group of skilled men). As she pointed out to the convenor:
"There are many reasons why this sort of thing 
could backfire on us. For example, Ida....they 
might decide they want her - someone we didn't 
want at all. And they'd say - we insist..."
Mary (branch secretary)(21) my emphasis
Looking for a means of getting the company to make the decision 
they required the officials scrutinised the recoq.ii tioii agieement but 
found only that: "The number of Shop Representatives and their consti­
tuencies shall be mutually agreed between the full-time officials of
the union.... "(p.2. s.8). It said nothing about individuals being
mutually agreed. As it happened, however, they did not have to wait 
long for alternative arguments with which to present their case to the
company.
Within a week the autoshop stewards had raised strong objections
to the idea that Jerry should have a new constituency in order to retain
the deputy convenorship, and the branch secretary immediately penned
the following letter to the Industrial Relations director:
"I am led to believe that the female supervision 
have accepted Jerry who previously represented 
the maintenance department to be their representative.
I am sure that a representative from the maintenance 
department, now representing the female supervision 
would not be acceptable to the company. Therefore 
an early reply would be appreciated, as we are 
expecting repercussions from other areas."
(25.S1977)
On the same day, Jerry was finally removed from office and Pat, the 
shopsteward representing women operatives in the autoshop, was elected 
deputy convenor in his place. Grasping the opportunity provided, the 
two male stewards from this department had tried, and failed again, to 
get a vote of no-confidence passed against the convenor at the same 
meeting.
INSIDE/OUTSIDE BARGAINING AND CONTROL
Failing to make headway in the promotion of their interests by 
capturing positions in the formal bargaining structure the maintenance 
workers had continued to generate the resources they needed to by-pass 
it. They did this by organising on a cross-factory basis. These 
activities were not easy to sustain from the workers' point of view. 
Moreover, they raised a number of control problems in relation to the 
formal structure. And we can look at both of these points, drawing 
on the experience of the toolroom workers as well.
Although the numbers involved in the staggered holidays dispute 
were relatively small, the geographical separation of the two main 
toolrooms made communication difficult and there were even greater 
problems attached to keeping in touch with the dozen or so toolmakers
-754-
working in the other three factories. For example, suspecting that 
blacked tools at Old Hill were being sent outside for repair, Vin found 
so much difficulty in contacting Irene (the convenor) that he finally 
had to relay a message via Mary West at the branch office. Similarly, 
when Mary visited the Stourbridge factory, Keith, the toolroom steward, 
made a point of enquiring about the toolmakers at Waterfall Lane and 
Garretts Lane. His previous point of contact had been a shopsteward, 
Brian (a tool-setter), whose accessibility had been much increased as 
a result of his occupying the post of deputy convenor at Garretts Lane, 
a position he had since resigned. The main concern of the Stourbridge 
steward was to find out if there were any signs of the company developing 
(alternative) toolrooms at either of the other two factories.
The difficulties illustrated here, which indicated the amount of 
time and energy involved simply in maintaining communications on matters 
essential to the conduct of their dispute, serves to highlight the 
potential and actual problems facing other groups of workers. Few 
shopfloor workers had comparable freedom of movement and access to the 
telephone. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, to the extent that the 
female production workers and their representatives (apart from the 
convenor) were tied to their jobs, they had far less scope to maintain 
the same degree of communication even between themselves. Beyond this, 
access to the telephone was extremely restricted. There was one public 
call-box in the factory at Stourbridge and at lunchtime even this was 
switched off.
The toolmakers faced fewer practical problems of this nature - 
although there were other obstacles to their communicating directly, 
at least between factories. Thus when Vin telephoned Keith to find 
out of any tools at the Stourbridge factory were being sent out for
who fetched Ellen, the convenor. "No shopsteward of mine receives
'phone calls, except through me!" Commenting on this 'control' the
branch secretary observed:
"She's probably right really. I mean, 
otherwise they could get a couple of 
young ones in - they could stop the factory 
couldn't they? Without the convenor even 
knowing!" (22)
As we have seen in relation to the auto-shop the union officials 
continuously attempted as far as possible, to maintain control over 
bargaining by keeping the membership's activities within the formal 
structures of procedure and representation; while retaining the choice 
of going outside this themselves. Perhaps because they were aware 
that management would be more prepared to concede sectional demands 
to the 'tradesmen' and less liable to escalate any dispute, the officials 
were more prepared to 'allow' this group to move outside the formal 
bargaining channels. Despite the fact that this did still, to some 
extent, raise problems of control for themselves.
When in May, the foreman at Old Hill gave his permission for a 
meeting of the maintenance department there, the men at Stourbridge 
invited themselves along too. And from this time they decided to 
hold regular meetings involving the maintenance workers of all the 
factories together, in order to progress their claim.
As with the toolroom workers, the officials tolerated this 
organising outside of 'the normal channels' and the fact that the claim 
went against pay policy and TUC 'rulings' made it difficult to pursue 
'officially' in any case. The negotiating officer was therefore widely 
quoted as having told maintenance workers "I'd rather you did things 
on your own - without me".
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But we can soon see how this policy of going 'outside' the system raised 
different problems of control. In the first place the officials were 
reliant on more voluntary methods of contact and reporting back. And 
secondly, open by-passing of the system threatened the whole insti­
tutional structure.
The original dispute over oiling and greasing was still being 
progressed formally (i.e. through procedure). The six weeks con­
sultation period had come to an end and management had again tried to 
finish the Saturday morning overtime, since none of the "agreed" 
discussions on reduced manning had, in fact, taken place. Indeed, the 
men had voted firmly against accepting either manning or overtime cuts, 
but their representatives had failed to report this back, partly because 
they were refusing to work through the female convenor. Terry finally 
contacted the negotiating official directly, but not before a strike 
had been narrowly averted.
The officials tried to regain control by insisting on the use of
procedure - in particular, to prevent the maintenance stewards meeting
with management directly. But, as with the autoshop, we find that the
full-time officers needed management's co-operation on this.
"Terry can go ahead and try to meet the company.
If the Company refuses we can discuss it on Thursday.
We don't want to give Terry the satisfaction of 
getting a meeting just like that."
Mary West (branch secretary) (23)
And indeed, in a telephone call to the branch office on the same day, 
Terry duly reported that when he had gone into meet management, "I was 
told I was out of procedure - so I can't get anywhere now - so it's 
put back into your's and Paul's lap at the moment."(24)
The officials were also, however, under increasing pressure to
remain positively responsive to the men's demands in order to maintain 
their control - the option of closing down the dispute directly or 
indirectly ' losing' it (and the maintenance workers' claim) through 
inertia and delay appeared less and less feasible. An underlying 
reason was undoubtedly the way that proposals to force both the union 
and the company to skip stage II of the statutory incomes policy were 
being widely discussed by the male workers who, acting in the tradition 
of separate wage negotiations for the men alone, had not, at this time, 
enjoined their female colleagues. The issue seemed , therefore, set to 
split the workforce and the officials were forced to be more responsive 
to the men in dispute in order to head off their ultimate fear - that 
the men's demands for separate negotiations would culminate in mass 
resignations and an attempt to get another union in to represent them.
Overall it would seem that it is not so much the pressure which 
groups can exert within the organisational structures of the union at 
the workforce which are crucial, but their ability to operate outside 
these.
As a result of this pressure the officials were forced - if not 
to take up the particular issues in dispute, certainly to pay attention 
to the individuals and groups concerned - in order to preserve the 
'formal' representational structures so central to overall membership 
control. The representatives of strong groups of male workers were 
thus officially recognised and - made shopstewards. And the more 
vociferous were rapidly 'promoted' into positions such as Chairperson 
(like Terry) , put onto committees^ negotiating teams etc.
One consequence of this kind of sponsorship was that, as we have 
already observed, male workers as a whole were markedly over-represented 
in the organisational structure and the bargaining machinery.
WHO BEARS THE COST? AND CONTROL IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS.
"Someone always suffers. That's how you 
get disputes to end isn't it?"
Mary (branch secretary)
When the maintenance men stopped oiling and greasing in the moulding 
shop their action soon took effect. The control-arm machine broke 
down and others were soon likely to follow suit. Whether or to what 
extent the women operatives lost earnings as a result of the men's 
action is not recorded. A rare occasion when this was however, arose 
as a result of the toolmakers' 'blacking', in pursuance of their demand 
for staggered holidays.
Twenty girls in a section of sub-assembly had been short of work 
for a period and lost earnings of between £6 and £1.50, depending on 
their hours. The issue had been taken up through the procedure, 
eventually reaching the agenda for a stage 5 conference - which was 
unusual for a dispute specifically concerning women.(25)
At this conference the issue broadly under discussion was who 
should bear the costs of the dispute? And the negotiations which 
took place revealed some distinctive sets of interests in relation to 
this, which broadly centred around the question of control over and 
within the bargaining process. An outline is given here in order 
also to illustrate one aspect of the thesis that the distribution of 
costs is an integral element of collective bargaining, and, being subject 
to the pull of conflicting interests, the outcome is a negotiated one.
In this particular example the costs were literally financial.
Attending the meeting were the officials, convenors and deputies, 
management and the shopsteward (Sally) representing the group of women 
concerned. As it happened, there was no-one from either of the main 
toolrooms present. They made their representations afterwards.
The grievance, as presented by the full-time regional officer, 
was that even though the company had made the women payments at minimum 
earnings level (which was less than El per hour) for the periods they 
were idle, the union's contention was that waiting time should have 
been paid instead: "We have no agreement to pay MEL". Also, the rate 
for the former was slightly higher - although the difference it would 
have made to the women's wage packet was small ranging from 30p to El.50.
In his reply the Industrial Relations director pointed out that 
the women had really been "in a lay-off situation" and the company had 
been under no obligation to pay them anything at all under their 
agreements, because the loss of earnings had arisen as a result of an 
industrial dispute. The payment had been a "one-off", an "act of good 
faith". "over the whole fourteeen week period (of restricted working 
in the toolroom) I tried to avoid confrontation". In response to 
both the union official's reiterated opinion that the payment should 
have been waiting time,and the convenors’ questions as to why alternative 
work had not been found (i.e. mobility of labour applied), he repeated 
that he would not establish the principle or precedent of "paying for 
a dispute".
Immediately on the adjournment the officials began to negotiate 
their own interests in the matter.
Paul Silver: "I'm dropping it. The company shouldn't
(union official) have paid anything. It may well have been 
best to say - lay the girls off....we kept 
them on from day to day."
Male shopsteward: "Why couldn't they have used movement of 
labour? If they've no job, they should 
be found one."
"No. The agreements don't apply. I 'm 
not going to have it - for what's going to 
happen next time.
Paul
Sally "But it's management isn't it? It's
(shopsteward) mismanagement...."
Mary West (branch "As a union official it's Paul's job to
secretary): protect the earnings of those inside.
If they'd said to the lads - you’re laid 
off -first then there'd have been no work 
at all. Next time Paul should leave the 
area - until people ARE laid off. No- 
one realises what he does for them."
Pearl (convenor) : "Send a box round the toolroom."
Paul "Good idea! Bring it up at branch."
Sally "They'd tell us to get stuffed.... What
about the union paying....?"
Paul "70 men on strike - that's 50 pence each.
One of the members should raise it.”
Field notes 12.5.1977. My emphasis 1/c original emphasis u/c
und e r l i n e d  u n d erlined
Management, clearly knew the importance of maintaining the init­
iative in respect of escalating or containing disputes. On this 
occasion they had 'chosen' to bear some of the costs themselves and not 
to escalate the impact of the men's action. There were, of course, 
times when this could be used effectively to put pressure on groups in 
dispute - by causing other workers to be affected. Management's 
refusal to minimise the extent to which this had occurred any further 
left the question of its distribution to be negotiated internally.
The union officials were well aware also, of the importance of 
minimising pressure on themselves as negotiators - as often as possible 
making bargaining conditional upon normal working being resumed. They 
also had an interest, therefore, in the costs being borne internally 
within the workforce as a means of increasing the 'containment effect'. 
Rather than being deferred externally onto management or the uit'ii,.
Finally, the men themselves had an interest in passing on the costs, 
and they were not happy with the outcome of this 'internal negotiation', 
which distributed a share back to them. They had had no presence at 
the meeting, but their feelings were expressed in a letter to the union
officials soon afterwards. It was written by Vin from the Portersfield 
toolroom. And, interestingly, it echoes the points made about 
"containment" above.
With reference to our brief conversation at the Branch 
meeting regarding women losing pay due to the toolroom 
men's dispute over holiday working. I would now 
register my disapproval (...) on the following points.
(a) Firstly, the toolroom men settled their dispute 
for a lot less than required in order that 
women, through no fault of their own, were
not laid off work.
(b) The amount of money lost by the women is less, 
in most cases, than was lost by the toolroom men 
in a last attempt to save women being laid off 
work. My members lost £1.45p, Stourbridge lost 
money also.
I consider the statement that women lost money whilst 
toolroom men worked normal plus overtime to be grossly 
unfair. I feel that it's time that you understood what 
men lose because BSR have a dominantly high female labour 
force. These are as follows.
(1) Full sick pay to skilled male workers could quite 
easily be achieved.
(2) Votes on holidays, pay and, in fact, anything - is 
dominated by the female labour force of the BSR.
I could list more but will end now, just hoping you will 
understand my feelings throughout this letter.
A major and recurring complaint from the workers at BSR was that 
they could never stick together. They were always "at each others' 
throats", they were too divi led and so on. It is argued here, that 
one reason for this may have been the exacerbation of interest divisions/ 
which already existed in the workforce^as a result of continuously 
being forced to negotiate the distribution of "costs" arising from 
bargaining - either the process (e.g. disputes) or its substantive 
content (e.g. increased workload) among themselves. The case cited 
above is a small Instance and one where the company had already accepted 
part of the (financial) costs themselves because of their earlier 
decision to keep a low profile on the dispute (and their agreement to
negotiate the men's demands).
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Nevertheless, the union officials' stance in blocking further 
distribution of cost 'upwards', in order to protect their own position 
as negotiators, switched the process of cost distribution down again, 
and the separate groups of workers were left to confront each other.
This pattern could be seen continuously repeated in a great number of 
different contexts with, as we have suggested, divisive effects. 
Conclusions - institutional and non-institutional bargaining resources.
Issues raised in these case studies touch on the complex relation­
ship between institutional and non-institutional structures of organ­
isation and bargaining. The division of labour in production, 
patterning relationships along technical/social/sexual lines shapes 
institutional relationships and is, in turn, shaped by them (26). 
Bargaining resources having both an institutional and a non-institutional 
basis, are unequally distributed - as the pattern of representation 
may reveal. We have been examining some of the processes (and con­
sequences) underlying this.
We have seen how the distribution of reward or benefit in 
particular-being affected by the levels of bargaining, the channels of 
negotiation available and the positions of representatives and neg­
otiators in the structure - resulted in these institutional features
becoming as much the subject as the means of 'collective' bargaining ,
>
i.e. members had to bargain for as well as with institutional resources.
It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the male workers in 
general, and certain groups in particular, havii.g t.l u greater non- 
institutional 'power' resources available (as well as more scope to 
use them) were able to dominate the union's domestic organisation.
They were successful because and to the extent that they were able to
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move outside the formal structures. As we have seen, the group of 
toolroom and maintenance workers were able to do this to a greater 
degree than the autoshop males, using their workgroup strength to force 
sufficient 'external' channels of bargaining to enable them to by-pass 
the domestic system when required. And also, moot importantly as 
a result, to exert extra pressure on both union officials and management 
as a result. The autoshop men constantly attempted but were not able 
to sustain 'outside' organising to the same extent. Pushed back into 
the formal structures, they concentrated on using their 'bargaining 
strength' to attain positions of power and advantage within these.
The women workers were pushed back in these competitive struggles 
within the formal system and did not have sufficient non-institutional 
bargaining resources to go 'outside' and exert pressure on the formal 
structures, apart from short periods in exceptional circumstances.
We would argue, in short, that workers' 'success' within the 
institutional structures of collective bargaining is dependent upon 
the degree to which they can operate outside them.
t
CHAPTER 15 CONTROL IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS : DISPUTING THE
DISTRIBUTION OF 'BENEFITS'.
FOOTNOTES
(1) One aspect which certainly enhanced job security for the men was 
the fact that they monopolised the jobs for which training was 
required.
Apart from those jobs designated 'craft ' for which qualifications 
could be necessary, the company also provided its own training - 
in particular, of setters, who were the main source of recruitment 
into shopfloor management positions (where company-trained - and 
tied - men were preferred). There is no evidence that this 
training was ever made available to women.
Setters at BSR were graded as skilled. They were all male and had 
started as machine operators or labourers on the shopfloor. They 
were shown how to set up/adjust certain kinds of machinery - a 
process which apparently took no more than a couple of weeks.
This group of workers were referred to as "BSR-trained". Although 
graded as "skilled" (setting was traditionally a 'tradesman's' 
work) their actual skills were highly specific to the company 
and not necessarily easily transferred. Apart from the large 
presses,many women operators felt they could have easily adjusted 
their own machines. While the "craftsmen" felt anxious about 
the differential which separated them from these "low-born" 
occupants of a skilled grade. This status was probably less due 
to technical skills involved than the fact that it was a spring­
board to shopfloor management - setter-chargehand being the first 
step. One of the reasons given by management for the lack of 
women in their ranks was that shopfloor management had to be skilled. 
The decision to use more women supervisors in areas such as the 
final assembly lines thus put a few women into the skilled grade, 
but they did not have the opportunity to enter it in any other way.
(2) ”RP and IB offered to revert to status quo immediately, but on 
condition this was put into procedure. This was refused by our 
convenor most rudely....we take strong exception...."(CH)
(3) The case for the women who had lost pay was treated less cursorily 
however. While the company were claiming that the women had 
"withdrawn their labour" as well, there was also some doubt as to 
whether - if there was no supervision present - the women would 
have been allowed to work the machinery. This argument was 
supported strongly by the male steward representing the setters. 4
(4) Meanwhile, within the workers' ranks, the support of those who 
were (literally) bearing the cost of the dispute with nothing to 
gain from its outcome, had to be maintained. Hence the setters' 
concern - voiced by their steward: "that the company should at 
least try to find something for the women."
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(5) Apart from the question of access to higher bargaining levels, 
the convenor's position was especially important to the men in 
relation to the body of stewards as a whole because, despite the 
degree to which male workers were over-represented on the steward's 
body, they remained outnumbered.
(6) Rather more of the office staff were in this position, because 
the company's sister-factory in East Kilbridge, as well as the 
firms' customers had different shut-down periods.
(7) The 'catch' in the demand for staggered holidays from the worker's 
point of view (which was not, it would appear, explicitly discussed) 
was that by showing themselves willing and prepared to cover holiday 
making colleagues, the toolmakers were admitting to the possibility 
that fewer men were, in fact, required to do the job - which manage­
ment could later use against them.
(8) The committee also included four other women who were not present.
(9) Another example of the "double standards" being pointed out here 
occurred two weeks later when it was revealed that Vin had been to 
ACAS to inquire whether or not the toolroom workers were entitled 
to ask for more pay. This was on the grounds that, in respect of 
some tools they were working on,they were engaged on "new work".
(He was told this was allowable. Under the pay policy - apart 
from "new work" - the only other "allowable area" was in respect 
of "schedule 11" claims). No critical comment at all was passed 
about this 'initiative'.
(10) The Industrial relations director had himself once belonged to the 
skilled section of the AUEW.
(11) From management's point of view the main danger-area for general­
isation of this demand was on the staff side where a considerable 
number already worked through the stop-weeks of necessity, causing 
much dissatisfaction among the rest,whose holidays were tied along 
with the production workers. The staff had been unionised more 
recently than the manual workers and the MATSA official, who was 
now looking for a 100% membership agreement, needed some "gains" 
with which to recruit more of them. Over and above this, both
he and the negotiating official for the manual side were leading 
contenders for the forthcoming regional secretaryship. As the 
Industrial relations director pointed out - the competitive edge 
this lent to their bargaining had been causing the company a few 
headaches. It certainly made it less likely that this demand could
be contained.
(12) This is not say they were not implicated in more general (to the men 
that is) issues such as 'the male wage claim' and holiday pay at 
average earnings.
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( 1 3 )
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
( 20) 
( 21 ) 
( 22 )
(23)
(24)
(25)
In the second week of May convenors and deputies met the Industrial 
relations director plus another general manager for "informal 
discussions" in an attempt (by the Industrial relations director 
and union officials) to reduce the build-up of grievances at 
stage 5. It was not supposed to be a "negotiating session" - 
although it was referred to as 'stage 41;'.
Ref TM 11/S2 : 489.
In 1974 negotiations had opened on a maintenance agreement, the 
company being prepared to consider a variety of improvements in 
terms and conditions in return for rationalised working on the 
maintenance side. The matter had been dropped when,at the time, 
the men decided not to pursue it further.
Discussing the situation at the end of the first day, the union 
official observed that it had been a difficult year, industrial 
action being started by skilled men everywhere. Apart from the 
British Leyland toolmakers, he had skilled men on overtime bans 
and work to rule in numerous factories himself. "But why, today 
were the majority of the skilled men working?" The Industrial 
relations director asked - but no-one replied. (Field notes 
21.3/234).
"Toolroom storemen will be included in the above stated working 
agreement on the clear understanding that no other section or 
department will use their inclusion in this agreement as a reason 
to involve themselves."
Ref TM 22/ S3 : 483-507.
Ref IB, 18.5/324.
Ref PH, 16.5/314.
Ref 18.5/326.
Ref PW 8.3/172.
Ref PW 17.5/320.
Ref Field notes 17.5/321.
See Chapter 12. One reason for this relatively unusual occurrence 
was undoubtedly the fact that there had been a change of convenor 
at Stourbridge. Pearl, new incumbent, had less inclination to 
keep her problems 'in-house'. And, certainly, fewer resour r 
withwhich to attain or enforce their resolution at this level in 
the same way that Ellen, the previous convenor, would have done.
(26) See Rubery (1978) and Stone (1975).
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Conclusions: The impact of inequality j,n collective bargaining
relationships.
We have attempted to utilise the basic approach and concepts, 
set out in the first part of this thesis, in order to analyse the 
data collected in our study of workplace trade unionism and to explain 
the findings.
Since we have already summarised our argument and conclusions 
at the beginning and end of each chapter, a detailed resume is not 
reproduced again here. Instead we give an overall view of what has 
been covered in this study and take up briefly one or two questions 
with policy implications arising from our research.
In the course of our investigation into the position of women 
in the union, we have taken seriously the proposition noted in our 
introduction that "the world of social production (must be) investigated 
as a source of divisions and inequalities among the working class". 
Exploring in Part Two how this was structured by (and structured) the 
sexual division of labour, we have pursued the implications of this 
for patterns of trade union organisation and collective bargaining in 
Part Three. In doing so, we have found it necessary to consider the 
relationship between institutional and non-institutional sources and 
forms of regulation in employment and to evaluate the full scope of 
(sexually differentiated) interests, relationships and processes involved 
in collective bargaining.
We have argued that collective bargaining involves costs as 
well as benefits for workers and that the process involves the 
distribution of these among workers as well as between them and employers. 
The distribution of costs and benefits in both respects is unequal and 
we have been particularly concerned to examine the implications of this.
In the first place,to the extent that the employer's interests 
are distributed as costs 'downwards* onto the lalx>ur force In general —
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and the female sections in particular-we Viave noted a double impact.
First the representational structures are rendered less responsive 
to the members needs/demands, and secondly the bargaining position 
of the workers is, at the same time, weakened as a result of cost 
absorption. In the second place, to the extent that the unequal
distribution of reward or benefit engenders internally competitive 
struggles, we can see the outcome in the way the trade union's 
organisational structures reproduce (as both reflection and reinforcement) 
prevailing power relationships in the labour process and in wider society. 
Thus we have noted that the resulting male domination of the overall 
structures - as far as the female membership is concerned - also has 
a double effect. First in further diminishing the organisation's 
responsiveness to the women's interests; and secondly, further weakening 
their position by ensuring that it is women workers who bear the 
main impact of any costs.
If we examine the consequences of the two sets of unequal 
relationships (worker/employer, women/men) together, we can identify a 
number of important implications for trade union organisation and 
structure in general and the female membership in particular.
In so far as the union's representational system is rendered 
unresponsive to the workers interests generally, groups in a stronger 
bargaining position are likely to be forced to go 'outside' and to bypass 
it. And to that extent, the growth of 'sectionalism' can be seen as 
a consequence of the employer's domination, (which is also facilitated 
by their greater willingness to concede 'benefits' on a limited basis).
But we have noted some of the consequences of this process for 
the 'weaker' groups,and their position may well be further undermined 
as a result of the stronger groups' domination of the bargaining
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structures. And also the separation and fragmentation within these 
- both of which allow these sectional gains to be made more easily 
at the expense of other workers (rather than the employer). The costs 
from the employer's point of view, are simply passed on downwards.
The classic instance of this can be seen when the male workers bargain 
over extra "consumption" demands or "compensation", which is ’paid for' by 
speeding up the women. A process which is rendered all the more likely in the 
light of union bargaining structures and policies which follow the employer's
preference and 'favour' compensatory rather than production demands.
As a consequence of this double impact of collective bargaining 
on the institutional structures and the position of groups within 
these - the problems of reversing the pattern of distribution without deliberate 
intervention in the institutional structures and processes are obvious.
Those groups requiring the greatest degree of bargaining strength are 
those that are most likely to have their resources undermined - unless 
conscious efforts can be made to avoid this.
Beyond this 'in-built' process of reinforcing inequality in respect 
of specific groups of workers in the membership, we would maintain more 
generally that the impact of unequal collective bargaining serves to 
continuously generate 'anti-democratic' pressures within workers' 
organisations. And this is an aspect we might further explore.
We have already suggested that the greater the predominance of 
the employers' interest carried in joint bargaining, the greater the 
degree of interest differentiation occurring within the representational 
structure - and the less responsive this becomes from the point of view 
of the membership as a whole. In particular we have shown how the 
full-time officers representing the institution on the one hand and the 
membership on the other, and engaged in bargaining Jointly with 
management - have a key mediating role which requires a high level of 
control within and over the domestic organisation. This is variable to
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ti'.e extent that the greater the degree of inequality between the 
employer and the labour force, the greater the differentiation of 
interests loading the collective bargaining structures and the 
greater the measure of institutional control required to sustain 
the joint bargaining relationship. But as we have noted, the 
imposition of the employer's costs via the institutional process does 
not go forward without effect. It generates responses - grievances 
and demands - from the membership who attempt to use the same 
structures in order to re-distribute them within their own ranks and/or 
to shift them (back) onto the employer again.
Sectional gains or unequally distributed rewards likewise generate
dissatisfaction and demands for parity from groups in the membership -
such as the women workers - who attempt to use the bargaining structures
available to effect their wider 'equalisation' and generalisation.
relationships
As a result of both 'sets' of unequal bargaining/we can surmise 
there will be increasing pressure on the union machinery - from groups 
such as the women workers especially. In order to maintain the same 
pattern of distribution in the face of this, it becomes necessary to 
decrease further the responsiveness of the union structures to their 
demands, and to increase the degree of institutional control over both 
the structures and the (female) membership itself. We are thus 
proposing a theoretical link between the distribution of costs and 
benefits by collective bargaining, institutionalised on the fundamentally 
unstable basis of relationships structured along systematic lines of 
inequality, and the growth of bureaucratic control and processes of 
'undemocracy' (as well as pressures for democracy) in trade unions.
This proposition is broader than (but linked to) our thesis 
concerned with explaining the position of women within these organisations 
and can be illustrated with reference to our case study:
UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION AND BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL AT BSR.
The desire of the employer for cheap labour on the one hand and 
the unequal bargaining relationships between the men and women 
workersat BSR on the other, had resulted in unequal pay deals for 
many years. And, as we have seen, the implementation of Equal Pay 
legislation at this company had failed (as in many others) to alter 
the basic inequality of distribution patterning wage awards in any 
fundamental way. The period had however been marked by an increase 
in wage militancy among women workers generally - and at BSR, the 
strike for the lieu bonus in 1976 was a dramatic expression of this.
The women workers' heightened awareness of inequality continued 
to generate militancy and a growing pressure on the union machinery - 
which reproduced the same pattern of distribution through collective 
bargaining, as it had done previously. This pressure was increased 
by the fact that as a result of the Equal Pay legislation the men 
could no longer negotiate separate wage claims. They were increasingly 
forced, as a result, to take part in more "internal" negotiations with 
the women workers on the shape of the union side's bargaining policy for 
all workers than they had ever done before. And the women were, 
thereby,better informed about their relative pay positions and prospects. 
But the male workers (especially certain skilled groups) still dominated 
these internal negotiations and struggled even harder to maintain the 
separation necessary to establish differentials in their favour. Thus 
we have seen that the toolroom and maintenance men held separate 
meetings.utilised separate channels of negotiation, controlled the 
bargaining agenda and dominated the process of internal bargaining 
which shaped the final pay "groupings' in the "craftsmen's" agreement, 
as well as the pattern of distribution (percentage payout) of the 
productivity deal.
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What happened when the women attempted to use the union's 
representative machinery in order to change this pattern of distribution? 
Demanding a flat-rate payout across the board on the productivity deal, 
their branch decision had to be directly blocked, if the established 
(unequal) pattern was to be maintained. Moreover, to get the scheme 
accepted at all, the officials had found it necessary, as with the 
sick pay scheme, to keep strong control over information regarding 
negotiations and the deals as a whole. (This was facilitated by 
the impenetrable language of the Inbucon report).
We have already pointed out how information is a crucial bargaining 
resource and sectional (unequal) claims which require its limitation 
ultimately lead to a reduction in the amount and flow of information 
within the membership as a whole. Indeed, the maintenance of inequality 
was so dependent upon secrecy and the restriction of information in this 
domestic organisation that members were only permitted to see the page 
of the 'rate book' relevant to themselves.
The incident of the "holiday pay dispute" illustrates this process 
of information restriction "in action". It also provides a nice 
example of our thesis that the maintenance of unequal distribution 
through supposedly "special" bargaining structures generates a continuous 
process of 'undemocracy' and ultimately bureaucratic control, within this 
(or we would argue any other) form of organisation.
THE HOLIDAY PAY DISPUTE
"It's only 'a one off'. That's how they keep getting 
out of it - 'it's a one off'. But we always end up 
permanently 'one off', you know." Madge (Moulding Shop).
Average earnings for holiday pay had been a long-standing demand 
of the male workers - especially those whose earnings contained a 
high proportion of shift/overtime premium pay. The company had
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always refused thisypaying out a sum calculated (with a 'plussage') 
on basic rates and the minimum earnings level. In many cases this 
gave the women holiday pay which was above their average earnings. 
But for shift and overtime workers it was always less.
The 'craftsmen' had included the demand in their claim which was 
conceded in 1978. The whole series of negotiations leading up to 
the agreement - with management over the restoration of differentials 
and between the different sections of the workforce over 'groupings' - 
had given the question of pay levels a high profile. (As we have 
seen, the 'craftsmen1had already been forced to justify their claims 
for special treatment to the female membership directly). And when 
the back-pay on the productivity deal - on which the women had refused 
to accept there was any justification for differentials - was paid out 
in a lump sum, the consequences, in money terms, were only too plain 
to see.
"You see, since then - the women have always ... 
Whatever happens - whatever payment or backpay, or 
anything that comes up now - say its done on a 
percentage basis... Well, obviously, if I earn 
ElOO per week, and its 5%, then I get £5; and if 
the women earn £50 per week and its 5%, they get 
£2.50. But, ever since all this trouble with the 
craftsmen etc - and there's any payments put up on 
a sheet - you know: Craftsmen - the backpay for so 
and so is 'x' number of pounds. And then it comes 
down, and it comes down to the semi-skilled, and 
theirs is - I don't know - probably £10 difference, 
or something ... Oh, they create havoc! ... er, 
you know, you can understand it - I mean, a 
percentage is a percentage, and if you earn more 
money - its gotta be right you see. (You know ... 
its O.K. its money that we've been owed - on holidays 
or wage rises you see).
So, when we negotiate with Tony Stuart, ho finds 
it difficult to understand ... I probably would if 
I was in his position. We say please don't put 
any figures on a piece of paper! you know ... just 
try and ... because at the end of the day, we don't 
want trouble willy-nilly - just for the sake of 
havin' trouble, do we like? And ... we have to 
ask him not to put sums on a ... 'cos a lot of our 
women got upset. They just look at the top one, 
and say - 'That's what wo want! - you know. It 
gets a bit difficult.” Ernie (Maintenance, deputy 
convenor) (2). My emphasis.
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The old arguments justifying inequality, were beginning, it 
seems, to have lost their power. In Terry's view the women had 
been made greedy:
(Do you think that trade unions do enough for women?)
"I think they've done quite well actually.
(In what particular respect?)
"Well, on this equal pay thing they've gone very 
well here. Extremely well. And to be honest, it 
seems to have made them very greedy now. That's 
my opinion yes. Whereas at one time they knew - 
well we've never been equal in rates of pay - this 
that and the other, (I'm not saying keep 'em down, 
because I think they should get the same - if 
they're doing the same job - they should get the 
same money. If the responsibility's there, then 
they get paid for the responsibility). But now, 
its gone - at this firm particularly. They're 
saying, 'well, we want the same as the maintenance 
men.' Those maintenance men are turning round 
and saying, 'I've served a 5 year apprenticeship 
I've given a lot of money to get this! 'oh, but 
we don't get it, we should get the same as you ... 
it's us who're producing the products'... This 
that and the other. And this has been said - 'we 
see you hanging round ...' And we say: 'Alright 
then, you don't see us hanging around at weekends 
when we've got all the work to do'.
They forget, if the place is moving smoothly and 
quietly, it means there's no maintenance to be done, 
it's been done - so unless I'm getting breakdowns..."
Terry (Maintenance Chargehand) (3).
In June 1978 the company had conceded holiday pay at average 
earnings - calculated on the same basis as the 'groupings' in the 
'craftsmen's agreement' - for the following year beginning in January 1979. 
When the September (1978) holiday came round, however, the male 
workers asked for the agreement to be brought forward to cover this
. i, (4)week as well.
The final arrangement was that the women would be paid the 
National Engineering Agreement's minimum earnings level of £61.25 - a 
sum slightly above their average earnings; while the men would be 
paid at the average earnings figure for their 'group'. The problem
was that for this purpose, one section - the semi-skilled servicemen - 
had managed to negotiate themselves into a higher category.
"The problem in September arose because the 
servicemen who are ALWAYS treated the same as the 
women on the lines, were paid £71 instead of 
£61.25 which the women got. They were put in 
a different group - all male semi-skilled, which 
included men who did do overtime - even though 
these servicemen don't. The women demanded 
equal rights." Ernie (Maintenance, Deputy convenor). 
Emphasis in original.
Ernie had tried to explain to the women that they were not 
really worse off, and that they did not, in fact, want average earnings, 
because this would give them closer to £58 than the £61.25. And 
if all the semi-skilled men and women were to be put together in 
one group, they would all receive £61.78, 53p more for the women, but a 
drop for those semi-skilled men who did overtime.
"Now, they wouldn't have minded, say the guy 
in the stores or the ordinary labourer, getting 
more - what caused the aggro was that the old 
serviceman - who, you know is a good hard 
workin'guy - had always got the same as the 
women on the lines. But this time he'd been 
classed in with other people that brought him 
up - because they don't do overtime, these 
servicemen you see. But they'd been put in 
with another group of people as do do overtime - 
so consequently, it had brought them up."
Ernie (Maintenance, deputy convenor) (6).
The servicemen had been paid £71; £10 more than the women.
Ernie had tried to explain that the women would still not get the 
£71 if their pay was calculated on the same basis. But an alternative 
explanation which was also being proposed was that the ingineering 
Agreement minimum earnings level for the semi-skilled was due to be 
increased in January 1979 to £70 and the servicemen had been paid at 
this new rate early. In which case, of course, the women felt they
should have been as well.
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Whichever way it was argued, the result was the same. And 
the women felt the same way about it:
"Well it was never fully explained to us why 
and how they got it. So of course, the women 
up Old Hill said, 'We are semi-skilled the same 
as them, there is no'men', there is no 'women' 
we are semi-skilled, and you owe us the ElO.
We want the back pay!
Nothing! And so the men are creeping away from 
the women. I mean, I know there should be no 
'men' and 'women', we're 'semi-skilled' but when 
we're working here, we're still men and women - 
but ... there's a division coming which we didn't 
have before and this has caused a lot of the 
aggro, which makes the union work an awful lot ...
I mean its alright if you can explain the reason 
why and understand it - even if its for or against 
- if you can understand it. But when you don't 
understand it and you have to try and explain it 
to your women, its bad."
Madge (Moulding Shop) (7). Emphasis in original.
Some women members brought the matter up at the November branch 
meeting:
"Last week they were on about the holiday money, 
and it was all passed up there. Nothing's 
changed though".
(Dc you think anything more will happen about that?) 
"I think it will eventually get lost actually".
(Will the women bring it up again?)
"Well I don't know. The women, they're quite ...
They want that ElO they're entitled to it. 1^ think 
they're entitled to it. But I don't think the 
people higher up are going to give it to them".
(What do you think they can do about it, will your 
women stop work?)
"Well they've stopped work before and for less than 
that so ... they would stop work.
(Do you think they will over this?)
"I don't know really. Some's stronger than others. 
If they stop the rest have got no option really, 
because if they stop up the front the work stops 
going down so ...
(So at the moment it's in the officials' hands?)
"Yes, I think they're meeting about it ... Stage 6 
I think.
Barbara (Final assembly) (8).
Nothing came of these discussions. \And at Stourbridge the
convenor and her deputy sat down to plan how they would publish
the holiday pay rates for December. "We will have to be very
careful how we go about it". They decided that the rate for each
separate group would be printed on an individual page and the shop
steward^ would only be allowed to see the one, relevant sheet.
Ernie
(Deputy Convenor)
"It's important not to let the wrong 
groups have the wrong info - as this 
only causes problems".
Pearl
(Convenor)
"Yes that's right. Look at the trouble 
we had on sub-plates that time. I was 
terrible".
Field notes : 23.11.78 (9)
(Is the gap between men's and women's earnings 
getting wider?)
"Well, I haven't really got a man, like on the line - 
that I could sort of look this up. I only really 
know the women's money ... It wasn't very fair on 
the holiday pay - the semi-skilled men got more 
than the semi-skilled women, which wasn't fair, even 
under the Discrimination Act".
(How did they get away with that?)
"Well, I can't understand that either, because I 
mean, its gotta be agreement with the union and the 
management - so, one or the other isn't sticking up!
I mean, somebody's got it wrong, so I don't know ...
I don't know why it is.
Edna (Final Assembly). (10). My emphasis.
"Holiday pay: Servicemen and Craftsmen getting more - 
that causes difficulties with the women you see.
ENDLESSLY the women say, 'I can do their bloody 
job.'Which, as I said, I don't doubt it at all".
Pip (Sub-assembly) (11). Emphasis in original.
This case illustrates, in respect of inequalities between 
workers, our proposition that the institutionalisation of unequal 
patterns of distribution in the representation and bargaining structures 
generates further demands and pressures within these. As a consequence, 
if organisational stability based on previously established distributional 
patterns is to be maintained, this must engender increasingly, the need 
to reduce bargaining resources (e.g. information) available to the
membership and increase the concentration of control within 
the upper layers of the organisational structure.
Countering this process of 'undemocracy' are members' activities 
aimed at rendering their organisations more responsive to their 
needs. We have noted how the women workers demands imply not only 
quantitative but;even more significantly, qualitative changes in the 
bargaining activity of trade unions . As waged and domestic workers 
women's demands raise questions which fundamentally challenge the 
structure of employment relationships(and control exercised within 
them. We have argued that it is not only necessary to recognise 
questions of domestic work and family responsibilities as priority 
areas for male and female trade unionists# but also to focus attention 
on the utilisation/exploitation of (especially women's) labour within 
the workplace.
At BSR we could see how closely the links were entwined: the
women workers were recruited and penalised on the same basis — their 
domestic commitments. And their telling phrase "It's a woman's 
factory" contained within it a twofold demand: abolition of the 
punitive aspects (underpinning the rate of exploitation) in employment 
relations; and a positive orientation of these to accommodate social 
reproduction and human care. How will the unions respond to this 
demand in the future?
While our investigation, based on the study of a single workplace 
appears pessimistic, It would be unwise to generalise too widely in 
respect of the outcome. Wo have been concerned to explain the 
position of women in the union - their distinctive (and historically 
sustained) patterns of representation and involvement. And we have 
examined the dimensions of those relationships and processes, albeit 
in the context of a single firm, which might be seen as being
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more widely operative and relevant. But the extent to which 
they are so^ and the utility of our approach, will of course, have 
to be confirmed by further studies.
This is important not least because this study has served 
particularly to highlight the more problematic aspects of trade 
union organisation and collective bargaining from women workers' point 
of view. But in workplaces and in the unions generally, increasing 
numbers of both men and women are consciously taking steps in order 
to tackle these problems - attended with varying degrees of success.
This is true of the GMWU (now the GMBATU ) in which
has been established an equal opportunities structure of conferences 
and committees reaching from branch to national level. Experience 
of this has revealed the stubbornness of problems facing women members 
and shown the need to extend such positive action measures still 
further. And so in this union, along with others, the question of 
directly increasing the representation of women on decision-making 
bodies (by a system of reserved seats) is now being currently debated.
However we have shown where the roots of under-representation lie 
at workplace level. The problems run deep and it is true to say that 
here, in the way of direct intervention, less has been either attempted 
or achieved.
We can only argue that unless the 'processes' of inequality, 
however depressing, are fully understood they can hardly begin to be 
countered. And our study would seem to s.iov that unless they are 
countered and deliberately so, little will be achieved. The implications 
of this research are therefore, that the principle of 'positive action' 
for women in trade unions (as well as outside them) will in the future 
have to take on dimensions at present hardly imagined. And we would
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argue in any case that it is time to break the silence.
"The real difficulty lies in what is NOT said - 
in the silence on how women are to participate 
fully when they are still unequal as workers, 
unequal as trade unionists and unequal in 
political parties and organisations of the left". (12)
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Footnotes
Conclusions: the impact of inequality in collective bargaining
relationships.
(1) MB 26/S3:190
(2) EC vi/Sl: 330-350
(3) TM 21/S3: 445-469
(4) This was conceded because the company had still not paid the 
wage rise agreed in June and the situation regarding back-pay 
was already getting complicated.
(5) EC ii/Sl: 97-110
(6) EC ii/sl: 120
(7) MB26/S3: 139-180
(8) BB12/S1: 700-734
(9) 23.11.78. D38
(10) EW6b/Sl: 362-377
(11) PW 46/S4: 484
(12) M. Barrett (1981) "Unity is Strength?" New Socialist 
Septembor/October pp. 35-38.
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APPENHIX 1 : Blue Book Agreement
Agreement Ik*tween HSR Limited (hereinafter called 
"the < 'ompany") and The Cicncral ami Municipal 
Workers Union (hereinafter called “the Union") in 
respect «if the Company’s Lactones at Monarch 
Works, Cradlcy Heath, Waterfall Lane. Cradley 
Heath and Wollaston, Stourbridge. I.23456*9
I. The Agreement applies to all hourly paid workers employed by the Company, both female and male, who are members of the Union.
2. It is the purpose of the Agreement to promote the mutual interests of the Company and the employees, to provide for the operation of the factory in the most cfTicicnt manner possible, together with established formal channels for joint consultation between the Company and its employees through Union representation.
3. The Company recognises the Union as the sole negotiating body for all employees referred to in (I) above.
4. The Company agrees to consult the representa­tives of the Union on matters related to local rates of pay and working conditions of the employees covered by this Agreement but once established by negotiation they will not be altered unless mutually agreed.
5. The Company shall, upon receipt of a signed authorisation card, deduct weekly from each cm- plovcc to whom this Agreement applies, stipulated Union dues. The C ompany cannot undertake to collect arrears. Deductions of Union dues from the emplovees wages when authorised will only be made for weeks in respect of which insurance con­tributions arc paid. All sums deducted shall be forwarded weekly. The Company agrees not to make any charge for administrative costs resulting from the deduction of Union dues during the period covered by the Agreement.
6. The Union shall indemnify the Company and its servants from and against any claims, suits, judgements, attachments and from all liability asa result of such deductions in accordance with the foregoing authorisation and the Union shall, on request by the Company, refund immediately to an employee from whom wrongful deduction was made.7. The Company recognises the right of the employees to have an adequai« ■ umber of repre­sentatives elected from the mcmlnrrs of the Union employed in the factory to act on their behalf in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. These representatives shall be called "Shop Representatives .
H. The number of Shop Representatives and their constitucnccs shall be mutually agreed between the Company and the full time officials of the Union and these conslitucnccs to remain unaltered for a minimum period of one year. Any alterations to /■nniiiinonfi’t in lu* u a reed at January each year.
9. Employees who arc at least 18 years of age and have had at least one year’s continuous service with the Company immediately prior to election, shall be eligible to act as Shop Representatives.
Exceptions to this rule may only Ik* made to meet sivci.il and unusual circumstances by mutual agreement between the Company and lull time officials of the t Inion.
in. I sei> employee who is a member «>1 the Union shall have the light to record a vole “» his oi hei own constituency H* v«»ling register shall Ik the pavroll at the dale of the election.
11. I he Management of the Company in consul­tation with the Union, shall appoint a Returning Ollicci and shall make such arrangements as may Ik necessary for holding elections. All ballots shallIk secret.
12. I he names and locations of Shop Representa­tives shall Ik notified in writing by the Union to the Company, who shall acknowledge receipt of the notification. Each Shop Representative must undertake to accept responsibility for carrying out his or her duties in accordance with the principles and procedures defined in the Agreement and shall accept personal responsibility for ensuring to the best of his or her ability that his or her constituents comply with the Agreement.
13. Both the Company and the Union recognise that negotiations require experienced representatives; hence both the Union and the Company will provide separately and together such training of. selected personnel as is considered necessary. The duration of time for which Shop Representatives arc away from their place of work undergoing such training shall be determined by agreement between the Company and full time officials of the Union.
14. Shop Representatives shall be able to leave their department in pursuance of Union duties with prior permission of the Foreman or other
Supervisor. Such permission shall not be unreasonably withheld. Reasonable facilities including such pay­ments as may Ik agreed shall be afforded to Shop Representatives to carry out their functions within the framework of this Agreement.
15. Shop Representatives shall conform to the same working rules as their fellow workers.
I ft. The Shop Representatives shall elect one of their number to be the Chief Shop Representative and Ins or lier name shall Ik advised to the Company in writing, who shall acknowledge receipt.
17. I he following procedure shall be followed in order to deal with requests, complaints and disputes:
STAGE I : Where any difference arises between the worker and the Company such difference will be discussed between the worker and the Foreman (or Forewoman where appropriate hereinafter). A decision must be reached within one day unless agreed by each side.
STAGE 2: Failing settlement, the employee shall then refer the difference to his or her particular Shop Representative who will consult with the Foreman of the section. An employee wishing to consult his or her Shop Representative during working hours shall first obtain permission from the Foreman and such permission shall not be withheld unreasonably. If a difference raised by one employee afreets a group of employees in the same constituency, the Shop Representative may raise the matter as affecting the group. A decision must be made within twenty-four hours unless agreed by each side.
Sl'AGI L f ailing settlement, the Shop Represen­tative and the I oreman shall then discuss it with the Departmental Head. A decision must be made within one w oik mg dav unless agreed hv each side.
M'AGI 4 failing seul» ment, the dilleiencc will then Ik discussed by (lie foreman and the Shop Representative with the Works Manager and the Chief Shop Representative I'he Chief Shop Representative may, at this stage, raise the mailer as affecting a group of employees in more than one department if this should Ik the case. A decision must be made within three working days unless agreed by each side.
STAGE ' f ailing settlement of matters raised in the above prtKcdurc, the difference will then Ik put before senior representatives of the Company and full time Trade Union officials with the Chief Shop Representative plus Shop Représentaiive(s) of the department(s) concerned.
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STAG!7. 6: Failing settlement, the difference will then Ik put before the Managing Director of the Company and a National Officer of the Union after which the question may, by joint agreement, be submitted to the Department of Employment for reference to the Industrial Court, or alternatively to any other form of arbitration agreed by both sides.
18. It is agreed between the Company and the Union that every elfort will be made by all con­cerned to reach a settlement at the earliest stage possible in the above procedure and until that pro­cedure has been exhausted there shall be no lockout, withdrawal of labour, go slow, work to rule, overtime ban or any other action which would interfere with, or prevent normal working.
19. A Joint Works Committee (hereinafter called "the Committee") shall Ik  established, composed of not more than seven members elected annually by the Shop Representatives and not more than an equal number nominated by the Company one of whom shall Ik  the Chairman. Each side shall appoint a Secretary.
20. The Joint Works Committee shall provide for consultation between Management and employees.
21. Should the Committee have lor consideration any matter solely concerning a department or departments having no direct representation on the Committee, both sides shall have the right to co-opt members concerned with the matter under discussion.
22. The Committee shall meet once a month, or in special circumstances at the request of either side'.
23. Either side may place items on the Agenda which must be issued together with notice of the meeting at least three clear working days in advance.
24. The Minutes shall be agreed by the Secretaries of the two sides and shall be distributed to members of the Committee.
25. Both the Company and the Union subscribe to a policy of increasing production and operating efficiency. Tbo achieve this end the Company will be free to introduce method improvements and new equipment but will consult with the Union as regards payment to be made to employees arising therefrom, and to decide whether or not work should be done within or sub-contracted outside the factory. Due to 
the large number of female employees and the type of work carried out in the factories, the work force has lo be balanced in all sections each morning. The Union recognises that flexibility, interchangea­bility and mobility of labour within the factory arc essential for its prosperity and to ensure continuity of production.
26. Where serious breakdowns occur, emergency shifts shall be introduced by drawing personnel, with their agreement, from any department it» ensure continuity of production. In addition, m exceptional circumstances the practice of Supervisors setting tools meets with the approval of the Union as does Production Engineers having practical contact with the shop lloor in as much as that they will Ik able to make adjustments in production set-ups whenever they are required to do so. There shall be no change in the Company's present practice of training setters unless mutually agreed.
27. Recruitment of all employees, promotions, appointments, transfers and dismissals of Supervisors or StalT will be at the sole discretion of Management.
28. A Company Rule Book has been mutually agreed by the Company and the Union. Every employee must agree to abide by the works rules when they arc accepted as employees by the Company. New employees at the time of their appointment will be provided with a copy of this Company Rule Book.
29. The Company acknowledge the right of the Union to pursue the principles of one hundred per cent Trade Unionism as distinct from the principles of the dosed shop.
30.' A disciplinary procedure has been mtioduced. the purpose of which is lo protect the interests and safety of the employee and the Company in a just manner. It is, therefore, essential that employees should be aware of and abide by the following rules and standards of work and the procedure to lv followed when such standards are not observed
(a) Action Constituting a Hazard:In those cases in which the action of the employee constitutes a hazard, either to the employee, or I«» other people (for example, removing a sal'et> guard, drunkenness, lighting, or smoking in a prohibited area) the Foreman will instruct the employee to leave his or her work place until action is intern hv the Departmental Manager. In certain circumstances it may be necessary tor the employee to await the commencement of the next shift. The above type of action is regarded as examples of serious misconduct and would normally warrant instant dismissal.
(b) Action Not Constituting a Hazard:
The Company would regard the following as examples of actions not constituting a hazard but serious enough to be liable to unpaid suspension or dismissal after investigation:—(i) Theft(ii) Falsifying documents(iii) False booking (Management reserve the right to conduct checks on individual and group bookings, without prior notice)(iv) Sleeping on duty(v) Unauthorised absence(vi) Refusal to obey a reasonable instruction(vii) Or those actions constituting a criminal offence(viii) Damage through negligence.
Employees are reminded the aforementioned are exam­ples only and it is not intended to Ik  a  complete list.If the finding by Management should recommend dismissal a two day unpaid suspension should prccecd this, in which time the proposals could be discussed with the Union.
The Foreman will report the matter to the Depart­mental Manager who will, thereupon, hold an enquiry into the matter and consult with the Personnel Department. The findings and the pro­posed action will be communicated to the employee in the presence of the Foreman and the Shop Representative.
(c) Performance and Conduct:In the normal course of their duties Foremen arc expected to make employees aware of short­comings such as:—<i) Output performance 
(ii) Conduct(in) Absenteeism and bad timekeeping (the latter includes clocking in punctually by the recognised shift starting lime and clocking out not before the recognised shift finishing time).
Employees arc reminded the above arc examples only and not intended to be sole reasons for disciplinary actions.
In eases of persistently poor performance or conduct, absenteeism and bad timekeeping, the following formal procedure shall be used:—
(A) The Foreman will tell the employee that he is dissatisfied with his or her performance or conduct, absenteeism or bad timekeeping, giving reasons and warning him or her, orally, that there must be an improvement, indicating the specific areas for improve­ment. The Shop Representative will be present as a witness to the warning and this fact, together with details of the warning, will Ik  noted oil the employee's record. The employee should sign the entry on Ins or her record.
til) After such recorded warning and if there is still no improvement, the Foreman will leporl the malMf to MS Departmental Manager, with recom­mendations as lo future action. The Departmental Manager will interview those concerned. II the Departmental Munager is satisfied that such action is warranted, he will issue a final warning lo the employee, in the presence of the Foreman and Shop Representative, indicating the likely penally for failure lo improve. A copy of the final warning, on a standard form, will be issued to the employee and a copy will be lodged with the employee's
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((.) If there continues to Ik* no improvement, the Foreman will report the matter to his Depart­mental Manager, who, after due investigation and consultation with the Personnel Department will decide whether suspension or dismissal is warranted. The Departmental Manager's action and the reasons for it, will be communicated to the employee in the presence of the Foreman and the Shop Representative. In the case of suspension the employee’s record must be so endorsed. Where suspension has not ejected an improvement dismissal must follow, after the procedure in this sub-paragraph has been once repeated.
In all eases in which a warning has been recorded, subsequent completion by the employee of each period of six months satisfactory service or service without further ofTcnce, will qualify for the deletion of one such warning.
31. (i) Tlur provisions of the Contracts of Em­ployment Act, 1972 shall apply when the employ­ment of an employee who has been continuously employed by the Company for thirteen weeks or more is terminated for reasons other than misconduct (e.g.. redundancy, or the employee wishes to leave). This means that after thirteen weeks service the minimum notice of dismissal shall be one week except as provided for in paragraph (ii) of this Article.(ii) Subject to the provisions of the agreed disciplinary procedure as laid down in paragraph (30) above the Company is entitled to suspend an employee from work, without payment, for up to three days for misconduct and to dismiss him or her instantly, without payment, if the nature of the misconduct is deemed to warrant such action.Any employee suspended shall forfeit all rights to payment under this Agreement for the period of suspension. Employees dismissed for misconduct shall not be entitled to any payment in lieu of notice.
32. Overtime and the method of its operation will be at the sole discretion of the Company but the Management of the Company will consult with the sectional Shop Representative as to its allocation over the employees to ensure fair and reasonable distribution.Employees arc reminded that in certain eases overtime may be necessary. However, in all eases domestic circumstances would be given sympathetic consideration.
33. Management will consult with the Union whether or not a particular job is suitable for bonus application but the final decision will rest with the Management.
34. It is understood that the Company will con­tinue to exercise the regular customary functions of Management including the extension, limitation, curtailment or cessation of operations and the right tti reprimand, demote or discharge an employee for just cause.
35. It is recognised that the functions of the Union arc to represent those employees of the Company who are covered by this Agreement on matters pertaining to rates of pay and conditions of employ­ment and in matters in dispute on these subjects will Ik handled in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Agreement.
36. It is agreed that neither the Company nor the Union will subscribe to the use of restrictive practices. It is agreed by both the Company and the Union that every effort will be made to ensure the continued prosperity of the Company and its employees.
37. The Company will not order a lock out and the Union or their representatives will not instruct their members to cease work and will not encourage their members to take, or support their members in taking, individual action until the agreed procedure for settling disputes has been exhausted.
38. The Company and the Union mutually agree to support the use of all safety devices provided and to co-operate fully in the elimination of all industrial accidents.
39. It is understood and mutually agreed between the Company and the Union that the provisions of this Agreement shall be at all times subject to regulations at present enacted or adopted or which hereafter shall be enacted or adopted by a Minister of the Crown or Department of Government having jurisdiction in the subject matter of this Agreement.
40. first amended Agreement. Both the Company and the Union recognise that the Agreement may not cover all matters relating to their relationship but no change shall be made to the Agreement without the written consent of all parties. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of twelve months from the first day of August. 1973. and shall Ik* renewed automatically for further periods of twelve months unless notice of termination is given by either parly in writing no less than thirty nor more than sixty days before its renewal or anniversary of the renewal date.
Ihe above Agreement and all its clauses is not intended to be legally enforceable by either party but nevertheless both parties accept that they arc honour bound to abide by it.
SIGNED FOR AND ON HFIIAI I OF HSR LIMITED
Chairman and Managing Director. (J. N. Ferguson).
Director.(G. Galet).
SIGNED FOR AND ON HEIIAl l OF THE GENERAL A MUNICIPAL
u / o n i r n i i x  U N I O N
Regional Secretary.(J. C. Mason).
Regional Organiser (I». Smith).
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APPENDIX 3 : DSR PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ABSENTEEISM.
The Company recognises that absenteeism may sometimes occur for quite 
genuine reasons, e.g. Bereavements, Weddings etc.,
It will be the responsibility of the individual employee to explain such absence 
to their Departmental Head within’three days of the absence and in cases where 
the absence is not in any case covered by Medical Certificate. The department 
hea.d may at his/her descretion decide that such absence shall not be taken in 
account of in connection with the Desciplinary Procedure outlined below.
In .these cases, the Department Head should, upon receipt of a satisfactory 
explanation from the employee concerned, place a written note explaining 
the absence on the employees personal record, by passing the said no£e to the 
appropriate Personnel Department.
1) Any employee who is absent twice in a three week period
without justifiable cause will be cautioned orally in the presence 
of his/her shop representative and the warning entered on the 
record card and endorsed by the employee and Shop Representative..
2) If the same employee absents him/herself for one further day 
without justifiable cause in the four weeks following the first 
caution they will be given a final warning by the departmental 
head in the presence of the foreman and shop representative, in 
writing on the form provided, and informed of the consequences 
should there be no improvement. A copy of the final warning 
handed to the employee will be attached to the employees record 
card.
3) Should the same employee be absent for one other day without 
Justifiable cause in the following four week period, the employee 
will be suspended for two days and the employee advised of it .in 
the presence of the foreman and shop representative. Full details 
will be entered on the employees record card.
4) if, after suspension the same employee bo absent for one day in
the following four week period appropriate disciplinary action wijl 
bo decided, which could result in dismissal.
5) Should an employee complete a four week period after the first or 
second caution, wherein t.hqro is no further cause for complaint, 
he or she will have their previous caution deleted.
6) In after a further four week period thoro is no cause for 
complaint any remaining warnings will bo deleted.
25th JUNE, 1976. PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT.
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A P P E N D I X  4  : 1974 Wage A w a r d  ,  2nd M a y , 1 9 7 4 .
\
BSR M ID L A N D S  F A C T O R IE S
F IN A L  O F F E R  B Y  M A N A G E M E N T  T O  THE G E N E R A L  & M U N IC IP A L  
W O R K E R S  B R A N C H  TRA D E U N IO N  IN  R E S P E C T  O F  T W E LV E  M O N T H S  
_________________ C O M M E N C IN G  1ST J U N E  1974
Lab o u r Breakdow n
M A L E S O ld  H i l l W a te r fa ll  Lane Stourb ridg e Tota l
S k i l le d 169 71 164 404
Semi S k i l le d 306 165 341 812
Y o u fh s 42 1 2 42 96
O . A . P .  (Pa rt tim e ) 33 (1 7 ) 30 (1 5 ) 67 (3 3 ) 130 (
E q u iv a le n t F / T 534 263 580 1 ,3 7 7
N . B .  O f  fhe 81 2 Semi S k i l le d  m ales 312  a re  p ie c e -w o rk e rs
F E M A L E S O ld  H i l l W a te r fa ll  Lane Stou rb ridg e Tota l
Fu i 1 tim e 6 86 305 590 1 ,581
Part Tim e 1 ,6 0 5 079 2 ,8 3 8 5 ,3 2 2
E q u iv a le n t F / T 1 ,451 710 2 ,1 6 9 4 ,3 3 8
Ju n io rs 104 37 1 2 1 262
E q u iv a le n t  F / T  ) 
p lus Ju n io rs  )
1 ,5 5 5 755 2 ,2 9 0 4 ,6 0 0
T o ta l num ber o f o q u iva le n t fu ll tim e  em p lo yees m a le  and  fem a le  5 ,9 7 7
T O T A L  NUMBER O F  ACTUAL W O R K E R S  EMPLOYED
W O M E N 2 ,3 9 5 1 , 2 2 1 3 ,5 4 9 7 ,1 6 5
M E N 551 2 7 8 613 1 ,4 4 2
A L L 1 ,4 9 9 4 , 1  ¿ 2 8 ,  ¿07
S U M M A R Y  O F  W A G E  A W A R D
(a )  Fe m a le  A d u lt  F / T
(b ) Fem ale  Ju n io r  F / T
(c )  M a le  S k i l le d
(d ) M a le  S e m i- S k il le d  (P ie c e w o rk )
(e )  M a le  S e m i- S k il le d  (In d ire c ts )
( f )  Ju n io r  M a le s
(g ) O . A . P .
£ 4 .3 7  ( in c lu d in g  Equal Pay) 
£ 3 .9 7  ( in c lu d in g  Eq ua l Pay)
£ 4 .8 4  ' + 1 /3  Sh ift A llo w a n c e  o f £ 1 .6 1  w h ere
a p p lic a b le
+ 1 /2  S h ift  A llo w a n c e  o f £ 2 .4 2  w h ere  
a p p lic a b le
£ 3 .0 0  + 1/3  S h ift  A llo w a n c e  o f £ 1 .0 0  w here
a p p lic a b le
+ 1 /2  S h ift  A llo w a n c e  o f £ 1 .5 0  whore 
a p p lic a b le
£ 3 .6 0  + 1/3  S h ift  A llo w a n c e  o f £ 1 .2 0  w here
£ 1 .8 5 j' > / A ^ . a.w l : cableA
£ 2 .2 5  -  / - / S .
A l l  the ab ove ra tes a re  fo r fu l l  tim e operato rs and w i l l  be pro  rata fo r part time o p e ra to rs .
S U M M A R Y  O F  T O T A L  C O S T  O F  W A G E  A W A R D
D e sc rip tio n
Fe m a le  W age A w a rd  
Fe m a le  Equal P ay  A w a rd  
Fe m a le  C o n d it io n s  A llo w a n c o (M a c h in e  Shop) 
Fe m a le  O ve rtim e  
M a le  O ve rtim e  
M a le  W ag e A w a rd  
M a le  S h if t  A llo w a n c e  
R estru c tu rin g  Paym ent
To ta l C o st o f W ogc A w a rd
Cost p e r W eek Total C ost per Annum
£ 9 ,8 3 8 .2 0 £ 5 1 1 ,5 8 6 .4 0
£ 1 2 ,5 4 9 .8 9 £ 6 5 2 ,5 9 4 .2 8
£ 5 8 .5 0 £ 3 ,0 4 2 .0 0
£ 6 8 7 .7 4 £ 3 5 ,7 6 2 .4 8
£ 1 ,5 7 1 .1 1 £ 8 1 ,6 9 7 .9 8
£ 5 ,0 1 5 .2 1 £ 2 6 0 ,7 9 0 .9 2
£ 91G .0 9 £ 4 7 ,7 4 0 .6 8
£ 5 4 .2 5 £ 2 ,8 2 1 .0 0
£ 3 0 ,6 9 2 .9 9 £1 ,5 9 6 ,0 3 5 .7 4
To ta l W ag e  D ill fo r y e a r  ended 31st M crc h  197< for M id la n d s  Fa c to rie s  £ 7 ,2 9 2 ,2 9 2
W ag e A w a rd  rep resents c  1 , 8 G% in c re a s e .
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D E T A IL E D  A N A L Y S IS  O F  TH E M A L E  W A G E  A W À R D
M o le  S k i l le d  This is based on 7 %  o f a v e ra g e  w ag e  por 4 0  hrs
M a le  Sem i S k i l le d  D ire c t  (P ie c e w o rk e rs )  B a s ic
M a le  Semi S k i l le d  In d ire c t  (S e rv ic e m e n , S tores e t c . )  B a s ic
£2.
£2.
£2.
Tota l w age b i l l  fo r y e a r  end ing  31st M a r c h ,  1974 fo r the M id la n d s  fa c to r ie s  h o u r ly  
p a id  em p loyees £ 7 ,2 9 2 ,2 9 2
1 %  a llo w e d  f le x ib i l i t y  m arg in
Am ount p e r  w eek
Less: R e s tru c tu r in g  Paym ent
£ 7 2 ,9 2 2 .9 2  
£ 1 ,4 0 2 .3 6  
£ 5 4 .2 5
A c tu a l am ount fo r re d is tr ib u tio n £ 1 ,3 1 8 .1 1  .
B a la n c e  o f B a s ic  in c rea se s  fo r re d is tr ib u t io n
Ju n io r  Fe m a le s 262 x  £ 0 .9 6 £ 2 5 1 .5 2 .  *
Ju n io r  M a le s 96  x  £ 0 .4 0 £ 3 8 .4 0  •
Ski l ie d  M a le s 404 x  £ 0 .0 6  ' £ 2 4 .2 4  •
A d u lt  Fe m a le s 1338 x  £ 0 .0 6 £ 2 6 0 .2 0  •
To ta l from  b a s ic s  fo r re d is tr ib u tio n £ 571 .4-1
A d d  b a la n c e  from 1%  f le x ib i l i t y £ 1 ,3 1 8 .1 1
To ta l fo r re d is tr ib u t io n  £  ^ ,9 2 2 .5 5
R ed istr ib u tio n  to M o les
M a le  S k i l le d  £ 2 .3 3  up to £ 4 .8 4  = £ 2 .5 1  x  104
M a le  Sem i s k i l le d  D ire c t£ 2 .2 5  up to  £ 3 .0 0  = £ 0 .7 5  x  312 
M a le  sem i s k i l le d  in d ire c t  £ 2 .2 5  up to £ 3 .6 0  -  £1 .3 5  x  5 0 0
Tota l re d is tr ib u te d
£ 1 ,0 1 4 .0 4  
£ 2 3 4 .0 0
£ 6 7 5 .0 0
£ 1 ,9 2 3 .0 4
M a le  A w a rd
S k i l le d  £ 2 .3 3  p lu s  £ 2 .5 1  from  f le x ib i l i t y  e t c .
Semi s k i l le d  (d ire c t )  £ 2 .2 5  p lu s  £ 0 .7 5  from  f le x ib i l i t y  e t c .
Somi s k i l le d  ( in d ire c t )  £ 2 .2 5  p lu s  £1 .3 5  from  f le x ib i l i t y  e t c .
£ 4 .8 4
£ 3 .0 0
£ 3 .6 0
It has boon a g re e d  to  ronogotioto  m a le  ra te s  o n ly  on 2nd D o co m b o r, 1974
BK
3
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f e m a l e s  e q u a l  p a y
\
The Eq u a l P a y  A w a rd  fo r a l l  fem ales has been c a lc u la te d  in  tho fo llo w in g  m anner:
M o le  P ie ce w o rk  base rate £ 2 4 .2 0
Fe m a le  P ie ce w o rk  base ra te £ 1 8 .8 4
D iffe re n t ia l £ 5 .3 6
A m ount A llo w e d £ 2 . 6 8
S P E C IF IE D  P A R IT Y  E Q U A L  P A Y  A W A R D S
In o d d itio n  to tho g e n era l aw erd o f £ 2 .6 8  m ade to a l l  fe m a le s , the C o m p a n y  ag reed  
to md<e a d d it io n a l aw ard s on p a r it y .  In b rin g in g  forw ard the b a la n c e  o f  the Equal 
P a y  A w a rd  those a d d it io n a l paym ents should  be reduced by the am ount brought 
fo rw a rd .
. H o w e v e r , the Com pany a rc  prepared  to s t i l l  honour the o r ig in a l o ffe r  w h ic h  was 
a c c e p te d  on co n d itio n  thatthe method used fo r c a lc u la t in g  these p a ym en ts  is  not 
used as an argum ent for m aking s im ila r  paym ents during the c u rre n cy  o f  th is  
ag re e m e n t.
F e m a le  S en io r C h a rg o h sn d : to M a le  S e n io r C h a rg ch a n d s , on a d d it io n a l 
aw ard  o f £1  . 6 0 .  < »• •
F e m a le  Charg ohands to M a la  C h arg ehand s an a d d it io n a l aw ard  o f £1 .3 7
F e m a le  Patro l Inspocto 's (A u ta ) to M a le  Inspectors G ra d e  II an a d d it io n a l 
a w ard  o f  £ 0 .5 3
The un ion  a lso  rese rve  the r ic h : to '■•..•goticto in d iv id u a ls  or groups o f fo m a lo s 
w ith  regard  to Equc! P a y  d v r i r t  the c u rre n c y  o f the ag reem en t.
M anag em ent a lso  made th . p r in t  that fum alo  in sp ec to rs , o th er than p a tro l and 
p ie c e w o rk e rs , w ou ld  in futj/o bo com pared w ith  m ale v ie w e rs  for the purpose  
o f E q u a l P a y .
\
Fo m o le  operato rs M ac h in e  c '
It w as ag reed  to m ake the sum/ "co n d itio n s  a l lo w a n c e "  to fem a le  o p e ra to rs  in  
tho M a c h in e  Shop (hot a lre a d y  o x irts  in  the Press Shop fo r fom alos i . e .  £ 0 .1 0  per 
8  hour s h if t .  Pro ra ta  fo r pn»t tim  <?{>..ro to rs .
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A P D IT IO N A L  G R A D E  R E S T R U C T U R IN G  P A Y M E N T S  
MALE IN S P E C T IO N
A  n e w  te c h n ic a l g rade to be form ed w ith  on a d d it io n a l p aym ent o f  £ 0 .5 0  on
th e  Bate R a te . A  p r a c t ic a l test w i l l  be g iv e n  fo r  q u a l i f ic a t io n  a n d  p e r io d ic a l ly
afterword».
B U IL D E R S  (B r ic k la y e r»  and  C a rp en te r»  C * l y )
A n  a d d it io n a l £ 0 .7 5  on the Base R ate  toward« re d u cin g  the d if fe re n t ia l  w ith  
M a in te n a n c e .
S K IL L E D  M O T O R  M E C H A N IC S  (G ra d e l and  I I )
A n  a d d it io n a l £ 0 .7 5  on the Q aje R a te  o f G  cods I and  £ 0 .5 0  on G ra d e  It to w aad i 
re d u c in g  the d if fe re n t ia l w it h  M a in te n a n c e .
HEAVY DRIVERS
A n  a d d it io n a l £ 0 .5 0  on the Date R a te .
C O S T : C ost p e r w e e k C o st per A nnum
In s p e c t io n , an  estim ated  78  x  £ 0 .5 0 £ 3 9 .0 0 £ 2 ,0 2 8 .0 0
B u ild e rs 11 x  £ 0 .7 5 £ 8 .2 5 £ 4 2 9 .0Q
M o to r M e ch a n ic s 2  x  £ 0 .7 5  + 2 x  £ 0 .5 0  £ 3 .0 0 £ 1 5 6 .0 0
H e a v y  D riv e rs 3  x  £ 0 .5 0 £ 4 .0 0 £ 2 0 6 .0 0
R e s tru c tu r in g  A d d it io n a l C o st £ 5 4 .2 5 £ 2 ,8 2 1 .0 0
\C O S T  O F  L IV IN G  S A F E G U A R D
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The C om pany w i l l  m ake paym ents w ith  e ffe c t  from th e  f irs t  fu ll  p a y  pe rio d  a fte r  
the d a te  o f p u b lic a t io n  o f the R . P . I .  f ig u re  w h ich  is 7 %  above the base f ig u re  for 
the purpose o f the arrangem ent and a  p ay  in c rease  o f 4 0 p  a w eek w i l l  be g iv e n , 
w ith  a  fu rth er in c re a se  o f 40p a week for e ve ry  subsequent fu ll 1%  r ise  in  excess  
o f 7 %  in  the R . P . I .  d u rin g  the cu rre n cy  o f the a rran g e m en t.
Paym ents a re  trea ted  as a sp e c ia l supplem ent on an in d iv id u a l basis  and  a re  not 
in c lu d e d  in  the base ra te  for o vertim e or a n y  other p re m ia .
Each  paym ent o f 40p a  w eek is pa id  in  fu ll o n ly  to f u l l  tim e em p loyees and 
p art tim e em ployees a re  p a id  pro r a t a .
The co n d itio n s  o f th is a w ard  a re  as la id  down in fu ll p a r a .  176 o f the  C o u n te r 
In f la t io n  docum ent 1973 N o . 1785 .
H O L ID A Y S  A N D  H O L ID A Y  P A Y
The U n ion  h ave  the rig h t to re n e g o tia te  both h o lid a y s  an d  h o lid a y  p ay  during  
the c u rre n c y  o f the ag ree m en t.
P E N S IO N  S C H EM E
The p lan n ed  Pension Schem e w i l l  come into e ffe c t  from  1st Ja n u a ry  1975 i f  
approved b y  both the U n io n  and a l l  governm ent departm ents in v o lv e d .
S IO C PA Y  S C H EM E
The C o m p any cannot ag ree  to a  S ick  Pay schem e. A b sen tee ism  du ring  the past 
yea r has reach ed  an a l l  tim e h ig h .
The C o m p any d o es, h o w e v e r , ag ree that they may be ap p ro ach ed  ag a in  a t a 
lo te r d a te .
This ag reem ent w ould  a lso  c a n c e l any outstanding m atte rs co n ce rn in g  e stab lish ed  
v a lu e s , methods o f p a ym e n t, a llo w a n c e s  for w ork ing  c o n d it io n s  e t c .  that a re  in  
d isp u te  at th is t im e .
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M A LE  S E M I S K IL L E D  IN D IR E C TS
Chargvihands G e n e ra l ,  S tores and  T ra in e e  So rv icom on  
In sp ectio n  G ra d e  II and Tra inee 
d u a l i t y  C o n tro l G ra d e  II and T ra in e e
T ra in e e  Sottors P re ss , M a c h in A A o t o r ,  Sub . vssem bly and P la s t ic
G u i l lo t in e  operators
Storem en
P ro d u ctio n  ond W areh o u se  C h e c k e rs
P ro d u ctio n  C o n tro l C h a s e rs , W areh o u se  O u ts id e  Loaders 
S tock  C o n tro lle r  and Stock. Reco rd ers 
P o llu t io n  C o n tro l
F a c to ry  T ra in e es  not on P ie ce w o rk  
Transport D riv e rs  
Lab o u re rs  (Sem i s k i l le d )
>
S e c u r ity
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AFPENDIX 5 : 1975 W a g e  Award
OSNEKAL A.’ J .’■'.u'N I C I .  AL WORKERS' U~ ION
Q9/'sa ».r i l r l e y  ¡iill branch
At a ballot h e l d  at 33R factory's on 
Friday, 1 3 th. J u n e ,  for ACC E P T A N C E  OH 
REJECTION of the C o m p a n y ' s  offer the 
result was as follows: -
SKILLED (Pales)
ACCEPTANCE SEJECTK N
ei 1SB
SEMI/SKIL^Su (MeQ.es) 95 592
F"j:ALE3 5295 .541
T.th. June, 1975
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FINAL OFFER BY THE CO M P A N Y  TO THE Ô .M .W .U . FOR W AGES 
A N D  C O N D IT IO N S IN THE MIDLANDS FACTORIES EFFECTIVE FOR  
__________ TWELVE M ONTHS
Woga A word -  Generol lncreose in Basic Rote»
Skilled Males £ 5 .50
Semi-Skilled Males £ 4 .26
Fem ales1 £5 .05  (IncI. £1 .13  equal pay)
1 . In addition to the above rates for males, a  Lieu Bonus of £2.00 w ill be 
paid to A LL males, and w ill be applied thus.
(i) A ll male grades who at present have a  Lieu Bonus w ill have this increased 
by £2.00
. (il) A ll male grades who at present do not have a Lieu Bonus e .g . shift workers, 
w ill have a £2.00 Lieu Bonus introduced.
2 . The above lieu bonus for males is given on the following conditions.
• (a) Rates, thus altered, w ill remain unchanged until 1st June, 1976.
(b) N o  claims under the Equal Pay Act w ill be submitted as a result of Para.1 .
(c) N o claim for consolidation ofJJeu Bonus w ill be submitted or entertained.
(d) Lieu Bonus w ill only be used in Holiday Pay calculations for males when 
own rate is used as the basis for calculation.
* 3 . From 1st January, 1976, £2.71 w ill be added to the female rates and this amount 
w ill meet the terms of the Equal Pay Act and w ill be the only amount paid to 
females, i . e .  no other sum w ill be paid .
4 .  Any other direct equal pay situations w ill be identified between now and December 
1975 and any necessary alterations made on 31st December, 1975.
5 . Threshold payments w ill be consolidated for all females.
6 .  An additional £1.00 to Maintenance Fitters and Electricians w ill be given on the 
understanding that this group, and only this group, is accepted by the 
Negotiating Committee as a special case , and on the assurance that no further 
differential claims would be put forward using this £1 .00  as justification.
7 .  A ll rates quoted above are for odult 40 hour employees. Junior employees wil. 
be paid the established differentials less than the above rates.
8 . Part-time employees w ill be paid pro rata for hours worked.
9 .  a) The Company w ill give the Trade Union, in writing, it's undertaking concerning
a Shop Floor Pension Scheme.
b) When the Equal Pay Act takes its final effect on 29th December, 1975 thereafter 
there w ill be no barriers to women doing mens work or men doing womens work 
anywhere in ony factory in the Midlands covered by the Agreement between the 
G  LA W I I _and BSR Limited.
2 .
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1 0 . H o lid a y  P a y : Fem a le s :
M a le  S e m i-  
Sk t i le d :
M a le  S k i l ie d :
1 .
2.
1 1 . Production Contro l C h a se rs  (G rad e  
a G rad e  2 Q u a li ty  C o n tro l Engines 
£ 1 .0 0 .
Basic ra te  + a v e ra g e  perfo rm ance ’ of 
th ree  fa c to r ie s , or M EL + 3  w h ich e v e r  
is the g re a te r .
B as ic  ra te  or M id lan d s fa c to r ie s  ave rag e  of 
M EL  + 3 ,  w h ic h e v e r  is g re a te r (M EL  +  ^ = 
£ 4 3 .1 6  to 24th  N o v e m b e r, 1 97 5 .
O w n  ra te  or M E L  + 3 ,  w h ic h e v e r  is g re a te r .
A l l  m ale  tim ew o rkers w ho a re  in  re c e ip t  o f a 
l ie u  bonus w i l l  h ave  th is used in  the 
c a lc u la t io n  of h o lid a y  c re d its  w hen th e ir  
own ra te  is used as H o lid a y  Pay  R a te .
L ie u  Bonus w i l l  not be used in  the c a lc u la t io n  
w hen M EL  + is  used as H o lid a y  Pay R a te .
I ) w i l l  be re c la s s if ie d  »0 the  same ra te  as 
r , th is w i l l  mean a d if fe re n t ia l in c re a se  of
1 2 . A  revised  set of ru les g o ve rn in g  the q u a lify in g  d ays for payment o f S ta tu to ry  
Holiday's has been a c c e p te d  on a t r ia l b a s is .
1 3 . A l l  other wages and c o n d it io n s , not m o d ified  by the  a b o v e , rem ain  u n c lte re d .
1 4 . These m o d ifica tio ns w i l l  o n ly  be im p lem ented  when fu l l  a c c e p ta n c e  is ad v ised  
to the Com pany.
1 5 . A  b rie f illu s tra tio n  of th e  e ffe c t  of the fo rego ing  oft*-* is as fo llo w s :
Increase in L ie u  Bonus
Equal Pay 
Increm ent
Tota l
S h ift
W orkers Tota l
Basic Rote M ales Wom en
l .1 .7 6
Prem ium
In crease
Sk i II ud M a le 5 .5 0 2.00
_ _
N i l
. . .  . .  
7 .5 0 ! . . 9 . 3 3
Semi S k i i ' f . l
M a le 4 .26 2 .0 0 Nil 6 .7 ' 1 A " 7 .6 3
Fem ale 5 .0 '- f i 1 2 .71 5 .0 5 ■ i i i 5 .0 ' .
7 .7 6
1 . Jar-.
/ . / 6  
1 . Jan
Howev»*', r..n majt fee made that mu < U  nance fitters and electricians will 
receive an add ** .»mil il .0 0  01 Cl .3 3  *t on shifts.
16 . In addition, the . •t.'irv will introduce f. day working for n'1 «'Moloyc*s 
as soon cs r .v.siüle t-.i mal < • ► ' : ¡.lion losses n ^ r t t j past few •
from increased ausen*, .■ is* • . from n\ii cod number 0» working days be veon 
now and tb*. end of Sc,.' ■ >' ci.i. ?;*. ir.ca.;, ¿1 bolidcys. k . . .»r, i* 
must he clearly winders» *'Od tn.it this is not a result of higher durnimd and there 
is fi ' v no..tee hat it will be extended beyond Ocfoocr of this year. 
Management will introciec«.1 evening shift work for cx-employeos ¡»tc . os 
necessitated by production reouiicments. This will result in higher wages 
for female employees otid probably more ove rtime for certain categories of 
mole employees.
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A P P E N D I X  6
(Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  f o r  s h o p - s t e w a r d s
The  purpose o f  th is  q u e s t io n n a ire  is to s a v e  m ore tim e  a t  the in te rv ie w  for d is c u s s io n , 
a n d  fo r that r e a s o n , a sk s  o n ly  for b a s ic  in fo rm a tio n  su ch  as dates w h ic h  a re  n o t  a lw a y s  
e a s y  to rem em ber*. P le a se  t ry  to f i l l  i t  in  as f u l ly  as you ca n  —  th is  w o u ld  be a 
g re a t h e lp . F i n a l l y ,  I sh o u ld  l ik e  to s a y  th a t the in fo rm a tio n  g iv e n  in  th is 
q u e s t io n n a ire  w i l l  b e  t re a te d  in  s t r ic te s t  c o n f id e n c e , an d  o n ly  used for the p u rp o ses o f 
th is  re se a rc h .
J i l l  Hardm an 
U n iv e rs it y  o f W a rw ic k
N am e .....................................................................................
X. D a te  o f b irth  .............................................................
3 .  M a r it a l status P le a se  t ic k  w h e re  a p p ro p ria te
S in g le  . . .  M a r r i e d . . .  S e p a ra te d  . . .
D iv o rc e d  . .  . L iv in g  w ith  p a rtn e r  . . .
*+. D o  you h ave  a n y  c h i ld r e n ?  ..................
I f  yes —  p le a se  f i l l  in  d e ta ils  b e lo w :-
N a m e A g e
T ic k
i f  l iv in g  a t  home
S. W h a t  is the to ta l n u m b er in y o u r h o u se h o ld ?
J O B  H IS T O R Y
4 . How o ld  w e re  you w h e n  you le f t  s c h o o l?  .............. y e a rs
7 , P lease  g iv e  d e ta i ls  o f  jobs fu l l- t im e  a n d  p a rt- t im e  s in c e  le a v in g  sch o o l a n d  b e fo re  .  
jo in in g  B . S .  R .
Dates N a m e  o f Typ e  o f M a n u fa c tu re Jo b
S ta rted  F in is h e d E m p lo y e r or S e rv ic e D u tie s Hours 
p e r w e e k
A v e ra g e
w a g e
W O R K IN G  A T  B . S . R .
s’. W hen d id  yo u  f ir s t  s ta r t  w o rk  a t  B . S . R .  ?  D a t e ............................................
<?, I f  you h ave  le f t  then  re jo in e d : D ate  l e f t .................................. D a te  re jo in e d
D e ta ils  o f p re se n t jo b :
10. N am e o f f a c to r y  ......................................................................................  S e c t io n / D e p t .............................................................
II. N am e o f  jo b  o r  d u t ie s  ....................................................................................................................................................................................
Z<2 , Hours w o rk e d  F r o m ......................................... a . m . / p .m .  T o ............................................a .m . / p .m .
IJ. Do you w o rk  o v e r t im e ?  P le a se  t ic k  w h e re  a p p ro p r ia te .
Y e s  : r e g u la r ly  (
Y e s  : bu t no t r e g u la r ly  [
N o
. . .  hours per w e ek
W h a t o th er jobs h a v e  you done a t  B . S . R . ?
P le a se  g iv e  d e ta i ls  o f  jobs done fo r more than  1 m onth .
Dc
S ta rte d
tes
F in is h e d
F a c to ry S e c t io n Jo b
T R A D E  U N IO N
H ad  you e v e r  b e en  a m em ber o f  a trad e un ion  b e fo re  you c a m e  to B . S . R .  ?  
I f  yes —  p le a s e  g iv e  d e t a i l s .
N am e o f U n io n
D ates P o s it io n s  h e ld  ( i f  a n y )  
e . g .  u n io n  o f f ic e / s h o p  stew ard sfrom to
W h en  d id  yo u  ¡o in t  the G . M . W .  U . ?  D ate
W h en  d id  you  b e co m e  a  s h o p -s te w a rd  a t  B . S . R . ?  D ate
W h e n  d id  yo u  b e co m e  a  c o n v e n o r  a t  B . S . R . ? D ate
f t .
do . 
ay.
aa.
33.
P le ase  l is t  b e lo w  m eeting s o f a l l  typ es w h ic h  you a re  supposed to a t te n d . L is t  a l l  
co m m ittees a s  se p a ra te  m e e tin g s .
N am e o f m e e tin g How o ften  
h e ld
W h ere
h e ld
P o s it io n s  you ho ld  
( i f  a n y )  e . g .  C h a irm a n ,
S e c r e ta r y , e t c .  )
How  m any  p e o p le  do you re p re sen t as shop s te w a rd ?  T o ta l N um ber
H ow  m a n y  m e n ?  T o ta l N um ber
How m any  w o m e n ?  T o ta l N um b er
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SV+.
Sf.
c3  b .
A C T IV IT IE S
D o you  b e lo n g  fo a n y  c lu b s , s o c ie t ie s ,  lo c a l o r n a t io n a l o rg a n isa t io n s?  
I f  yes —  p le a s e  l i s t  b e lo w :
Does your h u sb a n d /w ife  b e lo n g  to a n y  c lu b s , s o c ie t ie s ,  lo c a l o r n a t io n a l o rg a n is a t io n s?  
I f  yes —  p le a s e  l i s t  b e lo w :
S in c e  you le f t  s c h o o l ,  h ave  you been  on a n y  fu l l- t im e  or p a rt- t im e  e d u c a t io n  or t ra in in g  
courses (a p a rt  from  sh o p -ste w a rd  t r a in in g ) ?  ...........................
I f  yes —  p le a s e  l is t
Typ e  o f  co u rse
D a te s
W h ere  h e ld
from to
T h a n k  you v e r y  m u ch  for you r c o o p e ra t io n  in  co m p le tin g  th is  q u e s t io n n a ire .
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